more than the amount claimed to be due, and thereafter tried to escape from a police officer who witnessed the act, and who denied that defendant had then made any explanation thereof, a conviction for robbery will not be disturbed on the ground that felonious intent was lacking.

Appeal from criminal court, Jackson county; John W. Wofford, Judge.

Thomas Carroll was convicted of robbery, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Jennings & Kimbrell, for appellant. Edward C. Crow, Atty. Gen., and Sam B. Jeffries, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SHERWOOD, J. The petit jury of Jackson concurred with the grand jury of that county by finding defendant guilty of robbery in the first degree, and assessing his punishment at nine years in the penitentiary. The evidence fully supports the verdict, and the instructions such as have frequently received the approval of this court. An instruction was asked by and refused defendant, which, in effect, told the jury that they should not find defendant guilty if "he intended to turn the money over to the bartender of the White Rock saloon, to whom he believed that a debt was due from Sheehy." The bartender's name was Charles Moran (a brother of Thomas Moran, co-indicted with defendant), and defendant was a porter under him. Moran states that Sheehy came to the saloon the night of the robbery, and stayed an hour or so, drinking, and shaking dice for the drinks, until his bill was 50 or 60 cents, when the bartender, as he says, demanded the amount, but Sheehy refused to pay, when he ordered him to get out; but when he got out the bartender said: "Go and get old man Sheehy. He owes me 60 cents." Defendant, testifying in his own behalf, says: That the words used by the bartender about Sheehy were, "Go and fetch him back to pay for those drinks." That thereupon defendant went out into the street, and overtook Sheehy, and asked him to come back and pay for them, and he says, 'Damn you and the bartender,' and I grabbed hold of his arm, and started to take the money out of his pocket; and the officer says, 'What is the matter? and I says, 'He owes for the drinks;' and then he talked to Sheehy, and asked him what was the matter, and he took him off to one side, and came back, and says, 'I will have to put you under arrest.' I released him when the officer told me to, but Moran was not there at all. I scuffled with him because he owed for the drinks. I was employed there as porter. I was there to fetch him back." Defendant was positively identified by Sheehy as one of the men who robbed him of about $2, and defendant admits that he was there, and had started to take the money out of Sheehy's pocket; and Officer William Murphy identifies defendant as one of the men who assaulted and robbed Sheehy, and Moran as the

other. After stating that he was standing in the vicinity of the White Rock saloon, and while there saw Sheehy going down south, he says: "Then I next saw this man Carroll come out of the White Rock saloon at Sixth and Broadway, on the southeast corner. He first looked south, then north, and he stepped to the corner of the saloon, and looked east; and as he got to the corner this man Moran met him, and he pointed south, and as he pointed south he turned his collar up over his neck. He pointed south towards this man Sheehy, and then they started on tiptoes, and ran until they caught up with Sheehy, and caught hold of him. Moran grabbed hold of Sheehy by the neck, and slung him back, and grabbed hold of his wrist. This man Carroll put his right hand into his right-hand pocket, and I ran up and put him under arrest. Carroll let loose, and Moran had him by the throat, and I had quite a time to make him break loose. I placed them under arrest, and Moran said to Carroll: 'You keep still. You know nothing at all.' In coming down the street, when we got to the alley between Delaware and Wyandotte, Moran broke loose from me first, and ran south, and Carroll broke loose and ran north, and I shot him in the foot in the alley. We then sent him to the station in the wagon." There was testimony also that defendant, as to all the constituent elements that go to make up good reputation, was hopelessly in the vocative. Murphy, when recalled, also contradicts defendant as to sev eral things which occurred when the crime was committed. He says: "I have known the defendant here and Moran, who is jointly indicted with him, for four or five years. Moran was with the defendant that night. Defendant never said anything about explaining to me at that time that he was simply trying to collect the money for the drinks when he had hold of Mr. Sheehy. He did not tell me that this man owed him for drinks." There are cases where a creditor who collects by force from his debtor a debt due from the latter to him has been adjudged not guilty of robbery, because the felonious intent was lacking. Reg. v. Hemmings, 4 Fost. & F. 50. The same rule holds in robbery as in larceny, that a taking under an honest claim of right, no matter what circumstances of violence may occur, lacks one of the elements necessary to make the offense robbery. 2 Bish. New Cr. Law, § 1162a; Id. § 849; People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 345; Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126. And it is said that the same principle prevails where the taking occurs by one who acts as agent on behalf of another, believed by the former to be the owner. Herber v. State, 7 Tex. 69; Chambers v. State, 62 Miss. 108. But this doctrine has no application where there is no honest belief of ownership or agency, but where a dishonest pretense is resorted to in the endeavor to escape punishment. 2 Bish. New Cr. Law, § 851; State v. Hunt, 45 Iowa, 673. Here it is quite evident

that defendant was not acting in good faith. He was directed, as he says, to fetch Sheehy back "to pay for those drinks," but instead of that he seized him, and took, not the 60 cents which it is said Sheehy owed, but about $2. In this he did something he was not ordered to do, and collected about $1.40 more than was due. Besides that, he tried to escape from the officer, and was only recaptured after being shot. On these grounds, judgment affirmed. All concur.

SWINFORD v. TEEGARDEN et al. (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1. Feb. 12, 1901.)

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-ACTION TO SET ASIDE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-JUDGMENT-COLLATERAL ATTACK.

1. Where plaintiff recovered a judgment against defendant for breach of warranty, a defense that defendant did not execute the deed, that she never owned the land, and did not exchange it for property belonging to plaintiff, but that others were the grantors, she signing the deed only as a witness, and without reading it, cannot be set up in a collateral proceeding to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent and to enforce the judgment, since the defense should have been interposed in the former action.

2. Plaintiff recovered judgment against T. for breach of warranty, and caused execution to be issued against the lands in controversy, and at the sheriff's sale became the purchaser, and received a deed therefor. Nine days before the commencement of the suit, T. conveyed the lands in controversy to her son, a valuable consideration being named in the deed. T. had been administratrix of her husband's estate and guardian of her son. She filed her report as administratrix, and was discharged by the court. On her son's coming of age, she made a final settlement as guardian, and was discharged by an order of the court and a release under seal executed by her son. Defendant's evidence tended to show the land in dispute was conveyed to the son in settlement of a balance due from his father's estate, and that he executed the release to enable his mother to close the administration of the estate. The accounts tended to show that the son had received more than his share of his father's estate. There was evidence that T. continued to live on the land, to pay taxes and make repairs, to control the property, and that she tried to sell it. There were letters in evidence from the son to his mother asking about the title, and asking what he should say if he was interviewed regarding it, and advising her to sell the land. Held to support a finding that the conveyance was in fraud of creditors.

Appeal from circuit court, Grundy county; P. C. Stepp, Judge.

Action by Charles G. Swinford against Sarah Teegarden and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Harber & Knight, for appellants. C. J. Bain and Hall & Hall, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J. This is an action to set aside a deed to certain land in Grundy county from Sarah Teegarden, formerly Benedict, and her husband, to her son, Austin B. Benedict, dated August 14, 1889, and a deed to the same 60 S. W.-69

land from Austin B. Benedict and wife to Alice J. Dean, niece of Mrs. Teegarden, on the ground that such deeds were made without consideration, and for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the plaintiff in the collection of his claim against Mrs. Teegarden. The answers of defendants Teegarden and Benedict allege that the plaintiff's claim and judgment against Mrs. Teegarden are fraudulent and void, and deny generally the allegations of the petition, except as to the relationship of the parties. The defendants formerly lived in Ionia, Mich., where the defendant Alice J. Dean still resides. The defendant Sarah Teegarden was the widow of, and Austin B. Benedict the son of, Dr. Thomas B. Benedict, who died in 1874. The defendant Alice J. Dean is the niece of defendant Sarah Teegarden. Dr. Benedict left an estate valued at $8,979.22. The defendant Sarah Teegarden was appointed administratrix of his estate in October, 1874, and guardian of Austin B. Benedict. On the 11th day of October, 1875, the defendant Teegarden, as administratrix of the Thomas B. Benedict estate, filed a report or settlement in the probate court of her administration of said estate up to that time. In this report she took credit for $2.761.71 on account of disbursements and uncollectible accounts, leaving a balance of $6,217.51, including the real estate valued at $3,800, and personal property valued at $377. Defendants claim that the personal estate was loaned by the administratrix to the firm of Crookshank Bros. between 1880 and 1884. In 1884. Crookshank Bros. failed, and made an assignment, at which time they were largely indebted to the Benedict estate, in payment of which they, or John C. Crookshank, one of the firm, turned over to the administratrix a stock of millinery goods of the value of $4,000. She moved this stock of goods to Kansas City in 1884, at the instance of John C. Crookshank, who went to Kansas City about that time. With the aid of Crookshank she bought and traded and added to this stock. On the 29th day of May, 1885, she traded a part of this stock to S. R. Nelson for the land in controversy, subject to an incumbrance of $550. On the 8th day of February, 1887, defendant Austin B. Benedict became of age. On the 12th day of April, 1887, the defendant Sarah Teegarden made final settlement as guardian of defendant Austin B. Benedict, and Austin B. executed to her a final release under seal, releasing and discharging her from all liability on account of said guardianship absolutely and forever. On the same day the probate court of Ionia county, Mich., by an order of record, discharged and released said guardian and her securities from all liability concerning her administration of said estate. On the 2d day of May, 1887, defendant Sarah Benedict was married to James M. Teegarden, who died before the commencement of this suit. On the 11th day of November, 1886, the defendant Teegarden executed and

delivered to the plaintiff a warranty deed to 80 acres of land in Dade county, Mo., in exchange for a stock of millinery goods, which was valued at $1,200 in the trade. The said defendant Teegarden had no title to this property. On the 23d day of August, 1889, the plaintiff commenced suit against her and 'her deceased husband in the circuit court of Jackson county, Mo., on account of the breaches of the covenant in said warranty deed made to him, and recovered judgment against her in said court on the 4th day of June, 1894, for $1,817.70. On the 26th day of November, 1896, plaintiff caused execution to be issued upon said judgment, the lands in controversy to be levied upon and sold to'satisfy the same; at which sale plaintiff became the purchaser, and received a sheriff's deed therefor. On the 14th day of August, 1889, nine days before the commencement of the suit by plaintiff for the breaches of the covenants in said deed, the defendant Sarah Teegarden and her husband, by warranty deed, conveyed the lands in dispute to the defendant Austin B. Benedict; the consideration named in the deed being $4,500. On the 13th day of March, 1893, Austin B. Benedict and wife conveyed to William Mason about 110 acres of said lands. On the 11th day of July, 1893, they conveyed, by general warranty deed, to Alice J. Dean, the remainder of said lands; the consideration named in said deed being $3,390. The other facts and contentions of the respective parties will sufficiently appear in the course of this opinion. There was a decree for the plaintiff, and after proper steps the defendants ap pealed.

1. It is claimed by defendant Teegarden that she never owed the plaintiff anything, and never made a deed to him of the Dade county lands; that she never owned any land in Dade county, and never exchanged any such land with the plaintiff for his stock of millinery goods; that Gilruth and Crookshank traded with the plaintiff for his stock of goods, and gave him the land in Dade county for it; and that she signed the deed only as a witness, and without reading it, and that she took charge of the stock of goods for Gilruth and Crookshank, and sold some of the goods, and accounted to them for the proceeds. If all of this be conceded to be absolutely true, it cannot avail her anything in this action. She ought to have set up that defense to the suit of the plaintiff against her in Jackson county, when he sued her for breach of warranty in the deed to the Dade county land. She cannot attack the judgment rendered against her in that case in this collateral proceeding. Bates v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1, 45 S. W. 641. But she did not make any such claim in that case. She answered in that suit, and admitted the exchange of the land in Dade county for the stock of goods, and admitted that she made the deed to the Dade county land, but pleaded that, while she believed she had a per

fect title to the land, she had only agreed to give the plaintiff a quitclaim or special warranty deed to it, and that it was a mistake of the scrivener to make a warranty deed, and therefore she asked to have the deed reformed. But even this she did not attempt to sustain by proof, but, on the contrary, let judgment go against her by default. It is too late now to inquire into the matters concluded by that judgment. The plaintiff claims that the deed from Mrs. Teegarden to her son, Austin B. Benedict, is fraudulent, and also that his deed to his cousin, Mrs. Dean, is fraudulent. It is admitted that Austin's deed to Mrs. Dean was made to prevent his creditors from reaching it, and that it was a voluntary conveyance. That deed is, therefore, void. So the matter stands as if the title of record was still in Austin. The plaintiff claims that the deed from Mrs. Teegarden to Austin was made nine days before the plaintiff instituted the suit against her in Jackson county, and when she knew that she was about to be sued; and that it was a voluntary conveyance, made to defraud him, and to put her property out of the reach of any judgment he might obtain against her in his suit upon her warranty. On the other hand, the defendants claim that Austin had never heard of the plaintiff or his suit, and never knew that his mother owed any one except him. and both he and his mother claim that the deed to the land in question was made by his mother in payment of his share of his father's estate, which his mother, as his guardian, had loaned to Crookshank & Co.. and which was lost by the failure of that firm. In reply to this contention the plaintiff says that Mrs. Teegarden never loaned any such amount as she claims to Crookshank & Co., and that after the failure of that firm they turned over to her $4,000 worth of millinery goods, which she moved to Kansas City; that she afterwards traded a part for this land; that when Austin attained his majority she went to Michigan, and made a final settlement as administratrix of her husband's estate, which showed amount of inventory, including real estate, appraised at $8,874.77, gained $154.45, aggregating $8.979.22; loss uncollectible accounts, $1,063.10; paid funeral and other expenses, $1,450.37: debts paid, $248.24; real estate, as inventoried, $3,800, aggregating $5,651.71, and leaving in her hands for distribution, includ ing real estate, $6,217.51; and that Austin then executed a receipt in full and release to his mother of his share of the estate. The plaintiff then shows that Mrs. Teegarden turned over the homestead, personal property, and library to Austin, which he sold. realizing $1,300 for the homestead, $125 for the personal property, and $50 for the library; that she paid him $100 in cash, and also conveyed to him some land in Kansas City, the equity of redemption in which was worth $2,200. The plaintiff then takes the $6,

217.51, balance shown by her final settlement, deducts therefrom the real estate, $3,800, and the personal property allowed the wid ow, $377, aggregating $4,177, from the balance of $6,217.51, so found upon final settlement, and shows that the personalty to be distributed amounted to $2,040.51, of which Austin's share would be $1,020.25, which, with seven years' interest at 6 per cent., would aggregate $1,448.76, as the amount due him, exclusive of his half interest in the real estate. And then the plaintiff shows that the proceeds of the sale of the real estate, personal property, and library, together with the $100 cash, amounted to $1,575, or $126.24 more than the $1,448.76 his mother owed him. This calculation does not take into account the value of the equity of redemption in the lot in Kansas City, which plaintiff values at $2,200, but which the defendant Austin says was worse than nothing, for he was liable for the incumbrance on the land, and the land would not probably sell for enough to pay all the incumbrance, and he would be liable for the unpaid balance; and it was to avoid such contingency that he conveyed the Grundy county land to his cousin, Mrs. Dean. The plaintiff further relies upon the evidence that, after Mrs. Teegarden conveyed this land to Austin, and after Austin transferred it to Mrs. Dean, Mrs. Teegarden continued to live on the land; to pay the taxes, repairs, etc.; to control the property, ostensibly as tenant, but really enjoying all the benefits of ownership; and on her statements that it was the only property she owned, and that she tried to sell it, saying Austin and Mrs. Dean would do whatever she said about it; and on Austin's letters to his mother, asking how the title stood, and what he should say if he was interviewed about it, and advising his mother to sell the land, and get money enough to live on,-as facts and circumstances showing that her deed to Austin was fraudulent, and that she was the real owner all the time. The defendants, to overcome this, say that Mrs. Teegarden really owed Austin more than the settlement of his father's estate showed, and that he executed the release to his mother simply to enable her to close the administration on the estate; and, while they admit he realized the $1,575 from the property and cash she turned over to him, claim she really owed him $4,500, the consideration stated in the deed from his mother to him to this land, at the time that deed was made. The evidence they adduced in support of this contention is of the most general character. No items are specified; conclusions alone are stated. A careful examination of the testimony fails to show sufficient data to state an indebtedness of Mrs. Teegarden to her son, Austin, of $4,500 at the time she deeded this land to him on the 14th of August, 1889, and the testimony offered by the defendants on this subject is so vague, general, and wanting in details that

it is impossible to state any account between them, or to afford a reasonable basis of calculation. The final settlement and the admitted amounts Austin received from his mother furnish the only certain elements upon which to predicate a finding, and upon such showing it appears that his mother had paid him more than his share of his father's estate (outside of the $3,800 in real estate, of which he owned a half interest, and which is not accounted for or taken into consideration in this suit) at the time she made the deed to this land to him. This being true, that deed must be held to be a voluntary conveyance, and as to the plaintiff it is void in law.

The right of an insolvent debtor to prefer a bona fide creditor is not questioned in this case. Therefore it is not necessary to consider the cases cited and relied upon by the defendants bearing upon such a proposition. The law applicable to this case is plain and well settled. The only conflict is as to matters of fact. The evidence supports the finding of the chancellor, and, as the testimony was oral, he heard and saw the witnesses, and therefore this is a proper case for this court to defer to the finding of facts by the trial court, especially as above indicated there is no sufficient basis of computation afforded by the record to state an account which would show that Mrs. Teegarden owed her son, Austin, $4,500 at the time she conveyed the land to him for an expressed consideration of that amount, nor in fact that she owed him anything whatever. For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. All concur.

VAN CLEAVE v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS. (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1. Feb. 12, 1901.)

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS NEGLIGENCE

PLEADING-COMPLAINT BEFORE JUSTICESGENERALITY-OBJECTION CURED BY VER

DICT.

1. Where a complaint against a city, filed before a justice, alleged that a horse was injured while crossing a roadway negligently constructed by the defendant city across certain streetrailway tracks, such complaint was sufficient to reasonably advise the defendant of the nature of the claim, and was good, in absence of a motion to make more definite.

2. Where a complaint filed before a justice alleged defendant's negligence in very general terms, but the case went to trial, and judgment in the justice court, and again in the circuit court, objection to the generality of the complaint would not be heard on appeal, since the defect was cured by verdict and judgment.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; S. P. Spencer, Judge.

Action by J. W. Van Cleave against the city of St. Louis and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff and other defendants, the city of St. Louis appeals. Affirmed. B. Schnurmacher and Alex. Nicholson, for appellant. W. A. Alderson, for respondent.

ROBINSON, J. This action was originally begun before a justice of the peace against the city of St. Louis, the Lindell Railway Company, Philip F. Stifel, and Henry Ruckert upon the following petition or statement: "The plaintiff, complaining of the defendants, alleges that on or about the 22d day of August, 1897, he was the owner of a mare, which, through the negligence and carelessness of the defendants, was so injured and ruined that said animal was entirely lost to the plaintiff; that said animal was injured in the city of St. Louis, on Vandeventer avenue, just north of Washington avenue, and between said Washington avenue and Delmar avenue, and in front of the livery stable on the west side of said Vandeventer avenue, between said thoroughfares, said livery stable being known and called the 'West End Livery Stable'; that said animal was injured while on said Vandeventer avenue at said point, and while crossing a roadway constructed by the defendants across the street-railway tracks at said point; that, by reason of said negligence and carelessness of the defendants, the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $300." At the trial before the justice, a judgment was entered against the defendant city of St. Louis, and in favor of the other defendants, and the city of St. Louis appealed the case to the circuit court, where, upon a trial anew in that court, judgment was again rendered against it for the sum of $300, and by the same defendant the case has been brought here on appeal.

But one question is raised by appellant, and that is as to the sufficiency of the statement filed by plaintiff with the justice as his cause of action. What is or what is not a sufficient statement of a cause of action before a justice of the peace has been the source of frequent adjudication in this court. If a comparison of our various adjudications upon the different statements filed before justices of the peace, that from time to time have been brought before us for determination, has furnished justification for the suggestion that those adjudications have not at all times been in strict harmony, that want of harmony has not been so much the result of the want of a definite rule or test to be applied to all such statements as to the want of accuracy in the application of the rule to the particular statement at the particular time before the court. Without attempting to reconsider the court's disapproval of various statements filed as plaintiffs' causes of action with justices of the peace, discussed in a line of authorities cited by appellant, with those cited by respondent, wherein the statements filed before the justices have been sustained and held sufficient, we will try to test the question of the sufficiency of the statement filed by the plaintiff in this case by those general rules announced in both lines of cases, without regard to the question of the result of the application made in

any particular case or cases. The statute, in express terms, provides that "no formal pleading upon the part of either plaintiff or defendant shall be required in a justice court. but that before process shall issue in any suit the plaintiff shall file with the justice the instrument sued on or a statement of the account or of the facts constituting the cause of action upon which the suit is founded," etc. In favor of that popular tribunal which has been characterized as "the people's court," where those unacquainted with the technical rules and forms of pleading may and do go, without counsel, to settle and adjust their differences, this court has ever held that the requirements of the statute have been met and fulfilled when the statement filed with the justice, however informal and awkward in expression, was sufficient to reasonably advise the opposite party of the nature of his or her claim, and sufficiently specific to be a bar to another cause of action, with the further qualification, suggested in some of our cases, as to the first test, that resort may be had to reasonable implication to support the statement. Thus tested, we think the statement filed by the plaintiff with the justice in this case meets the requirement of the law, particularly under the circumstances of the present situation, when its sufficiency was not challenged by motion to make same more definite and specific, and both parties announced ready for trial upon issue joined upon the pleading as filed. Though the statement is somewhat awkward in construction, and the allegation as to defendants' negligence and carelessness is charged in general terms, and might have been held insufficient in the particulars now asserted by appellant, had timely motion to that end been filed with the justice of the peace, or with the circuit court when the case reached there, yet, after two trials and two judgments, we think the objection comes too late in this court. After verdict and judgment, it may be presumed that the generality of the charge of negligence contained in the statement was made more specific by a state of facts shown at the trial upon which the verdict and judgment were predicated. This court has frequently held in actions begun in the circuit court, where the strict rules of technical pleadings are in operation, that a general allegation of negligence is good after verdict, and sufficient to sustain a judgment, when no notice to make the petition more definite and specific was filed. Foster v. Railway Co., 115 Mo. 165, 21 S. W. 916; Mack v. Railway Co., 77 Mo. 232; Schneider v. Railway Co., 75 Mo. 295; Edens v. Railroad Co., 72 Mo. 213. Certainly, a rule more harsh or technical should not be applied to a statement filed by a plaintiff, as his cause of action, with a justice of the peace, to defeat a judgment obtained therein, than is applied to a like statement filed in the circuit court. The statement filed with the justice in this case advised the defend