nine-tenths of non-union men-but for that we may wait many years, since in it there would be no profit for any special class, no money for its promoters, no power for its advocates, but only general benevolence and fair play for all.

Now of what we have been saying this is the sum:

First. The union label is mainly a distinctive device for en forcing boycotts and making them more effective.

Second. Its object is to increase the power of trade unions aud to force all to submit to union authority.

Third. Its asserted purpose-to insure good conditions among working men-is mere pretence, since the label is not allowed to all manufacturers who can prove their conditions to be satisfactory, but only to those who employ none but union workmen.

Fourth. The circulars of its advocates harp on the employment of union men only and say little about their vaunted "good conditions."

Fifth. The claim of the label to the support of good citizens is, therefore, unwarranted, unless good citizens ought always to support trade unions and repudiate free and independent work

men.

Sixth. The general success of the label would result in raising the prices of goods, reducing the employment of free workmen, curtailing the liberty of contract between employers and employed, injuring many skilled and useful non-union laborers, and give to the unions a new and wide power in the community equivalent to a real tyranny, a most un-American and dangerous enlargement.

Seventh. It would seem, therefore, to be better that the community should oppose the use of the label and refuse to buy the goods on which it appears, preferring to favor the nine-tenths of laborers who are not union men to the one-tenth who are, because the one-tenth are seeking by the label to abridge the rights of the others in the common pursuit of life, liberty, and happi

ness.

STARR HOYT NICHOLS.

THE COMING SEA-POWER.

BY CHARLES H. CRAMP.

Most well-informed people have a pretty clear general idea that the present is an era of unexampled naval activity throughout the civilized world; that great fleets are building everywhere; that the ships composing them are of new types, representing the highest development of naval architecture and the most exquisite refinement of the art of naval armament. Doubtless, a much smaller number of persons are aware that a new factor of imposing proportions has come into the general situation; that the newest member of the family of civilization is with rapid strides reaching a status of actual and potential sea-power with which the older nations must henceforth reckon most seriously.

It is, however, questionable whether any one not intimately conversant with the current history of modern ship-building, or not qualified to estimate properly the relative values of actual armaments, can adequately conceive the vast significance of the prodigious efforts which this youngest of civilized nations is successfully putting forth toward the quick and sure attainment of commanding power on the sea.

In order to estimate accurately the significance of the current naval activity of Japan, it is requisite to trace briefly her prior development as a maritime power.

The foundation of the Japanese navy was laid by the purchase of the Confederate ram "Stonewall," built in France in 1864, surrendered to the United States in 1865, and shortly afterward sold or given to Japan. This ship was soon followed by another of somewhat similar type, built at the Thames Iron Works in 1864-1865, now borne on the Japanese navy list as the Riojo," and used as a gunnery and training ship.

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From that time to the period of the Chinese war the naval

growth of Japan was steady, and, considering her very recent adoption of Western methods, rapid.

At the beginning of that war Japan, though possessing a very respectable force of cruisers and gunboats, mostly of modern types and advanced design, had no armored ships worthy of the name. The old "Stonewall" had been broken up, the "Fu-So," the "Riojo," the "Heiyei," and the "Kon-Go," built from 1865 to 1877, were obsolete, and the "Chiyoda"-the only one of modern design and armament-was a small armored cruiser of 2,450 tons, with a 4-inch belt, and no guns larger than 4.7-inch calibre.

The unarmored fleet, however, on which she had to rely, was, for its total displacement, equal to any in the world. It embraced three of the "Hoshidate" class, 4,277 tons and 5,400 horsepower; two of the "Naniwa" class, 3,650 tons and 7,000 horsepower, which had been considered by our Navy Department worth copying in the "Charleston," the "Yoshino," 4,150 tons and 15,000 horse-power, and about fifteen serviceable gun-vessels from 615 to 1,700 tons. All of the cruisers had been built in Europe, but most of the gun-vessels were of Japanese build, and represented the first efforts of the Japanese people in modern naval construction.

Among the results of the war was the addition of several Chinese vessels to the Japanese navy, including the battleship "Chen Yuen," of 7,400 tons and 6,200 horse-power, and the "Ping Yuen," armored coast defence ship, which had been captured by the unarmored cruisers of the Mikado.

At the end of the war Japan had forty-three sea-going vessels, displacing in the aggregate 79,000 tons, of which seven serviceable ships, with total displacement of 15,000 tons, were prizes.

The navy in commission at this writing embraces forty-eight sea-going ships, of 111,000 tons displacement, and twenty-six torpedo boats. The five sea-going vessels, of 32,000 tons total displacement, which have been added since the war, represent the most advanced types of model naval architecture, and include two first-class battleships of 12,800 tons each, the "Fuji" and « Yashima.”

The ship-building programme now in process of actual construction is calculated to produce by the year 1903 a total effec

tive force of 67 sea-going ships, 12 torpedo-catchers and 75 torpedo boats, with an aggregate displacement of more than 200,000 tons.

To the navy in commission or available for instant service, already described, Japan now adds, in plain sight under actual construction in various stages of forwardness, a new fleet vastly superior in power and efficiency to it.

Here I desire to say that the word "progress," in its conventional sense, does not adequately indicate the naval activity of Japan. The word implies continuity, by more or less even pace, in one of two directions, or in both; one direction is an increase in tonnage, with but little or no improvement in efficiency; and the other is a marked advance of new ships in all the elements of offence, defence, staying power and economy.

The first condition of progress is represented by the present activity of most nations who are sailing along evenly and with self-approval in fancied superiority. The second condition is represented by Japan, who suddenly appears as a cyclone in a smooth sea of common-place progress.

Japan is not only building more ships than any other power except England, but she is building better ships in English shipyards than England herself is constructing for her own navy. While other nations proceed by steps, Japan proceeds by leaps and bounds. What other nations are doing may be described as progress, but what Japan is doing must be termed a phenomenon. She is now building:

(1.) Three 14,800-ton battleships, which are well advanced at Armstrong's, Thompson's, and the Thames Iron Works, respectively.

(2.) One battleship of about 10,000 tons, commencing at Armstrong s.

(3.) Four first-class armored cruisers of 9,600 tons displacement and twenty knots speed; two at Armstrong's, one at the Vulcan Works, Stettin, Germany, and one at Forges et Chantiers, France.

(4.) Two 5,000-ton protected cruisers of about twenty-three knots speed; one at San Francisco and one at Philadelphia.

(5.) One protected cruiser of 4,300 tons and about twentythree knots speed at Armstrong's.

(6.) Four thirty-knot torpedo-boat destroyers at Yarrow's.

(7.) Four more of similar type at Thompson's.

(8.) Eight 90-ton torpedo boats at the Schichau Works, Elbing, Germany.

(9.) Four more of similar type at the Normand Works, France.

(10.) Three 3,000-ton protected cruisers of 20 knots, three torpedo gunboats and a dispatch vessel, at the Imperial Dockyard, Yokosuka, Japan.

(11.) The programme for the current year embraces a fifth armored cruiser of the type previously described (9,600 tons and 20 knots) to be built also at Yokosuka.

This is Japan's naval increase actually in sight. Excepting the ships building at Yokosuka, the whole programme has come under my personal observation.

Comparison with the current progress of other powers discloses the fact that Japan is second only to England in naval activity, being ahead of France, much in advance of Germany, and vastly in the lead of Russia and the United States. It must also be borne in mind that the new Japanese fleet comprises throughout the very latest and highest types of naval architecture in every respect of force, economy and efficiency.

The spectacle of Japan surpassing France and closely following England herself in naval activity is startling. Considering the shortness of the time which has elapsed since Japan entered the family of nations or aspired to any rank whatever as a power, it is little short of miraculous. Yet it is a fact, and to my mind it is the most significant single fact of our time. Nations do not display such energy or undertake such expenditure without a .purpose.

It can hardly be maintained that Japan aims her vast preparations at the United States; at least not primarily. The pending Hawaiian affair has given rise to some irritation, but its importance has been systematically exaggerated by the English press. It cannot, in any event, go beyond the stage of diplomatic exchanges. Japan will, doubtless, receive from the United States sufficient assurance that the rights of her subjects in Hawaii will be protected in case of annexation, and thus far she has asked no more than that. She is certainly entitled to no less.

The object of the English in encouraging Japan to make a