V. EVANS. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the THE U. S. court, that in such a case, where there has been a nonsuit, and a motion to reinstate overruled, the court could not interfere. Judgment affirmed. YEATON AND OTHERS, CLAIMANTS OF THE sentence and the cause THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the In admiralty circuit court for the district of Maryland, which cases, an apcondemned the schooner General Pinkney and car- the peal suspends go, for breach of the act of congress prohibiting altogether; intercourse with certain ports of the island of St. is to be heard Domingo; passed February, 28th 1806. Vol. 8. p. in the appel11. This act was limited to one year; but by the act of late court as if February 24th, 1807, it was continued until the end had been pro of the then next session of congress, when it nounced. expired on the 26th of April, 1808. no sentence If the law under which the sentence of condemna low, and be court, no sen The schooner General Pinkney, on the 23d of tion was proAugust, 1806, was cleared from Alexandria for nounced be repealed after St. Fago de Cuba with a cargo, but went to Cape sentence in François in the island of St. Domingo, one of the the court beprohibited ports. On her return, she was seized fore final senon the 17th of November, 1806, and libelled on tence in the the 5th of January, 1807, and condemned in the appellate district court on the 23d of July following, which tence of concondemnation was affirmed in the circuit court on be pronounthe 7th of November, from which sentence the ced; claimants immediately appealed, in open court, to some special provision be the supreme court of the United States, then next made for that to be holden on the first Monday of February, 1808, purpose, where the cause was continued until the present demnation can statute. unless by YEATON V. THE U. S. The only question now argued was, whether this court could now affirm the sentence of condemnation, inasmuch as the law which created the forfeiture, and authorized the condemnation, had expired? C. Lee, Martin, Harper and Youngs, for the appellants, contended that, in all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, an appeal suspends entirely the sentence appealed from; and that in the appellate court the cause stands as if no sentence had been pronounced. 1 Browne's Civil Law, 495. 501. 1 Br. Parl. Cas. 70. 590. Rochfort v. Nugent. 2 Domat, 686. 2 Browne's Civil Law, 436, 437. 3 Dall. 87. 114. 118. Penhallow v. Doane. 4 Cranch, 2. Jennings v. Carson. Id. 443. United States v. The Betsey & Charlotte. Parker, 72. If then the case stands as if no sentence of condemnation has been passed, the question arises, can this court now proceed to condemn the vessel when there is no law authorizing a condemnation? The act of congress makes no provision for the recovery (after the expiration of the act) of penalties or forfeitures which had been incurred under that act during its existence. The And in such cases the law has always been understood to be, that the penalty or forfeiture cannot be enforced, nor the punishment inflicted. court has no longer any jurisdiction in the case. 2 East's Cr. Law, 576. Jones's case. 1 W. Bl. 451. Miller's case. 4 Dal. 373. 1 Hale, 291. The case of the United States v. The cargo of the ship Sophia Magdalena, before Judge Davis, at Boston, and a like case before Judge Hall, at New-Orleans. 1 Cranch, 103. United States v. Schooner Peggy. Rodney, Attorney-General, on the part of the United States, did not controvert the principles contended for on the other side, but in addition to the YEATON V authorities produced by the opposite counsel, referred the court to the opinion of Ch. J. Ellsworth, in THE U. S. the case of Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dal. 327. where he March 7. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court to the following effect: The majority of the court is clearly of opinion, that in admiralty cases an appeal suspends the sentence altogether; and that it is not res adjudicata until the final sentence of the appellate court be pronounced. The cause in the appellate court is to be heard de novo, as if no sentence had been passed. This has been the uniform practice not only in cases of appeal from the district to the circuit courts of the United States, but in this court also. In prize causes, the principle has never been disputed; and in the instance court, it is stated in 2 Browne's Civil Law, that in cases of appeal it is lawful to allege what has not before been alleged, and to prove what has not before been proved.* The court is, therefore, of opinion, that this cause is to be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced; and if no sentence had been pronounced, it has been long settled, on general principles, that after the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that purpose by statute.f * Clerke's Praxis, tit. 54. "Nam in appellatione a sententia definitiva licet non allegata allegare et non probata probare.” The cases of Wilmot et al. claimants of the schooner Collector, and Lewis, claimant of the schooner Gottenburgh v. United States, were reversed upon the same principle. The following sentence was then pronounced by the court: This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof the court is of opinion, that an appeal from the sentence of a court of admiralty brings the whole case before the appellate court unaffected by the sentence of condemnation from which the appeal is made, and that a sentence of condemnation cannot be pronounced on account of a forfeiture which accrued under a law not in force at the time of pronouncing such sentence, unless, by some statutory provision, the right to enforce such forfeiture be preserved. The court is, therefore, of opinion, that the sentence pronounced in this cause by the circuit court of the district of Maryland, affirming the sentence of the judge of the district court in this cause, be reversed, and annulled; and the court, proceeding to pronounce the proper sentence, doth direct that the libel be dismissed, and the property libelled be restored to the claimants, they paying the duties thereon if the same have not been already paid. And, on the motion of the attorney-general, it is ordered to be certified that in the opinion of this court, there was probable cause of seizure. THE UNITED STATES v. POTTS AND OTHERS. Round cop THIS was a case certified from the circuit court per bottoms for the district of Maryland. The question upon turned up ut the edge," are which the judges of that court differed in opinion not liable to duties, altho' was, imported un mination of der the deno- Whether round copper bottoms turned up at the ruised bot edge are liable to the payment of duty within the meaning of the several acts of congress. toms." V. POTTS. The following facts were admitted, viz. that the THE U. S. defendants imported a certain quantity of round copper plates, under the denomination "flat, bottoms," round copper plates turned up at the edges, under the denomination of "raised bottoms," and square and oblong copper plates, under the denomination of" sheets." That the round copper plates, and the round copper plates turned up at the edge, are never used, nor imported for use in the form in which they are imported, although they are capable of being used, but not with convenience or advantage, in that form; but are worked up by the manufacturers in this country into vessels of use after importation. That the round copper plates, as well as the square copper plates, are cut from large sheets which are made by pressure under a roller, but are never imported in the size or shape in which they come from the roller. That it is a great convenience and saving to the manufacturer here that the sheets of copper should come in a round rather than in a square shape, avoiding great waste by clipping and repeated heats. That all the said articles are sold and bought by weight, and the same price paid for the round plates, and the round plates turned up at the edges, as for the square or oblong plates. That the round copper plates turned up at the edge are raised at the edge from four to five inches. That copper plates of this description are sold for eigh teenpence sterling per pound, and that copper wrought up into vessels or implements of any kind, are sold at two shillings and fourpence to two shillings and sixpence per pound. That there is no copper imported into this country, under the denomination of plates; but that the square and oblong plates, which are commonly called copper plates, and are admitted to be free of duty, are imported under the denomination of sheets. Harper, for the defendants. This case differs from that of the United States v. Kid & Watson, 4 Cranch, 1. in one circumstance only. In that case it does not appear but that the |