tells us, too, that animals were brought before Adam to see what he would call them.

Nature presents first facts and phenomena, and then laws and principles. The genesis of all science is confirmatory of this statement. It is true that when a science reaches a certain stage of advancement and its laws and principles become wellestablished, they can be applied to new facts and phenomena; but science in its earlier stages of growth is now alone in question.

Nature presents first wholes and then parts and collections of wholes. The whole of an object must be observed before it can be analyzed into parts; and the mind must pass from one individual whole to others before it can make a synthesis of the collection.

If these statements are true, they must have an important bearing upon elementary education. Nature plainly indicates the first steps in learning. To attempt to teach in contravention of her plan is to damage the intellect under training, and to lay a foundation upon which science can never rest securely. The great aim of elementary education should be to communicate the elements of knowledge-to make more extensive the experience of the young.

5. NATURE OPENS UP HER TRUTHS IN A CERTAIN ORDER AND THAT ORDER MUST BE FOLLOWED IN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY.-The elements of all knowledge are cotemporary in origin. A child may begin the study of all branches of science, for in their beginnings all seem equally simple. Progress in science

is from a united base to divided branches, or from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. The ob servations a child may make as he stands in a garden or walks through a meadow will serve as the first steps in all kinds of learning. From this root several trunks spring, and divide and subdivide like the branches of a tree.

The object-matter of knowledge is arranged like successive strata, that beneath not being approchable except by passing through that above. First, we find qualities and facts disconnected and fragmentary. They lie upon the surface. Deeper down we find other facts and other qualities. Second, we notice the likeness and unlikeness of things. They appear to us in clusters or classes. The differences we notice first are very apparent, but identity and difference extend down to the very heart of things. Third, we begin to see that particulars can be reduced to generals, that individuals belong to classes, and species to genera, that many phenomena are the result of a single law. No limits can be fixed to this work. Fourth, seeing effects, we search for causes. We inquire why? and wherefore? We construct syllogisms and carry on processes of reasoning. No end can be found to the chain of causation. Fifth, we realize that something exists that no process of reasoning can reach-that we can think things that we could never know by experience; that we can catch glimpses, at least, of the infinite, the pure, and the perfect. Here we find God, and our work is done.

I cannot claim that what has just been said is an accurate expression of the order in which the mind

proceeds in acquainting itself with the object-matter of knowledge, for I well know that more or fewer steps may be made; but I think it will convey to the mind of the reader with sufficient clearness the great educational truth under consideration.

The contents of a text-book must be arranged in accordance with the law now stated. In commencing the study of a branch of learning, it is clear that there is a first step which should be taken, a second that ought to follow, and this introduces a third; and so a whole subject, to be properly studied, must be made up of a series of logically connected parts. A pupil enters school knowing something. The teacher must acquaint himself with what his pupil knows, and then detach from what is unknown to him appropriate matter, and link the known and the unknown together.

6. THE EMPIRICAL AND THE RATIONAL SCIENCES REQUIRE DIFFERENT METHODS OF INSTRUCTION. Knowledge has two sources, the Senses and the Reason. All science based upon the evidence of experience may be call Empirical science, and all science based upon the intuitions of the Reason may be called Rational science. Methods of teaching these two classes of sciences are different.

An Empirical science differs from a Rational science in its data, in its end, and in its processes of reasoning. The data of an Empirical science are facts; its end is the attainment of general laws, and its processes of reasoning are inductive. The data of a Rational science are necessary and universal principles or ideas, its end is the attainment of particular

principles, or less general ideas, and its processes of reasoning are deductive. Chemistry is an Empirical science, and Geometry, including its axioms and definitions, has the form of a Rational science; to those acquainted with the nature of both no further exposition is necessary.

There are two modes by which an Empirical science may be taught. By the first, facts are presented, and then the laws that may be inferred from them. By the second, an hypothesis may be assumed, and afterwards search may be made for the facts by which it can be tested; or laws, fully established, may be stated to the unlearned in the form of propositions, and the facts upon which they rest adduced to prove them. In the more advanced stages of an Empirical science, it is possible to anticipate the existence of unascertained facts from a knowledge of the general laws which must control. them. In the first mode there are given facts to find laws, and in the second there are given laws, either ascertained or hypothecated, to find facts.

There are likewise two modes of teaching a Rational science. The necessary and universal principles which form the data of such a science may be first communicated, and this may be followed by the demonstration of the particular truths contained in them. This is the first mode. A particular truth or principle may be assumed, and the proof of it be sought for in the necessary and universal principles of which it is a part. This is the second mode. The first mode consists in the evolution of the contents of axioms, definitions, intuitions of the reason; the second consists in demonstrating particular

truths, by showing their conformity with universal and necessary truth.

The two modes of teaching an Empirical science differ from the two modes of teaching a Rational science. Take the modes first named with reference to each, and compare them. The source of our knowledge of facts is the Senses, the source of our knowledge of universal and necessary principles is the Reason. When we infer general laws from particular facts we proceed in one way, inductively; but when we attempt to analyze the pure products of the Reason we proceed in quite another, deductively. The conclusion in one case is but the generalization of experience and cannot extend beyond the facts observed, while in the other the conclusion is exact and positive knowledge.

The same differences will appear if we compare the two modes last mentioned. Starting out with an hypothesis or an ascertained law in Empirical Science may be the same as commencing with the assumption of a particular truth in a Rational Science, but here the similarity between the two modes of procedure ends, for proving a principle by facts differs very materially from demonstrating it by reasoning.

7. THE FIRST FORM OF INSTRUCTION MUST BE QUALITATIVE, NEXT QUANTITATIVE, AND THEN A COMPARISON OF RELATIONS.-Things are known only by their qualities. They are the Alphabet of nature. They are the medium of introduction between that which is to know and that which is to be known.

The first form of instruction must be qualitative.