and are exceedingly sceptical about tardy and compulsory conversions. However, such an admission, from such a quarter, proves the absurdity and folly of many of the measures of the administration of 1814, and leaves little to regret that they met with so

merited a fate.

The following summary of the errors of the Bourbon government, by which the affections of the mass of the French people were alienated from their legitimate sovereign, and disposed again to submit to the masculine despotism from which they had so lately escaped, is from the pen of our author, and contains the substance of the preceding portion of his work.

"I aver, then, that there can be no manner of doubt as to the faults which the Ultras caused the government of the King to commit, which were the same as they were guilty of in 1815. These were the repeal of all those laws which the Revolution had established; the disturbance of those proprietary changes which it had consecrated; the proscription of all those indi. viduals who, for the last twenty years, had taken any share in its events; in a word, the same system towards which they were hurrying, a second time, without being checked either by prudence, by anterior engagements, by the hazard of throwing France into new convulsions, by the mani. fest disapprobation of Europe, by the efforts of a ministry too long indulgent to their follies, or even by the representations of the King himself, whose authority alcne, exerted in the last resort, has been able to oppose a barrier to the torrent which threatened to overwhelm every thing." pp. 57,

58.

In his letter on the species of popularity which Buonaparte enjoyed at the period of his return from Elba, the author presents us with some striking and original views. At the time of his first abdication, Buonaparte was not popular with the enlightened part of the citizens. The weight of his despotism had become intolerable. Those fierce and untractable spirits who had plunged fearlessly into revolutionary excesses felt the power of that restraint which he had imposed. Those, again, who were ignorant of the crimes of the anarchists, on the one side, and of the folly and violence of the counter-revolutionary party, on the other, were equally dissatisfied. These feelings might have been turned to great advantage

"The sufferings which that army had undergone in his distant and gigantic expeditions had wearied out the most distinguished of the companions in arms of that indefatigable conqueror." p. 77.

The Marshals, too, loaded with riches and covered with honours, looked forward to enjoy what they had acquired, and wished for ease and retirement. Even as late as after the capture of Grenoble, Marshals Oudinot, Masséna, Jourdan, and Dumouceau, sent in their addresses of loyalty and adherence to Louis XVIII.; and, prior to the 15th March, assurances of fidelity to the constitutional throne had also been sent by Generals Pacthod, Decaen, Rapp, Miolis, Belliard, and Letort, all of whom remained faithful to the King, with the single exception of Letort, who was killed at Fleurus on the 16th June, leaving be hind him a declaration, protesting against any other view of his conduct than that he had only taken up arms, when the constitutional monarch had abandoned his country, in order to defend it from the violation of foreign conquest. The conduct of the garrisons of Fere and Cambray is no less remarkable. Buonaparte knew well of the existence of this feeling, and, for some days after his landing, and even as far as Grenoble, avoided the stations of the troops, and advanced forty leagues into the country before he ventured to expose himself to any armed force. His attempt on Antibes was unsuccessful, and the party of assailants made prisoners. Here, then, were two classes, generally believed to have been entirely devoted to Buonaparte,-the holders of national property, and the army,-at least doubtful, and whose inclinations might, with adroit management, have been turned into the right channel.

A large class, however, among whom Buonaparte was decidedly popular, consisted of those engaged in the manufactures peculiar to the country. How ever hostile to the fundamental principles of political philosophy may have been the Burning Decrees, and the rigorous exclusion from France of British and foreign manufactures and produce, and however vexatious and harassing to those engaged in foreign commerce, they had, nevertheless, the effect to give great encouragement to native industry. What people cannot find among their neighbours, they must endeavour to furnish for themselves. The régime prohibitif of Napoleon gave a new and powerful stimulus to French industry. A greater quantity of capital was attracted to certain employments by an increase of demand. Manufactures were thus extended and improved; fortunes were realized in professions which formerly yielded a bare subsistence; and France saw that she possessed within herself greater resources than her most sanguine friends had divined, and that nothing was wanting but an effectual demand, and a consequent reward for exertion, in order to bring the ingenuity of her people into successful competition with foreigners, and to ensure the extension of national wealth and power. This lesson was taught by the rigorous system of Napoleon. All those, therefore, connected, directly or indirectly, with the manufactures of the country, were enthusiastically devoted to his cause, thus identified with their own interests, and were ready to make very considerable sacrifices in his support; for be it remarked, that, while the return of the Emperor inflicted a mortal blow on distant commercial speculations, it was regarded, and justly, as an index of approaching prosperity to the internal manufactures of France. And, when we recollect that the foreign merchants, even in a country decidedly commercial, like our own, are few in number, in comparison of those who are engaged in the manufacture of raw material, we shall have some notion of the importance of the class of individuals just mentioned, when cast into the scale against the inefficiency of the Bourbon Government.

But, if Buonaparte might calculate on the support of this class, there were others who had still better reason to give

him their countenance, but who, nevertheless, were among the foremost to desert him, and, even when they joined him, were never hearty in his cause. Of these the most remarkable was the ancienne noblesse, at least that portion who had accepted the invitations of Napoleon, and gathered round his person, when his power was at the height, and his throne apparently placed beyond the reach of accident. But we must, on this part of the subject, borrow the words of our author.

"The relations subsisting between the head of the empire and the old nobility had, at all times, been sufficiently awkward. In the author of the 18th Brumaire, the peculiar instinct of this body had led them to discover an enemy of liberty; they accordingly rallied round him; at first applauding every thing, in his measures, which resembled despotism; then lending their full titles, places, and salaries, of which he had sanction to his power by accepting of those the entire disposal. They thus, in a great degree, contributed to the consolidation of his power, by affording him, in France, the benefit of the mode, and, in the eyes of Europe, by surrounding him with that traditional and chivalrous splendour which, for the continental courts, has still so many attractions. They had, so to speak, inrested the person who had supplanted the Bourbons with that peculiar quality which they denominate exclusive legitimacy; for, how is it possible to conceive any illegitimacy about a man who was surrounded by those families which had encircled and served sixty-six kings? However, the union between the master sprung from the new régime, and the servants borrowed from the old, had never been complete. Was it that they felt any regrets, which, if they did, they knew marvellously well how to conceal? Was it that the creation of another noblesse annoyed them, because the extension of the privilege destroyed the monopoly? From whatever cause proceeded the fact is certain that the fall of

Buonaparte was hailed by the old nobility with the most rapturous acclamations. Remaining in the palace, by birth right, they believed themselves purified; and the contempt which they expressed for past favours, to which they pretended only to have resigned themselves, served to merit and obtain present rewards. The return of the parvenu, whose livery they had so long that flexibility which they had laboured so worn, awakened a painful recollection of hard to consign to oblivion; and as, in attaching them to his triumphal car, Buonaparte, who, in his prosperous days, humbled all, had also humbled them, they cursed his apparition, and were, perhaps, a little puzzled with the secret reflection, that,

Of the conduct of some of the constitutional party, on the approach of danger, the author speaks with becoming severity. An infatuation appears to have spread amongst them. In this list Soult stands pre-eminent. His conduct was, indeed, absurd and inconsistent beyond all precedent. The erection of a monument to the emigrants who fell in the ill-fated expedition to Quiberon, and the cruel persecution of General Excelmans, affix an indelible stain of inconsistency and cruelty on his character. The author denies that the former of these acts, as the royalists asserted, was done with a view to render the Bourbon government odious. With regard to the latter, founded on the violation of epistolary confidence, and having for its object the destruction of one of the officers in the French service, the most distinguished for bravery, and, for his domestic and social qualities, it would be difficult indeed to find an apology. The truth seems to be,

When speaking of Marshal Soult, we were surprised to find M. Constant subjoining the following statement: "Je lui saurai grè toujours de cette memorable bataillé de Toulouse, précieuse sur-tout parce qu'elle a montré QU'IL N'ETAIT PAS IMPOSSIBLE de vaincre un général que la fortune avait pris à tâche de favoriser." Does M. Constant really mean to say, that Marshal Soult beat the Duke of Wellington at Toulouse? Are Frenchmen, indeed, ignorant that, but for the unparalleled humanity of the British hero, who wished to spare the inhabitants of Toulouse the horrors of a bombardment, not a man of Soult's army would have escaped? Is it not known in France that Soult's troops filed off under the very guns of the British army, by whom not a shot was fired? By whom was Soult forced from his lines on the heights which he had been three months in fortifying? Is this "PRECIEUSE BATAILLE 39 so creditable to Soult, who is known to have fought it, with a perfect knowledge of the events that had taken place at Paris, and of the abdication of Fountainbleau? National vanity is, indeed, a strong passion. We were simple enough to believe the defeat of Toulouse as complete as that at Orthés, where even Frenchmen did not claim the victory.

VOL. VIII.

however, that the constitutional party would have adhered firmly to the King, and defended him to the last man, had they been convinced of his sincerity, or been admitted to his confidence. Insulted, humiliated, reviled, by those about the royal person, -and finding that, though invested temporarily with office, they had received no portion of the trust which office presupposes,-obnoxious to the violent royalists from revolutionary recollections, and by the rank which they had earned under an usurper, they were necessarily led to look to the party in opposition to the Court, for that support which the Court ought, in common justice, and in good faith, to have afforded them. To this cause may be ascribed much of the mischief and treachery that followed.

The last letter of this first part of our author's performance is devoted to prove that, prior to the 20th March, there existed no conspiracy, having for its object the recall and re-enthronement of the Ex-Emperor. In this part of his book we think our author has been most completely successful; and although this article has already extended to an unconscionable length, we will yet trespass, for a moment, on the patience of our readers, with a brief summary of the facts produced in support of this negative. Many fine theatrical stories have, we are well aware, been coined by ingenious travellers, and circulated in this credulous country, about a sort of free-masonry established in France, as the organ of communication with Napoleon in Elba, and as a test or sign, by which the number and devotion of his partizans might previously be ascertained. The shrewd Buonapartist asked the individual whose faith he wished to put to the testAimez-vous la violette? If the answer was, Oui," the respondent was put down as a cowie, or a royalist. But if, on the other hand, the answer was, "ELLE REPARAÎTRA AVEC fellowship was instantly extended, LE PRINTEMPS," the right hand of and a communion of knowledge, schemes, hopes, fears, and difficulties, immediately commenced. Can any thing be more paltry or absurd, not to say impossible, than this? From such pitiful fictions let us turn to plain and stubborn facts.

D

And here it is not to be denied, that a man who had governed France for fourteen years, who had created so many functionaries and offices,-who had expended such treasures,-and to whom so many hopes were attached, must, in spite of his faults and reverses, have preserved a great and powerful influence. Nor is it to be doubt ed that he had many correspondents in France, from whom he received regular information of the state of parties in that country. Nay, our author asserts, that he derived the most valuable information from the ministers of the great continental powers, whom he had formerly corrupted, and who had no great disinclination to finger a few more napoleons. But all this did not amount to a regularly-organised conspiracy. In fact, such a thing was morally, if not physically, impossible. Among the millions who must have been in the secret, would there not have been found one traitor? How comes it that the conspiracy was not so much as breathed till long after it had taken effect? How does it happen that no fears had been excited, and no precautions taken to ensure safety? Individuals and small parties of men may conspire, but there is no example in all history of a whole nation conspiring. When we look back into the records of past events, how few conspiracies have succeeded? A man who has once become a traitor, has but little way to go, and scarcely deepens the enormity of his crime by superadding the guilt of an informer. The machinations of Cataline were no secret to Cicero, long before the plot was ripe for execution; and even the gunpowder treason, the darkest, most formidable, and longest concealed conspiracy that ever existed, was nevertheless betrayed. Of all countries Germany, from the peculiar habits of the people, is the country most favourable to secret institutions and conspiracies, and yet the celebrated Tugenbund was well known to the French to have existed in the Prussian dominions, notwithstanding their inability to extirpate it. The small resistance made to the progress of Buonaparte is no proof of anterior conspiracy. Countries have, from different causes, been conquered with out the loss of a man, where there never existed the smallest suspicion

of treason. In the next place, the prefects, mayors, and other officers of Buonaparte, contributed so little to the success of his enterprise, that even the royalists have admitted that, on his arrival, he was abandoned by nearly the whole of these functionaries.

Of eighty-three prefects in office on the 20th March," says the Moniteur of Ghent," and whose fidelity had not been brought under suspicion, twenty-three only remained in office under the usurper." And yet the reader will observe, that these officers had all been appointed by Napoleon. What answer can be given to this fact? It is singular that not a tittle of correspondence between a single prefect, or mayor, and Napoleon, was ever detected. Of all the counsellors of state, retained in 1814, three only continued to sit under Buonaparte; and of these three two have, since the 8th of July last, been called to form part of the present ministry. It is true Labédoyère and Ney were tried and shot for passing over to Napoleon; but what proof of a conspiracy appeared on their trials? In fact, neither of these men was accused as a conspirator. The case of Lavalette certainly involved the question of conspiracy, but the jury did not find that part of the case proved. The acquittal of General Drouet, tried on a charge of a similar description, is decisive of this point. In the subsequent trials of Generals Bertrand and Cambrone, the question of conspiracy was abandoned by the Attorney-General, and the accusation restricted to an attack on the government. If the proclamations posterior to the landing at Frejus, and the occupation of the departments, be held as a proof of conspiracy, then the greatest of all conspirators must have been the Mayor of Lyons, who, on the 10th of March, celebrated the arrival of Buonaparte in terms full of enthusiasın;-yet, strange to tell, the "royalistes exagérés” numbered him in their ranks in 1815 ;— he sat in the "Chambre Introuvable;-continued Mayor of Lyons till his death;-received his share of merit on account of the events of 1817; and is now generally esteemed to have been " trés bon royaliste." In fine, we may be allowed, on this head, to cite no less an authority than that of Buonaparte himself, who had no