to accept the bounty the constitution permitted the Superintendent to bestow. This writing would have much probative force, if we were simply to treat it as an admission of the statements it contains, when considered in connection with other evidence in the record. But, we think, this writing is something more than an admission, and stands in a different light from an ordinary receipt. The writing must be treated as the contract of dissolution, be tween the plaintiff and the Society, of their mutual obligations and engagements to each other. No evidence of prior declarations or antecedent conduct is admissible to contradict or to vary it. It was prepared to preserve the remembrance of what the parties had prescribed to themselves to do, and expresses their intention in their own language; that such was its object, is corroborated by the fact that for three years there is no evidence of a contrary sentiment. Treating this writing as an instrument of evidence of this class, it is clear that the bill has not made a case in which its validity can be impeached. To enable the plaintiff to show that the rule of the leader (Rapp), instead of being patriarchal, was austere, oppressive, or tyrannical, his discipline vexatious and cruel; his instructions fanatical, and, upon occasions, impious; his system repugnant to public order, and the domestic happiness of its members; his management of their revenues and estate rapa cious, selfish, or dishonest; and that the condition of his subjects was servile, ignorant and degraded, so that none of them were responsible for their contracts or engagements to him, from a defect of capacity and freedom, as has been attempted by him in the testimony collected in this cause, it was a necessary prerequisite that his bill should have been so framed as to exhibit such aspects of the internal arrangements and social and religious economy of the Association. This was not done; and for this cause the evidence cannot be considered. The authorites cited from the decisions of this court are decisive. Very v. Levy, 13 How., 345, 361; Patton v. Taylor, 7 How., 157 Crockett v. Lee, 7 Wheat., 525. Decree reversed-Bill dismissed. THE UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. States for the Northern District of California, by S. W. Inge, Esq., U. S. Dist. Atty., in behalf of the U. S., against the brig Neurea, her tackle, &c. The libel of Samuel W. Inge, Attorney of the United States for the Northern District of California, who prosecutes on behalf of the said United States against the brig Neurea, and against all persons intervening for their interest therein, in a cause of forfeiture, alleges and informs as follows: 1. That Richard P. Hammond, Esq., Collector of the Customs for the District of San Francisco, heretofore, to wit: on the thirtyfirst day of August, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty four, at the port of San Francisco, and within the Northern District of California, on waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, seized as forfeited to the use of the said United States, the said brig Neurea, being the property of some person or persons to the said attorney unknown. that are 2. That one Kohler, master of the said brig Neurea, which is a vessel owned wholly or in part by a subject or subjects of the kingdom of Sweden, did on the first day of June, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty-four, at the foreign port of Hong Kong, in China, take on board said vessel two hundred and sixtythree passengers, which was a greater number of passengers than in the following proportion to the space occupied by them and appropri ated for their use on board said vessel, and occupied by stores or other goods not being the personal luggage of such passengers; that is to say, on the lower deck or platform, one passenger for every fourteen clear superficial feet of deck, with intent to bring said passengers to the United States of America, and did leave said port with the same; and afterwards, to wit: on the twenty-sixth day of August, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty four, did bring the said passengers, being two hundred and sixty-three in number, on board the said vessel to the said port of San Francisco, within the jurisdiction of the United States, and that the said passengers so taken on board of said vessel and brought into the United States as aforesaid, did exceed the number which could be lawfully taken on board, and brought into the United States as aforesaid, as limited by the 1st section of the Act of Congress approved Feb. 22, 1847, entitled, "An Act to regulate the carriage of passengers in THE BRIG "NEUREA," Her Tackle, &c., merchant vessels," to the number of twenty in WILLIAM KOHLER, Claimant, the whole, in violation of the Act of Congress of the United States in such cases made and provided, and that by force and virtue of the said Acts of Congress in such cases made and provided, the said vessel became and is forfeited to the use of the United States. And the said attorney saith, that by reason of all and singular the premises aforesaid and by force of the Statute in such cases made and provided, the aforementioned vessel became and is forfeited to the use of the said United States. Lastly. That all and singular the premises APPEAL from the District Court of the aforesaid are true, and within the admiralty United Sates for the Northern District of California. On September 2, 1854, the following libel was filed in the District Court of the United and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and of this court. Wherefore, the said attorney prays the usual process and monition of this court in this be half to be made, and that all persons interested | The exceptions to this rule are, where the in the said vessel may be cited in general and offenses created by statute are analogous to special to answer the premises, and all due certain common law felonies or misdemeanors, proceedings being had, that the said vessel may where the precedents require certain technical be, for the causes aforesaid, and other appear language, or where special averments are necing, condemned by the definitive sentence and essary in the description of the particular decree of this court, as forfeited to the use of offense, in order that the defendant may after the said United States, according to the form wards protect himself under the plea of autreof the Statute of the United States in such fois acquit or convict. See on this subject, cases made and provided. United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat., 474. S. W. INGE, U. S. Dist. Atty. Pr. JOHN A. GODFREY. The defendant having answered, subsequently withdrew his answer and filed a demurrer, alleging the following grounds: 1. That the said libel states no sufficient cause of condemnation of said ship. 2. Because said libel states no offense against the laws of the United States. 3. Because the said libel does not aver that the excess of passengers carried or imported on said ship were so carried or imported on the lower deck of said brig, or orlop deck thereof. 4. Because the facts stated in said libel do not constitute a violation of the Passenger Act of the United States, passed in 1847, or any other law of the United States. The District Judge sustained the demurrer and dismissed the libel; whereupon the libelants took an appeal to this court. Mr. C. Cushing, Atty-Gen., for the plaintiffs in error. No counsel appeared for the appellee. Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court: The Swedish brig Neurea was seized by the Collector of Customs at San Francisco, as for feited to the United States under the Passenger Act of 1847. The record in this case exhibits the libel for information, filed on behalf of the United States, a demurrer thereto by the claimant, and a decree of the court below dismissing the libel. The appeal, therefore, brings under review the question of the sufficiency of the libel. The claimant sets forth the following grounds of demurrer: 1. That the said libel states no sufficient cause of condemnation of said ship. 2. Because the said libel states no offense against the laws of the United States. 3. Because the said libel does not aver that the excess of passengers carried or imported on said ship were so carried and imported on the lower deck of said brig, or the orlop deck thereof. 4. Because the facts stated in said libel do not constitute a violation of the Passenger Act of the United States of 1847, or any other law of the United States. The first, second and fourth are but different forms of the same general assertion, “that the libel states no offense." The third, which is more specific, objects to the libel for want of an averment that the passengers were carried on the lower deck. An information for forfeiture of a vessel need not be more technical in its language, or specitic in its description of the offense, than an indictment. As a general rule, an indictment for a statute offense is sufficient, if it describe the offense in the very words of the Statute. The offense created by the Statute on which this libel is founded, has no analogy to any particular common law crime. If, therefore, the libel sets forth the offense in the words of the Statute which creates it, with sufficient cer tainty as to the time and place of its commission, it is all that is necessary to put the claim. ant on his defense. The object of the Act in question is the protection of the health and lives of passengers from becoming a prey to the avarice of ship owners. In order to test the sufficiency of the libel, it will be necessary to set forth at length the two sections under which it was framed: The 1st section provides that no master "shall take on board such vessel, at any foreign port or place, a greater number of passengers than in the following proportion to the space occupied by them and appropriated to their use, and unoccupied by stores or other goods not being the personal baggage of such passengers, that is to say, on the lower deck or platform, one passenger for every fourteen clear superficial feet of deck, if such vessel is not to pass within the tropics during such voyage; but if such vessel is to pass within the tropics during such voyage, then one passenger for every twenty such clear superficial feet of deck; and on the orlop deck (if any), one passenger for every thirty such superficial feet in all cases, with intent to bring such passengers into the United States of America, and shall leave such port or place with the same, and bring the same, or any number thereof, within the jurisdiction of the United States aforesaid, or if any such master of vessel shall take on board of his vessel, at any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States aforesaid, any greater number of passengers than the proportions aforesaid admit, with the intent to carry the same to any foreign port or place, every such master shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof before any circuit or district court of the United States aforesaid, shall, for each passenger taken on board beyond the above proportions, be fined in the sum of fifty dollars, and may also be imprisoned for any term not exceeding one year: Provided that this Act shall not be construed to permit any ship or vessel to carry more than two passengers to every five tons of such ship or vessel. 64 It avers that the master "took on board the Neurea at Hong, Kong in China, on the 1st of June, 1854, two hundred and sixty-three passengers. That this was a greater number than in proportion to the space occupied by them, viz.: on the lower deck or platform " one passenger for every fourteen clear superficial feet, with intent to bring said passengers to the United States. That he afterwards, viz. : on the 26th day of August, did bring them on said vessel to the port of San Francisco. That the passengers so taken on board and brought into the United States did exceed the number which could be lawfully taken, to the number of twenty in the whole, &c. The Act does not require an averment that the passengers "were carried or imported on the lower deck or the orlop deck." The libel sets forth every averment of time, place, numbers, intention, and act, in the very words of the Statute. It was not necessary to specify the precise measurement of the deck, or to show by a mathematical calculation its incapacity; nor to state the sex, age, color or nation of the passengers; nor how many more than twenty their number exceeded the required area on deck. All these particulars were matters of evidence which required no special averment of them, to constitute a complete and technical description of the offense. The decree of the District Court is, therefore, reversed, and record remitted for further proceedings. A further statement appears in the opinion of the court. Mr. Randall for appellant. Messrs. Tillinghast, Bradley and Albert C. Green for appellee. Mr. Justice McLean delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal in chancery from the Cir cuit Court for the District of Rhode Island. The bill was filed to set aside certain titles for frauds alleged to have been committed in the year 1767, by a father against his own children, for the benefit of strangers. The frauds are stated to have been investigated and sanctioned, directly or indirectly, by the Court of Probate, by referees chosen by the parties to determine their matter of controversy, and by the highest courts of the State. The legal history of the case commences in July, 1767, by the execution of a deed by the administrator of John Manton to Waterman and Pearce. From this period a series of events are detailed, genealogical and historical, sweeping over near a century. Acts are stated in the bill, as it would seem, from mere vague reports, and sometimes resting on conjectures. And many of the facts set forth, if proved, and were of modern occurrence, would not be sufficient to avoid the titles enumerated; but the facts are denied generally by the answers, and not sufficiently proved by the evidence. The lands when sold were comparatively of little value, but, by the progress of time and the advance of improvements, they are now covered with large manufacturing_establish ELIZABETH MOORE, Complainant and Ap- ments and flourishing villages. Generation pellant. v. after generation has risen up and passed away. of individuals connected with these titles, who RAY GREENE AND BENJAMIN W. increased the value of the property by their HAWKINS. (See S. C., 19 How., 69-72.) Adverse possession of over eighty years, not disturbed-Statute of Limitations does not begin to run till the fraud is discovered-the fraud must be stated and the time it was discovered burden of proof is on him who alleges that administrator's sale is void. An adverse possession of over eighty years, relief against which is barred by the Statute of LimitaWhere fraud is alleged as a ground to set aside title, the Statute does not begin to run till the fraud is discovered. tions, will not be disturbed. But in such case, the bill must state the facts and circumstances making the fraud, and the time it was discovered. The burden of proof that an administrator's sale was illegal and void, falls on him who attempts to disturb a possession of ages, transmitted and enjoyed under the forms of law. large expenditures; and the property, by deed or will, or by the law of descents, has been transmitted through the generations that have passed, without doubt as to the legal ownership. The bill was filed in 1851; its averments of facts, by which the lapse of time and the Statute of Limitations are sought to be avoided, are loose and unsatisfactory. The adverse entry is alleged to have been made, under the deed of the administrator of Manton, in 1767; and it appears that Betty Waterman, the complainant's grandmother, through whom the title is claimed to have descended, was born in 1756. She was of age in 1777, and in ten years afterward her right was barred by the Statute. It is true the date of her coverture does not appear, but as she was only 11 years of age in 1767, she could not then have been married; and if her marriage occurred subsequently, it Submitted Dec. 8, 1856. Decided Dec. 24, 1856. was a cumulative disability, which is not al lowed by the Statute of Rhode Island. The 1815, and her 10 years expired in 1825. Her complainant became of disability of coverture, and it was cumulative, expired in 1840, more than ten years before the bill was filed. The complainant avers that from the death of John Manton, in 1767, to 1822, 1823 and 1824, his estates were the subject of legal controversy and litigation in courts of law; and that ever since, renewed and continued claims and demands, by the heirs of Lydia Thornton and Betty Carpenter, for their proportion of said estates, as his rightful heirs at law, upon the assignees of the Manton estate, and upon all persons deriving title under them, have been continuously prosecuted. But prosecutions to stop the operations of the Statute must be suc cessful and lead to a change in the possession. When fraud is alleged as a ground to set aside a title, the Statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered; and this is the ground on which the complainant asks relief. But, in such a case, the bill must be specific in stating the facts and circumstances which constitute the fraud; and also as to the time it was dis covered. This is necessary to enable the defendants to meet the fraud, and the alleged time of its discovery. In these respects, the bill is defective and the evidence is still more so. The complainant's counsel seem to suppose, that as the defendants in their answer admit the property, at least in part, was originally acquired under a sale of Manton's administrator, they are bound to show the proceedings were not only conformable to law, but they must go further, and prove the debts for which it was sold were due and owing by the deceased. So far from this being the legal rule, under the circumstances of this case, the presumptions are in favor of the present occupants, and the complainants must show that the administrator's sale was illegal and void. After an adverse possession of more than eighty years, when the facts have passed from the memory, and, as in this case, the papers are not to be found in the Probate Court, no court can require of the defendants proof in regard to such sale. The burden of proof falls upon him who attempts to disturb a possession of ages, transmitted and enjoyed under the forms of law. Whether we consider the great lapse of time, and the change in the value of the property, or the Statutes of Limitation, the right of the complainant is barred. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Aff'g 2 Curt., C. C., 202. power, in a case of necessity, to hypothecate the personally for repairs and supplies, to the furvessel, and also to bind himself and the owners nishers thereof, or to one who lends money to pay such furnishers, and the master does so, without any express hypothecation, when in a case of necessity he obtains them on the credit of the vessel without a bottomry bond. the vessel. An owner pro hac vice, such as one who has received the vessel on what is termed a “lay,” in command of the vessel, has the same power to bind But a case of necessity is uniformly required. Where the freight money earned by the vessel was sufficient to pay for all needful repairs and supplies, if it had not been wrongfully diverted, and the persons giving the credit knew this, and aided the master to divert the freight money to for their advances to pay for repairs and supplies. other objects, they obtained no lien on the vessel Argued Apr. 11, 1855. Decided Dec. 29, 1856. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, The libel in this case was filed in the District Court of Maryland, by the appellee, as agent and assignee of Loring & Co., a mercantile house of Valparaiso, to recover against the barque Laura, of Massachusetts. A bill for repairs and supplies furnished to said barque in Valparaiso; and another bill of two items, the one for bread furnished to said barque by the above mercantile house at Valparaiso, and the other for the amount of a draft on the said house, and paid by them for the barque's expenses. The District Court slightly reduced the latter item, and rendered a decree for the libelants. This decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court. The case further appears in the opinion of the court. Messrs. George W. Brown and F. W. Brune, for the appellants: The appellants will contend that the decree of the Circuit Court should be reversed for the following reasons: 1. No lien on The Laura was created for the expenses paid and supplies furnished by Loring & Co., Phineas Leach, on whose order or request they were paid and furnished. not then being the master of the barque. No one but the master can create an implied lien on a ves Cited 23 How., 208; 16 Wall., 29; 21 Wall., 348; 11 sel. Otto, 140 4 Bank. Reg., 85; 12 Bank. Reg., 28. Master may bind vessel in foreign port for repairs and supplies, and for money loaned therefor, without express hypothecation or bottomry bond-owner pro hac vice in command may do so, but only in case of necessity -where lender aids master to divert freight money to other objects, he gets no lien By the maritime law of the United States, the master of a vessel, being in a foreign port, has Conk. Adm., 59; Flander's Ship., 181; Flander's Mar. Law., 174, 175, 186; Story, Agency, secs., 116-124; Curt. Merch. Seaman, 76, 165– 185; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat., 409-416; vis, Crabbe, 199-201; Jones v. Blum, 2 Rich., The Phebe, 1 Ware, 275; Sarchet v. Sloop Da475-479; Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow., 700; James v. Bixby, 11 Mass., 37, 38, 40, 41; Sproat v. Donnell, 26 Me., 187; Thompson v. Snow, 4 Me., 268; Urann v. Fletcher, 1 Gray, 128; Webb v. Peirce, 1 Curt. C. C., 105-113; Reeve v. Davis, 1 Ad. & E., 311; Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How., 477; The Aurora, 1 Wheat.. 103; Greenway v. Turner, 4 Md., 296, 303; Young v. Brander, 8 East, 12; Frazer v. Marsh, 13 East, 238; Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How., 401; Abb. Ship., 128; 1 Bell's Com., 506; The Jane, 1 Dod., 461; 2 Starr's Inst., 953-955, 962-966; Harper v. The New Brig Gilpin, 543. 2. And the facts which came to the knowledge of Loring & Co. were sufficient to have put them on the inquiry as to the legality of NOTE.-Lien on ships for repairs, necessaries, sup- the right which Leach claimed to exercise over plies, &c. Proceedings in rem for. See note to The The Laura, and such an inquiry would have General Smith, 4 Wheat., 438, and note to Blaine v.enabled them to ascertain that he had no such The Charles Caretr, 4 Cranch, 328. right. They had therefore constructive notice | of all the facts to which such an inquiry might have led. Curt. on Seamen, 151-153; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt. C. C., 393, and cases there cited; Ringgold v. Bryant, 3 Md. Ch., 493; Magruder v. Peter, 11 G. & J., 243; Baynard v. Norris, 5 Gill, 468; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How., 379-395; Harrison v. Vose, 9 How., 372. 3. The credit in this case was not given to the vessel, nor is the captain nor the owners of the vessel liable. In the accounts current. in evidence, the charges are to Leach personally, The Amstel, Blatchf. & H., 217: James v. Birby, 11 Mass., 36; Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cow., 700; Zane v. Brig President, 4 Wash., 459; The American Ins. Co. v. Coster, 3 Paige, 331; Leland v. The Medora, 2 W. & M., 97. 4. If any lien existed, it was waived by Lor ing & Co. Blaine v. The Charles Carter, 4 Cranch, 331; The Utility, 1 Blatchf. & H., 222; The Boston, 1 Blatchf. & H., 326; The Aurora, 1 Wheat., 104: Packard v. The Louisa, 2 W. & M., 56. 5. The rule of law is, that the credits in an account current are to be applied, in the order of time, to the items constituting the debits in the account. If this rule be applied to this case, the claim of the appellee is more than paid. U. S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 737; Jones v. The U. S.. 7 How., 691; Tayloe v. Sandiford. 7 Wheat., 20; Whetmore v. Murdock, 3 W. & M., 395; Gass v. Stinson, 3 Sumn., 112; U. S. v. Wardwell, 5 Mass, 87; Mc Doncell v. Black stone Canal Co., 5 Mass., 12; Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cow., 770; Allen v. Culver, 3 Den., 293; Miller v. Miller, 23 Me., 24; Bodenham v. Purchas, 2 B. & Aid., 46; Smith v. Wigley, 3 Moo. & Sc., 174. 6. If the above rules should not be sus tained, the appellants contend that the remittance from Garrison & Fritz, being the proceeds of the cargo shipped by Loring & Co., should be applied ratably to the different items constituting the balance of the account. Perris v. Roberts, 1 Vern., 34; Waller v. Lacy, 1 Man. & G., 54, 39; E. C. L., 349 to 360; Blackstone Bank v. Hill, 10 Pick.. 129; Commercial Bank v. Cunningham, 24 Pick., 270, 271; Cage v. Iler, 5 Sm. & Mar., 410. Messrs. S. T. Wallis and J. H. Thomas, for the appellee: The proctors of the appellee will contend: 1. Whether Leach, by the terms of the contract under which he navigated the barque, was or was not to be regarded as her temporary owner, at the time when the repairs and supplies in controversy were furnished, and whether the general owners were or were not bound personally by his contracts for neces saries, he was at all events master of the barque and imposed a lien in rem by ordering and rereceiving such repairs and supplies for her, in a foreign port. His relation to the vessel was not altered by his having temporarily intrusted Easton, his mate, with her navigation, nor was the responsibility of the vessel herself to Loring & Co., for repairs and supplies, at all af fected by the secret agreement between Leach and the owners, of which Loring & Co. were ignorant. The General Smith, 4 Wheat., 438; The Nestor, 1 Sumn., 78; The Tribune, 3 Sumn., 149; Arthur v. The Cassius, 2 Story, 92-94; The Chusan, 2 Story, 467; The William and Emeline, 1 Blatchf. & How., 71; Webb v. Pierce, 1 Curt. C. C., 110; Arthur v. Barton, 6 Mees. & W., 142; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat.. 409; Rich v. Coe, Cow., 636; Reeve v. Davis, 1 Ad. & E., 315; Sarchet v The Davis, Crabbe, 201; Story, Agency, secs. 36, 120; North v. The Eagle, Bee, 78; Skolfield v. Potter, Daveis, 397; L'Arina v. The Exchange, Bee, 198; The Vir gin, 8 Pet., 552; f Bell's Com., 525; Hays v. Pacific Steam Co.. 17 How., 598; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet., 341; Recens v. Lewis, 2 Paine C. C., 207. Even if Easton is to be regarded as master, the fact that the repairs and supplies were furnished with his knowledge and consent and under his superintendence, is sufficient to charge the barque with the usual maritime lien. Stewart v. Hall, 2 Dow., 32; Voorhees v. The Eureka, 14 Mo., 56. The onus of showing a waiver of the customary maritime lien by giving credit to Leach, rests on the appellants, and they must not only show that such credit was given, but that it was exclusive, and with the intent to forego all recourse in rem. The circumstances of the transaction, the mode of making the charges, and the certificates required from Leach to the validity of the accounts against the barque and owners." all establish affirmatively that the credit of the vessel was especially looked to, and the usual remedy against her, particularly reserved. Ex parte Bland, 2 Rose, 92; Stewart v. Hall, 2 Dow., 29-37; The Chusan, 2 Story, 468; Peyroux v. Honcard, 7 Pet., 344; The Nestor, 1 Sumn., 75; North v. The Eagle, Bee, 78. Even if the relation of Leach to the vessel was not such as necessarily to raise an implication of lien from his mere contract for repairs and supplies, he had the right to pledge the vessel expressly. The proof shows that he did this, and the lien thus expressly imposed, being of a maritime nature, became proprio vigore, enforceable in admiralty. Alexander v. Ghiselin, 5 Gill, 182; Sullivan v. Tuck, 1 Md. Ch., 62; The Nestor. 1 Sumn., 78; The Marion, 1 Story, 73; The Hilarity, 1 Blatchf. & H., 92; Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How., 401; The Draco, 2 Sumn., 177. 5. That Mr. Atherton, the partner of the old firm of Loring & Co., who was seen by Weston at Valparaiso, had no right to disavow or waive the lien of the firm on The Laura, after the partnership dissolved, and that even if he had, there was nothing in his intercourse with Weston or his omission to insist at that time, on the payment of the present claim, from which any such disavowal or waiver could be inferred. 6. That there was no concealment on the part of Loring & Co., of their claim of lien, and no laches or delay in ascertaining it. No rights of third parties had intervened, nor had any settlement previously taken place between Capt. Leach and his owners. Stewart v. Hall, 2 Dow, 29; The Nestor, 1 Sumn., 83; The Chusan, 2 Story, 468. 7. That no appropriation was made by Capt, Leach of the Panama remittance, to the pay |