matical sense of the words in which the statute is expressed. Whenever the intention of the legislature can be discovered from the words employed, in view of the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances, it ought to prevail, unless it lead to absurd and irrational conclusions. The Court cannot change or add words unless the reason for so doing is very cogent. It cannot substitute for the clear expressions which Congress has actually used, other expressions, which the Court think Congress ought to have used (Kohlsaat vs. Murphy, 96 U. S, 160; Rice vs. U. S., C. C. of Appeals, 53 Fed. Rep., 910; In re Downing, C. C. of Appeals, 56 Fed. Rep., 474, G. A. 2999) or as said by the Court in Merritt vs. Welsh (104 U. S., 694) it is better to submit to a temporary inconvenience than to set the laws all afloat by laying down a canon of construction which leaves the plain words and seeks to spell, or guess at, the supposed intent of the legislature, contrary or supplementary to that which is clearly embodied in the words it has used. If experience shows that Congress acted under a mistaken impression, that does not authorize the Treasury Department, or the Courts, to take the part of legislative guardians, and, by construction to make new laws which they imagine Congress would have made had it been properly informed."

"The adjudication in the case of Church vs. U. S. (143 U. S., 457) is frequently cited where the effort is to induce the Court to legislate, and substitute its own notions of what the law should be. We do not understand, however, that it sanctions any new rules of statutory interpretation" (In re Downing, supra).

"The rule of construction should be, as far as is practicable, uniform and not easily disturbed by exceptions, and where a construction makes apparent a lack of symmetry in rates of duty, the Courts cannot attempt to adjust into symmetry the various provisions of a statute which must include many details, by creating exceptions to a wellsettled, and, on the whole, satisfactory rule of interpretation" (In re Clafflin & Co., C. C A., 52 Fed. Rep, 121).

Titles to schedules of the tariff acts are intended merely as general suggestions, as to the character of the articles included therein, and not as technically accurate definitions of them (Hollander vs. Magone, 149 U. S., 586).

Punctuations are of no controlling importance in the construction of a provision of a statute (G. A. 325, 806, citing Hammock vs. Loan Co., 105 U. S., 77. See In re Schilling, C. C. A., 53 Fed. Rep., 88).

Repeal by implication. The settled rule is, that the former statute must be construed to be repealed only so far as it is repugnant to or irreconcileable with the later one, or where the new law is intended as a revision of

the whole subject under legislative consideration, and consequently as a substitute for the old law previously existing. And especially is the rule applied with great strictness to our system of revenue laws, the provisions of which are known to be very complicated. Unless the repugnancy between two revenue statutes is clear and positive, so as to leave no doubt as to the intent of the law maker to alter or repeal previous legislation, both laws will be upheld by the Courts (U. S. vs. sixty-seven packages of merchandise, 17 How., 85, cited in G. A. 49; U. S. vs. Claflin, 97 U. S., 546, cited in G. A. 420).

(9) Department Decisions. An unbroken line of Treasury Department rulings, extending over a period of twentytwo years upon the classification of a certain imported article, is such a "long acquiescence" as to be controlling (G. A. 396).

(10) Board of General Appraisers' Decisions. It is not advisable that an existing practic in the classification of an imported article should be changed on account of decisions of the Board of General Appraisers in analogous cases, but such decisions should be applied only to articles identical with those covered thereby, inasmuch as otherwise it would be impracticable to secure a uniform practice at the several ports (T. D. 15098).

(11) Acts in pari materia are undoubtedly to be construed. with reference to each other. If a special meaning were attached to certain words in a prior tariff act, it would be presumed that Congress intended that they should have the same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject matter, but this presumption is not conclusive (Arthur vs. Lahey, 96 U. S., 117; Greenleaf vs. Goodrich, 101 U. S., 281; Maddock vs. Magone, 152 U. S., 372).

(12) Rule of noscitur a sociis. Árticles grouped together

are to be deemed to be of a kindred nature and of kindred materials, unless there is something in the context which repels that inference (Adams vs. Bancroft, 2 Sumn., U. S., 384; Beuttell vs. Magone, 157 U. S., 159).

(13) Conflicting provisions in statutes. Where clauses of a statute appear to conflict, any reasonable mode of construction should be adopted which will make the provisions harmonious, and give effect to the legislative intention declared in each (G. A. 325.) And where two provisions are directly repugnant, the earliest stands impliedly repealed by the latter, and the last prevails (G. A. 325, citing Powers vs. Barney, 5 Blatchf., 202).

(14) The collector to classify the merchandise. (See also Sections 2910, 2911, 2912, Revised Statutes, supra.) It

is the duty of the collector to classify the merchandise, and while the opinion of the appraiser may be considered, it must not control if contrary to the collector's conclusions (T. D. 7113), and the decisions of the Board of General Appraisers should not be applied in merely analogous cases, but in those identical with that covered by such decision (T. D. 15098).

(15) Classification determined as of date of the Act. The classification of the goods is to be determined as of the date the Act was passed, and according to the actual character and condition of the article when imported. The use of the article and method of manufacture arising after the passage of an Act, on the purpose for which the article is now imported, or the use to which it will be ultimately put, are not to be considered (Roseman vs. Hedden, 145 U. S., 561; U. S. vs. Schoolling, 146 U. S., 76; Cadwalade: vs. Zeh, 151 U. S., 171; U. S. vs. Wotton, C. C. A., 53 Fed. Rep., 344; In re Von Blankensteyn, C. C. A., 56 Fed. Rep., 474).

The fact that at the date of the Act, goods of a certain kind had not been manufactured, does not withdraw them from the class to which they belong, when the language of the statute clearly and fairly includes them (Newman vs. Arthur, 109 U. S., 132).

(16) Classification by Commercial Designation. It is a cardinal rule of the Supreme Court that, in fixing the classification of goods for the payment of duties, the name or designation of the goods is to be understood in its known commercial sense, and that their denomination in the market when the law was passed will control their classification without regard to their scientific designation, the material of which they may be made, or the use to which they may be applied (American Net and Twine Co. vs. Worthington, 141 U. S., 471; and cases cited, followed in Erhardt vs. Ullman, C. C. A., 51 Fed. Rep., 414; Worthington vs. Abbott, 124 U. S., 434; Robertson vs. Soloman, 130 U. S., 412; In re Clafflin, C. C. A., 52 Fed. Rep., 123; In re Herrman, C. C. A., 56 Fed. Rep., 478; In re Downing, id. 473). But the scientific designation of an article may in some cases be of value in fixing its proper classifi cation, but where the popular idea of an article in its actual use in the arts, is diametrically opposed to its scientific designation the latter should not prevail (Lutz vs. Magone, 153 U. S., 105).

The inquiry is whether, in a commercial sense, the articles were so known, trafficked in, and used, under the denomination, that Congress, in the use of the particular word, should be presumed to have had that designation in mind as covering such articles. Necessarily the commercial designation is the result of established usage in com

merce and trade, and such usage must be definite, uniform and general, and not partial or local, or personal, from which it may be inferred that Congress intended to use particular words in a particular sense (Maddock vs. Magone 152 U. S., 371; Berbecker vs. Robertson, 152 U. S., 376.) and the commercial meaning is to prevail, unless Congress has clearly manifested a contrary intention, and it is only when no commercial meaning is called for or approved, that the common meaning of the words is to be adopted, (Cadwalader vs. Zeh, 151 U. S., 176, affirmed in Maddock vs. Magone, supra; Toplitz vs. Hedden, 146 U. S., 252; Lutz vs. Magone, 153 U. S., 105; T. D. 14120; G. A. 2828, 3011,) for legislation may show that Congress did not intend to include a particular article under a name including it in commerce. The intention of the law maker is the law (De Forest vs. Lawrence, 13 How., 274; Smythe vs. Fiske, 23 Wall., 374).

The rule is equally applicable where a term is confined in its meaning not merely to commerce, but to a particular trade, and in such case, also, the presumption is that the term was used in its trade signification For example, "wholly or partly finished furniture," in par. 181, Act August 28, 1894 (Hedden vs. Richard, 149 U. S., 346; Cadwalader vs. Zeh, 151 U. S., 171, 176; T. D. 14906). It applies to the description of the article in our own markets, in our domestic as well as our foreign traffic. But where a foreign name is well known here, and no different appellation exists in domestic use, we must presume the legislature used the word in the foreign sense (Two hundred chests of tea, 9 Wheat., U. S., 430; 1 Sumner, U. S., 163). The designation is a fact to be proved like any other-by evidence. (Seeberger vs. Schlesinger, 152 U. S., 585. See also G. A. 2834 and cases cited upon the question of "Fudicial notice" upon matters of common knowledge in trades and manufactures).

In the case of Robertson vs. Salomon (130 U. S., 412) the Court declared that, "Commercial designation' is the first and most important designation to be ascertained in settling the meaning and application of the tariff laws." The Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of In re Clafflin (52 Fed. Rep., 121), in referring to this declaration, said, "Very likely, advantage will be attempted to be taken of the breadth of this declaration to endow mere subordinate fanciful commercial names with an undue importance. *** It must be evident that goods cannot be withdrawn from the operation of a general classification, according to material, by designating them by particular names, which merely indicate a subdivision of the general class named in the statute."

Where goods of a particular kind, which would other

wise be comprehended in a class described by a term having a settled commercial signification, have been described in the laws by a more specific and long continued designation and subjected to a distinct rate of duty from that imposed upon the class generally, they are taken out of that class and regarded in the light in which it is viewed by these Acts, rather than in trade and commerce, whether there be evidence that it is so known in commerce or not. (De Forest vs. Lawrence, 13 How., U. S., 282; Cadwalader vs. Zeh, 151 U. S., 177).

Articles specified in the free list without terms of limitation are exempt from duty, irrespective of the condition in which they may be imported, if they retain their commercial designation (T. D. 9415; G. A. 1916, 2802). But if a new article is produced by a process of manufacture so as to acquire a different commercial use and name, the right to free entry would, of course, be abrogated (Schriefer vs. Wood, 5 Blatchf., U. S., 215, cited in G. A. 2802).

It is the pre

(17) Classification by "predominant use." dominant use to which articles are applied that determines their character for classification (Cadwalader vs. Wannamaker, 149 U. S., 539; Walker vs. Seeberger, id. 541), and a rate of duty based upon the use of an article is a more specific enumeration than a mere designation of the article, accordingly certain "cedar timber, sawed, used in building wharves," was classified under the provision for "timber used in building wharves," and not under "all forms of sawed cedar" (G. A. 852).

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(18) Classification of “Entireties." The mere fact that an article is called an entirety" in the invoice is not controlling, and will not prevent a separate classification, otherwise assessment of duty would be made to depend upon the manner the goods are entered in the invoice. (United States vs. Schoverling, 146 U. S., 76; In re Crowley, C. C. A., 55 Fed. Rep., 283; T. D. 13938, G. A. 812, 1569, 1706, 1718, 2477, 2484, 2487, 2524, 2795. 2898.) Where an article and its indispensable parts are invoiced as an entirety (for example, "Orchestrian and Rollers," see G. A. 812), they should be assessed as an entirety (T. D. 14265, G. A. 812, 2008), or where the portions, although invoiced separately, are united with other materials, so as to form a completed article, they are to be classified as a unit or entirety (T. D. 5656, 8973, 10066; G. A. 368, 591, 711, 3013).

Where different portions of commodities, composed of materials liable to separate rates of duty, can be readily separable for the purpose of classification, each portion will be classified according to its characteristics (T. D.