The effort of the plaintiff is to show by parol | the said Oliver S. Beers is deputy-postmaster at proof that the bond did not apply to the subject Mobile aforesaid," &c. in esse, that perfect office then in being, but to a subject matter not then in existence, to a term of office not then begun. To do this, would be to make the bond speak from its approval or acceptance, and not from its date. This the law will not tolerate. Baker v. Dewey, 1 Barn. & C., 704; Williams v. Jones, 5 Barn. & C., 108; Lightbody v. North Amer. Ins. Co., 23 Wend, 24; Rickman v. Carstairs, 5 Barn. & Ad., 65!; Bronson v. Fitz hugh, 1 Hill, 185. The new appointment could take effect only from the time the bond and oath of office were received and filed in the Post office Department. 5 U. S. Stat., 103; 5 U. S. Stat., 87. If the new appointment had been of some third party, the old appointment would have terminated only when notice of the new appointment had been given to the incumbent. Bonterbank v. Morris, Wall. C. C., 118; People v. Carrique, 2 Hill, 93. The same principle applies here. U. S. v. Ircing, 1 How., 250; U. S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 734; U. S. v. Eckford, 1 How., 2.9. The conclusion is, that on July 1st, 1850, there was an office then existing, perfect and complete, of which Beers was the incumbent. To this the bond applied. It cannot be made to apply to a term of office not then existing, and which was to commence in the future, and which possibly Beers might never fill, and for which there is good reason to believe an entirely different bond was executed. Mr. Justice Curtis delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, in an action of debt, founded on an official bond of Oliver S. Beers, as deputy postmaster at Mobile, the defendant being one of his sureties. It appeared, on the trial in the Circuit Court, that Beers was appointed to that office by the President of the United States, during the recess of the Senate, and received a commission, bearing date in April, 1849, to continue in force until the end of the next session of the Senate, which terminated on the 30th day of September, 1850. It also appeared, that in April, 1850, Beers was nominated by the President to the Senate, as deputy-postmaster at Mobile; and the nomination having been duly confirmed, a commission was made out and signed by President Tay lor, bearing date on the 22d day of April, 1850; but it had not been transmitted to Beers on the 1st day of July, 1850, when the bond declared on bears date. Beers took charge of the postoffice at Mobile before his second appointment, and continued to act, without intermission, until he was removed from office in February, 1853. The default, assigned as a breach of the bond, was admitted to have occurred under his second appointment; and the principal question upon this writ of error is, whether the bond declared on secures the faithful performance of the duties of the office under the first or under the second appointment. The condition of the bond recites: "Whereas The first inquiry is, to what date is this recital to be referred. The District Judge, who presided at the trial, ruled that it referred to the office held by Beers when the bond was signed. The delivery of a deed is presumed to have been made on the day of its date. But this presumption may be removed by evidence that it was delivered on some subsequent day; and when a delivery on some subsequent day is shown, the deed speaks on that subsequent day, and not on the day of its date. In Clayton's case, 5 Co., 1. a lease bearing date on the 26th of May, to hold for three years from henceforth," was delivered on the 20th of June. It was resolved, that "from henceforth" should be accounted from the day of delivery of the indentures, and not from the day of their date; for the words of an indenture are not of any effect until delivery-traditio loqui facit chartam. So in Oshey v. Hicks, Cro. Jac., 263, by a charter party, under seal, bearing date on the 8th of September, it was agreed that the defendant should pay for a moiety of the corn which then was, or afterwards should be, laden on board a certain vessel. The defendant pleaded that the deed was not delivered until the 28th of October, and that on and after that day there was no corn on board; and on demurrer, it was held a good plea, because the word "then" was to be referred to the time of the delivery of the deed, and not to its date. And the modern case of Steele v. Mart, 4 B. & C., 272, is to the same point. A lease purported on its face to have been made on the 25th of March, 1783, habendum from the 25th of March now last past. It was proved that the delivery was made after the day of the date, and the Court of King's Bench held that the word "now" referred to the time of delivery, and not to the date of the indenture. At the trial in the Circuit Court, it appeared that on the day after the date of the bond, Beers, in obedience to instructions from the PostmasterGeneral, deposited it, together with a certificate of his oath of office under his last appointment, in the mail, addressed to the Postmaster-General at Washington. In Broome v. The United States, 15 How., 143, it was held that a collector's bond might be deemed to be delivered when it was put in a course of transmission to the Comptroller of the Treasury, whose duty it is to examine and approve or reject such bonds. But this decis ion proceeded upon the ground that the Act of Congress requiring these bonds, and their ap proval, had allowed the collector to exercise his office for three months without a bond; and that consequently the approval and delivery were not necessarily simultaneous acts, nor need the approval precede the delivery; and the distinc tion between bonds of collectors and those of postmasters is there adverted to. The former may take and hold office for three months without a bond. The latter must give bond, with approved security, on their appointment; and there is no time allowed them, after entering on their offices, to comply with this requirement. The bond must, therefore, be accepted by the Postmaster General, as sufficient in point of amount and security, before it can have any effect as a contract. Otherwise the postmaster | sede an old one, would open to the objections might enter on the office merely on giving a which the defendants in error have so strenubond, which, on its presentation, the Postmaster- ously urged. General might reject as insufficient. There is no ambiguity in the bond. It refers to a holding at some particular date. The law determines that date to be the time when the bond took effect. Nothing remains but to determine upon the facts, under which appointment Beers then held; this also the law settles, and when it has thus been ascertained that he then held under the second appointment, evi In other words, the person appointed might act without any operative bond, which, we think, was not intended by Congress. It is like the case of Bruce et al. v. The State of Mary land, 11 Gill and John., 382, where it was held that the bond of a sheriff took effect only when approved by the County Court; because it was only on such approval that the sheriff was au-dence to show that the bond was not intended thorized to act. The purpose of the obligee was to become security for one legally authorized to exercise the office; not for one who enters on it unlawfully, because he failed to comply with the requirement to furnish an approved bond; and this purpose can be accomplished only by holding that the apointee cannot act, and the bond cannot take effect, until it is approved. Our opinion is, therefore, that this bond speaks only from the time when it reached the PostmasterGeneral, and was accepted by him; that until that time it was only an offer, or proposal of an obligation, which became complete and effectual by acceptance; and that, unlike the case of a collector's bond, which is not a condition precedent to his taking office, and which may be intended to have a retrospective operation, the bond of a postmaster, given on his appointment, cannot be intended to relate back to any earlier date than the time of its acceptance, because it is only after its acceptance that there can be any such holding of the office as the bond was meant to apply to. Now, at the time when this bond was accepted by the Postmaster General, Beers had been nominated and confirmed as deputy postmaster; he had given bond in such a penalty, and with such security, as was satisfactory to the Postmaster-General; be had taken the oath of office, and there was evidence that a certificate thereof had been filed in the general postoffice. Upon this state of facts, we are of opinion that at that time his holding under the first appointment had been superseded by his holding under the second appointment; and when the bond says "is now postmaster," it refers to such holding under the second appointment, and is a security for the faithful discharge of his duties under the second appointment. It was suggested at the argument, that this bond was not, in point of fact, taken in refer ence to the new apointment, but was a new bond, called for by the Postmaster General under the authority conferred on him by the Act of July 2, 1836. 5 Stat. at L., 88, sec. 37. To this there are several answers. No such ground appears to have been taken at the trial, and the rulings of the court, which were excepted to by the plaintiffs in error, precluded any such inquiry. These rulings were, that the holding to which the bond referred was a holding on the first day of July, and that Beers was in office on that day under the first ap pointment, and not under the second. This put an end to the claim, and rendered a verdict for the defendant inevitable. to apply to that appointment would directly contradict the bond, for it would show it was not intended to apply to the appointment which Beers then held, while the bond declares it was so intended. The defendant in error further insists that Beers was not in office, under the second appointment, at the time this bond took effect, because the commission sent to him was signed by President Taylor, and was not transmitted until after his death. When a person has been nominated to an office by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and his commission has been signed by the President, and the seal of the United States affixed thereto, his appointment to that office is complete. Congress may provide, as it has done in this case, that certain acts shall be done by the appointee before he shall enter on the possession of the office under his appointment. These acts then become conditions precedent to the complete investiture of the office; but they are to be performed by the appointee, not by the Executive; all that the Executive can do to invest the person with his office has been completed when the commission has been signed and sealed; and when the person has performed the required conditions, his title to enter on the possession of the office is also complete. The transmission of the commission to the officer is not essential to his investiture of the office. If, by any inadvertence or accident, it should fail to reach him, his possession of the office is as lawful as if it were in his cus tody. It is but evidence of those acts of appointment and qualification which constitute his title, and which may be proved by other evidence, where the rule of law requiring the best evidence does not prevent. It follows from the premises, that when the commission of a postmaster has been signed and sealed, and placed in the hands of the Postmaster General to be transmitted to the officer, so far as the execution is concerned, it is a completed act. The officer has then been commissioned by the President pursuant to the Constitution; and the subsequent death of the President, by whom nothing remained to be done, can have no effect on that completed act. It is of no importance that the person commissioned must give a bond and take an oath, before he possesses the office under the commission; nor that it is the duty of the Postmaster-General to transmit the commission to the officer when he shall have done so. These are acts of third persons. The President has previously acted to the full extent which he is required or enabled by the Constitution and laws to act in apBut if this were otherwise, parol or extrane-pointing and commissioning the officer; and to ous evidence that the bond was not intended to the benefit of that complete action the officer is apply to the holding under the second appoint- entitled, when he fulfills the conditions on his ment, because it was a new bond taken to super-part, imposed by law. No evidence of prior declarations or conduct is admissible to contradict or vary it. To enable plaintiff to show that the rule of the leader was austere, oppressive or tyrannical, &c., it was necessary that his bill should have been so framed as to exhibit such aspects of the internal arrangements and economy of the association. Argued Dec. 5, 1856. Decided Dec. 16, 1856. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The bill in this case was filed by the appellee in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against the trustees and elders of the "Harmony Society," praying for an accounting of the property and effects of said Society, and the This case is governed by the preceding case, and award to him of his share in the same. A deis decided in conformity with that. cree was rendered in the court below in favor (Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, having been of counsel, of the complainant, for $3,890 and costs; did not sit in this case.) whereupon this appeal was taken. Argued Dec. 3, 1856. Decided Dec. 16, 1856. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United A further statement of the case appears in the opinion of the court. Messrs. A. W. Loomis and Stanbury, I States for the Southern District of Alabama. for the appellants: Mr. C. Cushing, Atty-Gen., for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. George N. Stewart and E. S. Dargan for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Curtis delivered the opinion of the court: The opinion of the court in the preceding case determines this, and the judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed, in conformity with that opinion. ROMELIUS L. BAKER ET AL., Appts., v. JOSHUA NACHTRIEB. (See S. C., 19 How., 126-130.) Voluntary society, withdrawal therefrom-contract of withdrawal cannot be varied by parol evidence-requisites of bill. When a member withdraws from a voluntary society and executes a writing stating his withdrawal, containing a receipt for moneys from the be considered as the contract of dissolution between leader, agreeably to contract, such writing must the plaintiff and the society, of their mutual obliga tions and engagements to each other. NOTE.-Receipts, their effect and conclusiveness. The mere acknowledgment of payment is not treated in law as binding or conclusive in any high degree. So far as a simple acknowledgement of payment or delivery is concerned, it is presumptive evidence only. 1 Pet., C. C., 181: 1 Rich., 32; 1 Harr., 5; 3 Harr., 317; 4 Harr., 206; Southwick v. Hayden, 7 Cow., 334; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend., 460; 16 Me., 475; 5 Ark., 61; 11 Mass., 3, 363; Weed v. Snow, 3 McLean, 265; 6 B. Mon., 199. Murray v. Gouverneur, 2 Johns. Cas., 438; Skaife v. Jackson, 3 Barn. & Cres., 421; 8 Gill., 179; 3 Jones, 501. It is, in general, open to explanation, and is an exception to the rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary a written instrument. House v. Low, 2 Johns., 378; Johnson v. Weed, 9 Johns., 310; 6 Ala., 811; 8 Ala. N. S., 59; 4 Vt., 308; 21 Vt., 222; Weed v. Snow, 3 McLean, 265; Laurence v. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 4 McLean, 562; Thomas v. Austin, 4 Barb., 265; 5 J. J. Marsh, 79; 5 Mich., 171; Beebee v. Moore, 3 McLean, 387; Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns., 68; Brooks v. White, 2 Metc., 283; Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland., 249; Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 541; Rollins v. Dyer, 4 Shefley, 475; Ensign v. Webster, 1 Johns. Cas., 145; Keller v. Lieb, 1 Pa., 220; The execution by the complainant of the receipt of June 18, 1846, constituted a complete defense to the complainant's bill under art. 3, of the agreement of Oct. 31, 1836, which is as follows: 'Should any individual withdraw from the society or depart this life, neither he in the one case, nor his representatives in the other, shall be entitled to demand an account of said contributions, whether in land, goods, money or labor, or to claim anything from the society as matter of right, but it shall be left altogether to the discretion of the superintendent to decide whether any, and if any, what allowance shall be made to such member or his representatives, as a donation.' James v. Mc Kernon, 6 Johns., 558; Patton v. Taylor, 7 How., 159; Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow., 734; Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet., 503; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet., 208; Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet., 274; Very v. Levy, 13 How., 361; Crocket v. Lee, 7 Wheat., 525; 14 How., 602. It is manifest from complainant's bill, that all his rights sprang from the articles of agreement. He is not, therefore, entitled to comfrom the provisions of the agreement. pensation for his labor. This is also manifest the material allegations contained in the comWere Dutton v. Tilden, 1 Harr., 46; Walrath v. Norton, 6 Gilm.,,437; Driker v. Hudspeth, 16 Ala., 348; Cole v. Taylor, 2 Zab., 59. The circumstances under which it was given, a fraud, mistake, or that no money was, in fact, paid, or that it was rescinded by agreement of the parties, may be shown. Putnam v. Lee, 8 Johns., 389; Wright, 764; 4 Harr. & McH., 219; Egleston v. Nickerbacker, 6 Barb., 458; 3 Dana, 427; 2 Strob., 390; Davis v. Allen, 3 N. Y., 168; 10 Vt., 96: but see 1 J. J. Marsh, 583; Van Nest v. Talmadge, 17 Abb., 99. When a receipt is "in full," "in full of all accounts," or of "all demands," it is evidence of a compromise and mutual settlement of the rights of the parties. The law infers, from such acknowledgment, an adjustment of the amount due, after consideration of the claims of each party, and a payment of the specified sum, as a final satisfaction. 10 Vt., 491; 2 Dev., 247; Wright, 764; 2 N. H., 85. In general, a receipt in full is conclusive when given with a knowledge of the circumstances, and when the party giving it connot complain of any misapprehension as to the compromise he was plainant's bill susceptible of satisfactory proof, the appropriate remedy would be by petition for, and the rendering of, a decree of restoration to full enjoyment of his rights as a member of the Society. Commonwealth v. St. Patrick Benevolent So ciety, 2 Binu.. 441. Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, for appellees: The power to make by-laws, &c., vested in the society, was to be exercised reasonably, in accordance with the happiness of the members and the intent of the association. Angell & Ames on Corp., 288; 1 Ld. Raym., 113; 5 Bing., 58; 15 E. C. L., 371. A member of a corporation, or quasi corporation, cannot be expelled for any threat or hostile intention against the association or its members, not carried into effect or action; and even then only on cpen trial and defense. Angell & Ames on Corp., 351, 360; Bagg's case, 11 Coke, 98; 4 Com. Dig. Franchise, F. 33, p. 502. The payment of $200 was made, not on the footing of any just account rendered, or from settlement made; the receipt was obtained by the hardship and oppression of his condition, and in undue advantage of his necessities, and not in the exercise of full knowledge and free will. 1 Story, Eq., sec. 251; Hill on Trustees, 156: Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves., Sr., 155. making, or of any fraud. 5 Vt., 520; Bristow v. Eastman, 1 Esp., 173; Alner v. George, 1 Camp., 392; 2 Strob., 203. It is a waiver of interest, and prohibits the enforcement of any further demand. Cutler v. Mayer, 12 Week. Dig., 296. Receipts of this character are not wholly exempt from explanation. Fraud or misrepresentation may be proved, and so may any such mistake as enters into and vitiates the compromise of the demand admitted. Brayt., 75; Houston v. Shindler, 11 Babb., 36; Jason v. Capron, 64 Barb., 598; Alner v. George, 1 Camp., 394, n.; Coxe, 48; 2 Brev., 223; 4 Harr. & McH., 219; Thomas v. Austin, 4 Barb., 265; 2 Harr., 392; Riley v. White, 6 Leg. Obs., 272; Dib-¦ din v. Morris, 2 C. & P., 44; McDougal v. Cooper, 31 N. Y., 498; or when, there being no dispute as to the amount due, less than the full amount is paid, the receipt, though in full, may be explained or contradicted. Foersh v. Blackwell, 14 Barb, 607. Thomas v. McDaniel, 14 Johns., 185; Storey v. Rourke, 4 E. D. Smith, 524. A receipt which embodies a contract is not open to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence, like a simple receipt. 4 Gray, 186; 5 Ind., 109; Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend.. 116; 12 Pick., 40; 12 Pick., 562; 15 Pick., 347; Coon v. Knapp, 4 Seld., 402. A receipt for rent is presumptive evidence that all rent accruing previous to that receipted for, had been paid. Decker v. Livingston, 15 Johns., 479. Parol evidence is admissible to show for what purpose a receipt was given, to what fund it referred, and to inquire into the consideration. Col-, burn v. Lansing, 46 Barb., 37. Receipts upon the faith of which others have acted, cannot be gainsaid. Union B'k v. Sollee, 2 Strob., 390, 407. A receipt of payment for a bill of goods unexplained or uncontradicted, is conclusive against a for the plaintiff a decree for the amount of the share to which he is entitled in the property of the Society, or compensation for his labor and service during the time he was a member. In 1819, he became associated with George Rapp and others, in the Harmony Society in Indiana, and remained with them there, or at Economy, in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, till 1846. He devoted his time, skill, attention and care during that period to the increase of the wealth and the promotion of the interest of the Society. These facts are admitted in the pleadings of either party. The bill avers, that in 1846, the plaintiff being then 48 years old, and worn out with years and labor for said Association, was wrongfully and unjustly excluded from it, and deprived of any share in its property, benefits or advantages, by the combination and covin of George Rapp and his associates; that at the time of his exclusion he was entitled to a large sum of money, which those persons unjustly and il legally appropriated to their own use; that George Rapp was the leader and trustee of the Association, invested with the title to its property; and that, since his death, the defendants have acquired the control and management of its business and affairs and the possession of its effects. The plaintiff calls for the production of the Articles of Association, which from time to time have regulated this Society, and prays for an account and distribution of its property, or a compensation for his labor. The defendants produce a series of articles, by which the Association has been governed since its organization in 1805. They admit that from small beginnings the Society have become independent in their circumstances, being the owners of lands ample for the supply of their subsistence, warm and comfortable houses for the members and en recovery for the goods. Lambert v. Seely, 17 How. Pr.,.432. A party is not precluded by a receipt in full of all demands up to a certain date, from showing that there were demands existing at the date of such receipt, which were unsettled and unpaid, although not then due. Churchill v. Bradley, 43 N. Y., Supr. Ct., 170, A receipt embodied in a promisory note, given upon a settlement between the parties, is open to explanation by parol, as to what was settled, the same as if it were in a separate instrument. Smith v. Holland,, 61 N. Y., 635. A receipt unexplained is conclusive. Moore v. The Fashion, Newb., 49; S. C., 8 Law Rep., N. S., 50: Moore v. Newbury, 6 McLean, 472. In Conn., a receipt in full, is, in the absence of fraud, mistake, accident or surprise, a good defense in bar. It will operate like a discharge to defeat any further claim by the party giving it. Beam v. Barnum, 21 Conn., 200; Fuller v. Crittenden, 9 Conn., 401; Tucker v. Baldwin, 13 Conn., 137; Hurd v. Blackman, 19 Conn., 136. A receipt given by an authorized agent is conclusive upon his principal for the amount actually received, but no further. Dyer v. Girard, 2 Root, 55; see Pate v. U. S., 4 Ct. of Cl., 523; see, also, as to effect of receipts in particular cases, U. S. v. Gear, 3 McLean, 571; 7 Op. Atty-Gen., 40; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How., 503; Butler v. The Arrow, Newb., 59; S. C., 6 McLean, 470; Jackson v. Hale, 14 How., 525; The May Paulina, 1 Sprague, 45; Leak v. Isaacson, Abb. Adm., 41; Jackson v. White, 1 Pet. Adm., 179; The Neptune, 1 Pet. Adm., 180; The Rajah, 1 Sprague, 199; 5 C. 5, Law Rep., N. S., 208; Bates v. Seabury, 1 Sprague, 433; S. C., 11 Law Rep., N. S., 666; Payne v. Allen, 1 Sprague, 304; Whitney v. Eager, Crabbe, 422; Piehl v. Balchen, Olcott, 24. gines and machinery to diminish and cheapen their labors. They affirm that the plaintiff participated in all the individual, social and religious benefits which were enjoyed by his fellows, under their contract, until he became possessed by a spirit of discontent and disaffection, a short time before his membership terminated. They deny that the plaintiff was wrongfully excluded from the Association, or deprived of a share or participation in the property and effects, by the combination or covin of George Rapp and his associates; but assert, that voluntarily, and of his own accord, he separated himself from the Society. They deny that he had a title to any compensation for labor and service while he was a member, other than that which was expended for his support, maintenance and instruction, and that which he derived during the time from the spiritual and social advantages he enjoyed. To support this averment, they epitomize the history of the Harmony Society, and the agreements which, from time to time, have been the basis of its organization. The Society was composed at first of Germans, who emigrated to the United States in 1805, under the leadership of George Rapp. The members were associated and combined by the common belief that the government of the patriarchal age, united to the community of property, adopted in the days of the Apostles, would conduce to promote their temporal and eternal happiness. The founders of the Society surrendered up their property to the Association for the common benefit. The Society was set, tled originally in Pennsylvania, was removed in 1814 and 1815 to Indiana, and again in 1825 10 Economy, in Pennsylvania. The organic law of the Society, in regard to their property, is contained in sections of the Articles of Association, adopted in 1827 by the associates, of whom the plaintiff was one. They are as follows: "All the property of the Society, real, personal and mixed, in law or equity, and howsoever contributed and acquired, shall be deemed, now and forever, joint and indivisible stock; each individual is to be considered to have finally and irrevocably parted with all his former contributions, whether in land, goods, money or labor, and the same rule shall apply to all future contributions whatever they may be. Should any individual withdraw from the Society, or depart this life, neither he, in the one case, nor his representatives in the latter, shall be entitled to demand an account of said contributions, whether in land, goods, money or labor; or to claim anything from the society as matter of right. But it shall be left al together to the discretion of the Superintendent to decide whether any, and, if any, what allowance shall be made to such member, or his representatives, as a donation." The defendants, admitting, as we have seen, that the plaintiff, until 1846, was a contented member of the Association, answer and say, that during that year he became disaffected; used violent threats against the associates; made re peated declarations of his intentions to leave the society, and in that year fulfilled his design by a voluntary withdrawal and separation from the Society, receiving at the same time from George Rapp $200 as a donation. They exhibit as a part of the answer, a writing, signed by the plaintiff, to the following effect: To day I have withdrawn myself from the Harmony Society, and ceased to be a member thereof; I have also received of George Rapp two hundred dollars as a donation, agreeably to contract. JOSHUA NACHTRIEB. Economy, June 18, 1846." This statement of the pleadings shows that no issue was made in them upon the merit of the doctrines, social or religous, which form the basis of this Association; nor any question in reference to the religious instruction and ministration, or the domestic economy or phys ical discipline which their leader and the other managers have adopted and enforced. Nordo they suggest any inquiry into the condition of the members, and wnether they have experienced hardship. oppression, or undue morti fication, from the ambition avarice, or fanaticism of their guides and administrators. The bill depends on the averments, that the plaintiff approved the constitution of the Society; submitted to its government; obeyed its regulations, and prized the advantage of being a member. The burden of his complaint is, that he was wrongfully, and without any fault or consent on his part, deprived of his station through the combination of the leader and his assistants. And the defendants concede the character the plaintiff claims for himself; they concede that the plaintiff was an approved and blameless member of the Association, and was entitled to whatever its constitution and order provided for the temporal good or the eternal felicity of the members, and assert that he enjoyed them until he became disaffected and repining, and finally surrendered to a spirit of discontent, which moved him to abandon his condition and privileges. As an evidence of this, they produce a writing, signed by him, in which he acknowledges a voluntary seces sion from the Society, and claims that the case has arisen to authorize him to make an appeal to the bounty of the Superintendent, and that the Superintendent has answered that appeal by a donation. The value of this writing is now to be considered. The power of the Superintendent to subtract from the otherwise joint and indivisible stock" of the Society a portion for the individual use of a seceding member, depends upon the concession that the member has withdrawn voluntarily. He cannot supply one who is the victim of covin or combination. The evidence shows that the mind of the plaintiff, in June, 1846, was disquieted in consequence of his connection with the Association, and that he contemplated a change in his condition; that he made inquiries upon the expediency of a removal from Economy, and made some preparations from his departure; that the leader of the Society, suspecting his discontent, and discovering some deviation by him from the rules of the Society, rebuked him with harshness, and menaced him with a sentence of expulsion. Some of the witnesses testify to such a sentence, while the testimony of others reduces the expressions to an admonition and menace. But two days after the occurrence of the last of these scenes, and before any removal had taken place, the writing in the record was executed by him, em: bodying his decision to leave the Society, and |