special tribunal has authority to hear and determine certain matters arising in the course of its duties, its decision within the scope of its authority is conclusive upon all others, and said: "That the action of the land-office in issuing a patent for any of the public lands, subject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise, is conclusive of the legal title, must be admitted under the principle above stated; and in all courts, and in all forms of judicial proceedings where this title must control, either by reason of the limited powers of the court, or the essential character of the proceedings, no inquiry can be permitted into the circumstances under which it was obtained. On the other hand, there has always existed in the courts of equity the power in certain classes of cases to inquire into and correct mistakes, injustice, and wrong, in both judicial and executive action, however solemn the form which the result of that action may assume when it invades private rights; and by virtue of this power the final judgments of courts of law have been annulled or modified, and patents and other important instruments issuing from the crown, or other executive branch of the government, have been corrected or declared void, or other relief granted. No reason is perceived why the action of the land-office should constitute an exception to this principle. In dealing with the public domain under the system of laws enacted by congress for their management and sale, that tribunal decides upon private rights of great value, and very often, from the nature of its functions, this is by a proceeding essentially ex parte, and peculiarly liable to the influence of frauds, false swearing, and mistakes. These are among the most ancient and well-established grounds of special jurisdiction of courts of equity just referred to, and the necessity and value of that jurisdiction are nowhere better exemplified than in its application to cases arising in the land-office." This case is a leading one in this branch of the law, and has been uniformly followed. The decision aptly expresses the settled doctrine of this court with reference to the action of officers of the land department, that when the legal title has passed from the United States to one party, when in equity and in good conscience, and by the laws of congress, it ought to go to another, a court of equity will convert the holder into a trustee of the true owner and compel him to convey the legal title. This doctrine extends to the action of all officers having charge of proceedings for the alienation of any portion of the public domain. The parties actually entitled under the law cannot, because of its misconstruction by those officers, be deprived of their rights. Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326, 335; Carpentier v. Montgomery, 13 Wall. 480, 496; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330; Moore Av. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530; Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420; Smelting Co. v. Kemp, Id. 636. The bill is open to the objection that it does not allege that the heirs of Ballantine have acted upon the award and purchased the lands in controversy; but their counsel makes no point upon this omission, and admits that they have in fact purchased. It follows from the views expressed that the decree of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer, and to take further proceedings in accordance with this opinion; the plaintiff to have leave to amend his bill and the defendants to answer. WAITE, C. J., dissenting. I am unable to agree to this judgment. In my opinion the act of March 3, 1877, granted a new right to the occupants of the Hot Springs reservation, and provided a special tribunal for the settlement of all controversies between conflicting claimants. The right and the remedy were created by the same statute, and, consequently, the remedy thus specially provided was exclusive of all others. No provision was made for a review of the decisions of the tribunal. Its determination, therefore, of all questions arising under the jurisdiction must necessarily be conclusive, and not open to attack collaterally. It seems to me there is a very broad distinction between this case and that of Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, and others of that class. Here a special tribunal has been created for a special purpose. It has been clothed with power to compel the attendance of witnesses, "and to fiinally determine the right of each claimant or occupant to purchase" from the United States, under the provisions of the act of congress, the ground ne occupies or claims. The duties of the tribunal are judicial in their character, and their decisions evidently intended to be binding on the parties. The question now is, not whether, if Rector had kept away from the tribunal and Gibbon had got a title under his occupancy, he could be charged as trustee for Rector on account of his tenancy, but whether, having appeared before the tribunal and been beaten in a contest with Gibbon, on that identical question" Rector can in this suit correct the errors of the tribunal in its decision. I think he cannot. If he can, it is difficult to see why all the decisions of the tribunal are not open to revision by the courts. I am authorized to say that Justices HARLAN, WOODS, and BLATCHYCKD concur with me in this opinion. (111 U. S. 722) HITZ . NATIONAL METROPOLITAN BANK. (May 5, 1884.) 1. TRUST DEed-Delivery-EXECUTION EVIDENCE. Where evidence shows that a conveyance is made in trust, and the deed receiveo by the trustee and cared for for a time, and then delivered to his cestui que trust, it is plain that the deed was executed and delivered, and the trusteeship accepted, and the deed is valid as between the parties. 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE-DEED-CONSIDERATION. Where a husband and wife deed property to trustees for the wife's benefit, because the wife will not join with him in conveying property in which she is interested, to relieve him from financial embarrassment, unless he thus relinquishes his marital rights in this property which belongs to her, there is sufficient consideration for the deed. 3. SAME CURTESY-PURCHASE OF, BY WIFE. A wife has the same right to buy her husband's curtesy in her real estate, and to have it barred by a proper conveyance, that any one else has. 4. SAME PURCHASE OF CURTESY-CONVEYANCE WITHOUT FRAUD. When a wife properly purchases for good consideration her husband's curtesy in her real estate, creditors having no lien upon it at the time, and the consideration goes to his creditors in satisfaction of his debts, the conveyance is not in fraud of creditors. 5. DEED-CONSIDERATION VARIED BY PAROL. Where the consideration mentioned in a deed is one dollar, the true consideratio❤ may be shown by parol. 6. SAME CONSIDERATION-EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE. Where a complainant calls upon a defendant to state in his answer the consid eration of a deed, and the latter does so and supports it by evidence, the evidence will not be disregarded as inadmissible, because unfavorable to the complainant. 7. SAME-VOID AGAINST CREDITORS-SUPP. REV. ST. D. C. 315. Where a deed is not filed for record until after a judgment is recovered against the grantor, the judgment creditor having no notice of its existence until after issue of execution and levy, the conveyance is ineffectual against the creditor. Supp. Rev. St. D. C. 315. 8. HUSBAND And Wife-SeCTION 727, REV. ST. D. C.-WIFE'S PROPERTY-EXEMPTIONHUSBAND'S DEBTS. Section 727, Rev. St. D. C., was intended to exempt all property which came to a wife, from any source except her husband, from liability to seizure for his debts, without regard to the nature of the interest which the husband may have in it, or the time when it accrued, and no principle of law or morals is violated by it *725 Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. R. K. Elliott and Leigh Robinson, for appellee. MILLER, J. This is a bill in chancery brought by the bank against Jobu Hitz, Jane C. Hitz, his wife, and Metzerott and Cross, trustees, to declare void a deed, so far as it affects rights of the bank, made by Hitz and wife to Metzerott and Cross, as trustees, for the benefit of the wife. The deed was ade December 9, 1878, and filed for record in the proper office, May 13, 1879. The property conveyed, which was real estate in the city of Washing ton, came to Mrs. Hitz by inheritance from her father, and by the birth of children before the married woman's act of congress of April 10,*1869, (16 st. 45.) Hitz had become entitled to a life estate in it as tenant by the curtesy. It is this right which is the subject of the present controversy. The bank, as creditor of Hitz, obtained a judgment against him on the twentyeighth day of April, 1879, for the sum of $10,000, with interest and costs, and on the fifth day of June a writ of execution was issued on said judgment and returned nulla bona the same day. On the next day plaintiff caused another execution to be issued on the same judgment, and levied by the marshal on the interest of the said John Hitz in the property described in the trust deed of Hitz and wife to Metzerott and Cross. We will notice the grounds on which the validity of the deed is assailed, in their order: 1. It is said that the deed was never delivered to the trustees. But the testimony of Mr. Metzerott, complainant's witness, shows clearly that he did receive the deed and kept it for an indefinite length of time, and then placed it in a box which he bought for that purpose, and handed it to Mrs. Hitz, that she might deposit the box with this and other valuable papers in the Bank of the Metropolis. This was done. It is also objected that it was delivered to Metzerott as an escrow, to be recorded, as he expresses it, only when Hitz should have made some adjustment of his indebtedness to the German-American Bank, which has never been done. It is quite obvious, and perhaps natural, that Metzerott should confound his holding the deed as an escrow and withholding it from record as meaning the same thing; and it is very clear from all his testimony and that of Mr. Cross, the other trustee, that only the latter was in question. Both of these gentlemen had been consulted before the deed was made, and had consented to act as trustees in it. As soon as the deed was executed and acknowledged, it was placed in the hands of Metzerott, who received and held it for some time, and then gave it to the party chiefly interested for safe-keeping. Leaving out the testimony of Mrs. Hitz, of Hitz, and their sworn answers, in which they both deny that they had ever heard of the deed being delived as an escrow, it is plain that it was executed, delivered, and the trusteeship accepted, and the deed thus became a valid instrument as between the parties to it. 2. As regards the understanding that it was not to be recorded until Hitz's debt to the bank was adjusted, it rests upon Mr. Metzerott's testimony alone. Mrs. Hitz swears that though she was advised by Mr. Cox, her lawyer, who drew up the deed, that it was better not to record it at once, and that Mr. Metzerott expressed the same views to her, she did not adopt them, and made no promise to withhold it from record. Hitz, whose interest in the property was the thing conveyed, says that he had no such understanding, and Cross, the other trustee, knows nothing of it except what was told him by Metzerott. There can be no reason favorable to the purpose of the deed, the interests of Mrs. Hitz, the cestui que trust, why it should be withheld from record, or why she should have made such a promise. 3. This brings us to the third objection to the deed, namely, that it was voluntary, was without consideration, and designed to defraud creditors. It appears that up to a very short time before this deed was made, Mr. Hitz had the entire management of his wife's affairs, and she had trusted him unreservedly. It was a complete surprise to her when she learned that with the failure of the bank, of which her husband was president and principal manager, her own fortune, inherited from her father, had also disappeared. The evidence leaves no doubt that she at once took the management of her affairs out of his hands, not even permitting him to receive or collect for her the rents of what remained, of which the property now in suit was the main part. It appears that, to save himself from prosecution by the bank, or for other reasons, he desired to convey to the bank some real estate, the title of which was in his own name, though it had been purchased partly by her money. He wished her to join him in conveyance of this property to Keyser, the receiver, who had been appointed to close up the affairs of the bank. He* had also conveyed to Hatch and wife, for some purpose of his own, a valuable business house on Pennsylvania avenue, which was part of her inheritance, and then had procured these persons to mortgage it to the bank of which he was president, to secure a large debt due by him to the bank. But it had been discovered that Mrs. Hitz had never signed or otherwise executed any conveyance of this lot. Mr. Hitz was in an embarrassing condition with regard to this matter. It was after some resistance on her part to making these matters straight for Mr. Hitz that it was agreed, if he would make the deed of trust by which all the estate in the lots mentioned in it, including his interest, whatever it might be, and hers also, should be secured to Mrs. Hitz and her children by the intervention of trustees, she would make good the title of the lot on Pennsylvania avenue which he had pledged to the bank, and would join him also in the deed to Keyser, the receiver, of what was asserted to be his property. The trust deed was, therefore, made on a valuable consideration. The value of the avenue property alone conveyed by Mrs. Hitz is sworn to be $18,000. What her interest in the other property was worth is not proved, and could not easily be ascertained. No estimate of the value of Hitz's interest in the lots conveyed to the trustees is shown. When, sitting as a court of equity, we see this man trying to rectify the wrong done his wife, we are not required to scan closely the value of what she gave at the moment for his relinquishment of his marital rights in her remaining property. The case is wholly free from fraud. Mrs. Hitz had the same right to buy his curtesy in her real estate, to have it barred by a proper conveyance, as any one else had or could have had. Her equity was as good as that of any other creditor, and he could secure her as well as he could the bank. As the present complainant had no lien on the property, the joint right of husband and wife to sell it for value was undoubted, and the right to sell to her by the intervention of trustees is equally clear. The property she gave in exchange for his interest in her lots did not go to him to be secretly used in fraud of his creditors, but was conveyed directly to creditors in*satisfaction of his debts. The conveyance was not without consideration, and it was without fraud. We do not concur in the view of the learned court below, that because the sum of one dollar is mentioned in this trust deed as the consideration, the true consideration cannot be shown by parol evidence. It is always understood that the one dollar in such connection is merely nominal, and is never actually paid. In this case it means no more than that nothing was paid by the trustees, who took no beneficial interest. It neither contradicts nor varies this statement to show that a valuable consideration passed from Mrs. Hitz to her husband for his conveyance of his life estate to the trustees for her benefit. The question is unimportant in this case, because the bill of complaint calls upon the defendants to show under oath the true consideration of the deed in the following language: "That defendants by their answers under oath may disclose what was the real and true consideration and purpose for the making of said deed." That the answer thus * called for, showing a valuable and meritorious consideration, which answer is uncontradicted by any evidence whatever, and is well supported on crossexamination of defendants in their depositions, can be disregarded as inadmissible because unfavorable to the party who demanded it, would be to permit the party to trifle with the powers of the court at its pleasure. 4. There remains to be considered the effect to be given to the fact that complainant recovered its judgment against Hitz before this deed was recorded, but issued no execution until after it had been filed according to law with the proper officer for record. On this question a petition for a rehearing points out a mistake in the opinion of the court as originally delivered, in regard to the date of the act repealing the recording statutes as found in sections 446 and 447 of the Revised Statutes, whereby we were misled to believe that the sections mentioned governed the case. It is apparent, however, that the new statute was approved April 29, 1878, and not 1879, and its provision as to the effect of recording, or failing to record, the instrument in question, which was executed in December, 1878, must be governed by that act. It is in the following language: "That all deeds, deeds of trust, mortgages, conveyances, covenants, agreements, decrees, instruments in writing, which by law are entitled to be recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds, shall take effect and be valid, as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, from the time such deed, deed of trust, mortgage, conveyance, covenant, agreement, or instrument in writing shall, after having been acknowledged, proved, or certified, as the case may be, be delivered to the recorder of deeds for record, and from that time only." Supp. Rev. St. 315. As the deed of trust in question was not recorded until several weeks after the judgment of the bank against Hitz was recovered, and as there is no evidence that the bank ever had actual notice of its existence until after execution was issued and levied on Hitz's interest in the property, we entertain no doubt but that the conveyance would be ineffectual against the bank, or any purchaser at the sale under that judgment. But as this deed interposed no obstruction to the sale, and none to the title of a purchaser, it is not easy to see on what ground the interposition of a court of equity is sought, since the bank having levied on Hitz's interest in the property, which was a legal estate if it was anything, it could be sold under that execution, if liable to sale for his debts, without the aid of a court of equity, the whole proceeding being one at law, and its effect, when completed, a mere question of statutory construction. It may be, however, that the bank had a right to remove the apparent cloud which this deed would throw upon the title of the purchaser at the sale, and this demands of us an examination of the argument advanced at the hearing, that this interest of Hitz in the property of his wife was not liable to sale for his debts, by reason of section 727 of the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia, which is as follows: "In the district, the right of any married woman to any property, personal or real, belonging to her at the time of marriage, or acquired during marriage in any other way than by gift or conveyance from her husband, shall be as absolute as if she were unmarried, and shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts." There can be no question that this statute exempts the wife's property from the control of her husband, and liability for his debts as to all property coming to her from any source but him, after its enactment. This was on the tenth of April, 1869, and it is insisted that the right of Hitz, as tenant by the curtesy, had then become vested, because the inheritance had then come to Mrs. Hitz, the marriage had taken place, and issue had been born of it. It is argued with much force that congress did not intend by this statute to destroy an existing vested right of the husband under such circumstances, and that if it did so intend it had not the power to do so. We should be |