CHAPTER IX.

SANTA CRUZ-TENERIFFE.

(1797.)

Nelson's proposals for the attack on Santa Cruz-No troops availableThe attack and failure-Nelson severely wounded-Josiah NisbetNelson's care for the feelings of Mrs. Fremantle-The loss of his right arm-Letters to Sir J. Jervis, Mrs. Nelson-Invalided homeArrival at Spithead-At Bath-Devotion of his wife-Slow recovery-The London mob at the illumination for CamperdownLetters from Lady Nelson and the Duke of Clarence, and to Sir S. A. Hamond-Memorial to the King-Nelson and Lord Chancellor Loughborough-Thanks to God for his recovery-Nelson and Clerk of the Pay-office-Letter from his father-Ready again for service.

INCE the days of Anson the possible capture of the huge galleons that periodically brought to Spain the riches of the New World had made a war with that country popular with the English. It is not to be

wondered, then, that the report of

the Viceroy of Mexico having evaded the English frigates that kept watch from the Straits of Gibraltar to Cape St. Vincent, from the day that Cordova and his fleet fled to Cadiz, had put into Santa Cruz, in the island of Teneriffe, should lead such daring spirits as those of Nelson and Troubridge to project an expedition for the capture of the riches supposed to be in that port. In 1657 Admiral Blake had succeeded in a similar project -a precedent far too tempting to the daring mind of

Nelson. Though, instead of the Viceroy of Mexico's fleet, only one ship of any value had reached Santa Cruz, the capture of that town, and the consequent submission of the whole island, would undoubtedly have been a severe blow to the Spanish Government, coming so soon after the day of St. Vincent, and might have had the effect on which Nelson calculated in his first communication to his chief, and, had the expedition been as powerful by land as by sea, as he proposed, might have been brought to a successful issue.

In a letter to Sir J. Jervis, April 15, 1797, Nelson gives his masterly views of the practicability of an attack on Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, where the Viceroy of Mexico and one of the galleons were believed to be anchored.

"April 12, 1797

"MY DEAR SIR,-Troubridge talked to me last night about the Viceroy at Teneriffe. Since I first believed it was possible that his Excellency might have gone there, I have endeavoured to make myself master of the situation and means of approach by sea and land. I shall begin by sea.

"The Spanish ships generally moor with two cables to the sea, and four cables from their sterns to the shore; therefore, although we might get to be masters of them, should the wind not come off the shore, it does not appear certain we should succeed so completly as we might wish. As to any opposition, except from natural impediments, I should not think it would avail. I do not reckon myself equal to Blake; but if I recollect right, he was more obliged to the wind coming off the land than to any exertions of his own; fortune favoured the gallant attempt, and may do so again. But it becomes my duty to state all the difficulties, as you have done me the honour to desire me to enter on the subject.

"The approach by sea to the anchoring place is under very high land, passing three valleys; therefore the wind is either in from the sea, or squally with calms from the mountains. Sometimes in a night a ship may get in with the land wind and moderate weather. So much for the sea attack, which, if you approve, I am ready and willing to look at or to carry into execution. But now comes my plan, which could not fail of success, would immortalize the undertakers, ruin

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NELSON'S PLAN FOR SANTA CRUZ.

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Spain, and has every prospect of raising our country to a higher pitch of wealth than she ever yet attained; but here soldiers must be consulted, and I know from experience, excepting General O'Hara, they have not the same boldness in undertaking a political measure that we have. We look to the benefit of our country, and risk our fame every day to serve her; a soldier obeys his orders, and no more. By saying soldiers should be consulted, you will guess I mean the army of 3,700 men from Elba, with cannon, mortars, and every implement now embarked; they would do the business in three days, probably much less. I will undertake with a very small squadron to do the naval part. The shore, though not very easy of access, is so steep that the transports may run in, and land the army in one day. The water is conveyed to the town in wooden troughs; this supply cut off would probably induce a very speedy surrender; good terms for the town, private property secured to the islanders, and only the delivery of public stores and foreign merchandise demanded, with threats of utter destruction if one gun is fired. In short, the business could not miscarry."

Your opinion

"Now it comes for me to discover what might induce General de Burgh to act in this business. All the risk and responsibility must rest with you. A fair representation should also be made by you of the great national advantages that would arise to our country, and of the ruin that our success would occasion to Spain. besides should be stated, of the superior advantages a fortnight thus employed would be to the Army, to what they could do in Portugal; and that of the six or seven millions sterling the army would have one half. If this sum were thrown into circulation in England, what might not be done? It would secure an honourable peace, with innumerable other blessings. It has long occupied my thoughts. Should General de Burgh not choose to act, after having all those blessings for our country stated to him, which are almost put into our hands, we must look to General O'Hara. The Royals, about six hundred, are in the fleet, with artillery sufficient for the purpose. You have the power of stopping the store-ships; one thousand more men would still insure the business, for Teneriffe never was besieged; therefore the hills that cover the town are not fortified to resist any attempt of taking them by storm; the rest must follow-a fleet of ships and money to reward the victors. But I know with you, and I can lay my hand on my heart and say the same: it is the honour and prosperity of our country that we wish to extend.

"I am, &c.,

"HORATIO NELSON."

From the not unnatural objection of the commander of the land forces to deviate from the orders he had received, no troops were available for the expedition, and Nelson was left to attempt the venture with only such soldiers as were serving as marines on board his squadron, and with the blue jackets who could be spared from the ships. Besides this serious difficulty, it was probable that the treasure brought to Santa Cruz in the one vessel would have been landed and stored in the town, and to be obtained only by a vigorous attack on its defences and defenders. Still, Nelson felt that the attempt should be made, and with four line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and the ill-fated Fox cutter, essayed the enterprise. How the expedition fared is best told in his own words:

"On Friday, the 21st instant (July) I directed to be embarked on Seahorse, Terpsichore, and Emerald frigates one thousand men (including 250 marines under the command of Captain Thomas Oldfield), the whole commanded by Captain Troubridge, attended by all the boats of the squadron, scaling ladders, and every implement which I thought necessary for the success of the enterprise. I directed that the boats should land in the night, between the fort on the north-east side of the Bay of Santa Cruz and the town, and endeavour to make themselves masters of that fort, which done, to send in my summons, the liberal terms of which I am confident you will approve.

"Although the frigates approached within three miles of the place of debarkation by twelve o'clock, yet from the unforeseen circumstance of a strong gale of wind in the offing, and a strong current against them in shore, they did not approach within a mile of the landing place when the day dawned, which discovered to the Spaniards our force and intentions. On my approach with the line-of-battle ships, Captains Troubridge and Bowen, with Captain Oldfield of the Marines, came on board to consult with me what was best to be done, and were of opinion, if they could possess the heights over the fort above mentioned, that it could be stormed, to which I gave my assent, and directed the line-of-battle ships to batter the fort, in order to create a diversion; but this was found impracticable, not being able

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THE RESULT OF THE EXPEDITION.

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to get nearer the shore than three miles, from a calm and contrary current, nor could our men possess themselves of the heights, as the enemy had taken possession of them, and seemed as anxious to retain, &c., as we were to get them. Thus foiled in my original plan, I considered it for the honour of my King and country not to give over the attempt to possess ourselves of the town, that our enemies might be convinced there is nothing that Englishmen are not equal to; and confident in the bravery of those who would be employed in the service, I embarked every person from the shore on 22nd at night.

"On the 24th I got the ships to an anchor about two miles to the northward of the town, and made every show for a disposition of attacking the heights, which appeared to answer the end, from the great number of people they had placed on them. The Leander, Captain Thomson, joined this afternoon, and her Marines were added. to the force before appointed, and Captain Thompson also volunteered his services.

"At eleven at night the boats of the squadron, containing between six and seven hundred men, one hundred and eighty on board the Fox cutter, and about seventy or eighty men in a boat we had taken the night before, proceeded towards the town. The divisions of the boats conducted by all the captains, except Fremantle and Bowen, who attended with me to regulate and lead the way to the attack; every captain being acquainted that the landing was to be made on the Mole, from whence they were to proceed as fast as possible to the Great Square, where they were to form, and proceed on such service, as might be found necessary. We were not discovered till within half-gun-shot of the landing-place, when I directed the boats to cast off from each other, give an hurrah, and push for the shore.

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"A fire of thirty or forty pieces of cannon, with musketry, from one end of the town to the other, opened upon us, but nothing could stop the intrepidity of the captains leading the divisions. Unfortunately, the greatest part of the boats did not see the Mole, but went on shore through a raging surf, which stove all the boats to the left of it.

"For the details of the proceedings, I send a copy of Captain Troubridge's account to me, and I cannot but express my admiration of the firmness with which he and his brave associates supported the honour of the British flag.

"Captains Fremantle, Bowen, and myself, with four or five boats, stormed the Mole, although opposed apparently by four hundred or five hundred men, took possession of it, and spiked the guns; but such a heavy fire of musketry and grape shot was kept up from the citadel