still so imperfect as it is, all attempts to divine the true nature of the relation between light and heat are premature, and must be in the highest degree insecure and visionary. Speculations in which, from the general assumption of a caloriferous and luminiferous medium, and from a few facts arbitrarily selected and loosely analyzed, a general theory of light and heat is asserted, are entirely foreign to the course of inductive science, and cannot lead to any stable and substantial truth.

20. Other Instruments for measuring Heat.—It does not belong to our present purpose to speak of instruments of which the object is to measure, not sensible qualities, but some effect or modification of the cause by which such qualities are produced: such, for instance, are the Calorimeter, employed by Lavoisier and Laplace, in order to compare the specific heat of different substances; and the Actinometer, invented by Sir John Herschel, in order to determine the effect of the sun's rays by means of the heat which they communicate in a given time; which effect is, as may readily be supposed, very different under different circumstances of atmosphere and position. The laws of such effects may be valuable contributions to our knowledge of heat, but the interpretation of them must depend on a previous knowledge of the relations which temperature bears to heat, according to the views just explained.

SECT. VI. Scales of other Qualities.

21. BEFORE quitting the subject of the measures of sensible qualities, we may observe that there are several other such qualities for which it would be necessary to have scales and means of measuring, in order to make any approach to science on such subjects. This is true, for instance, of tastes and smells. Indeed some attempts have been made towards a classification of the tastes of

sapid substances, but these have not yet assumed any satisfactory or systematic character; and I am not aware that any instruments has been suggested for measuring either the flavour or the odour of bodies which possess such qualities.

22. Quality of Sounds.-The same is true of that kind of difference in sounds which is peculiarly termed their quality; that character by which, for instance, the sound of a flute differs from that of a hautbois, when the note is the same; or a woman's voice from a boy's.

23. Articulate Sounds.-There is also in sounds. another difference, of which the nature is still obscure, but in reducing which to rule, and consequently to measure, some progress has nevertheless been made. I speak of the differences of sound considered as articulate. Classifications of the sounds of the usual alphabets have been frequently proposed; for instance, that which arranges the consonants in the following groups:

It is easily perceived that the relations of the sounds in each of these horizontal lines are analogous; and accordingly the rules of derivation and modification of words in several languages proceed upon such analogies. In the same manner the vowels may be arranged in an order depending on their sound. But to make such arrangements fixed and indisputable, we ought to know the mechanism by which such modifications are caused. Instruments have been invented by which some of these sounds can be imitated; and if such instruments could be made to produce the above series of articulate sounds, by connected and regular processes, we should find, in

the process, a measure of the sound produced. This has been in a great degree effected for the Vowels by Professor Willis's artificial mode of imitating them. For he finds that if a musical reed be made to sound through a cylindrical pipe, we obtain by gradually lengthening the cylindrical pipe, the series of vowels I, E, a, o, u, with intermediate sounds". In this instrument, then, the length of the pipe would determine the vowel, and might be used numerically to express it. Such an instrument so employed would be a measure of vowel quality, and might be called a Phthongometer.

Our business at present, however, is not with instruments which might be devised for measuring sensible qualities, but with those which have been so used, and have thus been the basis of the sciences in which such qualities are treated of; and this we have now done sufficiently for our present purpose.

24. There is another Idea which, though hitherto very vaguely entertained, has had considerable influence in the formation, both of the sciences spoken of in the present Book, and on others which will hereafter come under our notice: namely, the Idea of Polarity. This Idea will be the subject of the ensuing Book. And although this Idea forms a part of the basis of various other extensive portions of science, as Optics and Chemistry, it occupies so peculiarly conspicuous a place in speculations belonging to what I have termed the Mechanico-Chemical Sciences, (Magnetism and Electricity,) that I shall designate the discussion of the Idea of Polarity as the Philosophy of those Sciences.

* Camb. Trans., Vol. I. p. 239.

345

BOOK V.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MECHANICOCHEMICAL SCIENCES.

CHAPTER I.

ATTEMPTS AT THE SCIENTIFIC APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF POLARITY.

1. In some of the mechanical sciences, as Magnetism and Optics, the phenomena are found to depend upon position (the position of the magnet, or of the ray of light,) in a peculiar alternate manner. This dependence, as it was first apprehended, was represented by means of certain conceptions of space and force, as for instance by considering the two poles of a magnet. But in all such modes of representing these alternations by the conceptions borrowed from other ideas, a closer examination detected something superfluous and something defective; and in proportion as the view which philosophers took of this relation was gradually purified from these incongruous elements, and was rendered more general and abstract by the discovery of analogous properties in new cases, it was perceived that the relation could not be adequately apprehended without considering it as involving a peculiar and independent Idea, which we may designate by the term Polarity.

We shall trace some of the forms in which this Idea has manifested itself in the history of science. In doing so we shall not begin, as in other Books of this work

we have done, by speaking of the notion as it is employed in common use: for the relation of polarity is of so abstract and technical a nature, that it is not employed, at least in any distinct and obvious manner, on any ordinary or practical occasions. The idea belongs peculiarly to the region of speculation: in persons of common habits of thought it is probably almost or quite undeveloped; and even most of those whose minds have been long occupied by science, find a difficulty in apprehending it in its full generality and abstraction, and stript of all irrelevant hypothesis.

2. Magnetism.-The name and the notion of Poles were first adopted in the case of a magnet. If we have two magnets, their extremities attract and repel each other alternatively. If the first end of the one attract the first end of the other, it repels the second end, and conversely. In order to express this rule conveniently, the two ends of each magnet are called the north pole and the south pole respectively, the denominations being borrowed from the poles of the earth and heavens. "These poles," as Gilbert says, "regulate the motions of the celestial spheres and of the earth. In like manner the magnet has its poles, a northern and a southern one; certain and determined points constituted by nature in the stone, the primary terms of its motions and effects, the limits and governors of many actions and virtues."

The nature of the opposition of properties of which we speak may be stated thus.

The North pole of one magnet attracts the South pole of another magnet.

The North pole of one magnet repels the North pole of another magnet.

The South pole of one magnet repels the South pole of another magnet.

* De Magn., Lib. 1. c. iii.