The statute we have cited from the Code of Minnesota enlarges the powers of the Court of Chancery of that Territory, and enables it to act in rem. It may pass the title without any act of the defendant. The bill, subpœna, and injunction, placed the property wholly un der the control of the Court of Chancery, and new parties were not requisite to enable the court to vest the title in the equitable claimant.

This principle is not peculiar to courts of chancery; but the maxim that "pendente lite nihil innovetur,” is applied in real and mixed actions by the common law.

the money and the interest that had accrued, a party in such a case. Scott v. Calemon, 5 and on the refusal of Taylor to receive it, his Mon., 73. prompt application to chancery, and payment of the money into court, relieve the plaintiff from every imputation of laches or delay. The District Court expressed an opinion correspond ing to this, in July, 1852, in denying the motion to dissolve the injunction, and this was a virtual decision of the cause in that court. These transactions occurred before the judgments against Taylor, under which the land was afterwards sold, were rendered by the District Court. The District Court had the parties before it, and held the defendant (Tay lor) under restraint, by injunction, and the purchase money in its custody. It had been Was there a valid exercise of the jurisdicempowered by a statute of the Territory "to tion of the court, and did the decree pass the pass the title to real estate by a decree, without title to the purchaser? Had the plaintiff any any other act to be done on the part of the de- duty to perform, in regard to the application fendant, when, in its judgment, it was the of the purchase money, in the registry of the proper mode to carry its decree into effect." court? Some authorities affirm that a pur(Rev. Stat., Minn., p. 466, sec. 33) But, bechaser of the legal title at a judicial sale imfore the transfer to the plaintiff had been made, mediately succeeds to the rights of the debtor, judgments were obtained and docketed against and that the equitable claimant under an execTaylor, which were "a lien upon all the real utory contract becomes responsible to him for property of the debtor in the county owned by the purchase money remaining unpaid. Moyer him at the date of the judgment, or afterwards v. Hinman, 17 Barb., 137; 16 Serg. & R., 18. acquired." The influence of these judgments, Other authorities recognize the right of the and of the levy of the executions upon the purchaser to the benefit of the contract from land described in the agreement of January, the time that the equitable claimant has notice 1852, and the sale under those executions. re of the sale and convevance by the sheriff, mains to be considered. The twelfth of the (Moyer v. Hinman, 13 N. Y., 180; 2 Ired. Eq.. “Ordinances in Chancery" of Lord Bacon is, 507; 4 Madd., 506, note); while other well-conthat no decree bindeth any that cometh in bona sidered cases deny that the purchaser at the fide by conveyance from the defendant before sheriff's sale obtains a title which can be interbili exhibited, and is made no party, neither by posed to impede the progress of the legal title bill nor the order; but where he comes in pen to the purchaser by articles, or operates as a dente lite, and while the suit is in full prosecu transfer of his debt for the unpaid purchase tion, and without any color of allowance or money from his vendor to the claimant under privity of the court, there regularly the decree the judgment. Chinn v. Butts, 3 Dana, Ky., bindeth; but if there were any intermission of 547; Lodge v. Lyseley, 4 Simon, 70; Whitworth the suit, or the court made acquainted with, v. Gaugain, 3 Hare, 416; Scott v. Calemon, 5 the court is to give order upon the special mat- Mon., 73. The case reported in 3d Dana was ter according to justice. The rule has been a contest between two purchasers--one under applied with steadiness to all cases of transfer an executory contract, and the other under a during the progress of a cause, notwithstand- judgment against the vendor while a part of ing the hardship of individual cases, from the purchase money remained unpaid. The considerations of public policy and conven- holder of the sheriff's title recovered in an ejectience. Suits would be interminable, if the ment; and the questions decided arose on a bill rights of the parties could be disturbed by for relief filed by the defendant upon his elder mesne conveyances, and a necessity imposed equitable title. The court say, that "the purfor the introduction of other parties on the rec- chase of the entire legal title, with notice of an ord. The apparent exception to the rule arises outstanding equity, arising from a previous sale when an event occurs which deprives the party of the land by the same vendor to a stranger, on the record, not only of his interest in the sub- does not per se transfer to the purchaser any ject of the suit, but also of his faculty to comply right, legal or equitable, to any portion of the effectively with the decree of the court. In unpaid consideration remaining due to the such a case, additional parties are necessary to vendor from the first buyer; and if there enable the court to make an operative decree. should be any extraneous ground for an equiThe Court of Chancery ordinarily acts in per- table substitution, if should be asserted and sonam; and in cases like the present, perfects shown by the purchaser before the stranger the title of the purchaser by requiring the holding the prior equity had made full payvendor to execute a title conformable to the ment to the vendor. If there be such an equity, agreement. But, in cases of bankruptcy and it is against the vendor, and not against the insolvency, the bankrupt or insolvent is debtor; and, whether it exist or will ever be stripped of his rights of property and of his asserted, the debtor cannot be presumed to capacity to defend suits in which he is a party. know." In such cases the assignees are commonly made parties (Dan'l Pr., 328); but there are opposing authorities-Cleveland v. Boerum, 23 Barb., 201. And it has been decided that a purchaser under an execution issued on a judgment rendered pendente lite, need not be made

Without attempting to reconcile these cases, or to discover whether that is possible, it is evident that the present case does not fall within the limits of either of them. The right of the plaintiff to precedence over the judgment creditor, or the purchaser under his execution,

does not depend upon the exercise of the ex-edy, where the liberty of the citizen has been retraordinary jurisdiction of the Court of strained by process of the court, or by the execu tions of its judgment. Chancery, and is not confined by the rules under which that court administers that jurisdiction. His priority is a legal right, reposing upon the legislative authority. Before the judgment creditor had established his debt, the plaintiff had acquired possession of the property, and had paid his money into court. His purchase money was thus paid. If the purchasers from the sheriff acquired any title to that money by their purchase of the land, it is evident that it should have been asserted by a direct appeal to the court, and not by an adversary proceeding at law for the land. If a person pendente lite takes an assignment of the interest of one of the parties to the suit, he may, if he pleases, make himself a party by bill, but he cannot by petition pray to be admitted as a party defendant; all that the court will do is to make an order that the assignor shall not take the property out of court without notice. Dan'l Ch. Pr., 329; Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. S. C., 52.

An officer,executing the process of a court which has acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter, becomes a trespasser. regulated by an Act of Congress, or they may get Courts-martial derive their jurisdiction and are jurisdiction by a fair deduction from the definition of the crime that it comprehends. subject matter of the charge it has been convened to try, or shall inflict a punishment forbidden by the law, though its sentence shall be approved by courts may, in an action by a party aggrieved by the officers having a revisory power of it, civil it, inquire into the want of the court's jurisdiction, and give redress. Argued Jan. 8, 1858.

If a court-martial has no jurisdiction over the

We do not consider that the act of Taylor in consenting to a decree, or the act of the plaintiff in accepting one, is evidence of any fraud, or of a conspiracy against the defendants in this suit. The decree was a consequence of the opinion of the court upon the cause as presented by the pleading, on the motion to dissolve the injunction; and so far as the equities of the parties are to be considered, the decree embodies them.

There is no other specification of fraud, and the general charges of fraud, unaccompanied by a statement of the facts constituting the fraud, have no effect or influence.

We are of opinion that there is no error in the record, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota Territory is affirmed.

Cited 20 How., 270, 463, 466.

FRANK DYNES, Piff. in Error,

v.

JONAH D. HOOVER.

(See S. C. 20 How., 65-84.)

Courts martial-Congress can provide for and regulate where liberty of citizen is restrained in proceedings coram non judice, false imprisonment is proper action-officer executing process of court without jurisdiction, is trespasser-civil courts may give redress for illegal punishment by courts-martial, or where they have no jurisdiction-on charge of desertion, courts martial may convict of attempt to desert-sentence by, to penitentiary of District of Columbia, legal.

Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner practiced by civilized nations. Where an inferior court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, but is bound to adopt certain rules in the proceedings, from which it deviates, whereby the proceedings are rendered coram non judice, trespass for false imprisonment is the proper remNOTE.-Naval Court-Marshals. Jurisdiction of, as to persons and offenses, how constituted, &c. See note to Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U. S., (7 How.),

89.

Decided Feb. 1, 1858.

Ined States for the District of Columbia.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the

This was an action of trespass and false im· prisonment, instituted by the plaintiff, Frank Dynes, late a seaman in the United States Navy, against the defendant, John D. Hoover, for imprisoning him and causing him to be imprisoned in the Penitentiary for the District of Columbia. The defendant pleaded that the imprisonment was by the authority of a sentence of a naval general court-martial, convened under the Act of Congress of April 23, 1800, and that the defendant, as Marshal of the United States for the District of Columbia, was directed by the President, in a letter, to commit the said plaintiff to the Penitentiary in the District of Columbia, in accordance with the sentence of the said naval general court-martial, which direction the defendant, as Marshal aforesaid, executed and obeyed.

The defendant also alleged that the said sentence was absolute and final, and that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia had no juris

diction in the case.

The plaintiff demurred to the plea, on this ground that the court-martial had no jurisdiction or authority to pass such a sentence; that the sentence was illegal and void; and because the President had no jurisdiction or authority to write such letter as that pleaded; and that the letter and the directions therein contained were unconstutional, illegal and void.

A further statement of the case appears in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. J. M. Carlisle, George E. Badger and Charles Lee Jones, for plaintiff

in error.

A court-martial having no jurisdiction but one limited and defined, both in respect of of any impropriety but such as is prohibited persons and offenses, can take no cognizance and punished by positive law.

committed. It must be set out in such terms There must be a certainty of the offense as bring it unequivocally and clearly within the law or statute by which it is made punishable. In some instances, even words synonymous with those of the article prohibiting the offense. do not suffice; but the very words of the whole fact must be set forth with certainty in the specifications. All the circumstances of the time, place and manner of the act charged, must be minutely described. If disrespectful. contemptuous or mutinous words be imputed to him, the very words must be specified. A court-martial more resembles a tribunal of the

civil law, since the members unite in their own persons the character, both of judge and juror.

Tytler, ch. 5, sec. 1, pp. 206, 218; 2 McAr thur, ch. 1, secs. 3, 6-16; Hough, p. 32; Macomb, secs. 31-39, p. 25: De Hart, pp. 287, 292; Hickman, p. 168; 3 Greenl. Ev., p.

472.

sense of those words. The law will intend nothing in its favor. The decision of such a tribunal in a case without its jurisdiction, cannot protect the officer who executes it. The court and the officer are all trespassers.

Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch. 337; Er parte Watkins, 3 Pet., 208; Mills v. Martin, 19 Johns., 32; Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns., 267; Brooks v. Adams, 11 Pick., 442; Duffield v. Smith, 3 Serg. & R.. 599; 3 Greenl. Ev., sec. 470; Warden v. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Frye v. Ogle, 1 McArthur, App., No., 24, and Hickman, App., No. 17: Moore v. Bastard, 2 McArthur, 194–200; 1 McArthur, chap. 10, sec. 9. pp. 264, 272; Hannaford v. Hunn, 2 Carr. & P., 148; Wharton's Am. Law of Homicide, 52.

The rationale of the rule is the same in all courts; which is, that the prisoner, being thus minutely informed under what law and for what offense and of what facts he is accused, may duly prepare himself for his trial. In the same spirit it is required that he be furnished with a copy of the charges and specifications, and the names and descriptions of the witnesses for the prosecution, in due time before his trial. The object of this rule is, not only that he may be prepared to meet the matter of the charge, but to canvass, and if necessary impeach, the competency or the credit of the wit- 1. The finding was in a cause coram non juDessess. The charges, after a copy of them has dice, it being for an offense of which the plaintbeen thus served upon the prisoner, are uniff was never charged, and of which the court alterable except under very peculiar and ex- had no cognizance. traordinary circumstances.

Adye, pp. 127, 128; Tytler, 217, 244, 258; 1 McArthur, pp. 281, 282; Macomb, sec. 36 p. 26; De Hart, p. 102.

Now as to the procedure of the court-martial, whose judgment and sentence are now in question.

For the plaintiff we contend

That the judgment and sentence of the court-martial was an absolute nullity, and affords no sort of a justification to anyone executing process under it.

The following well settled principles of law can not be controverted: "That when a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question before it, and if its decision is merely erroneous and not irregular and void, it is binding on every other court until reversed. But if the subject matter is not within its jurisdiction, or where it appears from the conviction itself that they may have been guilty of an excess, or have decided on matters beyond and not within their jurisdiction, all is void, and their judgments or sentences are regarded in law as nullities. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are tres passers, and liable to an action thereon.

Two essential vices appear on the face of the proceedings of the court-martial in question, either of which would alone render their proceedings irregular and void.

2. The subject matter of the sentence, the punishment inflicted, was not within their jurisdiction, and is a punishment which they had no authority of law to inflict. See Hickman, 149, 152, and McArthur, 158.

1st. The court martial was brought into existence by the order or precept of the Secretary of the Navy. The plaintiff "legally brought before it" for the trial of his guilt or innocence of the following "charge and specification of a charge preferred by the Secretary of the Navy," and to no other legal intent or purpose whatsoever.

J. C. DOBBIN, Secretary of the Navy."

Of this charge, and of this charge only, had the court martial jurisdiction to try him (see 2 McArthur, 221), and their decision as to his guilt or innocence upon this charge, would be as absolute and final as would be the decision of any other court on matters within their jurisdiction.

of which they had no sort of jurisdiction; an offense as yet unknown to the law-not enumerated in the naval articles as one of the crimes within the cognizance of a court-martial.

1 Pet. 340; 2 Pet., 169; Griffith v. Frazier. 8 Cranch, 9; 14 How., 144; Wickes v. Caulk, 5 But the court-martial acquitted him of the Harr. & J., 42; Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 Johns., only charge legally brought before them, the 39; Case of The Marshalsea, 10, Co., 76; Terry only subject matter whereof they had cogniv. Huntington, Hardres, 480; Shergold v. Holl-zance, but found him guilty of another offense oway, 2 Str., 1002: Hill v. Bateman, 1 Str., 710; Perkins v. Proctor, 2 Wils.. 382; Dr. Bouchier's case, cited 2 Wils., 385; Martin v. Marshall, cited 2 Wils., 386; Parsons v. Lloyd, 3 Wils., 341; Miller v. Seare, 2 W. Bl., 1145; Crepps v. Durden, Cowp.. 640; Groome v. For rester, 5 M. & S., 314: Warne v. Varley, 6 T. R., 443; Brown v. Compton, 8 T. R., 424; Moravia v. Sloper, Willes, 30: Peacock v. Bell, 1 Saund., 74; 8 T. R., 178; 2 W. Bl., 1035; The King v. Bugger, 1 Dowl. & R., 460; 3 Camp., 388; Doswell v. Impey, 1 B. & C. 169. A court-martial is one of those inferior courts of limited jurisdiction whose judgments may be questioned collaterally. It is an inferior court, in the most technical common law

The finding of the court was as follows: "The court do find the accused, Frank Dynes, seaman of the United States Navy, as follows: Of the specification of the charge, guilty of attempting to desert; of the charge, not guilty of deserting, but guilty of attempting to de sert."

This finding is in direct violation of the oath which, by the 36th article of the Act of Congress for the government of the Navy, each member of the court is required to take "before