as could be rightfully classified under the heads of franchise, roadway, road-bed, rails, or rolling stock, that presumption was overthrown by proof that it did in fact include, under some one or more of these heads, the fences in question. It was then incumbent upon the plaintiff, by satisfactory evidence, to sepsrate that which was illegal from that which was legal, assuming for the purposes of this case only, that the assessment was in all other respects legal, and thus impose upon the defendant the duty of tendering, or enable the court to render judgment for such amount, if any, as was justly due. But no such evidence was introduced. The finding that the fences were valued at $300 per mile is too vague and indefinite as a basis for estimating the aggregate valuation of the fences included in the assessment, or the amount thereof apportioned to the respective counties. Were the fences the property of adjacent proprietors? Were they assessed at that rate for every mile of the railroad within the State? Were they erected on the line of the railroad in every county through which it was operated, or only in some of them? Wherever erected, were they assessed for each side of the railway, or only for one side? These questions, so important in determining the extent to which the assess ment included a valuation of the fences erected upon the line between the railroad and coterminous proprietors, find no solution in the record presented to this court. If it be suggested, that under the circumstances, the court might have assumed that the State board included the fences in their assessment at the rate of $300 per mile for every mile of the railroad within the State, counting one or both sides of the roadway, and having thus eliminated from the assess ment the aggregate so found, give judgment for such sum, if any, as upon that basis, would have been due upon the valuation of the franchise, road-bed. roadway, rails, and rolling stock of the defendant, the answer is that the plaintiff did not offer to take such a judgment; and the court could not have rendered one of that character without concluding the plaintiff hereafter, and upon a proper assessment, from claiming against the defendant taxes for the years in ques tion upon such of its property as constituted its fran chise, roadway, road bed, rails, and rolling stock. The case, as presented to the court below, was therefore one in which the plaintiff sought judgment for an entire tax arising upon an assessment of different kinds of property as a unit; such assessment including property not legally assessable by the State board, and the part of the tax assessed against the latter property not being separable from the other part. Upon such an issue the law we think is for the defendant. An assessment of that kind is invalid, and will not sup port an action for the recovery of the entire tax so levied. Cooley Tax'n, 295, 296, and authorities there cited; Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 147; State v. City of Plainfield, 38 N. J. Law, 94; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Miss. 35; Stone v. Bean, 15 Gray, 45; Mosher v. Robie, 2 Fairf. 137; Johnson v. Colburn, 36 Vt. 695; Wells v Burbank, 17 N. H. 412. May 10, 1886. County of Santa Clara v. South. Pac. R. Co.; People v. Cent. Pac. R. Co.; Same v. South. Pac. R. Co. Opinion by Hsrlan, J. [6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132.] assessors, the court said: "They are certainly not the franchise of the defendant corporation. They may constitute an element to be taken into computation to arrive at the value of the franchise of the corporation, but they are not such franchise. It is equally as clear that they are not rails or rolling stock. * * * Are they then embraced within the words 'roadway' or 'road-bed' in the ordinary and popular acceptation of such words as applied to railroads? These two words, as applied to common roads, ordinarily mean the same thing, but as applied to railroads their meaning is not the same. The 'road-bed' referred to in section 10, in our judgment, is the bed or foundation on which the superstructure of the railroad rests. Such is the definition given by both Worcester and Webster, and we think it correct. The 'roadway' has a more extended signification as applied to railroads. In addition to the part denominated road-bed, the roadway includes whatever space of ground the company is allowed by law in which to construct its road-bed and lay its track. Such space is defined in subdivision 4 of the seventeenth section and the twentieth section of the act to provide for the incorporation of railroad companies,' etc., approved May 20, 161. St. 1861, p. 607; San Francisco & N. P. R. Co. v. State Board, 60 Cal. 12." The argument in support of the proposition that these steamers-constituting, as they did, a necessary link in the line of the company's railway, and upon which rails were actually laid for the running of cars were a part either of the road-bed or roadway of the railroad, is much more cogent than the argument that the fences erected upon the line between a roadway and the lands of adjoining proprietors are a part of the roadway itself. It seems to the court that the fences in question are not within the meaning of the local law, a part of the roadway for purposes of taxation, but are "improvements" assessable by the local authorities of the proper county, and therefore were improperly included by the State board in its valuation of the property of the defendants. (2) The next inquiry that naturally arises is whether the different kinds of property assessed by the State board are distinct and separable upon the face of the assessment, so that the company, being thereby informed of the amount of taxes levied upon each, could be held to have been in default in not tendering such sum, if any, as was legally due. Upon the 'transcript before us, this question must be answered in the negative. No record of assessment, as made by the State board, was introduced at the trial, aud presumably no such record existed. Nor is there any documentary evidence of such assessment, except the official commu. nication of the State board to the local assessors called in the findings the assessment roll of the county. That roll shows only the aggregate valuation of the company's franchise, roadway, road-bed, rails, and rolling stock in the State; the length of the company's main track in the State; its length in the county; the assessed value per mile of the railway, as fixed by the pro rata distribution per mile of the assessed value of its whole franchise, roadway, road-bed, rails, and rolling stock in the State; and the apportionment of the property so assessed to the county. It appears, as already stated, from the evidence, that the fences were included in the valuation of the defendants' property; but under what head, whether of franchise, roadway, or road-bed, does not appear. Nor can it be ascertained, with reasonable certainty, either from the assessment roll or from other evidence, what was the aggregate valuation of the fences, or what part of such valuation was apportioned to the respective counties through which the railroad was operated. If the presumption is that the State board included in its valuation only such property as it had jurisdiction under the State Constitution to assess, namely, such ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE- CRIMINAL LAW BONDS.-Unissued bonds of a city, which are in the custody of the city comptroller, are the subject of em bezzlement, although the city may not be liable upon them. In determining whether the conversion of ne gotiable bonds or promissory notes is a crime under the statute, we must look at the reason for making such conversion a crime; and in determining that question, we must not only look at the evil effect upon the maker of the bonds and notes, but also the effect upon the person to whom they are sold and transferred by the person unlawfully converting them. Both effects are to be considered in determining the criminality of the act. In that respect the unlawful conversion and sale of the negotiable bond, bill or note which has not been put in circulation by the maker, is (if it be admitted that the holder cannot recover against the maker on the bond or note so put in circulation) in its effects upon the public welfare the same as the forging of such bond or note, and putting the forged instrument in circulation. The supposed maker of the forged instrument cannot be compelled to pay it, but he is likely to be subjected to costs and expenses in establishing its forgery, while the person to whom it is transferred by the forger suffers the loss of his money paid for the forged paper. In a common-sense view of the case, which is generally, if not universally, a sound legal view of the case, the unlawful conversion and sale of a bond or note which the maker has never put in circulation is as much a crime against the community as the forgery of a bond or note, and the circulation of the forged instrument. Wis. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. State v. White. Opinion by Taylor, J. [28 N. W. Rep. 202.] v. Republican Val. R. Co. Opinion by Cobb, J. [28 N. W. Rep. 284.] MASTER AND SERVANT-RAILROADS-NEGLIGENCE OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR.-When a railroad corporation agrees with a contractor to build a portion of its railroad, the locomotives, cars, etc., used in such construction being run exclusively under the direction and control of the contractor until the road is completed and turned over to the corporation, the railroad company will not be liable for damages occasioned by the negligence of persons running such locomotives and cars. In Hughes v. Railway Co., 39 Ohio St. 461, the work of building the road was done by contractors, under a contract with the railroad company, containing provisions substantially the same as those herein quoted from the contract between the defendant company and the contractor Fitzgerald. In the opinion the court say: "The work of constructing a railroad is not a corporate work, unless it be done by a corporation through its agents and servants; and a person may contract with a railroad company to construct its road without becoming its agent or servant. This proposition therefore resolves itself into a single question: May a railroad corporation, having power to contract as fully as a natural person in relation to its corporate business, enter into a contract with another person for the construction of its road, without retaining control over the mode and manner of doing the work? We can see no reason to doubt it. Of course any condition imposed upon the right to construct its road must be performed, and the company cannot shift its responsibility for the performance. But this is no new principle, nor one applicable to railroad corporations alone. Where a right is possessed by a natural person, and a duty is attached to the exercise of the right, such duty must be performed. Such natural person cannot relieve himself from liability through the intervention of an independent contractor. On the other hand, where the law exempts a natural person, as employee, from liability for the wrongful act of his contractor, it will also exempt a corporation, as employer, from liability for the wrongful act of its contractor." purport are the cases of Hunt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 51 Penn. St. 475, and McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil R. Co., 61 N. Y. 178. Neb. Sup. Ct., May 26, 1886. Hitte To the same INFANT SERVANT-DANGEROUS OCCUPATIONDUTY OF MASTER AS TO CAUTION, ETC.-It is the duty of the master, employing in a dangerous occupation a servant, who from youth, inexperience, ignorance, or want of general knowledge, may fail to appreciate the danger, to first instruct the servant, and warn him, so that he may comprehend the danger, and do the work safely with proper care on his part, even though the servant consented to be employed in the dangerous situation. This rule does not in any manner conflict with the other well-established rule that the employee in any particular business assumes all the risks and hazards which are incident to such business, when the employee is of sufficient intelligence and knowledge to comprehend the dangers incident to his employment; and in the case of an adult person, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, the presumption is that the employee has sufficient intelligence to com. prehend the dangers incident to his employment. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572; Sullivan v. India Manuf'g Co., 113 Mass. 396; Grizzlę v. Frost, 3 Fost. & F. 622; Gilman v. Railroad Co., 13 Allen, 433, 441, 442; Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. 266-295; Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45; Railroad Co. v. Valirius, 56 id. 511; Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553; Thompson v. Railroad Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 564; Cook v. Railroad Co., 24 N. W. Rep. 311; Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274; Strahlendorf v. Rosenthal, 30 Wis. 674. These cases and many others which might be cited fully establish the rule as above stated in regard to the employment of servants, who by reason of youth, inexperience or want of capacity are unable to comprehend the dangers incident to a hazardous employment. There are many reasons given by the courts for holding to the rule above stated, the most satisfactory of which are-First, that the master owes a duty toward an employee who is directed to perform a hazardous and dangerous work, or to perform his work in a dangerous place, when the employee, for want of age, experience or general capacity, does not comprehend the dangers, to point out to him the dangers incident to the employment, and thus enable him to comprehend and so avoid them, and that neglect to discharge such duty is gross negligence on the part of the employer; second, that such an employee does not assume the risk of the dangers incident to such hazardous employment, because he does not comprehend them, and the law will not therefore presume that he contracted to assume them. Wis. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. Jones v. Florence Min. Co. Opinion by Taylor, J. [28 N. W. Rep. 207.] MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-NEGLIGENCE-INJURY FROM FALLING SHOW-BILL BOARD-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. - The plaintiff, passing along a city street, was injured by a bill or show board, which hav ing been placed on a lot adjoining the south side of the sidewalk, had been blown down by a strong wind, and fell upon him. There was evidence tending to show that the officers of the city knew that the structure was not put up in a safe and proper manner, and that before its fall it was in a condition to endanger persons passing on the sidewalk. (1) We think in this case that the city, especially under its power to pre vent and remove nuisances, and to regulate all struc、 tures projecting upon or over or adjoining the street or sidewalk, was bound to remove or protect the sidewalk from the imperfectly constructed and insecure bill-board standing so near the sidewalk as to fall upon it. It was so close to or upon the edge of the sidewalk that it could not fall in that direction without falling upon it. Having failed to take the necessary steps to maintained their mother and provided for the chil dren, and afterward took the mother and children into his family, addressed the latter as his sons, and spoke of himself to them as their father, held, that the recognition of the children was notorious and general within the meaning of the Code, although the father sometimes denied that they were his children, and had stated that he was physically incapable of being a father. It is proven that Bowen sometimes denied that the plaintiffs were his children. In such denial he certainly did not recognize them. It is claimed therefore that his recognition was not general, but at most was limited and partial. But every thing is lim ited and partial which is not universal, and "general" is not equivalent to "universal." Webster says that the word "general" means "extensive, though not universal." We think that the evidence shows clearly that Bowen's recognition of the plaintiffs was general. They were not only born during his intimacy with the mother, but he visited the mother immediately after her confinement with one of them, and manifested especial interest in the new born child. He settled her bills, provided for the children, and afterward took the mother and children into his own family. He became deeply attached to the children, and in all his treatment of them he had precisely the bearing, as far as observable, of an affectionate father toward his children. He addressed each as "My son," and spoke of himself to them as Your papa." We are aware, as is urged by defendants, that such words are sometimes used as mere expressions of familiarity or affection, and without intention of making any claim or remove the bill-board, or to protect the sidewalk therefrom, the city is liable for the damages caused by the falling of the board upon any person passing in front thereof along the sidewalk, if such person was injured without fault on his part. We do not think it is very material whether the bill-board was so close to and adjoining the sidewalk as to be dangerously contiguous thereto, or was actually supported by braces or uprights resting upon the south edge of the walk. The liability of the city would be the same in either case. Grove v. City of Ft. Wayne, 45 Ind. 429; S. C., 15 Am. Rep. 262; Parker v. Mayor, etc., of Macon, 39 Ga. 725; Duffy v. City of Dubuque, 18 N. W. Rep. 900; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., $$ 789, 794, 795; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. 1; Kiley v. City of Kansas, 69 Mo. 102; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 491; Wood Nuis., § 744; Bassett v. City of St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290; S. C., 14 Am. Rep. 446; Taylor v. Peckham, 8 R. I. 349; S. C., 5 Am. Rep. 578; Hixon v. Lowell, 13 Gray, 59; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass. 75; S. C., 6 Am. Rep. 194. (2) As to the alleged negligence of plaintiff, we think the trial court should have committed the case to the decision of the jury. "The fact that a person attempts to travel on a street or sidewalk after he has notice that it is unsafe and out of repair is not necessarily negligence." Corlett v. City of Leavenworth, 27 Kau. 673. The mere fact that a person knows a sidewalk is defective will not prevent him from using it; and ordinarily a person is not obliged to forsake the sidewalk, and travel in the street, or take another way, because he has knowledge of its defects. "The reasonableness of his action depends upon the distance of the surrounding way and the urg-recognition of paternity. But the case before us has ency of his need, and all this presents a question of fact for the consideration and determination of the jury." Maultby v. City of Leavenworth, 28 Kans. 745; Lyman v. Inhabitants of Hampshire Co. (Sup. Ct. Mass.), 3 N. E. Rep. 211; City of Emporia v. Schmidling, 33 Kans. 485. Of course a person having knowledge that a sidewalk is defective or somewhat dangerous must use ordinary care and prudence to avoid danger. Munger v. City of Marshalltown (Sup. Ct. Iowa), 13 N. W. Rep. 642; Corlett v. City of Leavenworth, supra; Schaeffer v. City of Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 533. If the jury, upon the evidence in the record, had made a finding or returned a verdict that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, the finding or verdict would not be disturbed by this court, because there is testimony in the record tending to show that the plaintiff did not exercise ordinary care and prudence to avoid the danger. But the case stands in a different attitude before us from what it would occupy if the jury had passed upon the testimony. Then every conflict in the evidence, and all the inferences therefrom, would be resolved in favor of the result below; now they are against it. Kans. Sup. Ct., May 7, 1886. Langan v. City of Atchison. Opinion by Horton, J. [11 Pac. Rep. 38.] NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY-TRANSGRESSING OR this peculiarity: that the plaintiffs had no other os tensible paternity, and Bowen well knew this, and knew that others knew it. It is incredible that any man would treat any other man's illegitimate children as he treated the plaintiffs, nor can we account for a man's treating his own illegitimate children in that way without an intention to recognize them as his children. Now his general bearing toward them being such as involved a recognition, it follows that the recognition was general. We think too that the recognition was notorious. It was open--not concealed, except upon exceptional occasions. It was not, to be sure, widely known. The family, we infer, lived rather obscurely. It does not appear to have been a subject of much general interest. But Bowen's sup port of and care and affection for the plaintiffs, and general paternal bearing toward them, was observable by all, or nearly all, who came to the house. The notoriety of the recognition appears to have been about as wide as circumstances admitted. Iowa Sup. Ct., April 21, 1886. Blair v. Howell. Opinion by Adams, J.; Beck and Reed, JJ., dissenting. [28 N. W. Rep. 199.] .. DINANCE TO AVOID PERSONAL INJURY.-The plain-paid; " nor is the expression tiff, who was pushing a hand-cart across a city street, in order to avoid being run over by an approaching horse and wagon, endeavored to force his cart up over the curb on to the sidewalk; he failed to get it over the curb-stone, and was run down and injured by the horse and wagon. In an action brought by him to recover damages, the defendant offered to show the existence of a municipal ordinance, which prohibited the propelling, etc., of hand-carts upon the sidewalks. Held, incompetent. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 1886. Dennison v. Miner. Opinion per Curiam. PARENT AND CHILD-ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-RECOGNITION.-Where the father of illegitimate children STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ACKNOWLEDGMENT.-An acknowledgment of a signature to a note is not of itself an acknowledgment of the debt. The expression that it must be fixed "is not equivalent to "it must be "he and William would have to pay it "sufficient, as it involves another person, and may refer to a supposed liability, rather than a present intention to pay. Such expressions as these were held insufficient to toll the statute in Emerson v. Miller, 27 Penn. St. 278. "The decisions of this court apply very strict rules to acknowledgments to take a case out of the statute of limitations, and very rightly so. We mean to adhere to them in letter and spirit." Johns v. Lantz, 63 Penu. St. 324. It is not essentially necessary that the promise be actual or express, provided that the other necessary facts are shown. A clear, distinct and unequivocal acknowl edgment of the debt is sufficient to take a case out of the operation of the statute. It must be an admission consistent with a promise to pay. If so the law will imply the promise without its having been actually or expressly made. Palmer v. Gillespie, 95 Penn. St. 340. Tested by this rule, we find nothing in the deposition to toll the statute. Penn. Sup. Ct., May 17, 1886. Shaeffer v. Hoffman. Opinion by Paxson, J. [4 Atl. Rep. 39.] A. had loaned B. $2,000, which was used by the latter in the purchase of a piece of real estate. Afterward, and within six years of the suit, while negotiating with a prospective purchaser of the real estate, B. said "he wanted to sell the property; that A. had something like $2,000 in it; and that he wanted to sell it to pay him out of it." Held, that this was not such a distinct, positive and unambiguous recognition of the debt as to remove the bar of the statute of limitatious. Penn. Sup. Ct., May 17, 1886. Gerhard v. Gerhard. Opinion per Curiam. [4 Atl. Rep. 55.] This is on Metc. 76, 80; 2 Story Eq., § 799 b, note a. the old established maxim in equity jurisprudence, that he who seeks equity must do equity. Haunan v. Osborn, 4 Paige, 336; Deck's Appeal, 57 Penn. St. 468, 472; Peyton v. Smith, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 325, 349; Hibbert v. Cook, 1 Sim. & Stu. 552. N. H. Sup. Ct., March 12, 1886. Pickering v. Pickering. Opinion by Bingham, J. ner, TRADE-MARK-" HUNYADI JANOS" WATER.-The owner of a spring of mineral water in Hungary entered into a contract with complainant giving him the exclusive right to export and sell the water under its name of "Hunyadi Janos," which he had adopted as a trade-mark, in Great Britain and America. Defendant applied to the owner to purchase the bottled water, but was refused, and purchased it from those to whom it had been sold in Germany, and sold it in the United States in bottles with the same label as that used by complainant, except that defendant's bottles, like all those sold by the owner, were stamped with the following words: "Caution. This bottle is not intended for export, and if exported for sale in *** America * * * the public is cautioned against purchasing it," while complainant's bottles were stamped "Sole exporters." Held, that complainant was not entitled to an injunction to restrain defendant from selling the water. Upon first impression it would seem that the defendant cannot be justified in a course of conduct which is calculated, if not deliberately prompted, by the design to deprive the complainant of the benefit of its contract with Saxlehand that there must be some principle of equity, which can be invoked to prevent him from doing that which Saxlehner himself would not be permitted to do. The interposition of a court of equity is frequently invoked, and always successfully, to restrain unlawful competition in trade. All practices between rivals in business which end to engender unfair competition are odious, and will be suppressed by injunction. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84; Harper v. Pearson, 3 L. T. (N. S.) 547; Stevens v. Paine, 18 id. 600; Glenny v. Smith, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 694; Mack v. Petter, 41 L. J. Ch. 781; Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 896; Glen & H. Manuf'g Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226; Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Goodyear's Manuf'g Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 276; Genin v. Chadsey, 2 Brewst. 330; Avery v. Meikle, 17 West. Jur. 282; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige, 75. But the adjudications which illustrate the principle rest upon the ground that a merchant or trader is entitled to protection only against dishonest or perfidious rivalry in his business. He will be protected against the fraudulent or deceitful simulations by a competitor of tokens which tend to confuse the identity or business of the one with the other, and against the false representation of facts which tend to mislead the public and divert custom from the one to the other. Any thing short of this however is lawful competition. Accordingly the courts will not attempt to prevent the sending of circulars or advertisements by one to the customers of a competitor in business, although designed to alienate patronage, if they contain no deceitful or misleading statements. The law does not deal with motives which are not accompanied by a wrongful overt act. If the defendant is legally justified in buying where he cau and selling as he chooses, it is not material whether he is actuated by a desire to annoy the complainant or to promote his own pecuniary interests. U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. N. Y., March 16, 1886. Appolinaris Co., Limited, v. Scherer. Opinion by Wallace, J. [27 Fed. Rep. 18.] TENANT IN COMMON -ACCOUNTING -RENTS AND PROFITS-REPAIRS.-On a bill in equity for an accounting brought by a tenant in common against his cotenant, who has been in possession and received the entire rents and profits, the defendant may be allowed the expense of necessary repairs that have materially increased the value and income of the common property, but not expenses of insurance, if it does not appear that it was procured for the plaintiff or with his knowledge, or in his interest, or that he has received or claimed any benefit from it. If we are to consider it settled at common law that one tenant in common cannot recover of his co-tenant a contribution for necessary repairs, when there is no agreement, or request or notice to join in making them, or excuse for a notice not being given to join (Stevens v. Thompson, 17 N. H. 103, 111; Wiggin v. Wiggin, 43 id. 561, 568), because both parties till this is done are equally in fault, one having as much reason to complain as the other. Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cow, 475, 477; Kidder v. Rixford, 16 Vt. 169, 172; Kent, 371; Doane v Badger, 12 Mass. 65, 70; Calvert v. Aldrich, 99 id. 78. It does not follow that in this proceeding for an equitable accounting for the income, a part of which is produced by the repairs, the defendant may not be allowed for them. There is a wide difference between a right of action at common law to recover a contribution for repairs and a right to have them allowed out of the income, which exists in part through their having been made. In the first case the party makes them at his will, on the common property, without the consent or knowledge of his co.tenant, while in the last the co-tenant recogn.zes the existence of the repairs, that they have materially increased the income, but demands the increase, and refuses to allow for the repairs. The objec. tion that no privity, no joint knowledge, no authority existed is in equity and good conscieuce waived when the entire income is demanded. It is not unlike the ratification of the acts of an assumed agent; it relates back to the time of making the repairs, and makes the plaintiff a privy from the beginning. He cannot claim the repairs and the income and equitably ignore the expenses of making them. Moore v. Cable, 1 Johns. Ch. 385; Jackson v. Loomis, 4 Cow. 168; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Rathbun v. Colton, 15 Pick. 472, 485. It seems however that courts of equity have not confined the doctrine of compensation for repairs and improvements to cases of agreement or joint purchases, but have extended it to other cases, where the party making the repairs and improvements has acted in good faith, innocently, and there has been a substantial benefit conferred on the owner, so that in equity and right he ought to pay for the same. 2 Story Eq., §§ 1236, 1237, 799 b; Coffin v. Heath, 6 "CHATTERBOX "-PERIODICAL.-Whether the use which the defendants make of the name is calculated to put their publications in the place which those of the orators would otherwise take is principally a question of fact, and is the most important one open in this case. The publications of Johnston were composed of selections of stories, sketches and poems, with pictorial illustrations intended for, and interesting to, the young; printed with a head-line, "Chatterbox," on each page; bound in square form, in illumin. ated boards, with vignette slightly varying in style from one number to another, and the name "Chatterbox" prominently on the front, and with a plain cloth back. The selections had been made with such care and skill, and the illustrations and style of binding made so attractive that they had acquired great popularity, and found large sales, as well in this country as elsewhere. The same method of selection and illustration, square form, style of binding, and of vignette, as well as name on the cover, have been taken by the defendants. The name is the only thing in question in this case, but the adoption of so many other features tends to show the intent with which the same is used. All these things together lead plainly to the conclusion that the name has been appropriated to gain an advantage from the reputation and popularity which Johnston's work had acquired under it, and that this appropriation of it is calculated to make the works of the defendants pass for his to some extent. It is true that the name "Frank Leslie" is added, so that the title is "Frank Leslie's Chatterbox," and the address of the publishing house is put on. This appears to be done however for the purpose of adding the reputation of Frank Leslie's and of that publishing house to that of the Chatterbox rather than for that of building up a new reputation under that name. If nothing had been wanted of the popularity which had been acquired under it, and which it stood for, it could have been left, and another name taken to build up. The defendants do not copy the orators' publications, but imitate them, and apply the name of the orators' publications to their imitations. U. S. Cir. Ct., Feb. 1886. Estes v. Leslie. Opinion by Wallace, J. [27 Fed. Rep. 22.] | has 731 pages of text, 68 of cases cited, 70 of index is a decided improvement over the first edition, and the anthor, we believe, still has the whole field himself. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. Superintendent Andrews is preparing, and will soot have in readiness, handsomely furnished and conve ient rooms in the Capitol, Albany, N. Y., for the se of the clerk of the New York State Bar Association. The leading journals and magazines of the day. stationery, etc., will be found there for the use of the officers and members of the association, and member of the bar generally, where they will always be ma welcome. L. B. PROCTOR, ALBANY, June 24, 1886. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. Clerk THE following decisions were handed down Tues day, June 22, 1886. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Meyer Geismer, respondent, v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., appellant.-Order affirmed with costs-Wm. H Crowell, respondent, v. Ephraim W. Smith, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-Mayor, etc., of New York, respondents, v. Second Avenue R. Co., ap pellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Edmund Coffin, Jr., appellant, v. John Scott and others, respondents.-Order affirmed-People ex rel. Robert Kopp, appellant, v. Stephen B. French and others. commissiouers, etc., respondents.—Appeal dismissed with costs-George W. Lord and others, respondents. v. Spencer D. Richardson and others, appellants. WILL-UNDUE INFLUENCE-SPIRITUALISM.--Where Appeal dismissed with costs-William E. James and a testator, otherwise of sound mind, married B., who was a spiritualistic medium, and there was evidence that she had great influence over him by pretending to be the medium of communication between the testator and his first wife, held, that there was evidence in the case upon which the jury might reasonably infer that an alleged will of the testator, in favor of B., was procured to be made through the undue influence and fraud of B. Mass. Sup. Ct., March 31, 1886. Bay lies v. Spaulding. Opinion by Gardner, J. [6 N. E. Rep. 62. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. WADE'S LAW OF NOTICE. The second edition of this well-known treatise appears after a lapse of eight years, in a very handsome dress from the publishing house of Callahan & Co., of Chicago. The work is not of scientific constructionthe subject forbids that-but it is eminently practical and useful. Large additions have been made, including several new subjects, such as notice as applicable to the liability of persons and corporations for torts, to the liability of warrantors of title, and judicial notice. The latter subiect is especially well treated, and we observe that the author lays it down as the law that courts take judicial notice of the laws of nature, an assertion which the critics of our proposed New York Code would have no patience with. The work others, respondents, v. Spencer D. Richardson and others, appellants.- Order affirmed with costsHenry Day, appellant, v. Abner Palmer & Co., respondents; Same v. Cornelia M. Palmer.-Appeals dismissed with costs-Anno H. Schloff and others, respondents, v. Moses G. Rosenberg and others, appellants, and S. P. Dexter and others v. Same.-Appeal dismissed with costs-Wm. S. Gray, respondent, v. Wm. J. Pollock, appellant.-Order affirmed with costs-Theodore P. Gilman, receiver, etc., appellant, v. Joseph Byrnes, respondent.-Appeal dismissed with costs-In re Application of Francis S. Turrer, au attorney.- -Appeal dismissed with costs-Frank S.A. Thompson, executor, etc., respondent, v. Charles L. Schneider and others; Appeal of Isadore Straus.Order of General Term reversed and judgment of Special Term affirmed with costs-People ex rel. Wm. R. Gilbert, respondent, v. Heury B. Laidlaw, New York County Treasurer.-Motion to advance cause granted-People ex rel. John Clark v. Matthew P. Breen. Motion to prepare cause granted without costs-In re E. M. Braytou Saw and File Co.--Motion for reargument denied with costs-Mathilde Paulitsch v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.-Motion to dismiss appeal granted with $10 costs of motion-John S. Stupps and another, respondents, v. Edward C. Ripley and others, appellants.-Motion to advance cause denied, and motion to dismiss appeal granted with $10 costs of motion-George L. Kingsland and others v. John Chetwood.-Appeal dismissed-In re Appeal of Fred P. Burrall, State Reservation at Niagara. |