the capture of four Spanish frigates on the 5th of October by the frigate squadron of Captain More. On the 5th of March, 1805, Spain took the field. At this juncture, Villeneuve took the command at Toulon in consequence of La Touch Treville's early death. As far as taking troops, saddles and horses on board, every preparation for an expedition was made, but still his fleet lingered in harbour, though if he has been rightly reported, he told his men, "There is nothing about an English Fleet that should frighten you; their ships are worn out by a two years' blockade." He little knew "what had been effected by the salutary and daily labours of a life at sea under a good chief."

"A first essay," writes Jurien de la Gravière, "was destined to establish the immense difference which cannot but exist between a fleet inured to labour, and another just escaped from the idleness of a port. On Jan. 19, 1805, Nelson was at anchor in Agincourt Roads, where two of his frigates, the Active and Seahorse, appeared at the entrance of the Straits of Bonifacio under a press of sail, with the long-expected signal, The enemy is at sea.' It was three o'clock in the afternoon when they anchored near the Victory, and at half-past four the English Fleet was under sail. It becomes dark there about five o'clock at that time of the year; the wind was blowing strong from the westward, and the fleet could not work to windward against it. So that it was necessary to go through one of the eastern passages which open into the Tuscan Sea. Though it was now completely dark, Nelson took the lead in the Victory, and resolved to conduct his eleven ships-of-the line between the rocks of Biscia, and the north-east extremity of Sardinia. This passage, whose breadth does not exceed a quarter of a mile, has never since been attempted by any fleet. The English squadron cleared it; formed in a single line ahead. Each ship showing a light astern, to guide the one which followed." 1

From the direction in which he was informed that the French Fleet was sailing, Nelson persuaded himself that the easternmost point of Sardinia was their object. Thither

"The Last Naval War," p. 148–9.

1804-5.] PASSAGE OF THE STRAITS OF BONIFACIO. 297

he sailed at once, only to be disappointed of hearing any news of the enemy. From the signs of the weather, Nelson foresaw the approach of a storm, and prepared for it.

"Better acquainted than anybody with the seas in which he then was, he knew how with sudden violence the heaviest gales commence in the Mediterranean, and expecting to meet the enemy, he did not wish to risk doing so with ships already disabled. The tempest, which Nelson had foreseen, burst out the next morning, and found the English squadron under close-reefed sails, ready to defy the fury of the squalls which succeeded each other without interruption until the 23rd of January."1

Unprepared for such weather, Villeneuve had put back to Toulon, with loss, but as yet Nelson knew it not. He had heard of a French line-of-battle ship having taken refuge at Ajaccio, but was still determined to sail to Egypt. "If the enemy have put back crippled," he wrote to the Admiralty, "I could never overtake them, and therefore I could not do any harm in going to the eastward; and if the enemy are gone to the eastward, I am right." 2

On the 29th of January, therefore, he beat through the straits of Messina, and some days later was off the coast of Egypt. There were no signs of the French. On the 8th of February, therefore, he sailed back to Malta and Toulon. According to his French biographer, on the 8th of February, Nelson wrote again to the Admiralty, justifying his sailing to Egypt.

"Had I even known the injury sustained by one French ship, I could not forget the character of Buonaparte. I know that in the orders given by him on the banks of the Seine, neither wind nor weather would be considered, and indeed, in my opinion, though

there had been three or four French ships disabled, that was no reason for delaying an important expedition." I

Until the 10th of April, Nelson kept cruising about the French and Italian coasts, and though Villeneuve sailed a second time from Toulon on the 29th of March, it was not until the middle of April that he had any certain news that the French squadron had left the Mediterranean. Nelson at once made for the straits, baffled for many days with contrary winds. How bitterly he felt these delays is told in the following letters:

"April 19th.

"Victory AT SEA, ten leagues off Toro. "MY DEAR BALL,-My good luck seems flown away. I cannot get a fair wind, or even a side wind. Dead foul! dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what to do when I leave the straits, supposing there is no certain confirmation of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill-luck will go near to kill me; but as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down." 2

"To W. MARSDEN.

[Same date and place]. "SIR,-The enemy's fleet having so very long ago passed the straits, and formed a junction with some Spanish ships from Cadiz, I think it my duty, which must be satisfactory to their lordships, to know exactly my intentions. I have detached the Amazon to Lisbon for information, and I am proceeding off Cape St. Vincent as expeditiously as possible; and I hope the Amazon will join me there, or that I shall obtain some positive information of the destination of the enemy. The circumstance of their having taken the Spanish ships which were for sea, from Cadiz, satisfies my mind that they are not bound for the West Indies (nor probably Brazils), but intend forming a junction with the squadron at Ferrol, and pushing direct for Ireland or Brest, as I believe the French have troops on board; therefore, if I receive no intelligence to do away with my present belief, I shall proceed from

1 "The Last Naval War," p. 171. This letter not in the Despatches. * Despatches, vol. vi. p. 410.

2