language of the warrant does not restrict any one of the
parties to his own particular parish, and where the direc-
tion is to particular constables, it is quite immaterial
whether they are mentioned by their names, or by their
descriptions as constables of any particular place. This
very distinction is taken by Lord Mansfield, in Blatcher
v. Kemp. There does not appear to be any case in the
books precisely similar in its circumstances to the present,
neither is there any case to be found, in which it is held,
that such a description of the constable as the present is
insufficient to give a general jurisdiction over the county
at large. The office of a constable is the material part
of his description, and is at least as extensive as that of
his name.
Where a warrant is directed to all the con-
stables of a county generally, each is undoubtedly limited
to his own parish; but it is not so here. The designatio
personarum here is full and distinct, and must clearly be
intended to cover the entire jurisdiction of the Magistrates
under whose authority the constables are to act. The
authority of Lord Hale (a), seems to support this con-
struction; for he says, "If a warrant be directed to the
constable of D., he is not bound to execute it out of the
precincts of his constablewick; but if he doth, it is
good." And again, "If a warrant be directed by a Jus-
tice of Peace to the constable of D. to arrest a felon, he
is not bound to go out of the vill where he is constable
to execute the warrant; but yet if he do execute it in
another vill it is good enough; for he acts herein not
simply as constable of D., but by virtue of the Justice's
warrant." (b) It is true that this is said in cases of felony,
but the principle seems to be the same, and to be equally
applicable to civil process, and it is recognized in the
more recent case of Rex v. Kendall (c), by Holt, C. J.,

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without any qualification. The case of Rer v. Chandler (a), though apparently opposed to this argument, will not bear out the contrary position, because there was no positive decision there upon this point. It is also said by Dr. Burn, "If a warrant is directed to two or more jointly, yet any one of them alone may execute it."(b) Lord Coke also lays down the same rule; and says, "If a sheriff, upon a capias directed to him, make a warrant, to four or three, jointly or severally, to arrest the defendant, two of them may arrest him, because it is for the execution of justice (c). This is a dictum directly in point, applied to a case of civil process, and supported by a powerful reason, namely, the execution of public justice. Upon all these authorities, therefore, as well as for the furtherance of justice, it seems clear, that wherever there is a general direction to all the constables of a county, any one of them may act in any part of the county, and as the constable here has acted strictly upon that principle, there is no ground for the present application, and this rule must be discharged.

Marryat, Gurney, and Bolland, contrà, were stopped by the Court.

BAYLEY, J.-It is of great importance that accuracy should be observed in the direction of process of this nature, in order that the party who is to submit to it may know that it is executed by a person having authority for that purpose. Questions of the deepest interest may depend upon his knowledge of that fact, because, in case of resistance, where the death of the person serving the

(a) 1 Lord Raym. 546. Carth.

508.

(b) 1 Chetwynd's Burn.J.P.tit. Arrest, 174, citing Dalton, c. 169.

(c) Co. Litt. 181 a. Vide Milsom v. Green, 5 East, 233; and Prestidge v. Woodman, 2 Dow. & Ry. T. R. 43.

process ensues, that resistance may assume the different characters of murder, manslaughter, or justifiable homicide, according to the validity of the authority, and his knowledge of it. I agree, that where a warrant is directed to an individual by name, his jurisdiction is coextensive with that of the Justices who signed it, and in such cases the party served need only be informed of the name of the party serving it. On the other hand, where it is directed generally to all the officers of a district by their name of office only, each one is limited to the jurisdiction of his own particular parish. The present is a middle case. The warrant here is directed specifically by the official character "to the constables of Woolwich," and the question is, to what extent of jurisdiction they are limited. I am of opinion, that both from the cases which have been decided upon this subject, and from the plain reason of the thing, each is limited to his own parish. The authority was given to Ritchie, as constable of Woolwich, not personally as A. B. nor generally as one of the constables of the county, and therefore I think he had no authority to act beyond the parish of Woolwich. This distinction is expressly taken in the case of The Village of Chorley (a), where it is said, "if a warrant be directed to all constables, &c. generally, it shall be taken respectively, and no constable can execute the same out of his precinct." And this is founded in good sense and reason, for the name of a constable is a thing easy to be learnt, and likely to be known, but his character and office are not, at least beyond the limit of his own parish, and no man is bound to know that he fills the character when he goes out of his own parish. The same distinction is expressly taken by Holt, C. J. in Rer v. Chandler, when he says, "where a warrant is directed generally to

(a) 1 Salk. 176.

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all constables, it shall be taken respectively to each of them within their several districts, and not to the constable of one parish to take a distress in another parish." In addition to these is Tooley's case (a), which bears very strongly and pointedly upon the present, for it goes the full length of determining, that where a warrant directed to the constable of one parish, is executed in another, resistance, and even the death of the constable, is justifiable; and that case was very similar to the present, for there the warrant was directed to the constable by his official character only, without any limitation in terms. Upon the whole, therefore, whether I consider the law as settled by the authority of the cases, or the just reason and propriety of the thing, I am of opinion that no constable is justified in executing out of his own parish a warrant directed to him by his name of office generally, and consequently that the prosecutor in this case has exceeded his authority, and the defendant's resistance was justifiable.

HOLROYD, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think the constable of Woolwich had no authority to act out of his district. I take the governing principle to be this: where the warrant is directed to a constable, describing him by his name of office only, it conveys no special delegation of power beyond his own precinct. In this case the warrant is directed to C. S. by name, as an officer, and then "to the constables of Woolwich." The effect of the latter direction is to give them power as constables merely, and consequently to limit their authority to the district in and for which they are constables. I think, as well upon the authorities, as upon reason and principle, the constable in this case had no jurisdiction

(a) 2 Lord Raym. 1300.

beyond the parish of Woolwich. The case of Regina v. Tooley seems to me to be quite decisive of the point, and governs the present. The dicta in Hale also appear to me to imply the same conclusion. They hold, that where a warrant is directed to a particular officer, by name, he may act out of his own immediate jurisdiction. So it is held also in Rex v. Chandler. But all these cases assume that the warrant is directed specially by name, and not by office only; and thus construed, I think they tend materially to confirm and strengthen Regina v. Tooley. Upon this view of the subject, and upon the authority of the cases mentioned by my learned Brother, I am of opinion that the service of this warrant was illegal, and therefore that this rule ought to be made absolute.

BEST, J.-We are bound to take care that the office and duty of constables shall rest upon a clear, broad, and intelligible principle, so that the constables on the one hand may know what warrants they are to execute, and where to execute them, and on the other, that the parties upon whom they are to be executed, may know when and where they are bound to obey. Nice distinctions will be productive of great confusion, and will often produce that resistance which happened in Regina v. Tooley. The plain, clear, and broad principle upon which this case is to be governed, is this, namely, that the Magistrate may direct his warrant to any one by name, or direct it to a person by his official character. If it is directed to the party by name, he may execute it any where within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrates; if it is directed by the name of office, it can only be executed in the district where the party is an officer. In the first case, the jurisdiction given to the constable is co-extensive with that of the signing Justices; in the second, it is limited

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