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Olassification under Sec. 4, Act Aug. 28, 1894. (4) Text of Section 4. First provision-Classification of a non-enumerated article by
similitude to any one article enumerated. "That each and every imported article, not enumerated in this Act, which is similar, either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, to any article enumerated in this Act as chargeable with duty shall pay the same rate of duty which is levied on the enumerated article which it most resembles in any of
the particulars before mentioned;" Second provision- Classification of a non-enumerated article
by similitude to two or more articles enumerated. "And if any non-enumerated article equally resembles two or more enumerated articles on which different rates of duty are chargeable there shall be levied on such non-enumerated article the same rate of duty as is chargeable on the article which it resembles paying the highest rate of duty;" Third provision— Classification by component material of
chief value, “and on articles not enumerated, manufactured of two or more materials, the duty shall be assessed at the highest rate at which the same would be chargeable if composed wholly of the component material thereof of
chief value;' Fourth provision- Meaning of “component material of chief
value," "and the words "component material of chief value,' wherever used in this Act, shall be held to mean that component material which shall exceed in value any other single component material of the article; and the value of each component material shall be determined by the ascertained value of such material in its condition
as found in the article." Fifth provision
“If two or more rates of duty shall be applicable to any imported article it shall pay duty at the highest of such rates."
(5) Classification by similitude. If an article is found not enumerated, the first inquiry is whether it bears a similitude to an enumerated article as chargeable with duty, either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, if it does, and the similitude is substantial, it is to
be deemed the same and classified accordingly (Arthur vs. Fox, 108 U. S., 125).
The similarity required is a similarity in product, in adaptation to uses, and in uses, even though it may be classed as different articles. The statute does not contemplate that the goods shall be in all respects the same. It is intended to embrace goods like, but not identicle with other goods (Greenleaf vs. Goodrich, 101 U. S., 283).
(6) Classification by "component material of chief value." To place articles among those designated as enumerated it is not necessary that they should be specifically mentioned. It is sufficient if they are designated in the law in any way to distinguish them from other articles. (Arthur vs. Butterfield, 125 U. S., 77, affirmed in Junge vs. Hedden, 146 U.S., 238.)
Where articles are provided for in the tariff act according to component materials such articles are enumerated (G. A. 1392).
The following words have been held to sufficiently desig. nate articles to render them enumerated, and exclude them from classification under the similitude clause of this section as defined in Rule 5, supra: “Manufactures of which steel is a component part," (Arthur vs. Butterfield, supra); "All manufactures of wool of every description made wholly or in part of wool”; “All goods made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value” (Hartranft vs. Meyer, 135 U.S., 237); “Composed wholly or in part of worsted" (Seeberger vs. Cahn, 137 U. S., 95); “Manufactures of paper, or of which paper is a component material” (Liebenroth vs. Robertson, 144 U. S., 35); “Manufactures composed wholly of cotton," or even *Manufactures of cotton,” (Mason vs. Robertson, 144 L. S., 40); “All chemical compounds and salts by whatever name known” (Junge vs. Hedden, 146 U, S., 238).
By the act of March 3, 1883. Section 2499 of the Revised Statutes, was changed in regard to "articles manufactured from two or more materials,” a change by which, instead of making the duty depend on the highest rate at which any component part is chargeable, it is made to depend on the highest rate at which the “component material of chief value” is chargeable; and although Section 2499 refers, at least in its main provision, solely to non-enumerated articles, yet the change made shows the intent of Congress in reference to goods enumerated (Hartranft vs. Meyer, 135 U. S., 237, affirmed in Liebenroth vs. Robertson, 144 U. S., 35), and the change made has been re-enacted in the Act of 1890 and in the present Act of 1894.
In the case of Hartranft vs. Meyer, supra, effect was given to the charge made in Section 2499, Revised Statutes,
by the Act of 1883. The question in that case was whether certain cloth composed partly of silk, partly of cotton and partly of wool, silk being the component material of chirf value," should be classified under the provision for, "all manufactures of wool of every description, made wholly or in part of wool, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act,” or be classed as “goods, wares, and merchandise not specially enumerated or provided for in this Act, made of silk, or of which silk is the component of chief value." It was HELD, that as the words, “not specially enumerated or provided for," are found in each provision, the case came under the rule in Solomon vs. Arthur (102 U.S., 208), and neither description was absolute or exclusive, but the goods came under the description or enumeration of either provision, that either would be sufficient in the absence of the other; that the language, “made wholly or in part of wool," was more general in its character, reaching to all manufactured articles of which any portion is wool; while the language, “made of silk, or of which silk is the “component material of chief value," was narrower and more limited, and the article should be classified under the latter provision for silk, which was the “ component material of chief value.”
In the case of Liebenroth vs. Robertson, supra, the question was whether photographic albums made of paper, leather and metal, paper being the “component material of chief value,” should be classified as “manfactures and articles of leather or of which leather shall be a component part,” or as “manufactures of paper or of which paper is the 'component material of chief value, not specially enumerated or provided for.'” It was HELD, that the article was assessable with equal propriety under the one clause or the other; the rule in Hartranft vs. Meyer was applied and the article classified under the latter pro. vision, as “a manufacture of paper or of which paper is the 'component material of chief value.'”
In the case of United States vs. Manassee (56 Fed Rep. 828) the Circuit Court of Appeals followed the rule in Liebenroth vs. Robertson, supra.
In the case of Bister et. al. vs. United States (59 Fed. Rep., 452) the Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the case of Hartranft vs. Meyer, supra. The question there was whether certain "gloria cloth,” which is similar in description and character to women's and children's dress goods, and composed of silk and worsted, silk being the "component material of chief value," should be classified as a "manufacture of silk or of which silk is the component material of chief value, not specially enumerated or provided for” or should be classified as “women's and children's dress goods
and goods of similar
description and character, composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted
not specially provided for." It was HELD, that the latter was a more specific description, that when the two provisions are read together the former is interpreted as including all manufactures of which silk is the component material of chief value, except those similar to women's and children's dress goods, and the article was classified under the first provision as "women's and children's dress goods * and goods of similar description and character,” as a narrower term of enumeration. The Court said “It seems hardly debatable that if one provision of a tariff Act should prescribe a duty on wearing apparel, and another on all manufactures of which silk is a material of chief value, the former would supply the proper classification for an article of wearing apparel made of silk. The case falls within the general rule that, a specific name or description prevails over a general term although it embraces it broadly. “The general must give way to the particular."
In Boyd's Case (55 Fed. Rep., 599) the same Court held that the term “articles of wearing apparel” was a more specific enumeration than “articles made wholly or in part of lace."
The Board of General Appraisers (G. A. 2847) followed the rules laid down in Bister vs. U. S., supra, and Robertson vs. Glendennings (132 U.S., 158). The question before the Board was, whether certain shawls composed partly of wool and partly of cotton, the cotton being the .com. ponent material of chief value” and commercially known as “wool. n shawls,” should be classified as “woolen or worsted shawls made in part of wool or worsted not specially provided for," or should be classified as "wearing apparel composed of cotton, or of which cotton is the component material of chief value," and the article was classified under the former provision as ''woolen or worsted shawls
as the narrower and more specific designation, the word “shawls” being denominative and not merely descriptive, and therefore must prevail over the mere general descriptive term “wearing apparel of which cotton is the component material of chief value."
In the case of Seeberger vs. Schlesinger (152 U. S., 581, affirming Arthur vs. Susfield, 96 U. S., 128), the question was whether certain shell covered opera glasses, composed of shell, metal and glass, shell being the component material of chief value," should be classified under the provision for “shells, whole or parts of, manufactured," or be classified as “manufactures, articles. or wares, composed wholly, or in part of metal," and it was HELD, that the article could not properly be included within the first phrase at all, as the clause was obviously intended to
apply to articles made entirely, or nearly so, of shell, and not to articles of which shell was a mere component, though perhaps the most valuable part, that in view of the fact, while metal is not the “ component material of chief value," it is a substantial part of the finished glasses and the framework upon which the lenses and shell are mounted, the article should not be classified as articles manufactured of two or more materials under Section 4, but should be classified as a manufacture of metal. The Court said: “We do not wish to be understood as holding that, if the metal be a mere incident or an immaterial part of the completed article, as, for instance, the screws or knobs upon an article of household furniture, or the buttons upon an article of clothing, such articles should be classified as manufactures in part of metal, but where, as in this case, they form a necessary and substantial part of the article, we think this clause should determine their classification. Particularly is this so in view of the fact that opera glasses are frequently made of glass and metal alone, or with an outer covering of leather, which would form an inconsiderable part of the total expense."
The value of a component material is determined, as provided in the statute. by its value as found in the article. For example, certain jewelry cases made of wood, covered with silk and cotton velvet, and lined with satin, were classified as “manufactures of which wood is the component material of chief value” (G. A. 2313).
(7) Priority of the provisions of this section. In the classification of articles this section has priority in order of application over Section 3. supra, and the conditions named in this Section must be exhausted before resort can be had to Section 3. (G. A. 417, 1152)
General Rules for Classification, (8) Interpretation of Revenue Statutes.
It is a general rule, in the interpretation of all statutes fixing duties on imports, pot to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace matters not specially pointed out, although standing upon a close analogy. In every case, therefore, of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen or importer. This is the uniform doctrine of the authorities. (Hartranft vs. Weignann, 121 U. S. 615, followed in U. S. vs. Davis, C C. A , 54 Fed Rep. 147 ; Rice vs. U. S., C. C. A, 53 Fed. Rep., 910; Henderson vs. U. S., C. C. A., 66 Fed. Rep., 55 )
The statute should be interpreted according to gram