Infants or minors. not arise as to these, except probably as to minors emanci- § 47 pated under the law of Quebec by marriage, or by the Court, whereby they acquire a restricted right to contract: C. C. Arts. 314- 322; or by engaging in trade when they are reputed of full age for all acts relating to such trade: Art. 323. A promise or ratification after majority to pay a debt or obligation contracted during minority, is only binding when in writing: C. C. Art. 1235 (2); R. S. O. c. 146, s. 6. ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. Where a minor simply pleaded his minority to an action on a note given by him, held that he should have pleaded lesion and asked to be relieved to the extent to which he was not benefited: Cartier v. Pelletier, 1 R. L. 46 (1868); Boucher v. Girard, 20 L. C. J. 134 (1875). 2. A note made by a minor engaged in trade in connection with his business is binding on him: City Bank v. Lafleur, 20 L. C. J. 131 (1875); but a note signed and made payable in Montreal, by an Ontario trader who is a minor, is null, the law of Ontario governing as to his capacity: Jones v. Dickinson, Q. R. 7 S. C. 313 (1895). 3. A minor, 20 years of age, gave a note in payment of a premium of life insurance on his own life. Being sued after he became of age, he was held liable as he did not prove lesion: Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. King, Q. R. 9 S. C. 236 (1896). 4. A person is liable on a note given by him during infancy, if, after coming of age, he promises to pay it: Fisher v. Jewett, 2 N. B. (Berton) 69 (1835). 5. An infant 20 years and 9 months old accepts a bill payable in six months. He ratifies the transaction on attaining his majority and the bill is negotiated. He is not liable on the bill: Ex parte Kibble, L. R. 10 Ch. 373 (1875); 37 & 38 V. c. 62 (Imp.). 6. A person after coming of age accepts a bill for a debt contracted by him during his infancy. He is liable to a holder in due course: Belfast Banking Co. v. Doherty, 4 Ir. L. R. Q. B. D. 124 (1879). 7. An infant trader cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt for debts contracted for trading purposes: Ex parte Jones, 18 Ch. D. 109 (1881). 8. An infant cannot bind himself by the acceptance of a bill of exchange, even when it is given for necessaries supplied him. Such an acceptance is wholly void: Re Soltykoff, Ex parte Margrett. [1891] 1 Q. B. 413. $47 Want of capacity. 2. Idiots, Lunatics and Interdicted Persons. The rule in Quebec is that all acts subsequent to interdiction for imbecility, madness, or insanity are null and void; previous acts may be annulled if injurious: C. C. Arts: 334, 335. So of the acts of persons interdicted for prodigality: C. C. Art. 987; and for drunkenness: C. C. Art. 336 b. The old law as to a lunatic's acts was that he could not be admitted to avoid them himself, though in certain cases the Crown, and in other cases his heirs could. The modern rule as to the contract of lunatic or drunken man, who by reason of lunacy or drunkenness, is not capable of understanding its terms or forming a rational judgment of its effect on his interest, is that it is not void, but only voidable at his option, and this only if his state is known to the other party: Pollock on Contract, pp. 91, 93. See Robertson v. Kelly, 2 O. R. 163 (1883). ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. An infant gave his note for value and got it indorsed by his father, who was of unsound mind, and who got no value for it. The holder was not aware of the condition of the father. Held, that the father's estate was not liable: Re James, 9 Ont. P. R. 88 (1881). 2. Complete drunkenness, so that the party did not know what he was doing, held to be a good defence by an indorser against an indorsee who took with notice: Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 623 (1845). 3. A lunatic, while sane, gave a note for a very large sum for a merely moral obligation. Held, that the payee was not entitled to rank on the lunatic's estate for the amount of the note: In re Whitaker, 42 Ch. D. 119 (1889). 4. It is not enough that defendant show that he was insane when he gave the note sued on; he must also show that the person to whom he gave it knew that he was insane: Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, [1892] 1 Q. B. 599. 3. Married Women. The law of Quebec differs in this respect from that of the other provinces. The general rule there is that a wife cannot contract without the authorization of her husband. If she is separate as to property by marriage contract she may administer her own property: C. C. Art. 1422; or if she be granted by the Court a separation from bed and board: Art. 210; or even a separation as to property only: Art. 177. If she is a public trader she may bind herself without the authorization of her husband for all § 47 that relates to her commerce: Art. 179. A wife cannot bind Married her separate property in any contract with or for her hus- women. band: Art. 1301. So that if a wife gives a note or accepts a bill for her husband's debt, or endorses her husband's bill or note, it is a nullity; and the highest Court of the province has held that this, being a matter of public policy, makes the instrument void, even in the hands of a bona fide holder for value before maturity. In the other provinces the original rule was that of the common law. "Without authority from her husband, a wife cannot at the common law charge either him or herself by making, drawing, accepting, or endorsing negotiable instruments": Byles, p. 71. In those provinces which have adopted the principle of the English Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the stringency of the common law rule is somewhat relaxed, and a married woman having separate property may by bill, note, or otherwise, bind the separate property which she then has or may afterwards acquire, in all respects as if she were feme sole. See "The Married Women's Property Act," R. S. O. c. 163; R. S. N. S. c. 112; C. S. N. B. c. 78; R. S. Man. c. 106; 44 V. c. 12, P. E. I.; R. S. B. C. c. 130; Sask. 1907, c. 18; N.-W. Territories Act, R. S. C. c. 62, s. 26; Cons. Ord. N. W. T. c. 47. ILLUSTRATIONS. 1. A promissory note made by a married woman for a debt of her husband is not binding on her personally either at common law or under the statutes. Where a married woman who has separate property contracts a, debt, she is deemed in equity to have contracted it with reference to her separate property, and if she had power to dispose of that property, equity will make it liable for the payment of the debt: Lawson v. Laidlaw, 3 Ont. A. R. 77 (1878). See also Merchants' Bank v. Bell, 29 Grant, 413 (1881). These cases were prior to the passing of the Ontario Married Women's Property Act, 47 V. c. 19. 2. Defendant, a married woman, indorsed certain notes held by plaintiff and wrote him a letter that she had $33,000 worth of land in her own name and right. There was no evidence given at the trial as to when she was married or as to how the property was held for her. Held, that there was not sufficient evidence to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment against her: Moore v. Jackson, 16 Ont. A. R. 431 (1889). In a subsequent action founded on the same transaction further proof was made, and it was held by the Supreme Court § 47 Married women. that plaintiff was entitled to judgment against her and to execution against her separate property: Moore v. Jackson, 22 S. C. Can. 210 (1893). See Palliser v. Gurney, 19 Q. B. D. 519 (1887). 3. Where a married woman and her daughter were induced by the fraud and undue influence of the husband and father to sign promissory notes, the holder who was aware of the confidential relation existing between them, cannot recover upon the notes unless he establishes that competent and independent advice had been given to the wife and daughter: Cox v. Adams, 35 S. C. Can. 393 (1904). 4. A promissory note signed by a wife, separate as to property. is null, unless authorized by her husband: Guay v. Peltier, 2 Rev. de Lég. 437 (1812); Badeau v. Brault, 1 L. C. J. 171 (1857), overruling Rivet v. Leonard, 1 L. C. J. 172 (1848); Danziger v. Ritchie, 8 L. C. J. 103 (1864). 5. A wife is not liable on a note made by her jointly with her husband where she received no value: Shearer v. Compain, 5 L. C. J. 47 (1860). Nor where value was received by the community: Daigneault v. Wells, 8 R. J. 489 (1902). 6. A husband and wife are both liable on a note given for business in which they are jointly interested: Girouard v. Lachapelle, 7 L. C. J. 289 (1863). 7. A note made by a wife, separate as to property, in favor of her husband, and indorsed by him for necessaries purchased by her, is binding on her: Cholet v. Duplessis, 6 L. C. J. 81 (1862). 8. A note made by a wife, who is a public trader, for her business is binding on her, although not authorized by her husband: Beaubien v. Husson, 12 L. C. R. 17 (1862). 9. A wife separate as to property is not liable on a note given or indorsed for a debt of her husband: Scantlin v. St. Pierre, 10 R. L. 52 (1879); Martin v. Guyot, M. L. R. 1 S. C. 181 (1885): Thibaudeau v. Burke, 20 R. L. 85 (1890). 10. The authorization of a married woman to make a promissory note is sufficiently proved by the indorsement of her husband: Johnston v. Scott, 3 L. N. 171 (1880). 11. The indorsement by a wife, separate as to property, of her husband's note given for goods sold and delivered and charged to him is num, although such goods may have contributed to her support: Bruneau v. Barnes, 25 L. C. J. 245 (1880). 12. A promissory note, made by a wife separate as to property, jointly and severally with her husband, is null and of no effect as regards the wife, such an obligation being prohibited by the terms of Art. 1301, ('. C.: Chapdelaine v. Vallée, M. L. R. 3 S. C. 380 (1886); Leclerc v. Ouimet, 19 R. L. 78 (1890). 13. A note signed by a wife for the benefit of her husband, and for which she receives no value, is null; and this nullity being a mat $47 ter of public policy, may be invoked even against a holder in due course: Ricard v. Banque Nationale, Q. R. 3 Q. B. 161 (1893); Maclean v. O'Brien, Q. R. 12 S. C. 110 (1896); overruling Kearney Married v. Gervais, Q. R. 3 S. C. 496 (1893). See Banque Nationale v. Guy, women. M. L. R. 7 S. C. 144 (1891). 14. A husband had a power of attorney to manage his wife's business. He indorsed a note in her name to accommodate a friend without authority. The wife made an assignment and included this note among her liabilities. The husband was not a party to the assignment. Held, that the ratification was null, and her estate was not liable: Paquin v. Dawson, Q. R. 4 Q. B. 72 (1894). See also La Banque Ville Marie v. Mayrand, Q. R. 10 S. C. 460 (1896). 15. A married woman is not liable on a note given by her during her coverture: Sinclair v. Wakefield, 13 N. S. (1 R. & G.) 465 (1880). (Before the Married Women's Property Act.) 4. Corporations. Some corporations are given special authority to become parties to notes and bills by their charters, or by the general laws by which they are governed. In the case of others it is implied from the nature of their objects. In every (Dominion) Act, unless the contrary intention appears, words making any association or number of persons a corporation or body politic and corporate shall,--(a) vest in such corporation power to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with in their corporate name," etc.: Interpretation Act, R. S. C. c. 1, s. 30. "The rights which a corporation may exercise, besides those specially conferred by its title, or by the general laws applicable to its particular kind, are all those which are necessary to attain the object of its creation; thus it may acquire, alienate, and possess property, sue and be sued, contract, incur obligations, and bind others in its favor": C. C. Art. 358. Formerly the right to become parties to bills and notes was almost restricted to commercial corporations; the modern tendency is to extend it to corporations generally. As to companies incorporated under the Dominion Companies Act, whether by Letters Patent from the Governor-in-Council or by special Act of Parliament, it is provided that: "Every contract, agreement, engagement or bargain made, and every bill of exchange drawn, accepted or endorsed, and every promissory note and cheque made, drawn or endorsed on behalf of the company |