what was said in Bowers v. Citizens' Water 13. "From the judgment on this verdict the defendant appeals, and the only practical contention it makes against the plaintiff's right of recovery is that the defendant had never filed a bond or made a definite appropriation of a specific quantity of water which they would require. To these defenses it is only necessary to say in reply that the right of the plaintiff to commence the proceeding by a petition for viewers does not depend either upon the filing of a bond by the defendant or the making of a specific appropriation of a definite quantity of water which they intended to use. The right to commence the proceeding is given by the fortyfirst section of the act of April 22, 1874 (P. L. 104), to either of the parties, and it is sufficient to know that the water was actually taken and used for corporate purposes for more than a year when the petition was presented. If such defenses were permitted to prevail, the company might prevent indefinitely any recovery of damages by the persons injured." ATERS AND SHOWS 2 Act June 19, 1911 (P. L. 1067), providing for the appointing of a state board of censors to regulate the operation and exhibition of moving picture films, is not violative of the Constitution of Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, or of the due process of law provision of Const. U. S. Amend. 14. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 149. 825-838, 840-846; Dec. Dig. 82, 296; Theaters and Shows, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. 2.] TITLE AND SUBJECT4. STATUTES 114 MATTER-STATE BOARD OF CENSORS. The subject-matter of Act June 19, 1911 (P. L. 1067), creating the board of censors, is clearly expressed in the title, which is general in its terms, and does not attempt to furnish an index of its contents, but is sufficient to lead to inquiry beyond the title into the body of the bill to ascertain the extent of the regulations enacted. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. 88 145, 147-149; Dec. Dig. 114.] Appeals from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. Bills by the Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corporation, by the the Mutual Film Corporation of Pennsylvania and another, and by Albert E. Brown and others, trading as the Overbrook Theater, against J. Louis Breitinger, Chief Censor, and E. C. Niver, Assistant Censor, constituting the State Board of Censors. From decrees refusing injunction, In the case at bar the statute gave appellant the right to commence the proceeding by asking for the appointment of viewers to assess damages for the injuries sustained, and if this right be denied, the city may indefinitely prevent the recovery of damages, just as is pointed out in the language of this court above quoted. We think it is clear that the statute of limitations is not a bar to a recovery in the present case, and that the property of appellant has been injured to such an extent as to constitute a taking within the meaning of the Constitution. It plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. therefore follows that appellant is within On motion for a preliminary injunction, its legal rights in presenting a petition ask-Martin, P. J., filed the following opinion in ing for the appointment of viewers to assess damages. Order reversed, petition reinstated, and record remitted, with direction to appoint viewers as prayed for; costs of this appeal to be paid by appellee. MOSCHZISKER, J., dissents. (250 Pa. 225) BUFFALO BRANCH, MUTUAL FILM COR- 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURTS. 48-PROVINCE OF Nothing but a clear violation of the Constitution will authorize the courts to declare a statute unconstitutional. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. 48.] 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81 "POLICE POWER"-EXTENT. the court of common pleas: Four separate bills in equity were filed against J. Louis Breitinger, chief censor, and E. C. Niver, assistant censor, constituting the state board of censors. The Buffalo Branch Mutual Film Corporation, is a New York corporation, with its principal place of business in the city of Buffalo, and doing business in Pennsylvania. The Mutual Film Corporation of Pennsylvania is a Pennsylvania corporation, and the Interstate Films Company is a New Jersey corporation, with its principal place of business in Philadelphia. The Pittsburgh Photoplay Company is a Pennsylvania corporation, with its principal place of business in Pittsburgh. Albert E. Brown, William Sachsenmaier, and Vernon R. Carrick are copartners, trading as the "Overbrook Theater." The bills filed by these corporation plaintiffs are substantially similar in terms, and aver that an act of assembly of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania was approved June 19, 1911 (P. L. 1067), pursuant to the directions of which the Governor appointed the defendants, J. Louis Breitinger, chief censor, and E. C. Niver, assistant censor, to constitute the state board of censors, and that they have entered upon their duties. The bills allege that the act of assembly and the appointments are unconThe police power of the commonwealth ex-stitutional and void; that plaintiffs are engaged tends to all regulations affecting the health, in the business of operating motion picture film good order, morals, peace, and safety of society, exchanges, and sell and rent films or reels in and under it restrictions and burdens not in conflict with constitutional principles may be imposed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 148; Dec. Dig. 81. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Police Power.] the state of Pennsylvania to motion picture exhibitors, and have invested large sums of money in the business; that none of the films or reels rented, or intended to be rented, are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, immoral, or such as tend to corrupt morals; that defendants published a pamphlet of rules and standards adopted by the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes On behalf of defendants a representative of the General Film Company testified that his company had submitted its films to the censorship; that the market value was not thereby depreciated; that it was not impossible to produce them in the time intended to release them; and that his company was not burdened by the payment of the fee required by the act. Counsel for defendants expressed at the bar of the court a desire to file an answer to the bill of complaint in one of the cases and intention to file answers in all the cases. Counsel for plaintiffs suggested that the answers be considered as filed, and the application for an injunction be considered as a final hearing, and promised to file a replication, but neither answers nor replications have been filed, and the application now before the court is upon motion for a preliminary injunction. board, which was issued on or about April 25th, [ of trial by jury. Application was made for a and came into the hands of plaintiffs on or about preliminary injunction. May 10, 1914; that the films owned by plain- At the hearing testimony was taken by plaintiffs and rented in Pennsylvania are produced tiffs in support of some of the allegations of in other states of the Union and shipped in in- the bills to show the character and number of terstate commerce, and rented and received by films produced and the length of time necessary lessees for exhibition purposes; that the act to examine them. is in violation of section 1, art. 14, of the Constitution of the United States, in that it abridges plaintiffs' right in the transaction of business with citizens of states other than Pennsylvania; that it is arbitrary and inflicts a tax and burden on plaintiffs which is unlawful and contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; that the fees provided in it are exorbitant; that it is in contravention of the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in that plaintiffs are subjected to the arbitrary action of defendants, from which there is no provision for appeal, and that the act is an unwarranted interference with plaintiffs' right to carry on lawful business, make contracts, or use and enjoy their property; that it is unconstitutional because it imposes a legal duty beyond the police powers of the General Assembly as a condition precedent to the right to rent films, of obtaining approval of defendants, and which approval may be withheld in their discretion without hearing and without right of appeal, if, in their judgment, the films are sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, immoral, or such as tend to corrupt morals, and that plaintiffs are deprived of the right to pursue a lawful business and the freedom to contract, and of their property without due process of law or the equal protection of the laws; that the extreme penalties imposed evidences an intent to limit or prevent judicial inquiry as to the validity of the act, and that fear of fines will prevent exhibitors from renting films; that the act attempts to give defendants legislative power, and delegates to them power to determine judicial questions without right of appeal to any court; and that it restrains the right of plaintiffs to freely write and publish their sentiments, guaranteed by the Constitution. The bills further allege that defendants have demanded that plaintiffs submit to them for approval or rejection films or reels to be exhibited, and threatened to refuse to allow films to be rented to exhibitors unless plaintiffs comply with the demand, and have threatened to cause the arrest of all persons who seek to place on exhibition films not censored or passed upon, approved, and stamped by them; that it will be impossible for defendants to inspect all films and reels which plaintiffs and others desire to rent to parties who exhibit in the state of Pennsylvania with sufficient rapidity to permit them to carry on business in the regular course, and that the delay which will be occasioned if the films must be submitted to defendants before they are produced will cause great and irreparable injury to plaintiffs' business; that the tax for censoring films imposes an illegal and oppressive burden upon the plaintiffs; that the operation of the act amounts to an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce and the deprivation of the property and liberty of plaintiffs without due process of law. [1] Nothing but a clear violation of the Constitution-a clear usurpation of power prohibited-will justify the judicial department in pronouncing an act of the legislative department unconstitutional and void. The constitutionality of an act of assembly cannot be tried by the motives and designs of the lawmakers, however plainly expressed. If the act itself is within the scope of their authority, it must stand. Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265, 7 Atl. 913, 60 Am. Rep. 350. It was said in Com. v. Keary, 198 Pa. 500, 48 Atl. 472: "It must not be lost sight of that the attitude of courts is not one of hostility to acts whose constitutionality is attacked. On the contrary, all the presumptions are in their favor, as the courts are not to be astute in finding or sustaining objections." ""To justify a court in pronouncing an act of the Legislature unconstitutional and void, either in whole or in part, it must be able to vouch some exception or prohibition clearly expressed or necessarily implied. To doubt is to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act.' Prima facie the legislative authority is absolute, except where expressly limited. This is the uniform principle of all political and legal views, and of all constructions recognized by constitutional law." v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, at pages 554, 555, 49 Atl. 351, at pages 357, 358 (53 L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St. Rep. 801). Com. "The rule of law upon this subject appears to be that, except where the Constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the state, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protection against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives The bills pray that the act of June 19, 1911 of the people. If this fail, the people in their (P. L. 1067), be declared unconstitutional; that sovereign capacity can correct the evil; but the defendants be enjoined temporarily until courts cannot assume their rights. The juhearing and perpetually thereafter from enforc- diciary can only arrest the execution of a ing its provisions, or from inquiring into and statute when it conflicts with the Constitution. investigating the films or reels sold or rented It cannot run a race of opinions upon points by plaintiffs, or from approving or disapproving of right, reason, and expediency with the lawsuch moving picture films; and for general re-making power. * * If the courts are not lief. In the case of the Overbrook Theater, the individuals composing the firm aver that they are engaged in exhibiting moving pictures in the state of Pennsylvania, and, in addition to the general averments of unconstitutionality of the act of assembly set forth in the other bills, alleged that it denies to these plaintiffs the right at liberty to declare statutes void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to violate fundamental principles of republican government, unless it should be found that these principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution.' Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, c. 7, 88 4, 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. 544, 555, 60 Atl. | of the public health. By reference to the act in question it clearly appears that it is an exercise of the police power of the state, enacted to conserve the morals and manners of the public, and, as such, its purport is within the scope of legislative authority. [2, 3] Amongst the powers of the states not surrendered to the general government are the police powers exercised by passing laws to promote the peace, safety, good order, health, and interests of the state. When a state exercises her sovereign power in a matter involving the interests of her citizens, though it may touch upon a subject within the power to regulate commerce, it is not invalid unless it conflicts with a law of Congress on the same subject. Craig & Blanchard v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399, 408, 409, 3 Am. Rep. 636. "It is more despotic and broader in its action than the right of eminent domain, caring for the public health and morals of the community, restraining individuals from interfering with them, and when it is found necessary to take private property under the police power, no compensation need be given the owner, unless expressly provided by statute. It is the application of the personal right or principle of self-preservation of the body politic.' Bouvier's Law Dictionary, under the title "Police Power," p. 692. This power, as was said in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U. S. 129, at page 138 [21 L. Ed. 929], 'extends to all regulations affecting the health, good order, mor als, peace, and safety of society, and under it all sorts of restrictions and burdens are imposed, and, when they are not in conflict with any constitutional principles, they cannot be successfully assailed in a judicial tribunal.'" The promotion of public morals and public health is a chief function of government, to be exercised at all times as occasion may require. The method by which the result may be accomplished depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and the largest legislative discretion is allowed. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. Ed. 989. "The police power of the state," says Judge Orlady in Com. v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 5, 15, “is difficult of definition, but it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience, and morals of the community which does not encroach on a like power vested in Congress or state Legislatures by the federal Constitution, or does not violate the provisions of the organic law; and it has been expressly held that the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution was not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power by the state. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 [8 Sup. Ct. 992, 1257, 32 L. Ed. 253]; Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265 [7 Atl. 913, 60 Am. Rep. 350]. Its essential quality, as a governmental agency, is that it imposes upon persons and property burdens designed to pronote the safety and welfare of the public at large. The principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law was embodied, in substance, in the Constitutions of nearly all, if not all, of the states at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and it has never been reWheth-garded as incompatible with the principle, equally vital, because equally essential to the peace and safety of society, that all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community." In Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80, 85, 22 Am. Rep. 738, Chief Justice Agnew said: "The argument in this case took an extended range of discussion upon the powers of the state, of eminent domain, and police. In their leading features these powers are plainly different, the latter reaching even to destruction of property, as in tearing down a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration, or to removal at the expense of the owner, as in the case of a nuisance tending to breed disease. * er the prohibited act or omission shall be made a criminal offense, punishable under the general laws, or subject to punishment under muLicipal by-laws, or, on the other hand, the party be deprived of all remedy for any right which, but for the regulation, he might have had against other persons, are questions which the Legislature must decide. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 890." Numerous cases of regulation and control of the use of private property in the exercise of the police power are cited in the opinion of the lower court in the case of Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265, 7 Atl. 913, 60 Am. Rep. 350, and many others are enumerated by counsel in the argument in that case presented to the Supreme Court. It was held in Com. v. Keary, 198 Pa. 500, 48 Atl. 472, that the act of May 6, 1863 (P. L. 582), making it unlawful for persons not possessed of a certificate of authority to act as agent for a railroad, steamboat, or public conveyance, and sell tickets, does not contravene the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or the interstate commerce clause. In Com. v. Andrews, 211 Pa. 110, 60 Atl. 554, affirming an appeal from the superior court, it was held that section 9 of the act of May 29. 1901 (P. L. 327), conferring jurisdiction upon the court of quarter sessions to issue restraining orders forbidding the sale of oleomargarine without a license, was a constitutional exercise of the police power; that no question of the right of trial by jury arises; and, if it did, that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the Legislature from declaring new offenses and defining the mode by which the guilt of persons accused may be determined. It was said by Henderson, J., in the superior court: "The statute was enacted under the police power of the commonwealth for the preservation "In the exercise of the police power of the state it [the Legislature] may enact laws in the interest of public morals, and to protect the lives, health, and safety of persons following specified callings, and thus indirectly interfere with freedom of contract"-i. e., with individual liberty and the right to acquire and use property. Rice, P. J., in Com. v. Brown, 8 Pa. Super. Ct., 339, 351, 352. "The police power is distinguished from the right of eminent domain in that the state, by exercising the latter right, takes private property for public use, thereby entitling the owner to compensation under the Constitution, while the police power, founded as it is on the maxim, 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas,' is exerted to make that maxim effective by regulating the use and enjoyment of property by the cwner, or, if he is deprived of his property altogether, it is not taken for public use, but rather destroyed in order to conserve the safety, morals, health, or general welfare of the public, and in neither case is the owner entitled to compensation, for the law either regards his loss as damnum absque injuria or considers him sufficiently compensated by sharing in the general * benefits resulting from the exercise of the police power. 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2_Ed.) 916." Com. v. Plymouth Coal Co., 232 Pa. 141, 149, 81 Atl. 148, 151. * The right to control the person as well as property was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 26, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 I Ed. 643, 3 Ann. Cas. 765, where the defendant insisted that his liberty was invaded when the state subjected him to fine or imprisonment for refusing to submit to vaccination. The court | payment of $2.50 by vessels during quarantine said: "In Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 89 [11 Sup. Ct. 13, 15 (34 L. Ed. 620)], we said: "The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoy ment of the same right by others. It is then liberty regulated by law.' Whatever may be thought of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be affirmed to be beyond question, in palpable conflict with the Constitution." It was held in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581, 88 Atl. 775, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 157, that uncompensated obedience to a regulation enacted for the public welfare or safety under the police power of the state is not taking property without due compensation, and any injuries sustained in obeying such regulation is but damnum absque injuria, and such requirement is not in violation of the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts, and that, the act of June 19, 1911 (P. L. 1053), being a valid exercise of police power by the Legislature, the fact that railroad companies affected by it must make additional expenditures to comply with its provisions is an immaterial matter, so far as the courts are concerned. In Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 52 N. E. 44, 48 L. R. A. 230, the fact that young persons of weak and immature minds are more liable to use tobacco in the form of cigarettes than in any other form was considered sufficient to authorize the city to single out, regulate, and license the sale of tobacco in that form without including any other form of tobacco. In the exercise of police powers by legislative bodies, the delegation of administrative duties may be made to subordinate bodies. * In Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498, 13 Am. Rep. 716, it was said by Agnew, J.: "What is more common than to appoint commissioners under a law to determine things upon the decision of which the act is to operate in one way or another? ** Take the case of granting a license to keep an inn and sell liquor. The judge determines whether the license is necessary, and, if not necessary, the law says to the applicant, 'No license.' The law takes effect just as the judge determines; yet who says it is the court that legislates? The true distinction, I conceive, is this: The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation. months specified in the act. and compelled them to stop at the lazaretto to be examined by the physician and quarantine master, and provided that before any part of the cargo or baggage was landed, or any person permitted to leave or board the ship, the examination required by the act should be perfected, under a penalty of $500, and if it appeared, upon examination, that the vessel came from a port at which a malignant or contagious disease prevailed, the act provided that it should be detained at the lazaretto for such time as the board of health deemed necessary, not exceeding 20 days, and the board was authorized to determine what measure should be pursued to cleanse the vessel and restore the health of diseased persons on board, which direction should be carried into execution at the expense of the master, owners, or consignees of the vessel and goods. At the expiration of said time, if it should appear to the physician and quarantine master that certain diseases had not occurred on the vessel, and the physician and quarantine master certified the facts to the board of health, and expressed the opinion that the vessel might be safely suffered to proceed to the city, the captain could proceed, unless the board of health deemed it necessary to cause a further detention of the vessel, or the cargo, or of the crew or passengers, or of any baggage on board, in which case it was to be detained until the board of health gave authority to proceed and enter the city. It was also made the duty of the board to cause nuisances which, in their opinion, endangered the health of the citizens to of the city at the expense of the owner of the be removed from the streets or any other parts premises on which any nuisance was found. The laws relating to building inspection make it unlawful to erect, alter, repair, or remove any building unless a permit is obtained from the bureau of building inspection, or to erect any building except in conformity with plans and specifications approved by the bureau. The appeal provided by the act lies to the board, and from the board to the director of public safety, who appoints an examining commission of three experts, any two of which may make a decision. The ordinance of March 28, 1894, makes it unlawful to repair, reconstruct, or remove any frame building which has been injured more than 50 per cent. of its original value by wear and tear, or by the effects of the elements, or by fire, and the value is to be determined by the bureau of building inspection. In Kennedy v. Board of Health, 2 Pa. 366, it was held that the board has final jurisdiction in determining the fact of the existence of a nuisance which they order to be removed. In United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563, it was held that Congress acted within its constitutional power in conferring authority on the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules under the acts establishing forest reserves, to regulate their use for grazing sheep and other legal purposes, and that the power conferred was administrative, and and not legislative. The defendants were inIf a determining power cannot be conferred by dicted for grazing sheep on a reservation without law, there can be no law that is not absolute, obtaining permission of the Secretary of Agriunconditional, and peremptory; and nothing culture. It was argued that the act of Congress which is unknown, uncertain, and contingent can was unconstitutional, in so far as it delegated be the subject of law. Half the stat- to the secretary power to make rules and reguutes on our books are in the alternative, depend-lations, and made the violation a penal offense. ing on the discretion of some person or persons It was said by Mr. Justice Lamar (220 U. S. to whom is confided the duty of determining 516, 31 Sup. Ct. 482, 55 L. Ed. 563): "In the whether the proper occasion exists for executing nature of things it was impracticable for Conthem. But it cannot be said the exercise of such a discretion is the making of the law." The act of January 29, 1818 (P. L. 38), is an illustration of the exercise of legislative power in appointing and vesting authority in administrative officers. The board of health was constituted and authorized to make general rules in the * gress to provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management. Each reservation had its peculiar and special features; and in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these local conditions Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him of the government various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations, not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions 'power to fill up the details' by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress." In Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 607, a park board was given authority to make rules and regulations for the control and governIt was held ment of roadways under its care. that a provision in the act making infractions of the rules breaches of the peace, punishable in any court having jurisdiction, was not a delegation of legislative power. The court referred to the fact that the punishment was not fixed by the board, saying that the making of the rules was administrative, while the substantive legislation was in the statute, which provided that they should be punished as breaches of the peace. But the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative character because the violation there of is punished as a public offense. In Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. 356, 54 L. Ed. 435, it was held that Congress may, in order to enforce its enactments, clothe an executive officer with power to ascertain whether certain specified facts exist, and thereupon to act in a prescribed manner, without delegating, in a constitutional sense, legislative or judicial power to such officer. It was said, referring to the power of the Secretary of War to require the removal of obstructions to navigation (216 U. S. 195, 30 Sup. Ct. 361, 54 L. Ed. 435): "It is for Congress, under the Constitution, to regulate the right of navigation by all appropriate means, to declare what is necessary to be done in order to free navigation from obstruction, and to prescribe the way in which the question of obstruction shall be determined. Its action in the premises cannot be revised or ignored by the courts or by juries, except that when it provides for an investigation of the facts, upon notice and after hearing, before final action is taken, the courts can see to it that executive officers conform their action to the mode prescribed by Congress. Learned counsel for the defendant suggests some extreme cases showing how reckless and arbitrary might be the action of executive officers proceeding under an act of Congress the enforce ment of which affects the enjoyment or value of private property. It will be time enough to deal with such cases as and when they arise. Suffice it to say that the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by technical rules that they could not find some remedy consistent with the law for acts, whether done by government or by individual persons, that violated natural justice or were hostile to the fundamental principles devised for the protection of the essential rights of property.' In Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 26 Sup. Ct. 144, 50 L. Ed. 305, an act providing that no milk should be received or held or delivered without a written permit from the board of health was held constitutional, and that a state has the right, in the exercise of the police power, and with a view to protect the public health and welfare, to make reasonable regulations in regard to such occupations as may, if unrestrained, become unsafe or dangerous, and the conferring of discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on such a trade or business is not violative of the fourteenth amendment, as depriving those engaged in that business of their property without due process of law or denying them the equal protection of It the laws, and that there is no presumption that a In Com. v. Kevin, 202 Pa. 23, 51 Atl. 594, 90 Am. St. Rep. 613, the act of June 26, 1895 (P. L. 317), known as the "Pure Food Law," was held constitutional and a proper exercise of the police power of the state. Mr. Justice Mestrezat (202 Pa. 29, 51 Atl. 596, 90 Am. St. Rep. 613), quoting from Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265, 7 Atl. 913, 60 Am. Rep. 350, said: "The manufacture, sale, and keeping with intent to sell may all alike be prohibited by the Legislature, if, in their judgment, the protection of the public from injury or fraud requires it. To deny the authority of the Legislature to do so is to attack all that is vital in the police power. To refuse recognition of the power in a given case because, in the judgment of some, the Legislature, though acting within its proper sphere, may have mistaken the public necessity for a law prohibitory in its character, is to make the individual judgment superior to that of the Legislature, to which the people in their sovereign capacity have delegated the lawmaking power." The case of Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 34 Sup. Ct. 359, 58 L. Ed. 713, on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, was affirmed, and it was held that the business of mining coal was attended with dangers which render it a proper subject of police regulation by the state, and that it is not an unreasonable exercise of the power to require owners of adjoining properties to cause boundary pillars to be left in the ground of sufficient width to safeguard the employés of either mine, in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water, although the regulation prevents the removal and marketing of the coal contained in the pillars; and in determining whether the constitutional rights of a party have been affected by a state statute the courts will presume, until the contrary is shown, that any administrative body to which power is delegated will act with reasonable regard to property rights, that in matters of police regulation, where decisions on questions of public safety are delegated to an administrative board, the right of appeal on other than constitutional grounds may be withheld by the Legislature, in its discretion, without denying due process of law, and that the statute is not unconstitutional, either as depriving the owners of their property without due process of law, or as denying them equal protection of the law, or because of the procedure and method prescribed for determining the width of the barrier delegating the matter to an administrative board without providing for any appeal. Mr. Justice Pitney, in the opinion (232 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 361, 58 L. Ed. 713), cites the case of Curran v. Delano, 235 Pa. 478, 485, 84 Atl. 452, and adds: "The Legislature |