nishes a rule of construction for prior statutes, and is not in terms an amendment, is not within the meaning of this constitutional regulation; it need not set forth the statutes affected.' Nor is a statute amendatory which repeals in general terms all acts and parts of acts which are inconsistent with its provisions. Such a provision in an unconstitutional act has no effect.3 There is another kind of legislation which does not require a restatement of existing statutes referred to because not a revisal, revival or amendment of such statutes. The legislature may subject procedure to attain the objects of new legislation to existing general statutes without re-enacting them.* 152; Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573; Shields v. Bennett, 8 W. Va. 87; State v. Cain, id. 720; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 295; Falconer v. Robinson, 46 Ala. 340. See Central R. R. Co. v. Hamilton, 71 Ga. 461; Muscogee R. R. v. Neal, 26 id. 121. 1 State v. Geiger, 65 Mo. 306. 2 Medical College v. Muldon, 46 Ala. 603; State v. Gaines, 1 Lea, 734. 3 Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Davis, Ex parte, 21 Fed. Rep. 396; People ex rel. v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 230. The provisions of an existing statute may not be extended under the Arkansas constitution by a general reference to the title of the statute. Watkins v. Eureka Springs, '49 Ark. 131. 4 People ex rel. v. Banks, 67 N. Y. 575. This case was decided under section 17, article 3, of the constitution of New York, declaring that no act should be passed which shall provide that any existing law or any part thereof shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact that any existing law or any part thereof shall be applicable except by inserting it in such act. CHAPTER VIII. REPEALING ACTS. § 136. Duration of statutes and power | § 146. Repeal by radical change of § 136. Duration of statutes and power of repeal. Statutes are perpetual when no time is stated. A temporary statute operates until its time expires.2 The operation of statutes may be suspended; then they will come into operation when the period of suspension expires. A temporary statute made perpetual before its expiration is in effect perpetual from the beginning. Statutes have this duration subject to the continuous power of repeal. A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertain 2 Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365. 1 United States v. Gear, 3 How. in limitation of the action. Hanger 120. v. Abbott, 6 Wall, 532; S. C. 18 U. S. Sup. Ct. 93a, and note. The implied suspension should not continue longer than the real disability barred the institution of the action. Braun v Sauerwein, 10 Wall. 218. 3 A state of war between the governments of the creditor and debtor suspends the right and opportunity of a citizen of one belligerent to sue in the courts of the other, and as a consequence the statute of limitations is suspended during the existence of the war, and that time is not computed 4 Dingley v. Moor, Cro. Eliz. 750; Rex v. Morgan, Str. 1066; Rex v. Swiney, Alcock & Napier, 131. 3 ing to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repcal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. The legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. A repealing clause in a statute may be valid, although every other clause is unconstitutional, if such is plainly the legislative intent.' But where the repeal is intended to clear the way for the operation of the act containing the repealing clause, thereby showing an intention to displace the old law with the new, if the latter is unconstitutional the repealing clause would be dependent and inoperative. 8 § 137. Modes of repeal, express or implied.— A repeal will take effect from any subsequent statute in which the legislature gives a clear expression of its will for that purpose." The 1 Musgrove v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. 818; Bourgignon, etc. Assoc. v. ComCo. 50 Miss. 677. 2 Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158; Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37; McNeil v. Commonwealth, 12 id. 727; Moore v. New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 726; City Council v. Baptist Church, 4 Strob. 306; Files, Auditor, v. Fuller, 44 Ark. 273; Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 153; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419; Monet v. Jones, 10 Sm. & Mar. 237; Chambers v. State, 25 Tex. 307; Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 569. See Oleson v. R. R. Co. 36 Wis. 383. 3 Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41, 50; Ham v. State, 7 Blackf. 314; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; In re Oregon, etc. Co. 3 Sawy. 614; Rex v. Middlesex Justices, 2 B. & Ad. monwealth, 98 Pa. St. 54; People v. Lyttle, 1 Idaho, 143; Houghton Co. v. Commissioners of St. L. O. 23 Mich. 270; Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365. See Manlove v. White, 8 Cal. 376. 4 The Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446. Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623. 6 Mongeon v. People, 55 N. Y. 613. 7 Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70. 8 Ante, § 135. 9 State v. Judge, 14 La. Ann. 486; Casey v. Harned, 5 Iowa, 1; Leard v. Leard, 30 Ind. 171. A recital in a statute that a former statute was or was not repealed is not conclusive, for it is but a legislative declaration on a judicial question. word repeal may be used in a limited sense.1 The suspension of a statute for a limited time is not a repeal'-it properly signifies the abrogation of one statute by another. It is express when declared in direct terms; implied when the intention to repeal is inferred from subsequent repugnant legislation. In neither form will the repeal be effected and operative until the repealing statute goes into effect.1 Laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with a knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. If they profess to make a change, by substitution, of new for old provisions, a repeal to some extent is thus suggested, and the extent readily ascertained. Thus, amendment is frequently made by enacting that a certain section shall be so amended. as "to read as follows;" then inserting the substituted provision entire without specification of the change. The parts of the former law left out are repealed. This intention is manifest. There is a negative necessarily implied that such eliminated portion shall no longer be in force. The re-enacted portions are continuations and have force from their original enactment. Where a statute repeals all former laws within United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S. 546; 2 Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631; Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127; Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217; Longlois v. Longlois, 48 Ind. 60; Mosby v. Ins. Co. 31 Gratt. 629; State v. Wish, 15 Neb. 448. See Hirschburg v. People, 6 Colo. 145. Ely v. Holton, 15 N. Y. 595; Goodno v. Oshkosh, supra. The court say in this case: "The original section, as an independent and distinct statutory enactment, ceased to have any existence the very moment the amendatory act was passed and went into effect, and whatever provisions of it remained as law were such solely by virtue of being again enacted in the amendment. The original section, as a separate statute, was as effectually repealed and obliterated from the statute book as if the repeal had been made in direct and express words and none of its provisions had been re-enacted." its purview, the intention is obvious and is readily recognized to sweep away all existing laws upon the subjects with which the repealing act deals.1 The purview is the enacting part of a statute, in contradistinction to the preamble; and a repeal of all acts within the purview of the repealing statute should be understood as including all acts or parts of acts in relation to all cases which are provided for by the repealing act, and no more. But a statute may have the effect to repeal a former statute or some provision of it though it be silent on the subject of repeal. In such cases repeal is inferred from necessity, if there be such conflict that the old and new statutes cannot stand together.3 Repugnancy in principle merely, between two acts, forms no reason why both may not stand. Nor is one statute repealed by the repugnant spirit of another; nor for conflict with an unconstitutional provision." 5 It has been held that one private act will not repeal another by implication. It has been held that a statute may become repealed by adverse custom or long non-user. As repeal can only proceed from the legislature, the obsoleteness of the nonused statute must be in some way recognized in subsequent legislation. Popular disregard of a statute, or custom opposed to it, will not repeal it. A statute does not cease on removal 1Ogden v. Witherspoon, 2 Haywood, 404; Harrington v. Rochester, 10 Wend. 547. 2 Payne v. Conner, 3 Bibb, 180; Commonwealth v. Watts, 84 Ky. 537; Patterson v. Caldwell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 489 ; Grigsby v. Barr, 14 Bush, 330. See Gorham v. Luckett, 6 B. Mon. 146. See next section. Smith, Ex parte, 40 Cal. 419. 5 State v. Macon Co. Ct. 41 Mo. 453, 454. See Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 612; State v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio, 197. 6 Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 285; Sullivan v. Adams, 3 Gray, 476; People v. Fleming, 7 Colo. 230; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Stephens v. Ballou, 27 Kan. 594; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165; Harbeck v. Mayor, 10 Bosw. 366; People v. Tiphaine, 3 Park. Cr. 241; Shepardson v. Railroad Co. 6 Wis. 605; State v. Burton, 11 id. 50; Miller v. Edwards, 8 Colo. 528; State v. Hallock, 14 Nev. 202; Devoy v. Mayor, 35 Barb. 264. Trustees v. Laird, 4 De G. M. & G. 732. See Schneider v. Staples, 66 Wis. 167. 8 Hill v. Smith, Morris, 70; O'Hanlon v. Myers, 10 Rich. L. 128; Watson v. Blaylock, 2 Mills (S. C.), 351; Canady v. George, 6 Rich. Eq. 103. 9 Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa. St. 452; Homer v. Commonwealth, 106 id. 221; James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 220; White v. Boot, 2 T. R. 274; Leigh v. Kent, 3 id. 362; Tyson v. Thomas, McC. & Y. 127; Rex v. Wells, 4 Dowl. 562; The India, 33 L. J. Rep. P. M. & A. 193; S. C. Br. & L. |