sion could be had. But it is said that, from the standpoint of the state constitution, the statute may operate unequally. It is unnecessary to comment on this point so far as the mere inconvenience which may be caused by possible conflicts is concerned. It is urged that the situation has been described as deplorable by the Supreme Court of the State (Board of Education v. Columbus, 118 O. S. 295) but it is not for this Court to intervene to protect the citizens of the State from the consequences of its policy, if the State has not disregarded the requirements of the Federal Constitution. In the present instance, there has been as yet no conflict of decision. The provision of the state constitution which is attacked is one operating uniformly throughout the entire State. The State has a wide discretion in respect to establishing its systems of courts and distributing their jurisdiction. It has been held by this Court that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts of a State as to subject matter or finality of decision if all persons within the territorial limits of the respective jurisdictions of the state courts have an equal right in like cases under like circumstances to resort to them for redress. A State "may establish one system of courts for cities, and another for rural districts, one system for one portion of its territory, and another system for another portion." Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 30, 31. Different courts of appeal may be set up for different portions of the State. Id., p. 33. It is thus well established that there is no requirement of the Federal Constitution that the State shall adopt a unifying method of appeals which will insure to all litigants within the State the same decisions on particular questions which may arise. Missouri v. Lewis, supra; Pittsburgh etc. Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 427; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 597-599.

98234°-30--0

Judgments affirmed.

281 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

RAILROAD COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN ET AL. v. MAXCY, RECEIVER.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.

No. 301. Argued March 6, 1930.-Decided March 12, 1930. A decree of the District Court of three judges enjoining a state commission from enforcing an order fixing the rates of a public utility, upon the ground that the commission's valuation of the company's property was not supported by the evidence, without other statement of facts or reasons, is set aside and the cause remanded with directions to state findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter a decree thereon, the restraining order to be continued pending further action by the court below.

Mr. Suel O. Arnold, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, with whom Mr. John W. Reynolds, Attorney General, was on the brief, and Mr. Adolph Kanneberg for appellants.

Messrs. H. L. Butler, H. H. Thomas, B. H. Stebbins, R. M. Stroud and R. M. Rieser were on the brief for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the decree of the District Court, composed of three judges as required by the statute, enjoining the appellants from enforcing an order of the Railroad Commission of Wisconsin fixing rates to be charged by the receiver of the Washburn Water Works Company for supplying water. The District Court gave no opinion and, aside from the general recital in the decree that the court had considered the evidence submitted by the parties and that it appeared therefrom that the

valuation fixed by the Railroad Commission of the property of the Company for rate making purposes was not supported, the record contains no finding whatever by the District Court.

This Court has repeatedly adverted to the importance in a suit of this character of a statement by the District Court of the grounds of its decision. Virginian Railway Company v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 674, 675; Lawrence, et al. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, 274 U. S. 588, 596; Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 404, 414; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. United States, 279 U. S. 781, 787.

In Lawrence, et al. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, supra, the court said: "The importance of an opinion to litigants and to this Court in cases of this character was pointed out in Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 675. The importance is even greater where the decree enjoins the enforcement of a state law or the action of state officials thereunder. For then, the respect due to the State demands that the need for nullifying the action of its legislature or of its executive officials be persuasively shown."

In the present instance this Court should have the aid of appropriate findings by the District Court of the facts. which underlie its conclusions.

The decree is set aside, and the cause is remanded to the District Court, specially constituted as provided by the statute, to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter a decree thereon, the restraining order entered in this suit to be continued pending further action by the District Court.

Decree set aside.

Argument for Petitioner.

281 U.S.

EARLY, RECEIVER, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 226. Argued February 26, 27, 1930.-Decided March 12, 1930.

A circular of a federal reserve bank, authorized by law, provided that when checks were received by the reserve bank for collection and forwarded to the member bank on which they were drawn, the drawee should remit or provide funds to meet them within an agreed transit time, failing which the amount should be chargeable against the reserve account of the drawee in the reserve bank; but that the reserve bank reserved the right to charge checks so forwarded against the drawee's reserve account at any time when in any particular case it deemed it necessary to do so. Held:

1. That the last provision, consented to by the drawee bank, created a power, in the interest and for the security of the owners of such checks, which was not revoked by insolvency of the drawee bank, and that upon learning of such insolvency it became the duty of the reserve bank, even though the transit time had not expired, to charge such checks against the reserve account of the drawee. P. 89.

2. This lien was not affected by the fact that the drawee bank had retained the right to draw drafts on the reserve. P. 90. 30 F. (2d) 198, affirmed.

CERTIORARI, 280 U. S. 540, to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing in part a judgment of the District Court recovered by the Receiver in a suit against the Reserve Bank.

Messrs. George P. Barse and R. E. Whiting, with whom Mr. F. G. Awalt was on the brief, for petitioner.

There was neither agreement of the parties, nor understanding implied from the terms of collection, to treat the reserve deposit balance either as equitably assigned or as a specified fund pledged to the payment of the accepted checks,

84

Argument for Petitioner.

All that the parties agreed was that the obligations incurred by the Lake City Bank by the acceptance of the checks should be paid by specified dates, which dates were shown in the cash letters in which the checks were sent. See National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U. S. 50. It was left to the drawee bank to provide funds for payment in the manner most convenient to itself, either by special remittance for the particular purpose, or by providing through general remittances for a sufficient balance in the reserve account, available at the expiration of the transit period to the Reserve Bank, to meet the cash letters. Either method served the same end-to pay a debt which by agreement of the parties was to be paid at Richmond on a fixed day.

Here, as in Commercial National Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, the owners of the checks became general creditors of the drawee when their checks were accepted and canceled. The terms upon which the checks were handled provided for a three day transit period. How the funds might be provided-whether from existing reserve balances, prospective reserve balances, shipments of currency, drafts upon other depositories, or otherwisewas not the concern of the owners of the checks, and no right was given them to demand that the reserve balances of the drawee bank should not be drawn upon for other purposes.

Customers of the Reserve Bank sending checks to it for collection are charged with notice of the provisions in the circular, permitting the drawee bank to pay for the checks otherwise than by appropriation of its reserve balance. They are also charged with notice of the provisions of § 19 of the Federal Reserve Act permitting the reserve accounts of member banks to be checked against or withdrawn. It is also to be noted that the customer banks assume the risk of failure and suspension of the drawee bank and agree that in such event checks for