CHAPTER XVI.

TRAFALGAR.

(1805.)

Napoleon's peremptory order to Villeneuve-How Nelson kept watch off Cadiz-The enemy coming out-The signal "England expects every man to do his duty "-Close action-How Collingwood began the battle-The log of the Victory-Villeneuve and the French eagle-The Victory breaks the line-Nelson's death-wound-Dr. Beattie's account of Nelson's death-The interview with Hardy-Dr. Scott's account-How Collingwood was told of it-His despatch of the battle-The fate of the combined fleets-British returnSpanish and French accounts of the Battle-Letters from Spaniards.

HAT Villeneuve was forced by Napo

leon to risk a great battle can no longer be denied; in his own better judgment he felt that while reliance could be placed on the ships of his own nation, those of the Spanish contingent "were for the most part

coming out of port for the first time, commanded by inexperienced captains and ill-manned." Napoleon would not hear of delay. Aware that English and Russian troops were proposed to be landed in Italy, he had ordered General St. Cyr with his forces to take Naples, disperse and annihilate the Neapolitan army, before the expected English and Russians could arrive.

"Some days after signing these instructions (to St. Cyr), on the 17th of September, 1805," writes his French biographer, "Napoleon sent Villeneuve orders to sail with the combined fleet, steering first for

Carthagena, to pick up Admiral Salcedo there; from Carthagena to proceed to Naples, and land the troops he had embarked to join General St. Cyr. Our intention,' added the Emperor, 'is that whenever you find the enemy in inferior force, you should attack him without besitation, and bring on a decisive action. . . . You must be aware that the success of these operations will mainly depend on the promptitude of your departure from Cadiz. We feel that you will neglect nothing to effect it without delay; and we require the utmost bravery and activity in this important expedition.' With Villeneuve the Emperor did not fear saying too much, as according to his expression the admiral was one who required the spur more than the curb.' Convinced, moreover, while ordering him on this unfortunate expedition, that 'his excessive pusillanimity would prevent his undertaking it,' he had privately despatched Admiral Rosily from Paris. That flag-officer, if he found the combined fleets still at Cadiz, was to take the command, hoist his flag on the Bucentaure, and send ViceAdmiral Villeneuve to France 'to account for his conduct.'” 1

"It was in vain that Admiral Décres, the Minister of Marine, warned the Emperor of the real condition of the Spanish portion of the combined fleets-that a council of war assembled by Villeneuve expressed the same opinion as Décres. "The English,' said the Emperor, will look very small when France shall have two or three admirals willing to die.' 'No one,' adds our author, was more resigned to such a sacrifice than Admiral Villeneuve; too happy, if at that price, he could have hoped to save his fleet.' 'But to leave Cadiz,' he wrote to Décres, 'without being able to enter the Straits immediately, and with the certainty of having to fight a superior enemy, would be to lose everything. I cannot believe that it is his Imperial Majesty's wish to expose the greater part of his naval force to such a desperate chance, which does not even promise them the reward of glory.'

"These scruples were, unhappily, to be soon removed. ViceAdmiral Rosily was already at Madrid; an accident which happened to his carriage at Madrid had prevented his setting out on the 14th of October; and during that time Admiral Villeneuve had heard of his arrival in Spain. That news cut Villeneuve to the heart. 'I should be happy,' he wrote to the Minister of Marine, 'to give up the first rank to Admiral Rosily, if, at least, the second were allowed to me; . . . but it would be too painful to me to lose all hope of

THE FLEETS OFF CAPE TRAFALGAR.

331

1805.] having an opportunity to prove myself worthy of better fortune. If the wind permits me to sail, I will sail to-morrow.' At this moment he was informed that Nelson had despatched six ships to Gibraltar ; he immediately summoned Admiral Gravina on board the Bucentaure, and, after consulting with him for some minutes made the signal to his fleet to prepare for sea.”1

At seven in the morning the combined fleet commenced to move, and by ten in the morning they were all out of Cadiz. Whilst the combined fleet was slowly drawing off shore, Nelson acquainted by his frigates with all their movements, was hastening to the struggle. "At nine that night the signal-guns ordered by Nelson to be fired to indicate the course the enemy were taking were heard at intervals, proving that the British Fleet was only about two miles off." 2

In his memorandum of the 20th, he wrote to "Captain Blackwood to keep with two frigates in sight of the enemy by night. Two other frigates to be placed between him and the Defence, Captain Hope. Colossus will take her station between Defence and Mars. Mars to communicate with Victory." And added :

"If the enemy are standing to the southward, or towards the straits, burn two blue lights together every hour, in order to make the greater blaze. If the enemy are standing to the westward, three guns, quick, every hour.

"NELSON AND BRONTE.

Signed by Nelson the day before he fell, the last time I saw him, "GEORGE HOPE."

Convinced by this report that it was in vain to make any further attempt to conceal his course, Villeneuve about ten at night gave the order to collect his somewhat scattered fleet and form line-of-battle, and the next sunrise saw the two fleets off Cape Trafalgar. How the

I

2

Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii. pp. 238-9.

Report of the chief of Gravina's staff to the Prince of Peace, Oct. 22nd. Gazette of Madrid, Nov. 5, 1805.