18

MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.

and the local divisions of their country, as into states (j), provinces (k), counties (7), cities, towns, parishes, and the like, so far as political government is concerned or affected; but not the relative positions of such local dominions, nor their precise boundaries, further than they may be described in public statutes (m). Thus the courts refused to say, judicially, that "a part of the coast called Suffolk" was not in Kent, or that "Orfordness, in the .county of Suffolk," was not situated between the North Foreland and Beachy-Head (n). Neither will they notice that a particular place is within a certain city (o); nor that a particular town is within a certain diocese (p); nor that a street mentioned in the pleadings is a public thoroughfare, though the word "street," via strata, would rather imply that it was (q); nor that a particular street is not in a certain county, though it be notorious that a street bearing the same name is in another county (r); nor that a city mentioned in a document is in a particular country, even though it appear that one with a similar name is the capital of such country (8).

extent thereof, it shall be lawful for the judge or judges of any such court, and he or they are hereby authorised to transmit, under his or their hand and seal or hands and seals, to one of Her Majesty's principal secretaries of state, questions by him or them properly framed respecting such of the matters aforesaid as it may be necessary to ascertain in order to the due determination of any such issue or question as aforesaid; and such secretary of state is hereby empowered and required, within a reasonable time in that behalf, to cause proper and sufficient answers to be returned to all such questions, and to be directed to the said judge or judges, or their successors; and such answers shall, upon production thereof, be final and conclusive evidence, in such suit or other proceedings, of the several matters therein contained and required to be ascertained thereby."

(j) Whyte v. Rose, 4 P. & D. 199; 3 Q. B. 495, S. C. There the court noticed, that by "the Kingdom of Ireland" was meant that part of the United Kingdom called Ireland. (7) Deybel's case, 4 B. & Al. 242.

(k) Id.

(m) Id.; 2 Inst. 557; Fazakerley v. Wiltshire, 1 Str. 469; R. v. Burridge, 3 P. Wms. 497; Thorne v. Jackson, 16 Law, J. (N. S.) C. P. 87. J.C..361. S.C. (n) Deybel's case, 4 B. & Al. 243.

(0) Brune v. Thompson, 2 Q. B. 789, in which case the plaintiff was non-suited for not proving that the Tower of London was within the City of London.

(p) R. v. Simpson, Lord Raym. 1379.

(9) Grant v. Moser, 5 M. & Gr. 129; per Tindal, C. J.

(r) Humphreys v. Budd, 9 Dowl. 1000. See also Thorne v. Jackson, 16 Law, J. (N.S.) C. P. 87. 3. C. B. E 61. P. C.

(s) Kearney v. King, 2 B. & Al. 301. There the declaration was on a bill

MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.

19

§ 15. But the courts will judicially recognise the political constitution or frame of their own government; its essential political agents or public officers, sharing in its regular administration; and its essential and regular political operations and actions. Thus notice is taken, by all tribunals, of the accession and demise of the sovereign (t); the heads of departments, and principal officers of state (u); marshals and sheriffs (v), but not their deputies; also the existence of a war in which their own country is engaged, at least when such war is recognised in public proclamations or Acts of Parliament (w); also the days of special public fasts and thanksgivings, when recognised in like manner; the stated days of general political elections; the date and place of the sittings of the legislature (x); and, in short, to borrow the language of the ViceChancellor in Taylor v. Barclay, "all public matters which affect the government of the country" (y). But they will not recognise private orders made at the council table (z), for these are matters of particular concernment; nor, it seems, any orders of council, even though they regard the Crown and the government (a); nor the transactions on the Journals of either House of Parliament (b).

§ 16. Lastly, all courts are bound judicially to notice their own rules and course of proceeding (c); also the customs of the

drawn and accepted at Dublin, to wit, at Westminster, for 5421. The court held that upon this declaration, the bill must be taken to have been drawn in England for English money, and, therefore, that proof of a bill drawn at Dublin in Ireland for Irish money, which is of less value, was a fatal variance.

(t) Holman v. Burrow, 2 Lord Raym. 794; R. v. Pringle, 2 M. & Rob. 276. (u) R. v. Jones, 2 Camp. 131; Bennett v. The State of Tennessee, Mart. & Yerg. R. 133. (v) See Grant v. Bagge, 3 East, 128.

(w) Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 292; R. v. De Berenger, 3 M. & Sel. 67. It seems that when war is neither publicly proclaimed, nor noticed in any statute, the question of its existence is one solely for the jury. 1 Hale, P. C. 164; Foster's Disc. 1, c. 2, § 12; and the existence of war between foreign countries will not be judicially noticed; Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 292, per Lord Eldon. (x) R. v. Wilde, 1 Lev. 396; 1 Doug. 97. n. (41); Birt v. Rothwell, 1 Lord Raym. 210, 343. (y) 2 Sim. 221. (*) 6 Vin. Abr. 490.

(a) Att.-Gen. v. Theakstone, 8 Price, 89.

(b) R. v. Knollys, 1 Lord Raym. 10, 15. Copies of the Journals are now admissible if purporting to be printed by the official printers, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, § 3, cited ante § 7.

(c) Dobson v. Bell, 2 Lev. 176; Pugh v. Robinson, 1 T. R. 118.

20

MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.

other superior Common Law Courts at Westminster (d); the limits of their jurisdiction (e), and the privileges of their officers (ƒ) and attornies (g); the power of the Courts of Equity, and the authority of the Master of the Rolls (h); the existence of Courts of General Jurisdiction (i); and the powers of the Ecclesiastical Courts, and the limits of their jurisdiction; as, for instance, that a judgment in the Court of Queen's Bench is not within the jurisdiction of the Archdeacon of Dorset (j), and that the Archbishop of Canterbury has so far jurisdiction over the bona notabilia of an intestate British subject, whether situated in Ireland, the colonies, or any foreign country, that he may grant letters to administer such personal property, and, indeed, must do so before the administrator can sue in any English court, whether of law or equity, in respect thereof (k). So the courts will recognise the rules, orders, and regulations made by the Poor-law Commissioners under the authority of the Act of 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, for these are constituted by the 42d sect. as binding as if embodied in that Act; and the latter statute of 7 & 8 Vict., c. 101, expressly provides, by the 71st sect. that "any copy of such rule, order, or regulation, printed by the printer duly authorised by the 'Crown,' shall be received in evidence, and judicially taken notice of, and shall, until the contrary be shown, be deemed sufficient proof that such order was duly made and is in force." It would seem, however, from the careless wording of this last Act, to be still necessary to prove that the paper offered in evidence was really printed by the Queen's printer; and this defect is not remedied by the recent Act of 8 & 9 Vict., c. 113.

§ 17. On the other hand, the Common Law Courts at West

(d) Lane's case, 2 Rep. 16, b; Worlich v. Massy, Cro. Jac. 67; Mounson v. Bourn, Cro. Car. 518, 526. (e) Doe v. Caperton, 9 C. & P. 116.

(f) Ogle v. Norcliffe, 2 Lord Raym. 869.

(g) Stokes v. Mason, 9 East, 426; Chatland v. Thornley, 12 East, 544; Hunter v. Neck, 3 M. & Gr. 181; 3 Scott, N. R. 448, S. C.; Walford v. Fleetwood, 14 M. & W. 449. (h) In re Clarke, 2 Q. B. 619.

(i) Tregany v. Fletcher, 1 Lord Raym. 154.

(j) Adams v. Terretenants of Savage, 2 Lord Raym. 856.

(*) Whyte v. Rose, 3 Q. B. 493, per Ex. Ch. overruling a judgment of the Queen's Bench, reported id., and 4 P. & Dav. 204.

MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED.

21

minster will not take judicial notice of the practice of the Court of Chancery (1), or of the offices of that court (m), or of the Ecclesiastical Courts (n), or of the Courts of Bankruptcy (0), or even of the Court of Review (p); though this last court has all the powers and privileges of the superior courts at Westminster expressly conferred upon it by statute (g).

§ 18. It does not seem perfectly clear, whether or not the judges of one of the superior courts are bound to notice who are the judges in the other superior courts. In an old case (r) it was objected that they were not; but, though reported by Strange, as well as Andrews, it does not appear from either report whether the decision turned on that, or on another exception that was taken. Probably, at the present day the question would be answered in the affirmative, on the ground that the appointment of the judges is a fact of general notoriety, and as, moreover, their signatures when attached to judicial or official documents must be now judicially noticed (s). The weight of American authorities is in favour of recognising the justices of even the inferior tribunals (); but this doctrine certainly does not prevail in England, as the Court of Queen's Bench has refused to notice who is the judge of the Court of Review (u). With regard to inferior courts of limited jurisdiction, the superior courts will not take cognizance of the customs and proceedings therein (v), unless when called upon to review their judgment upon a writ of error (w).

(1) Dicas v. Lord Brougham, 1 M. & Rob. 309; recognised in R. v. Koops, 6 A. & E. 202, per Lord Denman; Tucker v. Inman, 4 M. & Gr. 1049, 1063. (m) Worsley v. Filisker, 2 Roll. R. 119; Doe v. Lloyd, 1 M. & Gr. 685. (n) Beaurain v. Sir W. Scott, Camp. 388.

(0) Turquand v. Booth, sittings after H. T. 1844. (p) Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773.

London, per Patteson, J., MS. (q) 1 & 2 Will. 4., c. 56, § 1.

(r) Skipp v. Hooke, 2 Stra. 1080; Andr. 74. ex relatione alterius, S. C. (s) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, § 2, cited ante, § 7.

(t) Hawks v. Kennebec, 7 Mass. 461; Ripley v. Warren, 2 Pick. 592; Despau v. Swindler, 3 Mart. N. S. 705. (u) Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773, 786. (v) R. v. U. of Cambridge, 2 Lord Raym. 1334. In that case the court refused to notice that the university courts proceeded according to the rules of the civil law. See also Lane's case, 2 Rep. n. (d); Peacock v. Bell, 1 Saund. 75; and Dance v. Robson, M. & M. 295.

(w) Chitty v. Dendy, 3 A. & E. 324; 4 N. & Man. 842, S. C.

22

REFRESHING MEMORY OF JUDGE.

§ 19. In all these and the like cases, where the memory of the judge is at fault, he resorts to such documents or other means of reference as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence (x). Thus, if the point at issue be a date, the judge will refer to an almanac (y); if it be the meaning of a word, to a dictionary (z); if it be the construction of a statute, to the printed copy; or, in case that appears to be incorrect, to the parliament roll (a). In some instances, the judge has refused to take cognizance of a fact, unless the party calling upon him to do so, could produce at the trial some document by which his memory might be refreshed; as was the case in Van Omeron v. Dowick (6), where Lord Ellenborough declined to take judicial notice of the king's proclamation, the counsel not being prepared with a copy of the Gazette in which it was published. So also in R. v. Withers, tried before Mr. Justice Buller, in which case it became a material question to consider how far the prisoner owed obedience to his serjeant, and this depended on the articles of war, which were not produced at the trial, the judges thought that they ought to have been produced (c). But in many other cases, the courts have themselves made the necessary inquiries, and that too, without strictly confining their researches to the time of the trial. Thus, to give but a few examples: in Taylor v. Barclay, where the question was, whether the federal republic of Central America had been recognised by the British government as an independent state, the Vice Chancellor sought for information from the Foreign Office (d); in Chandler v. Grieves, the Court of Common Pleas directed an inquiry to be made in the Courts of Admiralty as to the maritime law (e); in Doe v. Lloyd the same court caused an inquiry to be made by their officers, as to the practice of the Inrolment Office in the Court of Chancery (ƒ); and in Willoughby v. Willoughby, Lord Hardwicke himself asked an eminent conveyancer respecting the existence of a general rule of practice in that branch of the profession (g).

(x) Gresl. Ev. 295.

(*) Clementi v. Golding, 2 Camp. 25.

(y) Page v. Faucet, Cro. Eliz. 227.

(a) R. v. Jeffries, 1 Str. 446; Spring v. Eve, 2 Mod. 240.

(b) 2 Camp. 44.

(d) 2 Sim. 221.

(c) Cited by Buller, J., in R. v. Holt, 5 T. R. 446. (e) 2 H. Bl. 606, n. a.

(f) 1 M. & Gr. 685. The court in that case acted on the authority of Worsley

v. Filisker, 2 Roll. R. 119.

(9) 1 T. R. 772.