of any particular locality, but for the public at large, the case is very different. It then becomes utterly unjust to charge the cost of what is purely a public improvement, designed exclusively for the general welfare upon the property of a few individuals, who however they may be incidentally benefited, have neither been consulted, nor their profit or convenience regarded. There is some show of reason why the original cost of grading and paving a street in a populous municipality should be charged upon the adjacent property, for it receives from the improvement some benefit of a local character, but when this is done it has fully paid for all its local advantages, and it cannot thereafter be charged for maintenance and repairs. Penn Sup. Ct. Jan. 4, 1886. In re Paving of Tenth Street. Opinion by Gordon, J. * restrictions on that business. His gains are increased, and he must bear the consequences. The fact that he has given orders not to sell to minors only showss bona fide intent to obey the law, which all the authorities say is immaterial, in determining guilt. The court may regard such fact in graduating punishment, when it has a discretion. The cases therefore which hold that such orders will exculpate the princi pal are inconsistent with the rule that in such case intent is immaterial. If intent is not an ingredient in the offense, it logically follows that it must be immaterial whether orders are given or not, for he who does by another that which he cannot lawfully do in person must be responsible for the agent's act, in fact it is his act. If the principal makes such sale at his peril, and is not excusable because he did not know or was deceived, for the reason that he was bound to know, and if he was not certain, should decline to sell or take the hazard, it cannot be that, by setting another to do his work, and occupying himself elsewhere and otherwise, he can reap the benefit of his agent's sales, and escape the consequences of the agent's conduct. It would be impossible to effectually enforce a statute of this kind if that were allowed, and no license would ever be suppressed. The law would soon become a dead letter. Md. Ct. App. June 23, 1885. Carroll v. State. Opinion by Irving, J. RULE OF EVIDENCE.-A statute providing that "it shall not be necessary to prove an actual sale of intoxicating liquors in any building, place or tenement in order to establish the character of such premises as a common nuisance, but the notorious character of any such premises * * shall be evidence that such premises are nuisances within the meaning of * * * this chapter," is constitutional, the jury free to acquit or convict upon the whole evidence. Doubtless there is a distinction, observed by careful writers, between character and reputation; "character," where the distinction is observed, signifying the reality and "reputation" merely what is reported as understood from report to be the realty, about a person or thing. The word "character" however is often used as synonymous with and in the sense of “reputation." We think it is clearly so used in section 3. The word is used twice in section 3, first in its more proper sense and secondly as synonymous with reputation. To hold that the word has the same sense in both instances would be to hold that the General Assembly has enacted the self evident proposition that "the notorious character of the premises" shall be evidence of their character. To interpret the word as used in section 3 the second time as synonymous with reputation does not render section 3 unconstitutional within either State v. Kartz, 13 R. I. 528, or State v. Beswick, id. 211. The fault of the provision condemned in State v. Kartz was that it made mere reputation criminal and so exposed a man to punishment as a criminal for what other people said about him. The fault of the provision condemned in State v. Beswick was that it made reputation prima facie evidence and thus made it the duty of the jury to convict on such evidence, if unrebutted, whether satisfied by it of the guilt of the accused or not. Section 3, as we in-plained of as a common seller, whereas, in the present terpret it, simply makes the reputation of a place evidence of its character, but it leaves the jury free to find the accused guilty or not according as they are satisfied of his guilt or not by the evidence. no reason to think that such an enactment is unconstitutional. R. I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 1885. State v. Wilson. Opinion by Durfee, C. J. We see CRIMINAL LAW-SALE OF INTOXICANTS TO MINORSAGENT'S DISOBEDIENCE.-A licensed liquor dealer is criminally liable for the sale of intoxicating liquors by his bar-tender to minors, although he has forbidden him to make such sales. Com. v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6; McCutcheon v. People, 64 Ill. 606; Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398; State v. Hartfield, 24 Wis. 60: Ulrich v. Com., 6 Bush, 400; Redgate v. Haynes, 1 Q. B. Div. 89; Mullins v. Collins, L. R., 9 Q. B. 294; Conedy v. Le Cocq, 23 Am. Law Reg. 758. When the agent, as in this case, is set to do the very thing which, and which only, the principal's business contemplates, namely, the dispensing of liquors to purchasers, the principal must be chargeable with the agent's violation of legal WIFE, WHEN UNDER CONTROL OF HUSBAND.The defendant was tried for keeping a common nuisance. It appeared at the trial that sales of liquor were made by her twice in her husband's presence, aud once while he was in the yard. Held, that an instruction to the jury that "no presumption arises that sales made by the wife, when the husband is on the estate, or on the premises, not in her presence, are made under constraint of the husband, and the defendant would be liable for any such sale so made," was erroneous, as tending to instruct the jury that the husband must be immediately and visibly present, or the wife would be liable. It is true that if the wife acts in the absence of her husband, there is no presumption that she acts under his coercion; but if the husband is near enough for the wife to act under his immediate influence and control, though not in the same room, he is not absent, within the meaning of the law. Com. v. Burk, 11 Gray, 437, 438. This principle was restated and applied in a case where, if it appeared at all where the husband was, he was in the barn while the sales were made in the house. Com. v. Munsey, 112 Mass. 287. That case was, if any thing, stronger than the present; for there the wife was com case (for keeping a nuisance), the sales do not constitute the offense, but are only evidence of it (Com. v. Patterson, 138 Mass. 498), and as the husband "was a cripple, generally at home, except that he could hop out," it is conceivable that his wife might be so far free from his influence as to be answerable for the sale, and yet not so independent as to be deemed to have acquired control of the place. See Com. v. Churchill, 136 Mass. 148, 151. The ruling sustained in Com. v. Roberts, 132 Mass. 267, concerned unlawful sales made by a woman while her husband was at sea, and while therefore his absence could not be disputed. Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 1886. Commonwealth v. Flaherty. Opinion by Holmes, J. jects of compensation." Deuslow v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 16 Conn. 103; St. Helena Water Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182; S. C., 45 Am. Rep. 659. The same requirements should apply equally to the taking of water from a stream in which the plaintiffs have valuable riparian rights, as to the taking of land. Both are equally the subjects of property and of compensation. Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 526. By the statutes and hereditaments connected therewith, and all interests therein. The riparian proprietor may insist that this his right to the use of water flowing in a natural stream shall be regarded and protected as property. Nuttall v. Bracewell, L. R., 2 Exch. 9. Such right is not a mere easement or appurtenance, but is inseparably annexed to the soil itself. Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 7 Exch. 299; Cary v. Daniels, 8 Metc. 480. And the damage for the taking of such right may be greater or less according to the quantity of water diverted, as the damage may be greater or less when measured by the quantity of land taken. If it be necessary therefore that the taking of land thus appropriated to public use be evidenced by some writing defining it by definite and specific boundaries, for the same reason should there be like evidence of the measure or quantity of water thus taken. Without this, no proper estimate of damages could be made. Without this, no proper protection would be afforded to the parties without resorting to the "uncertainties of conflicting testimony." Maine Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1886. Harnor v. Bar Harbor Water Co. Opinion by Foster, J. erasure of the name was an injury to the voter, for It EMINENT DOMAIN — WATER-COURSE - EVIDENCE.Interests in water are subject to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and the taking must be evidenced in the same way as the taking of land. The act authorizing the the defendants to take, detain and use the water from the sources and for the purposes therein specified is constitutional. The decisions are numerous that private property may be taken by the sovereign power of the government in the exercise of the right of eminent domain for purposes of public utility. That this may be done when the object is to supply a village or community with pure water, and though the agency by which it is done may be a private corporation, thereby deriving profit and advantage to itself, is not denied. In such case the interests of the public, from considerations affecting the health and comfort of densely populated communities, require that private property may be thus appropriated for uses which are deemed public. It is thus that the right of the property of private individuals, whether it be in lands, or the usufructuary interest in flowing water, is made to subserve the public exigencies, and for which, under the Constitution, "just compensation" is guaranteed and must be made. "It is true the injury in the one case is to the land, and in the other to the water; but this can make no difference in the result. Interests in water, as well as in land, may be taken under this act; and both are equally the sub FRAUD-BOND-MERE OPINION AS TO THE LAW.— A. conveyed to T., by warranty deed, a parcel of land, one boundary of which was described in these words: "To a stake and stones on the shore of Penobscot bay, thonce south-westerly by said shore to the extremity of Squam Point." A third party had a right of fishery, by prior deed, in the waters on that side of the parcel, with all privileges necessary for carrying on the same, and this prior deed was not mentioned in A.'s deed to T. An action of trespass had been brought by the third party against T., and judgment recovered, but damages had not been assessed or execution issued. T. represented to A. that by reason of the covenants contained in his deed A. was liable to pay whatever damages and costs should be recovered in the trespass suit, and A. thereupon executed a bond to T. for the payment of the same. Held, upon a bill in equity brought to cancel that bond, that the representations were not such as would warrant a court of equity to interfere. Professor Pomeroy, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, discussing the nature of fraud and misrepresentations cognizable by a court of equity, says: "A misrepresentation of the law is not considered as amounting to fraud, because, as is generally said, all persons are presumed to know the law; and it might perhaps be added that such a statement would rather be the expression of an opinion than the assertion of a fact." 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 877. In Fish v. Clelland, 33 Ill. 243, the principle is expressed in these words: "A representation of what the law will or will not permit to be done is one on which the party to whom it is made has no right to rely, and if he does so it is his folly, and he cannot ask the law to relieve him from the consequences. The truth or falsehood of such a representation can be tested by ordinary vigilance and attention. It is an opinion in regard to the law, and is always understood as such." To the same effect may be cited the following authorities: Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 50; Star v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 303: Lewis v. Jones, 4 B. & C. 512; Grant v. Grant, 56 Me. 573. By this it should not be understood that we mean to say that there need be no case of misrepre sentation in regard to the law where a court of equity INFANCY-NECESSARIES-HORSE-OFFER TO RETURN In "But it has been pithily and happily said that neces saries do not include horses, saddles, liquors, bridles, pistols, powder, whips and fiddles." A verdict awarding compensation against an infant for the hire of horses and gigs was set aside in Harrison v. Fane, 1 Man. & G. 550, as perverse. In Wharton v. MacKenzie, 5 Q. B. 606, Coleridge, J., very strongly declares that horses are not necessaries. The case of Hart v. Prater, 1 Jur. 623, cannot be justly considered as an exception to the general rule, for although it was there held that a horse was a necessary, it was so because the infant had been directed to use one by his medical adviser, Sir Benjamin Brodie. In such a case as that it may well be that a horse is a necessary in the same sense that medicine and medical services are necessaries. Ind. Sup. Ct., Feb. 12, 1886. House v. Alexander. Opinion by Elliott, J. MASTER AND SERVANT-INCOMPETENT FELLOW-SEE- VANTS-PRESUMPTION-CONTRIBUTORY -The contention of appellant is that where one is em ployed as an operative in a particular branch of service, he is bound to investigate and find out at his peril whether the common master has used reasona ble care and prudence in the selection of those already employed in the same branch of service. The law imposes no such duty. One thus employed is warranted in assuming that the master has discharged his duty in this respect, and until notice to the contrary is brought home to the employee he may safely act upon that hypothesis. All that the law demands of one thus employed is that he keep his eyes open to what is passing before him, and avail himself of such informa tion as he may receive with respect to the habits and characteristics of his fellow servants, and if from either of these sources he finds one of them, from incompetency or other cause, renders his own position extra hazardous, it is his duty to notify the master, and if the latter refuses to discharge the incompetent or otherwise unfit fellow servant the complaining servant will have no other alternative but to quit the master's employ. If he does not, he will be deemed to have assumed the extra hazard of his position thus occasioned. The case suggested, it will be perceived, is one of mutual negligence. On the part of the master it is negligence to retain the derelict servant in his employ. It is, on the other hand, negligence in the complaining servant to continue longer in the master's service unless he intends to assume the extra risk himself. Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 25, 1886. U. S. Rolling Stock Co. v. Wilder. Opinion by Mulkey, J. AND DEMAND OF PRICE.-An infant bought and paid for a horse, and subsequently tendered it back and demanded the money paid. Held, recoverable. Appellant's counsel quoted from 1 Pars. Cont. 322 the following: "If an infant advances money on a voidable contract, which he afterward rescinds, he cannot recover the money back, because it is lost to him by his own act, and the privilege of infancy does not extend so far as to restore this money, unless it was obtained by fraud." This is not, and never was the law. Shurtleff v. Millard, 12 R. I. 272; S. C., 34 Am. Rep. 640, the court expressly repudiated Mr. Parsons' statement, saying: "He cites no authority. The doctrine so broadly laid down has been overruled by later authorities, and this passage has been condemned in Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102-104. Still the last edition of the text-books take no notice of the fact." There is some conflict in the authorities as to whether an infant may avoid a contract and recover the money paid upon it, without returning the property received by him, but there is no substantial difference upon the proposition that where he tenders back all that he receives, and seeks a recovery of the money paid by him he is entitled to recover it. Our cases, beginning as far back at least as Miles v. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 385, hold that there may be a recovery, although the property received is not restored; but in this instance our decision stops far short of that, for here the contract was not for the infant's benefit, and he offers to restore the property received. The theory of the third paragraph of the plaintiff's answer is that the horse bought of him was a necessary, for the reason that the appellee was engaged in farming, and needed the horse in order to successfully carry on his business. The theory is unsound. The law does not encourage persons to engage in business during nonage, but on the contrary, its policy is to keep infants from engaging in business until they have attained full age, and upon this ground it is uniformly held that articles purchased for business purposes, whether that of agriculture or commerce, cannot be deemed necessaries. This is the law as the courts declare, even though the infant depends upon his business for support. Lowe v. Griffith, 1 Scott, 458; Latt v. Booth, 3 C. & K. 292; Mason v. Wright, 13 Metc. 308; Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Decell v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331; Grace v. Hale, 2 Humph. 28; 1 Rol. Abr. 729; 2 Cro. 494. Horses are not necessaries. The court affirmed this general rule in Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind. 30, saying: MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS APPROPRIATIONS FOR PUBLIC CONCERTS-STATUTE.-The question is whether a statute can be interpreted to authorize a city to appropriate money for public concerts by a band. The statute was passed after the decision in Hood v. Mayor, etc., 1 Allen, 103, that the celebration of the Fourth of July was not among the "other necessary charges" for which towns were authorized to expend money. Pub. Stat., ch. 27, § 10. It provided that by a yea and nay vote of two-thirds of the members of each branch present and voting, city councils might appropriate a comparatively small sum-not over onefiftieth of one per cent of the valuation for the year-for armories, for the celebration of holidays, and for other public purposes. The word "other" implies that the celebration of holidays is a public purpose within the meaning of the act, and indicates that purposes which are public only in that sense are included within its scope, although they look rather more obviously to increasing the picturesqueness and interests of life than to the satisfaction of rudimentary wants, which alone we generally recog le i. E gize as necessary. We know of no simple and merely logical test by which the limit can be fixed. It must be determined by practical considerations. The question is one of degree. But in reply to the petitioner's argument, we may say that if the purpose is within the act we do not see why the city council may not create the occasion. Taking into account the history and language of the act, the safeguards attached to the exercise of the power, the smallness of the sum allowed to be expended, and the fact that it has long been assumed to be within the power of cities to give concerts in the open air, we are not prepared to say that a case is presented for an injunction. Mass. Sup. Ct., Jan. 28, 1886. Hubbard v. City of Taunton. Opinion by Holmes, J. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-NOTE PAYABLE IN MERCHANDISE NON-PRESENTMENT.-A dealer in articles of merchandise executed a note, payable in these articles, on a day certain, at his place of business. He has always kept on hand in his stock, at his place of busines, sufficient of these articles with which to pay the note, and has always been ready and willing to pay whenever the note should be presented. The note was not presented for payment on due-day, nor was the holder present to receive the property. Held, that in an action to recover the amount of the note in money this readiness to perform was a good defense. We infer from the authorities cited by plaintiffs that their contention is that the only defense available to defendant would have been a plea of tender; and that to constitute a tender, it was not enough that he had on hand, at the time and place of payment, the articles in which the note was payable, and was ready to pay whenever it was presented, but that notwithstanding the note was not presented, and no one was present to receive the articles, yet on the dueday defendant was bound to have segregated from his stock the exact amount of these articles necessary to pay the note, and specifically appropriated them to that purpose, and set them apart for the plaintiffs as their property; and that this not having been done, the note immediately became payable in money. It may be conceded that some of the cases seem to fully sustain this contention. But we think it would never occur to any business man that when a dealer or merchant gives a note payable at his place of business in articles which he there keeps for sale, in order to relieve himself from a default which would render the note payable in money he must thus segregate and set apart out of his stock an amount of these articles equal to the amount due, although the note was not presented and no one present to receive the property. We apprehend it would never occur to him that he was required to do more than to keep and have on hand in stock sufficient of the articles with which to pay whenever the note was presented. It may also be conceded that to constitute a tender it would be necessary to thus set apart the articles as the property of the holder of the note; and if the maker desired to discharge and satisfy the debt he might undoubtedly do this. If this was done, and the articles thereafter held as the property of the holder of the note, the relation of debtor and creditor would no longer exist, but that of bailor and bailee. Lamb v. Lathrop, 13 Wend. 96; Games v. Manning, 2 G. Greene, 251; Conn v. Gano, 1 Ohio, 484. But the defense here is not that defendant has paid or discharged the debt. He still owes the note. What is claimed is that defendant having always been ready to pay according to the terms and conditions of the instrument, there has been no default on his part by reason of which he has become liable to pay in money. The defense is not payment or tender, but readiness to perform. This we think is a good defense, and was fully established. See Robbins v. Luce, 4 Mass. 474; Johnson v. Baird, 3 Blackf. 153, 182. Minn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 1886. Beede v. Proehl. Opinion by Mitchell, J. PARTNERSHIP-PROMISSORY NOTE BY PARTNER, BUT NOT IN FIRM BUSINESS.-One partner cannot, in the absence of express authority, bind the firm or his copartner by a note, executed by him in the firm name, in a transaction wholly outside the apparent and actual scope of the partnership business, although it may appear that the consideration for the note was applied to the payment of a firm debt. Smith v. Sloan, 37 Wis. 285; 1 Colly. Partn. (Wood's ed.) 660, 661, 792, and notes; Hickman v. Reineki, 6 Blackf. 387; Ditts v. Lonsdale, 49 Ind. 521; Graves v. Kellenberger, 51 id. 66; Lucas v. Baldwin, 97 Ind. 471. Ind. Sup. Ct., Feb. 19, 1886. Bays v. Conner. Opinion by Howk, J. PLEADING - AMENDMENT CHANGING ACTION. -An amendment of a pleading in an action at law that would change the action to one for equitable relief cannot be allowed. These actions were brought as common-law actions. The complaints are on the common counts, for care and feed of horses, and in one case for money paid and expended for the use and benefit of the defendant, and the usual common-law judgments for damages were rendered by the respective justices. The proposed amended complaints, had they been received, would have converted the actions into actions to enforce specific liens. The enforcement of specific liens is usually a matter of equitable cognizance, and although the same power may be conferred by statute upon courts of law, that does not change the nature of the relief granted. It is still essentially equitable. It has often been ruled that an amendment is unauthorized by law which changes a pleading in which legal relief is demanded into one for equitable relief. This case seems to be within the principle of that rule. But the point is directly ruled in Johnson v. Filkington, 39 Wis. 62. That was an action to enforce a statutory lien upon defendant's house for work done thereon and materials furnished therefor. The complaint contained the necessary averments to support a demand for such relief. The plaintiff sought to amend his complaint by substituting a cause of action for damages for the breach of a contract in respect to such work and materials. That is to say, he sought to change his action for statutory relief equitable in its nature to one for common-law relief only cognizable at law. It was held that the cause of actiou stated in the proposed amended complaint was a new and essentially different one from that stated in the original complaint; and hence that leave to interpose the amended complaint was properly refused. The principle of that decision is applicable here. Wis. Sup. Ct., Feb. 23, 1886. Brothers v. Williams. Opinion by Lyon, J. CORRESPONDENCE. CODIFICATION-LETTER FROM EX-SURROGATE CAL VIN. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: My attention has been called to a somewhat urgent appeal to those who desire the defeat of the proposed Code, to communicate with certain members of the Legislature to that end; hence I presume that it will not be deemed amiss if I shall state briefly why I desire to have the Code adopted. It has seemed to me that the arguments which have been addressed to the Legislature were calculated to The 17th section of the first article of the Constitu- The provision cited would seem to indicate that the constitutional convention and the people believed that there was need of codification, but to what extent they were not prepared to determine, but thought it best to leave that question to the commissioners to be appointed, subject nevertheless to the adoption or rejection by the Legislature. And so far as codification was contemplated there was made no distinction between civil procedure and the common and statute law. It was therefore the duty of the commissioners to codify the whole or part, as they should deem practic- If I am right in my interpretation of the Constitution, the question left to be considered is, whether the proposed Code is likely to be an improvement upon our present system of laws. Upon the assumption that it shall have a fair trial and such amendments as occassion may require. It is no answer to the proposed Code that it is imperfect, for no system of law is so perfect that a hypercritical microscopic scrutiny cannot find defects in in it. Indeed, perfection is not an attribute of humanity, and we may be well assured that if we wait until perfection shall be attained before we attempt improvement, legal reform will never be undertaken, much less accomplished; for trial and experience are the reliable tests of utility, and will best suggest the points of needed amendment. The argument that our Code of Procedure required numerous amendments goes for nothing, and does not prove that we should never have undertaken to reform our practice and pleadings. Such a position would paralyze all effort at constitutional or legal improvement, and would have left us and our ancestors "Feudal system." I under the domination of the think that upon a careful investigation it will be found that those lawyers who most urgently oppose the pres-. ent codification are they who would abolish our present system of practice, and return to the uncertain, the prolix, the fictitious and the expensive methods which it superseded; a calamity which the people are not likely to encourage. The history of the introduction of all great and beneficent improvements teaches that they have been but partially and imperfectly apprehended at first, and have been improved and developed by trial and atteuded by partial failures, out of which have been wrought great successes. The objection urged by one of the speakers before the joint meeting of the judiciary committees of the Senate and Assembly, that the commissiouers had codified certain parts of the law which the great body of the Bar Association of the city of New York and of the bar deemed it inexpedient to codify, carries very little weight with it, because he assumed to speak for the great body of the bar without authority. That the commissioners should have had the temerity to codify what the Bar Association of the city of New York thinks inexpedient was certainly a grievous of fense, but as the Constitution provided that they should codify so much and such parts thereof as to the said commissioners should seem practicable and expedient, and not what the Bar Association of the city of New York should deem expedient, their offense will be easily condoned. The oft repeated objection made by some of the senior members of the profession that they will be required to re-learn the law if codified does not seem to me to affect the question, for if beneficial to the younger members, and to the people, by introducing more certainty and simplicity into the administration of justice, neither the indolence nor the inconvenience of the seniors should be permitted to retard the progress of necessary reform. I venture to assert that a proper codification will be found sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to in clude the proper facilities for the enforcement of every cause of action. These are some of the reasons why I am in favor of the adoption of the proposed Code by the Legislature, and of giving it a fair trial. And venture the prediction that if adopted, and trial shall point out needed amendments, the Legislature will be found equal to its wise improvements, and thus set forward the cause of legal reform to the simplification of judicial proceedings, and the safety of popular rights. NEW YORK, April 11, 1876. THE DELANO C. CALVIN. COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. THE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, April 20, 1886: Judgment affirmed-John O. Murdock, appellant, v. Lewis S. Abbott, executor, etc., et al., respondents; Samuel L. M. Barlow et al., appellants, v. Maria J. Myers, respondent; Henry Winthrop Gray, respond ent, v. George T. Green, impleaded, etc., appellant. -Judgment affirmed with costs as to diamond, and reversed as to the company. New trial granted, costs to abide the event-Mary Frank, respondent, v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., of New York, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Mathilde Paulitsch, respondent, v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., appellant.-Motion to discontinue appeal granted without costs, ou condition that appellant pay respondent one bill of costs and all disbursements incurred prior to the offer to discontinue ~Joseph S. Lowery et al., appellants, v. Caluna B. Clinton et al., respondents.- -Motions for reargument denied with $10 costs-Oscar C. Ferris, respondents, v. William R. Spooner, assignee, etc., appellant; J. Clarence Hawkins, respondent, v. Betsey Reich, appellant: William H. Colson, administrator, respondent, v. Betsey Reich, appellant.-Motion to dismiss appeal denied with $10 costs-Elnathan Sweet, Jr., respondent, v. Dorilus Morrison et al., appellants.Motion to dismiss appeal granted with costs, without prejudice to the right of the appellant to apply to the Supreme Court for any relief to which he may be entitled-Lizzie A. Wood, respondent, v. Stiles M. Wood, appellaut. |