offenses against it and a bar to any subsequent prosecution.2 There can be no legal conviction for an offense unless the act be contrary to law at the time it is committed; nor can there be judgment unless the law is in force at the time of the indictment and judgment.3 Where a statute imposes a penalty for an injurious act done to the rights of others, such penalty to be recovered by the party aggrieved; it is in the nature of a satisfaction to him, as well as a punishment of the offender. In such a case, the plaintiff is said to have acquired a vested right to the penalty as soon as the offense is committed, and a general repeal of the statute after action accrued does not affect that right. An ordinance passed pursuant to a power in a city charter is not invalidated by repeal of the provision granting the power." While a convict in the state prison was liable to additional punishment under a statute in force at the time of sentence and commitment, in consequence of having been twice convicted and sentenced to confinement, a statute was passed so modifying the previous statute that a convict would be liable to additional punishment only in case he had been twice discharged from imprisonment. Before the prisoner was released from confinement under his second sentence the modifying statute was repealed. It was held that such statute operated to suspend, so long as it remained in force, but not to discharge, the prisoner's liability to additional punishment." § 167. Saving clauses. The effect of repeal upon inchoate rights, upon offenses and upon incomplete proceedings may Gumber, 37 Wis. 298; Union Iron 1 Wharton v. State, 5 Cold. 1. 2 Howard v. State, 5 Ind. 183; Griffin v. State, 39 Ala. 541; Genkinger v. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. St. 99; Wall v. State, 18 Tex. 682. 3 Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. McDonough, 13 Allen, 581; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; Pitman v. Commonwealth, 2 Rob. (Va.) 813; State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272. 4 President, etc. of L. v. Harrison, 9 B. & C. 524; Company of Cutlers v. Ruslin, Skinner, 363; Palmer v. Conly, 4 Denio, 374; S. C. 2 N. Y. 182; Thompson v. Howe, 46 Barb. 287; Harris v. Townshend, 56 Vt. 716; Graham v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. 53 Wis. 473; Grey v. Mobile Trade Co. 55 Ala. 387. See Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Biss. 327; Bay City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Austin, 21 Mich. 390, 5 Chamberlain v. Evansville, 77 Ind. 542. 6 Commonwealth v. Getchell, 16 Pick. 452. See Commonwealth v. Mott, 21 Pick. 492. 3 be avoided by a saving clause providing that it shall not affect such rights, prosecutions for such offenses, or such proceedings, or by a general statute for that purpose. Such general statutes have been enacted in nearly all of the states as well as by congress. The provision in the Iowa statute may be regarded as a typical one of this sort: "The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, nor affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any proceeding commenced, under and by virtue of the statute repealed." A tax voted and levied was held to be saved by that provision, though the statute under which the tax was so levied was repealed before the collection of the tax. Such a general provision has the same effect as a saving clause in the repealing statute." A saving clause is intended to save something which would otherwise .be lost." An act granting review after judgment was repealed "saving all actions pending;" this saving was held to mean a saving of something out of that which was repealed, and therefore to save pending petitions for review. It may em 1 People v. Gill, 7 Cal. 356. land, 18 Pick. 299; Barton v. Gads 2 See United States v. Reisinger, 128 den, 79 Ala. 495; Grace v. Donovan, U. S. 398. 3 Iowa Code (1888), § 49, par. 1. 4 Tobin v. Hartshorn, 69 Iowa, 648. 3 Cedar Rapids, etc. R'y Co. v. Carroll Co. 41 Iowa, 153; Dillon v. Linder, 36 Wis. 344; Burlington v. Burlington, etc. R'y Co. 41 Iowa, 134; Bartruff v. Remey, 15 id. 257; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Hartshorn, 30 Fed. Rep. 541; United States v. Barr, 4 Sawy. 254; Garland v. Hickey, 75 Wis. 178; Harris v. Townshend, 56 Vt. 716; Jones v. State, 1 Iowa, 395; Volmer v. State, 34 Ark. 487; Sanders v. State, 77 Ind. 227; Tempe v. State, 40 Ala. 350; State v. Ross, 49 Mo. 416; Treat v. Strickland, 23 Me. 234; Hine v. Pomeroy, 39 Vt. 211; State v. Boyle, 10 Kan. 113; State v. Crawford, 11 id. 32; Ballin v. Ferst, 55 Ga. 546; McCuen v. State, 19 Ark. 634; People v. Sloan, 2 Utah, 326; McCalment v. State, 77 Ind. 250; Fowle v. Kirk 12 Minn. 580; Pacific, etc. Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 70; Mongeon v. People, 55 N. Y. 613. 6 Colby v. Dennis, 36 Me. 9, 12. 7 Id. When a real action was commenced a statute was in force which provided that if either of the demandants should die during the pendency of a real action his death should be suggested on the record, and that the survivor might amend his declaration by describing his interest in the premises and proceed in the cause to final judgment. During the pendency of the action the statutes were revised so as to repeal that provision, but the revision contained these saving clauses: That all real actions which shall be pending "shall proceed and be conducted to final judgment, or other final disposal, in like manner as if this chapter had never been enacted;" in an brace an inchoate right as well as the remedy for its enforcement when it matures. A saving, that actions pending at the time of the repeal or passage of an act shall not be affected thereby, does not include proceedings in insolvency,2 nor a petition pending before county commissioners for the location of a highway. A municipal appropriation within the restrictions of the charter, when made, is not affected by a subsequent statute so changing the limit that such appropriation would exceed it, where the new statute contains a provision that "nothing in this act shall in any measure affect or impair any proceeding had and done under the acts to which this is an amendment, or any rights or privileges acquired under said acts."4 A revenue act provided that lands sold for the non-payment of taxes could be redeemed within a certain time upon the payment of a fixed penalty. The act was repealed by a subsequent one, changing the time of redemption and the amount of the penalty, but providing that the former act should remain in force for the collection of taxes levied thereunder. It was held that an act in force for the purpose of collection was in force for the purpose of redemption. The lien of a judgment in respect to duration was held saved by the words rights vested or liabilities incurred at that time shall be lost or discharged." The judgment lien is incident to a judgment, a liability incurred, and therefore saved from the effect of the other section a saving to all persons, of "all actions and causes of action which shall have accrued in virtue of or founded on any of said repealed acts, in the same manner as if such acts had never been repealed." It was contended that that action did not accrue in virtue of the repealed act, nor was founded on it. Shepley, J., said: "When the language is considered in connection with [the other saving clause] and with the recollection that the general purpose of the revision was to embody in a more systematic form the existing laws, with certain modifications and new provisions, without destroying existing rights, there can be little doubt that it was no the intention of the legislature to preserve not only actions which, technically and properly speaking, accrued or had been founded on the statute, but those also which were preserved and secured to a party by the repealed act." Treat v. Strickland, 23 Me. 234. 1 Cochran v. Taylor, 13 Ohio St. 382. 2 Belfast v. Fogler, 71 Me. 403. 3 Webster v. County Commissioners, 63 Me. 27; Downs v. Town of Huntington, 35 Conn. 588. 4 Beatty, Auditor, v. People, 6 Colo. 538. 5 Wolfe v. Henderson, 28 Ark. 304. repealing statute. A saving of pending prosecutions does not include a case where the prosecution has closed and sentence has been pronounced; nor cases commenced afterwards.3 Under a saving of pending prosecutions and offenses theretofore committed, an indictment filed after the repeal took effect was sustained. Such a provision in a repealing act relates solely to the acts repealed by it," unless a different intention is deducible from the language of the saving clause. A provision in the repealing law to the effect "that no remedy to which a creditor is entitled under the provisions of the laws heretofore in force shall be impaired by this act" does not apply to creditors suing for breaches of the bond occurring since the enactment of the repealing statute. The effect of the repeal of a statute and its re-enactment in the same words by a statute which takes effect at the same time with the repealing act is to continue such statute in uninterrupted operation. The rule is the same as to criminal offenses.8 § 168. Revival by repeal of repealing statute.-The common-law rule is well settled that the simple repeal, suspension or expiration of a repealing statute revives the repealed statute, whether such repeal was express or only by implication.o 1 Dearborn v. Patton, 3 Oregon, 420. 2 Aaron v. State, 40 Ala. 307. See Luke v. Calhoun Co. 56 Ala. 415. 3 Knox v. Baldwin, 80 N. Y. 610. 4 Sanders v. State, 77 Ind. 227. 5 Mongeon v. People, 55 N. Y. 613. 6 Collins v. Warren, 63 Tex. 311. 7 Laude v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. 33 Wis. 640; Middleton v. N. J. etc. R. R. Co. 26 N. J. Eq. 269; Dashiell v. Mayor, etc. 45 Md. 615; Capron v. Strout, 11 Nev. 304; United Hebrew B. Asso. v. Benshimol, 130 Mass. 325; Knoup v. Bank, 1 Ohio St. 603; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; Smith v. Estes, 46 Me. 158. 8 State v. Gumber, 37 Wis. 298; State v. Wish, 15 Neb. 448; ante, § 134; McMullen v. Guest, 6 Tex. 278; Hirschburg v. People, 6 Colo. 145. 9 Gale v. Mead, 4 Hill, 109; Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 365; People v.Davis, 61 Barb. 456; Wheeler v. Roberts, 7 Cow. 536; Van Denburgh v. President, etc. 66 N. Y. 1; Van Valkenburgh v. Torrey, 7 Cow. 252; People v. Trustees, 26 Hun, 488; Commonwealth v. Churchill, 2 Met. 118; Hastings v. Aiken, 1 Gray, 163; McMillan v. Bellows, 37 Hun, 214; Doe v. Naylor, 2 Blackf. 32; Harris v. Supervisors, 33 Hun, 279; Zimmerman v. Perkiomen, etc. Co. 81* Pa. St. 96. It has been held that a statute repealed by two acts is not revived by repeal of one of them. Dyer v. State, Meigs, 237; Teter v. Clayton, 71 Ind. 237; Poor Directors v. R. R. Co. 7 Watts & S. 236; Zimmerman v. Perkiomen, 81* Pa. St. 96; Longlois v. Longlois, 48 Ind. 60; Waugh v. Riley, 68 id. 482; Niblack, Adm'r, v. Goodman, 67 id. 174; Brinkley v. Swicegood, 65 N. C. 626; Harrison v. Walker, 1 Ga. 32; People v. Wintermute, 1 Dak. 63; But it is otherwise, it seems, where the constitution provides that no law shall be revived unless the new act contains the law revived. To repeal a statute will revive the common law.2 When a statute restraining a man's natural rights, or his use of his property, is repealed, he is restored to those rights, as before the law was passed. This rule of revival was held to apply to the vote of a tax by taxable inhabitants. This vote was restored to effect by repealing a rescinding vote. Where a statute professes to repeal absolutely a prior law and substitutes other provisions on the same subject which are limited to continue only till a certain time, the prior law does not revive after the repealing statute is spent, unless the intention of the legislature to that effect is expressed. The legislature may make the revival of an act depend upon a future event to be made known by executive proclamation. Where an act is revived by a subsequent law the legislature must be understood to give it, from the time of its revival, precisely that force and effect which it had at the moment when it expired. Incomplete proceedings which were arrested and rendered void by repeal of the statute under which they were instituted will not be restored to life by a revival thereof. A forfeiture for a prohibited act was given by statute to any one who should sue for it. Afterwards the exclusive right to sue for it was given to overseers of the poor. The repeal of this act was held to operate only prospectively and gave no right to any other than the overseers for forfeitures incurred during the operation of the second act.9 6 Where the repeal of a repealing statute is for the purpose Janes v. Buzzard, Hempst. 259; Witkouski v. Witkouski, 16 La. Ann. 232; Tallamon v. Cardenas, 14 id. 509; Weakley v. Pearce, 5 Heisk. 401; Hightower v. Wells, 6 Yerg. 249. See Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. St. 446. 1 Renter v. Bauer, 3 Kan. 505. 2 Mathewson V. Phoenix Iron Foundry, 20 Fed. Rep. 281; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550; Gray v. Obear, 54 Ga. 231; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336. See Boismare v. His Creditors, 8 La. 315. 3 James v. Dubois, 16 N. J. L. 285. 4 Gale v. Mead, 4 Hill, 109. 5 Warren v. Windle, 3 East, 205. 6 Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cr. 382. 7Id. See Shipman v. Henbest, 4 T. R. 109; Winter v. Dickerson, 42 Ala. 92. 8 Commonwealth v. Leech, 24 Pa. St. 55. 9 Van Valkenburgh v. Torrey, 7 Cow. 252. |