in any fuppofed cafe, that he prefer the one to the other; upon which preference or volition the action, or its forbearance, certainly follows." This, without doubt, is perfectly confonant to the principles of philofophical Neceffity. Nay, this argument is always urged by the advocates of that hypothesis as irrefra gable; for the action, as Mr. Locke obferves, certainly following the volition, and volitions being founded upon previous ideas of preference, from precifely fimilar fituations of mind, volitions and actions precisely fimilar muftinevitably result. "But the next thing demanded, fays Mr. Locke, fect. 25. is, Whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or reft?" A question of which the abfurdity is manifeft. It is to afk, Whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleafed with what he is pleased with? A queftion which needs no answer." True; and it is a question, therefore, which Mr. Locke might have spared himself the trouble of propofing. It is felf-evident, thatman has the liberty or rather the power to will that which he wills; and all that the Neceffitarians pretend is, that man has not the Liberty or power of willing that which he does not will. "In this, then," he repeats, fect. 28. "confifts freedom; in our being able to act or not to act, according as we fhall chufe or will." Thus far then Mr. Locke coincides with the advocates for philofophical Neceffity, though his conceffions are generally involved in a cloud of words; and he is still defirous, as it should feem, of ranking amongst amongst the friends of philofophical Liberty. Our actions he allows to be neceffarily determined by our volitions. He now goes on to afk, fect. 29. "What determines the will?" To which he answers, "The mind or the intelligent agent itself, exerting its power this or that particular way; or, more explicitly, the mind is determined by motives grounded upon feelings of fatisfaction or uneafinefs.” This account is entirely consistent with the fyftem of Neceffity; for the advocates of that hypothefis infift as strongly as Mr. Locke, that our actions are the refult of our volitions, which are themfelves produced by motives, or by the mind actuated by a regard to motives; and as those motives were themselves produced by caufes previ oufly exifting, it follows that motives, volitions, and actions, are all the definite effects of definite caufes, and that they are all links of that -"golden everlasting chain, "Whofe ftrong embrace holds heaven, and earth, and main.” It has, I think, been fufficiently demonftrated, that Mr. Locke's principles refpecting human agency did not in reality differ from thofe of Hartley, Leibnitz, Collins, &c. and that, in order to have been confiftent, he ought to have avowed himself a believer in the doctrine of philofophical Neceffity: but this, as it feems, he was previously determined againft; and a very curious expedient, it must be owned, he has difcovered, to ferve as a falvo for his reputation in this critical dilemma. ( dilemma. "It is natural," fays he, fect. 47. “ ta fuppofe, that the greatest and most preffing uneafiness or motive fhould determine the will to the next action; and fo it does for the most part, but not always for the mind has a power to fufpend the execution of its defires; is at liberty to confider, examine, and weigh them; and in this lies the Liberty that man has. This feems to me the fource of all Liberty; and in this feems to confift what is improperly ftiled free-will." Sect. 52. "This is the hinge on which turns the Liberty of intellectual beings; all the Liberty of which men are capable lies in this, that they can fufpend their defires; all we can do is, to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good and evil of what we defire. What follows after that, fol. lows in a chain of confequences linked one to another," &c. &c. Now, if Mr. Locke had been writing a practical treatife of morality, I am far from denying that he would have done well to have laid fo great a ftrefs upon the power we have of fufpending our determinations, I never heard of any Neceffarian writer who was in the leaft inclined to call it in queftion, or who, upon all proper occafions, was not difpofed to urge men to the practice of it as much as others; but that Mr. Locke fhould introduce it into a philofophical work, and fhould fancy that he had established the hypothefis of philofophical Liberty, merely by proving that man has a power of fufpending his yolitions, is not a little aftonishing. The argy, ment ment is fo futile, that were it not advanced by fo great a man, it could fcarcely be deemed, as Mr. Locke has truly faid of an abfurd question relating to the will, proposed by himself, to deserve an answer. “Volitions, fays Mr. Locke, are determined by motives." Of course, therefore, fay the Neceffitarians, the strongest motive muft determine the volition. "For the most part," replies Mr. Locke, "it does fo, but not always; for the mind has a power to fufpend its determinations, to weigh, examine, and de. liberate, before it finally refolves," &c. Who denies all this? But furely a degree of fagacity far inferior to that poffeffed by Mr. Locke might fuffice to convince us, that a determination to fufpend a volition is a mental act, no lefs real than the final determination itself: that it is fubject to the fame laws, and can no more be produced without a motive than any other volition. We are no lefs actuated by motives, and no lefs determined by the ftrongest motive, when we form a refolution to deliberate or to fufpend our final judgment, than in any other fuppofable cafe; and to pretend that we are ever influenced by the weaker motive to reject the stronger, is an abfurdity almost too grofs for refutation. If we determine to act, there must be fome motive influencing the determination; and that motive, whatever it may be, is without question the strongest motive, because it does influence the determination. On the other hand, if we determine not to act, or to fufpend action, the determination must likewife be founded on fome mo tive which, fo long as it influences the volition, is the predominant, that is, the strongest motive, Of what advantage then to the Anti-neceffarian hypothefis is this boasted power of suspension? It is a power perfectly analogous to all the other powers of the human mind; a power which cannot be exerted independently of motives: and, fo far as it is the refult of motives, the Neceffitarians are far from calling in queftion its reality; and they are as well convinced as Mr. Locke of its utility. The inconfiftency of Mr. Locke upon this fubject is very remarkable: he repeatedly tells us, and truly tells us, that Liberty confifts only in a power of acting, or forbearing to act: but, upon reconfidering his own affertions, he is apparently alarmed at the coincidence of his fyftem with that of certain unpopular writers; and he muft therefore find or make a difference, or at leaft a diftinction, between them. So, after much obfcure and useless prefatory matter, he retracts what he had before pofitively affirmed, and informs us, that Liberty confifts in the power of fufpend ing our volitions. One might reasonably suppose, that this power was included in the power of forbearing to act; but we are told there is a very important diftinction between them; for the power of forbearance cannot be exercised but in confequence of the prevalence of fome motive; but the power of fufpenfion may, it feems, be ex. erted in direct oppofition to the prevailing motive. Surely the hypothefis of philofophical Liberty |