even by the free exercise of their own powers, instru- Providence. ments of God's particular providence to other men; so may we well suppose that these higher beings may be so distributed through the universe, and subject to such an economy, unknown to us, as may render them also instruments of the same providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, consistently with the laws of nature, of influencing human affairs in proper places. Providence, not what quarter. If they proceeded from the mobility of spirits straggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were they of the nature of dreams, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are?" Is it not much more reasonable to imagine that they come by the order and direction of an all-seeing and all-gracious God, who continually watches over us, and disposes every thing in and about us for the good of ourselves or others? not to speak of the agreeableness of this notion to the opinions of the best and wisest men in all ages (A). "If this, then, be the case, as it seems to be, that men's minds are susceptible of such insinuations and impressions, as frequently, by ways unknown, do affect them, and give them an inclination towards this or that; how many things (asks our author) may be brought to pass by these means without fixing and refixing the laws of nature, any more than they are unfixed when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing in his way a book proper for that purpose?" IS And may be effected by beings superior to us, or by All this may be effected either by the immediate interposition of God himself, or by that of beings invisible, and in nature superior to us, who act as the ministers of his providence. That there are such beings we can the Deity. hardly doubt, as it is in the highest degree improbable that such imperfect beings as men are at the top of the scale of created existence. And since we ourselves, by the use of our limited powers, do often alter the course of things within our sphere from what they would be if left to the ordinary laws of motion and gravitation, without being said to alter those laws; why may not superior beings do the same as instruments of divine providence? This idea of the intervention of superior natures is beautifully illustrated by Thomson in the following passage: These are the haunts of meditation, these We agree, however, with Mr Wollaston, in thinking the power of these beings not so large as to alter or suspend the general laws of nature (see MIRACLE); for the world is not like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be often set backwards or forwards. We are likewise perfectly satisfied, that they cannot change their condition, to ape us or inferior beings; and consequently we are not apt hastily to credit stories of portents, &c. such as cannot be true, unless the nature of things and their manner of existence were occasional. ly reversed. Yet as men may be so placed as to become, We shall next proceed to state some of the chief ob- Objections jections which in ancient or modern times have been to the docbrought against the opinion, that the world is govern- trine of ed by a Divine providence. Providence 20 1. The first of these is this, that the system of nature from the contains many imperfections which it ought not to do if imperfecit be the work of a perfectly wise and good Being. To tions of naavoid the force of this objection, some modern writers ture, have deserted the ground of supreme and absolute goodness, which the ancient theists always occupied, and have asserted that the divine perfection consists in unlimited power and uncontrouled supremacy of will; that consequently the Deity does not always that which is best, but merely what he himself pleases; and that for no other reason but because he wills to do so. But this is no better than atheism itself. For it is of no importance to us whether the universe is governed by blind fate or chance, that is to say, by nothing at all; or whether it is governed by an arbitrary sovereign will that is directed by chance, or at least by no principle of beneficence. 21 The true answer to this objection is, that no created answered. system can have every perfection, because it must necessarily be destitute of self-existence and independence; and therefore if being destitute of some perfections be better than nothing, it was worthy of infinite power and perfect goodness to create such beings. In our present state, we mortals stand upon too low ground to take a commanding view of the whole frame of things. We can only reason concerning what is unknown from the little that is within our reach. In that little, we can see that wisdom and goodness reign; that nature always aims to produce perfection; that many salutary effects result even from the thunder and the storm: and we doubt not that a view of the whole structure of the universe would afford an additional triumph to the goodness and skill of its great Architect. We see a regular ascent in the scale of beings from mere lifeless matter up to man; and the probability is, that the scale continues to ascend as far above man in perfection as created beings can possibly be raised.— The sole purpose of God in creating the world must have been to produce happiness: but this would be most effectually done by creating, in the first place, as many of the most perfect class of beings as the system could contain; and afterwards other classes less and less perfect, till the whole universe should be completely full. We do not positively assert such a scheme of creation, Where (A) That such was the general belief of the Greeks in the days of Homer, is plain from that poet's constantly introducing his deities into the narrative of his poems, and telling us that Minerva, or some other god, altered the minds of his heroes. "By this," says Plutarch, "the poet does not mean to make God destroy the will of man, but only move him to will: nor does he miraculously produce the appetites themselves in men, but only causes such imaginations as are capable of exciting them." VOL. XVII. Part II. 3 N Providence. 22 Where all must fall, or not coherent be; And all that rises, rise in due degree, was actually in the divine Architect's intention; but that it is possible, is sufficiently obvious. No man will pretend to say, that this earth could afford a comfortable subsistence to a greater number of the human race, were all the inferior animals annihilated, than it could at present, swarming as every element is with life. Suppose then, that as many men had been placed at first upon the earth as it could possibly support, and that matters had been so constituted, as that the number should never have been either increased or diminished; we beg leave to ask, whether, since there would have been evidently room for inferior animals, it would have been most worthy of infinite goodness to leave the whole globe to men, or to introduce into it different orders of less perfect beings, which, while they could not incommode this principal inhabitant, would each find plea sure in its own existence? To this question different answers cannot surely be given. Let the reader then extend his view, and consider the universe, which, however vast, cannot be positively infinite, as one system as much united as the several parts of this globe; let him suppose that there were at first created as many of the highest order of beings as it could have contained had creation there stopt; let him remember that happiness in many different degrees is valuable ;-and he will not surely think it any imputation on the goodness of God that there are in the universe many beings far from perfection. The most imperfect of these are by themselves better than nothing; and they all contribute to make up a system which, considered as a whole, we have every reason to believe to be as perfect as any thing not self-existent can possibly be. Objection 2. If the world is conducted by a benevolent provifrom the introduc- dence, how came evil to be introduced into it? This tion of evil, question has perplexed mankind in all ages. The ancient Persians resolved it, by asserting the existence of two gods, Oromasdes the author of good, and Arimanius the author of evil. From them the Christian heretics called Manichees borrowed their doctrine of two opposite co-eternal principles. Both the Platonists and Stoics ascribed the origin of evil to the perverseness or imperfection of matter, which they thought the Deity could not alter and Pythagoras imagined a state of pre-existence, in which the souls of men had committed offences, for which they are here suffering the punishment. But these hypotheses are, some of them impious, and all unsatisfactory. 23 answered. Taking the expression in its most extensive sense, the evils to which the human race are exposed may be reduced to pain, uneasiness, disappointment of appetites, and death; of which not one could have been wholly prevented without occasioning greater evils, inconsistent with the perfect goodness of the Creator. As long as we have solid bodies capable of motion, supported by food, subject to the influence of the atmosphere, and divisible, they must necessarily be liable to dissolution or death: But if a man could suffer death, or have his limbs broken, without feeling pain, the human race had been long ago extinct. A fever is a state of the body in which the fluids are in great disorder. Felt we no uneasiness from that disorder, we should have no inducement to pay the proper attention to our state, and should cer tainly die unawares, without suspecting ourselves to be Providene. in danger; whereas, under the present administration of divine providence, the pain and sickness of the disease compel us to have recourse to the remedies proper for restoring us to soundness and to health. Of the uneasinesses to which we are liable, and which are not the effect of immediate pain, the greatest has been sometimes said to arise from the apprehension of death, which constantly stares us in the face, and frequently embitters all our pleasures even in the hour of perfect health.— But this dread of death is implanted in our breasts for the very best of purposes. Had we no horror at the apprehension of death, we should be apt, whenever any misfortune befel us, to quit this world rashly, and rush unprepared into the presence of our Judge: but the horror which attends our reflections on our own dissolution, arising not from any apprehensions of the pain of dying, but from our anxiety concerning our future state of existence, tends strongly to make us act, while we are here, in such a manner as to ensure our happiness hereafter. Add to this, that the fear of death is the greatest support of human laws. We every day see persons breaking through all the regulations of society and good life, notwithstanding they know death to be the certain consequence, and feel all the horrors of it that are natural to man: and therefore were death divested of these horrors, how insignificant would capital punishments be as guardians of the law, and how insecure would individuals be in civil society? With regard to the unavoidable misfortunes and anxieties of our present state, so far from being truly hurtful in themselves, they are proofs of divine beneficence. When we see men displeased with their situation, when we hear them complain of the difficulties, the miseries, and the cares of life, of the hardships which they have undergone, and the labours which still lie before them: instead of accounting them unfortunate, we ought to regard them as active beings, placed in the only situation that is fit for the improvement of their nature. That discontent, these restless wishes to improve their condition, are so many sure indications that their faculties will not languish. They who are in the least degree accustomed to observe the human character, know well the influence which pleasure and repose bave in enfeebling every manly principle, and how capable they are of attaching us even to a sordid and dishonourable existence. Happy indeed it is for the human race, that the number of those men is small whom providence has placed in situations in which personal activity is unnecessary. By far the greater number are compelled to exert themselves, to mix and to contend with their equals, in the race of fortune and of honour. It is thus that our powers are called forth, and that our nature reaches its highest perfection. It is even perhaps a general truth, that they who have struggled with the greatest variety of hardships, as they always acquire the highest energy of character, so if they have retained their integrity, and have not sunk entirely in the contest, seldom fail to spend their remaining days respectable and happy, superior to passion, and secured from folly by the possession of a wisdom dearly earned. 24 Physical But the benefits of physical evils have been set in a evil the still stronger light by a great master of moral wisdom, who was himself subject to many of those evils. That moral good, cause of Providence, man is a moral agent, sent into this world to acquire habits of virtue and piety to fit him for a better state, is a truth to which no consistent theist will for a moment refuse his assent. But almost all the moral good which is left among us, is the apparent effect of physical evil. Johnson's Idler, No. 89. "Goodness is divided by divines into soberness, righteousness, and godliness. Let it be examined how each of these duties would be practised if there were no physical evil to enforce it. 66 Sobriety or temperance is nothing but the forbearance of pleasure; and if pleasure was not followed by pain, who would forbear it? We see every hour those in whom the desire of present indulgence overpowers all sense of past, and all foresight of future misery. In a remission of the gout, the drunkard returns to his wine, and the glutton to his feast; and if neither disease nor poverty were felt or dreaded, every one would sink down in idle sensuality, without any care of others, or of himself. To eat and drink, and lie down to sleep, would be the whole business of mankind. "Righteousness, or the system of social duty, may be subdivided into justice and charity. Of justice, one of the heathen sages has shown, with great acuteness, that it was impressed upon mankind only by the inconveniences which injustice had produced. In the first ages (says he) men acted without any rule but the impulse of desire; they practised injustice upon others, and suffered it from others in their turn; but in time it was discovered, that the pain of suffering wrong was greater than the pleasure of doing it; and mankind, by a general compact, submitted to the restraint of laws, and resigned the pleasure to escape the pain.' "Of charity, it is superfluous to observe, that it could have no place if there were no want; for of a virtue which could not be practised, the omission could not be culpable. Evil is not only the occasional but the efficient cause of charity; we are incited to the relief of misery by the consciousness that we have the same nature with the sufferer; that we are in danger of the same distresses, and may some time implore the same assistance. "Godliness or piety is elevation of the mind towards the Supreme Being, and extension of the thoughts to another life. The other life is future, and the Supreme Being is invisible. None would have recourse to an invisible power, but that all other subjects had eluded their hopes. None would fix their attention upon the future, but that they are discontented with the present. If the senses were feasted with perpetual pleasure, they would always keep the mind in subjection. Reason has no authority over us but by its power to warn us against evil. "In childhood, while our minds are yet unoccupied, religion is impressed upon them; and the first years of almost all who have been well educated are passed in a regular discharge of the duties of piety: But as we advance forward into the crowds of life, innumerable delights solicit our inclinations, and innumerable cares distract our attention. The time of youth is passed in noisy frolics; manhood is led on from hope to hope, and from project to project; the dissoluteness of pleasure, the inebriation of success, the ardour of expectation, and the vehemence of competition, chain down the mind alike to the present scene: nor is it remem bered how soon this mist of trifles must be scattered, Providenceand the bubbles that float upon the rivulet of life be lost for ever in the gulf of eternity. To this consideration scarce any man is awakened but by some press. ing and resistless evil; the death of those from whom he derived his pleasures, or to whom he destined his possessions, some disease which shows him the vanity of all external acquisitions, or the gloom of age which intercepts his prospects of long enjoyment, forces him to fix his hopes upon another state; and when he has contended with the tempests of life till his strength fails him, he flies at last to the shelter of religion. "That misery does not make all virtuous, experience too certainly informs us; but it is no less certain, that of what virtue there is, misery produces far the greater part. Physical evil may be therefore endured with patience, since it is the cause of moral good; and patience itself is one virtue by which we are prepared for that state in which evil shall be no more." The calamities and the hardships of our present state, then, are so far from being real evils, of which providence ought to be accused, that in every point of view in which we can consider them, they afford the surest proofs of the wisdom of its administration, and of its goodness to man. 25 of moral The most serious difficulty lies in accounting for the Objections permission of moral evil or guilt, in a system governed from the by infinite benevolence and wisdom. Those who in a permission consistent manner hold the doctrine of the absolute ne- guilt, cessity of human actions in its full extent, and acknowledge all its consequences, find it easy to elude this difficulty. They very fairly deny the existence of any such thing as moral evil in the abstract; and assert, that what we call a crime, is nothing more than an action which we always regard with a painful sensation: that these apparent evils endure only for a time; and that all will at last terminate in the perfection and happiness of every intelligent being. 26 Upon the system of liberty, the shortest answer seems answered. to be this: that some things are absolutely impossible, not from any weakness in the Deity, but because they infer absurdity or contradiction. Thus it is impossible for twice two to be any thing else than four; and thus it is impossible for Omnipotence itself to confer selfapprobation upon an intelligent being who has never deserved it; that is to say, it is impossible for a man of sense to be pleased with himself for having done a certain action, while he himself is conscious that he never did that action. But self-approbation constitutes the highest, the most unmingled, and permanent felicity, of which our nature is capable. It is not in the power of Omnipotence itself, then, to bestow the highest and most permanent felicity of our nature; it must be earned and deserved before it can be obtained. In the same manner good desert, virtue or merit, cannot be conferred; they must be acquired. To enable us to acquire these, we must be exposed to difficulties, and must suffer in a certain degree. If these difficulties had no influence upon our conduct and feelings, if they exposed us to no real danger, no fabric of merit and of selfapprobation could be reared upon them. All that the Supreme Being could do for us, was to confer such an original constitution and character as would enable us to do well if we should exert our utmost powers. The 3 N 2 universe 187. ed. Salmas. 28 Objection from the apparent "He who says that God should not permit the exercise of its freedom to the soul, must affirm one of these two things; either that the soul, though by nature capable of indifferently choosing good or evil, should yet be constantly prevented from choosing evil; or else that it should have been made of such a nature as to have no power of choosing evil. "The former assertion (continues he) is irrational and absurd; for what kind of liberty would that be in which there should be no freedom of choice? and what choice could there be, if the mind were constantly restrained to one side of every alternative? With respect to the second assertion, it is to be observed (says he), that no evil is in itself desirable, or can be chosen as evil. But if this power of determining itself either way in any given case must be taken from the soul, it must either be as something not good, or as some great evil. But whoever saith so, does not consider how many things there are which, though accounted good and desirable, are yet never put in competition with this freedom of will for without it we should be on a level with the brutes; and there is no person who would rather be a brute than a man. If God then shows his goodness in giving to inferior beings such perfections as are far below this, is it incongruous to the divine nature and goodness to give man a self-determining power over his actions, and to permit him the free exercise of that power? Had God, to prevent man's sin, taken away the liberty of his will, he would likewise have destroyed the foundation of all virtue, and the very nature of man; for there could be no virtue were there not a possibility. of vice; and man's nature, had it continued rational, would have been divine, because impeccable. Therefore (continues he), though we attribute to God, as its author, this self-determining power, which is so necessary in the order of the universe; we have no reason to attribute to him that evil which comes by the abuse of liberty: For God doth not cause that aversion from good which is in the soul when it sins; he only gave to the soul such a power as might turn itself to evil, out of which he produces much good, which, without such a power, could not have been produced by Omnipotence itself." So consonant to the doctrine of our scriptures is the reasoning of this opponent of the writings of Moses! Fas est et ab hoste doceri. The last objection to the belief of a divine providence arises from the apparent confusion of human affairs, that confusion all things happen alike to all, that bad men are prosperous, and that a total want of justice appears to attend of human affairs, the divine administrations. Even the best men have at Provide times been shaken by this consideration.-But there ar many reasons for rendering this world a mixed scene: it would become unfit for a state of trial and of education to virtue were it otherwise. Larch 10 It has been shown already, that physical evil is the answered, parent of moral good; and therefore it would be absurd to expect that the virtuous should be entirely exempted from that evil. For the occasional prosperity of the wicked, many reasons have been assigned even by those who, in their disquisitions, were not guided by that revelation which has brought to light life and immortality. "God (says Plutarch) spares the wicked, that he by Plamay set to mankind an example of forbearance, and teach them not to revenge their injuries too hastily on each other. He spares some wicked men from early punishment, in order to make them instruments of his justice in punishing others. And he spares all for a time, that they may have leisure for repentance; for men (says the same excellent moralist) look at nothing further, in the punishments which they inflict, than to satisfy their revenge and malice, and therefore they pursue those who have offended them with the utmost rage and eagerness; whereas God, aiming at the cure of those who are not utterly incurable, gives them plaßaλsobni χρόνου, "time to be converted." But this objection receives the best solution from the 'Tis come, the glorious morn! the second birth THOMSON'S Winter. PROVIDENCE-Plantation, a colony of New England, which, with Rhode-island, formerly constituted a charter government. Its chief town is Newport. PROVIDENCE, one of the least of the Bahama islands in the American ocean, but the best of those planted and fortified by the English. It is seated on the east side The inne tality of the soul the best answer to this objec tiun Providence side of the gulf of Florida. W. Long. 77. 35. N. Lat. 25.0. 11 Provost. PROVINCE, in Roman antiquity, a country of considerable extent, which, upon being entirely reduced under the Roman dominion, was new-modelled according to the pleasure of the conquerors, and subjected to the command of annual governors sent from Rome; being commonly obliged to pay such taxes and contributions as the senate thought fit to demand. Of these countries, that part of France next the Alps was one, and still retains the name Provence. Nicod derives the word à procul vivendo, "living afar off;" but it is better deduced from pro and vinco, "I overcome." PROVINCE, in Geography, a division of a kingdom or state, comprising several cities, towns, &c. all under the same government, and usually distinguished by the extent either of the civil or ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The church distinguishes its provinces by archbishoprics; in which sense, England is divided into two provinces, Canterbury and York. The United Provinces are seven provinces of the Netherlands, who, revolting from the Spanish dominion, made a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, at Utrecht, anno 1579. See UNITED Provinces. PROVINCIAL, something relating to a province. It also denotes, in Romish countries, a person who has the direction of the several convents of a province. PROVISIONS, in a military sense, implies all manner of eatables, food or provender, used in an army, both for man and beast. PROVOST of a city or town, is the chief municipal magistrate in several trading cities, particularly Edinburgh, Paris, &c. being much the same with mayor in other places. He presides in city-courts, and together with the bailies, who are his deputies, determines in all differences that arise among citizens. The provost of Edinburgh is called lord, and the same title is claimed by the provost of Glasgow. The former calls yearly conventions of the royal boroughs to Edinburgh by his missives, and is, ex officio, president to the convention when met. PROVOST, or Prevot-Royal, a sort of inferior judge formerly established throughout France, to take cognizance of all civil, personal, real, and mixed causes, among the people only. Grand PROVOST of France, or of the Household, had jurisdiction in the king's house, and over the officers therein; looked to the policy thereof, the regulation of provisions, &c. Grand PROVOST of the Constable, a judge who manages processes against the soldiers in the army who have committed any crime. He has four lieutenants distributed throughout the army, called provosts of the army, and particular provosts in the several regiments. PROVOST Marshal of an Army, is an officer appointed to seize and secure deserters, and all other criminals. He is to hinder soldiers from pillaging, to indict offenders, and see the sentence passed on them executed. He also regulates the weights and measures, and the price of provisions, &c. in the army. For the discharge of his office, he has a lieutenant, a clerk, and a troop of marsbal-men on horseback, as also an executioner. There is also a provost-marshal in the navy, who has Provost charge over prisoners, &c. The French also had a provost-general of the ma- Prunella. rines, whose duty it was to prosecute the marines when guilty of any crime, and to make report thereof to the council of war; besides a marine provost in every vessel, who was a kind of gaoler, and took the prisoners into his care, and kept the vessel clean. PROVOSTS of the Marshals, were a kind of lieutenants of the marshals of France; of these there were 180 seats in France; their chief jurisdiction regarded highwaymen, footpads, house-breakers, &c. PROVOST of the Mint, a particular judge instituted for the apprehending and prosecuting of false coiners. PROVOST, Or Prevot, in the king's stables; his office is to attend at court, and hold the king's stirrup when he mounts his horse. There are four provosts of this kind, each of whom attends in his turn, monthly. PROW, denotes the head or fore-part of a ship, particularly in a galley; being that which is opposite to the poop or stern. PROXIMITY, denotes the relation of nearness, ei-. ther in respect of place, blood, or alliance. PRUDENCE, in ethics, may be defined an ability of judging what is best, in the choice both of ends and means. According to the definition of the Roman moralist, De Officiis, lib. i. cap. 43. prudence is the knowledge of what is to be desired or avoided. Accordingly, he makes prudentia (De Legibus, lib. i.) to be a contraction of providentia, or foresight. Plato (De Legi bus, lib. iii.) calls this the leading virtue; and Juvenal, Sat. x. observes, Nullum numen abest si sit prudentia. The idea of prudence includes gain, or due consultation; that is, concerning such things as demand con-sultation in a right manner, and for a competent time, that the resolution taken up may be neither too precipitate nor too slow; and runois, or a faculty of discerning proper means when they occur: and to the perfection of prudence, these three things are farther required, viz. devors, or a natural sagacity; ayxoa, presence of mind, or a ready turn of thought; and urgia, or experience. The extremities of prudence are craft or cunning on the one hand, which is the pursuit of an ill end by direct and proper though not honest means; and folly on the other, which is either a mistake, both as to the end and means, or prosecuting a good end by foreign and improper means. Grove's Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. chap. ii. PRUDENTIUS, or AURELIUS PRUDENTIUS CLEMENS, a famous Christian poet, under the reign of Theodosius the Great, who was born in Spain in the year 348. He first followed the profession of an advocate, was afterwards a judge, then a soldier, and at length had an honourable employment at court. We have a great number of his poems, which, from the choice of his subject, may be termed Christian poems; but the style is barbarous, and very different from the purity of the Augustan age. The most esteemed editions of Prudentius's works are that of Amsterdam, in 1667, with Heinsius's Notes, and that of Paris in 1687, in usum Delphini. PRUNELLA, a genus of plants belonging to the didynamia class; and in the natural method ranking under |