is good, and of all happiness, might overlook the immediate means and steps, and with this fense of piety, and comprehenfion of mind, might speak of future glory itself, as the gift of God, and therefore might make no difference in his mind, at that time, between predestination and foreknowledge. But the tenor of all his writings fhews, that it was far from being his intention to represent future glory as given by an arbitrary decree of God, without any respect to the good works which alone can fit men for it; which good works are as much in a man's power, as any other action of which he is capable. Having premised these general observations, I now proceed to fhew by what steps these principles of the utter inability of man to do the will of God, as derived from the fall of Adam, the imputation of his fin to all his posterity, and the arbitrary predeftination of some to eternal life, and the consequent rejection, or reprobation, of the rest of mankind, by which they are devoted to certain and everlasting deftruction, were first introduced, and at length got the firm establishment they now have in the creeds of almost all christian churches. SECTION SECTION I Of the Doctrines of Grace, &c. before the Pelagian Controverfy. IT is remarkable that we find hardly any trace of what are now called the doctrines of grace, original fin, or predeftination before the Pelagian controverfy which was near the end of the fourth century. I believe all the moderns are agreed, that it was clearly the opinion of all the antient Fathers, that God has left it entirely in the power of every man to act well or ill. Balnage, who was himself sufficiently orthodox in the modern fenfe of the word, acknowledges*, that though the fathers in general thought that we are indebted to the grace of God for all our virtues, yet they say that the beginning of falvation is from man, and that it depends entirely upon himself. It is not denied, however, but that they might believe an internal influence upon the mind on extraordinary occafions; but, as Voffius obferves†, none before Auftin fupposed that there was an immediate concurrence of divine grace, neceffary to every good thought or action. Hiftorie des Eglifes Reformeés, vol. i. p. 169. + Historia Pelagianismi, p. 291. the "God", fays Justin Martyr*, "has not "made man like the beafts, who can do no'thing from choice and judgment; for he would "not be worthy of reward or praise, if he did "not of himself chufe what was good, but was "made good; nor, if he was wicked, could he "be justly punished, as not having been fuch of ce himself, but only what he had been made." In fupport of this he quotes If. i. 16. Wash ye, make ye clean, &c. Bafnage fays†, that the antients maintained free will with much warmth, granting men an entire power to be converted or not. Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen, he fays, were at the head of this party. It is remarkable that Austin himself, before he engaged in the controversy with Pelagius, held the fame opinion concerning free will with the rest of the Fathers who had preceded him, and he was far from denying this. In particular, he acknowledges, that before this time he had been of opinion, that faith, or at least the beginning of faith, and a defire of conversion, was in the power of man. It was a faying of his §, "If there be not grace, how should God fave "the world, and if there be not free will, how "can he judge the world. No man," fays he, Apol. i. Edit. Thirlby, p. 65. + Hiftoire des Eglifes Reformeés, p 76. De Predeftinatione, lib. i. cap. iii. Opera, vol. vii. p. 1235. "can be justly condemned for doing that which "he was not able to refift*." Citing a paffage in the fon of Sirach, viz. God left man in the bands of his council, he placed life and death before bim, that that which he pleafed should be given him, he fayst," Behold here is a very plain proof of "the liberty of the human will, for how does "God command, if man has not free will, or power to obey." He also proves, that it is in our power to change the will, from thefe words of our Saviour, Make the tree good and the fruit good, &c. We have almost the fame unanimous opinion. of the antients, concerning the effects of the fin of Adam, as concerning the natural capacity of man with respect to virtue and vice; and they had occafion to speak to this fubject very early, in confequence of the opinion of the Gnoftics in general, and the Manicheans in particular; who held that the fouls of men were originally of different ranks, and fprung from different principles, good beings having produced fome of them, and bad beings the reft; on which account they faid fome were naturally carnal and others fpiritual. Accordingly, they had taught that fin arose not from the free will of man, but from the substance of matter, which they held to * De Duabus Animabus, cap. x. Opera, vol. vi. p. 153. + De Gratia, cap ii. Opera, vol. vii. p. 1299. ↑ Contra Adimantum, cap. xxvi Opera, vol vi. P. 210. be be the only fource of evil; fo that fome fouls were wicked not by choice, but by nature. In oppofition to this, Origen maintained, that all fouls were by nature equally capable of virtue or vice, and that the differences among men arofe merely from the freedom of the will, and the various uses of that freedom, that God left man to his liberty, and rewarded or punished him according to the use he made of it". It is evident, however that Origen must have maintained, according to his known philosophical principles, that perfect freedom with refpect to virtue and vice was only enjoyed by man in his pre-existent state. For he, with other Platonists, maintained that the fouls of men had finned in heaven, and therefore were united to fuch bodies as were a clog and a prison to the foul, and that the flesh laid upon it a kind of neceffity of finning. Chryfoftom alfo fays†, that with an infirm body we derive from Adam a proneness to inordinate affections. But he was far from fuppofing that men were in any other manner fufferers by the fall of Adam, and least of all that they were perfonally responsible for his conduct of himself. Le Sueur laments, that this writer was not quite orthodox with respect to original fin, grace, and free will; but he See his Philocalia, p. 50. &c. + Opera vol, ix. p. 136. T 2 I A. D. 497. apologizes |