assumption by a father of the support of an indigent grown-up son may be regarded as the performance of a legal obligation, and expenditures to a proper extent within the limit which could be laid down by compulsion, are as valid charges, and may be considered as on the same footing as if they had been compelled by law to save the public the expense of supporting a pauper; but beyond such limit the expenditures are to be regarded as the result of the father's generosity, and in an action by him against a liquor seller by whose wrongful act the son was rendered helpless, and thus dependent upon him, the jury are not to be asked to award damages to that extent. (2) The jury, in estimating the son's probability of life, must not regard the standard applied to more sound and healthy lives, but base such probabilities upon his own condition and prospects. (3) In estimating the period of the support, it is error not to limit the period of support by the age of the father, upon whose death the support would not fall on the estate. (4) The jury should not consider the question of sufferings, either bodily or mental, on the part of either the son or his parents. (5) If a plaintiff brings an action on shares with his counsel, the defendant cannot be made responsible in damages aggravated on that account. May 6, 1886. Mich. Sup. Ct., Clinton v. Laning. Opinion by Campbell, C. J. [28 N. W. Rep. 125.] CONTRACT-VOIDABLE FOR INTOXICATION.-A contract made by one who is so drunk as not to know what he is doing is voidable only, and not void. The court, in charging the jury, said upon the subject of rescission, and the condition of the plaintiff the time the trade was made: "If he was so drunk that he did not know what he was about the contract would be void, and so no rescission of the contract would be needed. He could replevy his property without any rescission, because there would be no contract to rescind." This was error. A contract entered into by a person who is so drunk as not to know what he is doing is voidable only, and not void, and may therefore be ratified by him when he becomes sober. Story Sales, § 15; Benj. Sales, 43; Bish. Cont., § 301; Matthews V. Baxter, L. R., 8 Exch. 132; Caulkins v. Fry, 35 Conn. 170; Foss v. Hildredth, 10 Allen, 76-79; Van Wyck v. Brasher, 81 N. Y. 260; Warnock v. Campbell, 25 N. J. Eq. 485; French v. French, 8 Ohio, 214; Noel v. Karper, 53 Penn. St. 97; Dulany v. Green, Har. (Del.) 285; Cummings v. Henry, 10 Ind. 109; Cory v. Cory, 1 Ves. Sr. 19; Pitt v. Smith, 3 Camp. 33; Newell v. Fisher, 11 Smedes & M. 431; Reynolds v. Waller, 1 Wash. (Va.) 164; Menkins v. Lightner, 18 Ill. 282; Taylor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb, 168; Broadwater v. Darne, 10 Mo. 277; Hutchinson v. Brown, 1 Clarke Ch. 408; Story Cont. 27, 28; Chit. Cont. 153, 154. Mich. Sup. Ct., May 12, 1886. Carpenter v. Rogers. Opinion by Sherwood, J. [28 N. W. Rep. 156.] ORDER IN A LANGUAGE UNFAMILIAR TO SIGNER -PAROL EVIDENCE.-In an action upon an alleged contract for the purchase of a reaper, as evidenced by an order in English signed by defendant, parol evidence is admissible to show that defendant was not familiar with that language, and that in the transaction he relied altogether upon the words and good faith of the agent selling the reaper, who procured the signing. Of course it was a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant entered into the contract relying upon representations made by Rice at the time, that the machine only weighed 600 pounds or thereabouts. That was a material fact, and might have been the sole inducement for the defendant to give the order. If such a representation was made, the defendant certainly, under the circumstances, had the right to rely upon it as true. It is idle to say that Rice did not know the representation to be false, if he made it. He was a dealer in these machines, and knew their weight. Under the charge of the court it the transaction true; that the order did not express is apparent the jury found the defendant's version of assent to it by reason of fraud practiced upon him by the real contract; that the defendant was induced to bound to accept the reaper and pay for it. This cour Rice. That being the case, the defendant was not maker's signature was procured by fraud as to the has held that a note negotiable in form, to which the guilty of negligence, was void even in the hands of an character of the paper, and where the maker was not innocent holder. See Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194; Kellogg v. Steiner, id. 626; Butler v. Carns, 37 id. 61: Griffiths v. Kellogg, 39 id. 290. This case presents much stronger grounds for the application of such a rule. Here the action is between the original parties Dragon. Opinion by Cole, C. J. [28 N. W. Rep. 141.] to the contract. Wis. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. Gross v. fendant signed a contract for the purchase of lightEVIDENCE-PAROL-COLLATERAL AGREEMENT.-Dening rods at a price stipulated in the contract. He was induced to sign this upon the representation that it was to be used as an advertisement only, having made a parol agreement for the purchase on very different terms from those recited in the contract. Held, that parol evidence was not admissible to vary the contract. It is proper to say here that there is no misled as to the contents of the instrument which he clain that defendant was in any manner deceived or signed. By its terms the instrument is an express and to pay forty cents per foot for the latter, and he agreement by defendant to buy the rods and points, knew when he signed it that it contained these protract which the parties entered into in every particu visions, and he admits that it expresses the real conlar, except as to the price which he was to pay for the property. His proposition now is to prove by parol purpose entirely different from that expressed in it: that the instrument was signed and delivered for a that while by its terms it appears to be a contract be tween the parties with reference to the subject about which they actually contracted, it was not intended by them as the evidence of their agreement. We think having deliberately declared in the instrument that it it entirely clear that this cannot be done. The parties was executed for one purpose, cannot be permitted to show by parol that it was executed for an entirely dif agreed in writing to pay the prices named for the ferent object, and defendant having deliberately property, cannot be permitted to prove by parol that his undertaking was different. The rule which for bids this is elementary, and we need not cite authori ties sustaining it. It may be that defendant was induced by misrepresentations of plaintiff's agent to bind himself to pay a greater price for the property than he intended to pay; but he signed and delivered the instrument with knowledge of its contents. Whatever of hardship there is in the case is the result of his own indiscretion, and the courts cannot set aside the settled rules of the law to protect men from the conse quences of their folly. Iowa Sup. Ct., April 22, 1886. Hutton v. Maines. Opinion by Reed, J. [28 N. W. Rep. 9.] ASSIGNMENT. The beneficial interest in a polINSURANCE-LIFE-POLICY BY FATHER FOR SONicy of insurance procured by a father on his life for the benefit of and payable to his minor the policy; and a subsequent assignment of the policy son, vests in the son upon the delivery of the by the father as security for his own debt conveys no avoid it, but he must pay the assignee the premiums title. If the son joins in the assignment, he may necessarily paid by him to keep the policy in force one can be held responsible. But however this may be, the matter is, under all the evidence, for a jury, and to a jury it must be referred. Penn. Sup. Ct., March 29, 1886. Tissue v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. Opinion by Gordon, J. [3 Atl. Rep. 667.] while it was in his possession. The minor's assign-sight could provide against, hence one for which no ment, though voidable, was valid until it was disaffirmed by him. The bank was rightfully in possession of the policy, and the assignment was an implied request and authority to do what was necessary to keep it in force and protect the insurance. The payment of the premiums by the bank, necessary to keep the policy on foot, was by the implied request and authority of H. F. Whittle, and for his benefit, and may be treated as made in his behalf; and by claiming and receiving the benefit of the payments, he ratified them and became liable to the bank therefor. Unity Mut. L. Assur. Ass'n v. Dugan, 118 Mass. 219; Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354; Bartlett v. Bailey, id. 408. N. H. Sup. Ct., March 12, 1886. City Savings Bank v. Whittle. Opinion by Clark, J. [13 Atl. Rep. 645.] BENEFICIARY.-Where MUTUAL-CHANGING the by-laws of a mutual benefit association, in the nature of a life insurance company, provide that upon the death of a member the benefit shall be paid to his direction, the member may change his beneficiary by surrendering his certificate of membership and procuring a new one made payable to the person therein named. N. H. Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1885. Barton v. Provident Mutual Relief Association. Opinion by Allen, J. [5 East. Rep. 7.] MARRIAGE-SEPARATE ESTATE OF WIFE.-A wife's earnings made by keeping boarders, selling butter and in other ways connected with her husband's property, cannot be regarded as her separate estate. Iowa Sup. Ct., April 23, 1886. Hamill v. Henry. Opinion by Beck, J. [28 N. W. Rep. 32.] MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-DYNAMITE MAGAZINE.-A master is bound to take heed that he does not, through his own want of care, expose his servant to unnecessary risks and dangers; but the question whether there was negligence in putting a dynamite magazine where its explosion killed an employee engaged in the ordinary discharge of his duty, in no way connected with the magazine, or whether the explosion was the result of an accident which no ordinary human foresight could provide against, and hence for which no one could be held responsible, was for the jury. Ought the company's superintendent to have known, that in placing the magazine where it was placed, he was exposing the men engaged in operating the road, as well as others, to a danger to which they ought not to have been exposed? The question is not whether he did have knowledge of the peculiar properties of the material which he was intrusted to handle, for his ignorance in this particular would be no excuse for the company, but whether the agent thus intrusted ought to have been one who knew that dynamite was from its nature liable to accidental explosions such as could not be ordinarily foreseen or provided against. We would indeed be unwilling to assume that either Yardly or Armstrong knew that he was subjecting these laboring men to a danger so frightful. They may, like the men themselves, have entertained the idea that dynamite could not be exploded but by the ordinary method of percussion. But as we have said, this ignorance, if ignorance it was, will not excuse the company, for there was a duty resting upon it to know, so far as it was possible to know, the character of the material which it placed in the hands of its agents. In this we are not to be understood as pronouncing upon the chemical characteristics of dynamite, for about it we know little or nothing, or as charging negligence on the company or its agents. The act of putting the magazine where it was may have been prudent, or at least not unreasonably imprudent, and the explosion may have been the result of an accident which no ordinary human fore NEGLIGENCE-INJURY BY EAVES DRIP.-Where two buildings are situated near each other upon lots adjacent, and the eaves of one come within a few inches of the side or wall of the other, and the owner of one building has no eaves-trough, gutter or other conductor for carrying off the rain or water falling upon his building, held, that an action will lie against him for any damage to the adjoining building, or its contents, caused by the water falling on the roof and discharged against the wall of such adjoining building, on account of the absence of the proper eaves-trough, gutter or other conductor to carry off such water. Upon the trial the court, over the objection of plaintiff below, charged the jury as follows: "While buildings are necessary for business and the habitation of man, and essential for all affairs and uses in business, yet the owners of them are called upon to exercise the highest degree of care to prevent their becoming a nuisance to others, and it is the duty of the owner and occupier of a building on a division line to keep gutters or other appliances for the discharge of water from the roof of his building, in proper repair and condition, to carry off the water that collects thereon, and he is bound to have them of sufficient capacity to carry off the water that may fall in storms likely to occur. And if in this case the defendant-and whether he did or not is for you to determine-for any cause that could have been prevented, and by the exercise of ordinary care, failed to carry the water from his roof, whereby the building or property of the plaintiff was damaged, as alleged in the petition, the defendant is liable for all the consequences resulting from such defects or acts, unless the same resulted from extraordinary or acci. dental circumstances." This instruction was unfortunate in the language employed, and was very liable to mislead the jury. All the evidence shows that the defendant below had no gutters or other appliances to catch and carry off the rain or water falling on his west roof; therefore it is clear that he did not exercise any care to prevent the water falling upon his own roof from being discharged upon the wall of plaintiff. No principle is more firmly established than that contained in the familiar maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas; and if the water from the defendant's roof fell upon the plaintiff's building on account of the neglect of defendant to have a trough or gutter, or some other conductor, to the injury of plaintiff's wall and hardware, the defendant is liable. Kans. Sup. Ct., April 9, 1886. Hazeltine v. Edgmand. Opinion by Horton, C. J. [10 Pac. Rep. 544.] ACTION FOR DEATH-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF DECEASED.-In an action by a wife as administratrix against a railway company to recover damages for the death of her husband at a railroad crossing, it must be made to appear that the deceased was without contributory negligence; and where there is no direct evidence, the facts and circumstances must be such as to at least justify the inference that such was the case. It was absolutely essential that there should have been some evidence exhibiting the conduct of the deceased in approaching the crossing. In order to uphold the verdict it must have affirmatively appeared, either directly or circumstantially, that he was free from contributory fault. Did he look or listen for the train, or did he continue on in a jog trot without thought of impending danger until horrified by the sight of the train, which was inevitably rushing upon him? Upon the plaintiff's The case these questions are left to be determined by conjecture. It is said, because nothing appears to the contrary, we are bound to presume that the deceased was in the exercise of proper care. This would be to supply by presumption that which an unbending rule of law requires should be established by proof. principles of law pertaining to actions of this nature were discussed in the recent case of Cincinnati, H. & I. Ry. Co. v. Butler, 103 Ind. 31. It can hardly be necessary to recur to them again. It may suffice to say, since it is the established rule of this court, as it is of the courts in a large majority of the States, that it must be affirmatively shown that the injured party was in the exercise of due care at the time the accident occurred. At least it must be made to appear that want of care on his part in no way contributed to bring about the injury or helped to produce the accident, for which compensation is sought. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Brinnigan, 75 Ind. 490. "Where the circumstances point just as much to the negligence of the deceased as to its absence, or point in neither direction, the plaintiff should be nonsuited." Warner v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 44 N. Y. 465; Cordell v. Ry. Co., 75 id. 330; State v. Me. Cent. R. Co., 76 Me. 356; Losen v. Same, 77 id. 85; Hinckley v. Cape Cod R., 120 Mass. 257. The facts and circumstances illustrating the conduct of the injured person at the time of the accident must be made to appear. If from those the inference can be drawn that proper caution was exercised, it may be said the presumption of contributory negligence has been affirmatively removed. Ind. Sup. Ct., April 20, 1886. Indiana, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Greene. Opinion by Mitchell, J. [3 Atl. Rep. 603.] CONTRIBUTORY-COMMUNICATION OF FIRELEAVING COMBUSTIBLES ON AND NEAR RAILROAD.-It is a question for the jury whether placing lumber within the railroad's right of way, where lumber was usually piled, is an act of contributory negligence. The plaintiff's lumber was piled near the depot grounds, one pile being placed eight or ten feet within the right of way, with the debris near and about it. The lumber was placed there for shipment, but the plaintiff had not notified the defendant that he intended to ship it, nor had he procured its consent to pile any lumber on its grounds. He states that he cleared the ground where his lumber was piled of all refuse or inflammable material. But it said that he was guilty of gross negligence in piling his lumber where he did, without taking any precaution to protect it against fires by having a watchman on the ground to look after it. On the other hand, it is said that there is no pretence that the lumber was set on fire by sparks from the engine, or otherwise than by fire communicated to it from the right of way; that the business of the defendant at that station was the shipping of lumber products; and for that purpose lumber, shingles, bark, ties, etc., had to be piled somewhere near the right of way for the convenience of loading them on the cars; that this lumber was in fact piled at the usual and customary place of depositing lumber intended for shipment; that the pile placed within the right of way did not essentially increase the danger to the balance of the lumber, or add to the combustible material which was the real cause of the spreading of the fire. Whether the plaintiff acted with ordinary care and prudence, under the circumstances, in placing his lumber where he did, was, we think, a question for the jury. In view of the facts, we do not feel justified in affirming as a matter of law that he was guilty of contributory negligence. The court told the jury there could be no recovery if the plaintiff, by failing to employ a person to watch his lumber, or in placing a portion of it within the right of way, or in any manner whatever was guilty of negligence which contributed to the loss; thus submitting the question of the plaintiff's negligence as a fact for the jury to determine. This, we think, wa the proper course to pursue. We have examined cases cited by defendant's counsel to the point that the plaintiff assumed the risk incident to placing his lun ber in such close proximity to the ground, and think they fail to sustain his position. Wis. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. Gibbons v. Wisconsin Valley R. Co. Opin ion by Cole, C. J. [28 N. W. Rep. 170.] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-ACTION FOR INTEREST WITHOUT DEMAND.-Where the interest on a promissory note is due at a time certain, an action may be maintained therefor without previous demand, and though the principal is not due. Me. Sup. Ct., April 24, 1886. Howe v. Bennett. Opinion per Curiam. (3 Atl. Rep. 661.] NOTICE OF PROTEST-DEPOSIT IN LETTER BOX. -Street letter boxes are a legal part of the post-office system, and the deposit of a letter in one of them is equivalent to a deposit at the post-office. Abb. Trial Ev. 433, 434; Bauk v. De Groot, 7 Hun, 210; Pearce v Langfit, 101 Penn. St. 107. Mich. Sup. Ct., May 12, 1888 Wood v. Callaghan. Opinion by Morse, J. [28 N. W. Rep. 162.] PARENT AND CHILD-CLAIMS FOR SUPPORT-REQUI SITES.-Where parties sustain the relation of parent and child, in order to entitle either to recover for sup port furnished the other, it must appear that such support was furnished under an express contract, of under such circumstances as show a mutual expectstion of the parties. An examination of the cases shows that no definite rule has been or can be laid down in regard to what the circumstances must be to show a mutual expectation to pay for such services or sup port; and that each case in this respect is made to turn largely upon its own peculiar circumstances. The case of Sprague v. Waldo, 38 Vt. 141, decides that a son-in-law is treated the same as a son in this respect. As said by Chief Justice Shaw in Guild v. Guild, 15 Pick. 129, and approved in Andrus v. Foster, 17 VL 556, the party thus related, stopping with the other, may sustain either one of three relations: that of a servant, a boarder, or a visitor. Where the relation is that of a visitor, no expectation of pay for board or incidental services exists. If either of the other rela tions is established, an expectation of pay arises under the circumstances represented. We cannot regard the intestate's relation to the plaintiff on these several occasions, while stopping with her son-in-law and daughter, sometimes at the request and invitation of the daughter, as other than that of a visitor. It would be crime against nature and humanity to give to all the courtesies, favors and visits that are exchanged be tween parents and children the mercenary quality of dollars and cents. The courts have universally refused to give such a quality to such transactions, and have especially guarded against allowing the surviving party to change such transactions into one of dollars and cents against the estate of the deceased party. Vt. Sup. Ct., April 23, 1886. Sawyer v. Hebard's Estate. Opinion by Ross, J. [3 Atl. Rep. 529.] RAILROAD LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES ON STATION GROUNDS.-A railroad company is not bound to exer cise so high a degree of care in regard to the condition of its station grounds as it is in the condition and management of its engines and cars. The degree of care is not fixed solely by the relation of carriers and passengers; it is measured by the consequences which may follow the want of care. A railroad company is condition and management of its engines and cars, held to the highest degree of care in respect to the because negligence in that respect involves extreme peril to passengers, against which they cannot protect themselves. It would not act reasonably if it did not exercise greater care in equipping and running its trains than in regard to the condition of its station grounds. Mass. Sup. Ct., Jan. 12, 1886. Moreland v. Boston & P. R. Co. Opinion by W. Allen, J. [6 N. E. Rep. 225.] IN STREET-STEAM MOTORS.-A passenger railway in a city street, operated by steam motors, authorized by the public authorities, is not necessarily an improper servitude, for which the adjacent land owners are entitled to compensation, although it continues as a steam railroad outside the city. A railway upon a street, engaged in carrying persons and things over the same, whether from one point to another on such street or in the city, or from points inside to those outside, or vice versa, is or is not rightfully using the street (with of course the sanction of the proper authorities), according as its use is or is not consistent with the common public use of the street, in which every person is entitled to share. There is no fact found showing that the operation of defendant's railway seriously jeopardizes or interferes with the safety and security or convenience, as respects either person or property, of any one who desires to avail himself of the public and common right of user. It may well be that defendant's railway could be so operated, even as a purely passenger street railway, as substantially to interfere with, if not to put a practical end to the use of the street by the general public. It is not impossible to conceive that an ordinary horse street railway could be operated with like effect. Suppose, for instance, that a horse railway were permitted tooccupy the entire breadth of a street with its tracks, and to run its cars at the rate of one in one or two minutes, what would be the value of the ordinary street easement in such a state of facts? This illustration is, as it seems to us, in point for the purpose of showing that the manner and effect of operating a street railway are the tests of its rightfulness; and while the manner and effect of operating defendant's railway might have been such as to interfere substantially with the public and common right, the findings do not show that it was so in this case, which, as it is important to bear in mind, was tried with reference to the state of facts set up in the pleadings as subsisting at the time when this action was commenced. The railway in question in Carli v. Stillwater S. R. & T. Co., 28 Minn. 373, was neither more nor less than a connecting link between two ordinary (so-called) commercial railways. But the defendant's railway is a different thing, and clearly in aid of the streets over which it runs. It takes on and discharges passengers at any street crossing upon its line, as does an ordinary horse railway; and this practice applies as well to those who get on for the purpose of going out of the city or of coming into it, as those who get on and also get off within the city limits. Such a railway is in aid of the street, because it facilitates the passage of persons over the street, enabling them in large numbers to pass over it with far less noise, trouble and expense than if each should pass on foot or in an ordinary vehicle, and without, so far as this case shows, any substantial interference with the public and common right of passage. Upon all these considerations we therefore conclude that defendant's railway was, within the city, properly a street railway; and that its construction, maintenance and operation do not impose upon plaintiff's soil a servitude additional to that of the ordinary street easement, so as to make defendant's use of the street unlawful without compensation to plaintiff. Minn. Sup. Ct., April 5, 1886. Newall v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co. Opinion by Berry, J. [27 N. W. Rep. 839.] [See Stanley v. City of Davenport, 54 Iowa, 463; S. C., 37 Am. Rep. 216.] SALE-PLACE-DELIVERY.-A., as agent of B., made a sale of intoxicating liquors in Rhode Island, the sale being illegal and void by the law of that State. A. agreed to deliver the goods in Rhode Island free of freight. A. and B. lived in Pennsylvania, and the goods were shipped from that place. Held, that the delivery was in Rhode Island, and the sale complete there. Mass. Sup. Ct., March 31, 1886. Weil v. GolOpinion by W. Allen, J. [6 N. E. Rep. 229.] TAXATION-ILLEGAL TAX PAID UNDER PROTEST. den. Where taxes are paid under protest, alleging that they are illegal for reasons stated therein, the protest merely determines the time from which the taxes may be recovered, and when the limitation of the right to bring the action begins to run for the causes mentioned therein. It does not make the payment invol untary when there has been no effort to collect, or demand for payment made; and when the reason assigned in the protest why the tax is illegal is not sustained by the evidence, there can be no recovery. Mich. Sup. Ct., April 15, 1886. White v. Millbrook Township. Opinion by Sherwood, J. [27 N. W. Rep. 674.] EXEMPTION-RAILROAD GRAIN ELEVATOR.-A statute exempting from taxation "all such real estate and other property as may be necessary for the construction of its railway stations and other accommodations" does not include a grain elevator. Without at all attempting to state the various articles or subjects of property that would clearly belong to the class of things specifically enumerated, we would say that it doubtless includes the road, with all necessary switches, together with all structures thereon; also rolling stock, with all its machinery and appendageswarehouses and other structures-at the termini or along the line of the road belonging to the company, and used by it exclusively for the reception of passen gers, the storage of freight, and also for the purpose of keeping the road and rolling stock in repair or of improving their general condition. This of course would include all necessary depot grounds and buildings, machine and work shops of all kinds, machinery, tools and implements of every description used in keeping the road and rolling stock in repair, and in a good, safe condition. All these things, it will be perceived, have an immediate connection with the improvement and operation of the road. Whatever would be necessary to increase its capacity, such as laying down an additional track or increasing the amount of rolling stock, would fall within the same category. But it is evident this elevator does not belong to any of the classes of things enumerated. It has no direct connection with the road or its operation. Yet when shipments of grain are made either to or from it over appellant's road, it is very clear appellant can handle the grain thus,shipped with more ease and greater facility, and hence by means of it do a greater amount of business. But this is purely incidental, and falls far short of establishing the proposition that a vast elevator like this, costing two or three hundred thousand dollars, is a necessary appendage of a railroad, or that the Legislature, in granting the appellant's charter, intended to exempt such a structure from taxation. It is clear the advantages accruing to the company, as shown by the evidence, do not at all result from the ownership of the property. Had the elevator been built and operated in the same manner it now is by some one other than the companyfor instance, the Halliday Bros.-the company, so far as facilitating its business as a common carrier is concerned, would derive the same benefit from it that it now does. As a mere carrier, the company has no right to put a bushel of grain in it, except when directed to do so by the shipper or consignee. This necessarily results from the fact that all grain, as is shown by the testimony, is stored in it according to grade, and not according to ownership. As to a railway warehouse, properly so called, the rule and usage is altogether different. On the arrival of a consignment of goods the company has the right to at once store them in its own warehouse. The appellant is bound to carry grain in bulk, and deliver the same from cars to other convenient places of storage, without extra charge, now, just the same as it was before the elevator was built, if so required; and the company has no right to mix one man's grain with others unless permitted to do so by the owners. It is clear therefore outside of the incidental benefits resulting to the company from a law of business rather than any municipal regulation, the elevator has no necessary connection with the construction, maintaining or operation of appellant's road; and such being the case, it clearly does not come within the exemption. If the elevator was used exclusively by the company in reeeiving grain for shipment, or for storing it after shipment, without any additional charge therefor, except where the owner neglected to take it away within a reasonable time after its arrival, the property would then be clearly exempt from taxation; but such is not the case. Buildings used for the storage of grain for compensation are indifferently called warehouses, grauaries and elevators. Vast amounts of capital are invested in them, and like railroads and other quasi public property are under legislative control. Their construction and operation constitute a distinct business in the State of vast magnitude. They are a great convenience to the community in which they are situated, and particularly to the owners of the railways, with which they are almost universally connected. Capitalists invest money in them for the same reason they do in other things-because they think it will pay. They are supported by contributions from dealers in grain, in the shape of tolls, which are always taken into account in buying and selling; hence the consumer in the end pays these expenses or contributions. So in this case the building of the elevator is a mere investment by the company, and it is now regularly collecting tolls from those who use it, through the Halliday Bros. These tolls thus collected are simply the returns of the company's investment. It is not reasonable to suppose the Legislature intended that property representing so large an amount of capital should be exempt from local taxation when the people at large are thus taxed for every benefit derived from it. Ill. Sup. Ct., March 26, 1886. People, ex rel. State Auditor, v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. Opinion by Mulkey, J NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. HAWES ON JURISDICTION OF COURTS (PONY SERIES). seems to have been judiciously arranged. We miss however several important cases, viz.: Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124 (exemption from service of process; People, ex rel. Tweed, v. Liscomb (habeas corpus; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. (contempt). We also fail to find that the topic as to the summary jurisdic tion of the court over its attorneys has been touched upon. BATES' LAW OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. This work is the result of reading nearly all the American cases on Partnership. As it is the only work on the subject which considers the cases generally, it should and probably will meet with a ready reception wherever there is a limited partnership stat The matter appears to be intelligently, judiciously and carefully arranged, and being well indexed. is readily accessible. The publishers' work is up to their usual standard of excellence. ute. LAWSON'S CRIMINAL DEFENSES. The fifth and concluding volume of this series is now published, and contains more than 1,300 pages. We have spoken of the preceding volumes as they ap peared. The work is a vast and comprehensive one, and it forms a very important collection of leading cases and notes. Nearly 2,000 cases in full are given, and nearly 4,000 are digested or cited. Some of the sources from which these have been derived are rare and costly, and the collection must be esteemed as of unique and practical value. Mr. Lawson's editorial work is always, as here, of the highest quality. Pub lished by Sumner, Whitney & Co., San Francisco. 4 AMERICAN PROBATE REPORTS. This series has been regularly noticed in these columns, and the present volume is equal to the preceding volumes in every respect. It contains about 100 cases, and probably gives all the current leading cases to date. The series is of great value to practitioners in the Probate Courts. It is very well edited by Wm. M. Ladd, Jr., and very handsomely printed by the publishers, Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. HE following decisions were handed down Tues day, June 8, 1886. Judgment affirmed with costs-Fitzsimmons v. City of Brooklyn; Zelly v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.; Tucker v. Cooney; McCarthy v. Central Refining Co.; Eno v. Diffendorf; Rembe v. New York, Ontario & Western R. Co.-Order affirmed with costs-People, ex rel. Popps, v. French and others; In re Estate of Jacob H. Deyo; Dwyer v. Hoffman; Trever v. Lyon; Collier v. Collyer.-Appeal dismissed with costsStevens v. Comstock; Stein v. Greissman.Motion to advance cause ordered on any motion calendar as an appeal from an order-In re Petition of Swan and others. -Motion to advance cause denied with costs Beste v. Berger. Motion to prefer cause denied with costs-Diffendorfer v. Dick.-Motion for reargument denied with costs-Ham v. Van Orden. |