lar city or county to raise money by tax for the payment of certain claims against it, or relieving a particular married woman by name of the disabilities of coverture; acts authorizing the sale of property of minors and other persons under disability, are private. Acts for the mere creation of a private corporation are of this character." The recital of facts in a private statute is strong evidence against those who obtained the act, but is not evidence against strangers, nor are such statutes binding on strangers. They may be avoided for fraud. 1 Bretz v. Mayor, etc. 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 478. See Sherman Co. v. Simons, 109 U. S. 735. 2 Ashford v. Watkins, 70 Ala. 156. 3 Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass. 326; Moore v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469; Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119; McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Lessee of Dulany v. Tilghman, 6 Gill & J. 461; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268; Jackson v. Catlin, 2 John. 248; Munford v. Pearce, 70 Ala. 452; Carroll v. Lessee of Olmsted, 16 Ohio, 251; Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13; Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435; Davison v. Johonnot, 7 Met. 388; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Williamson v. Suydam, 6 Wall. 723; Lobrano v. Nelligan, 9 id. 295; Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y. 245; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 id. 445; Tharp v. Fleming, 1 Houston, 580; Perry v. Newsom, 1 Ired. Eq. 28; Todd v. Flournoy's Heirs, 56 Ala. 99; Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 id. 520; Tindal v. Drake, 60 id. 170. See Watson v. Oates, 58 Ala. 647; Heirs of Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369. 4 Burhop v. Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 257; Perry v. New Orleans R. R. Co. 55 Ala. 413; Conley v. Columbus, etc. R. R. Co. 44 Tex. 579; Montgomery v. Plank R. Co. 31 Ala. 76; Drake v. Flewellen, 33 id. 106; Clarion Bank v. Gruber, 87 Pa. St. 468; Timlow v. Railroad Co. 90 id. 284; Perdicaris v. Bridge Co. An act may be in part 29 N. J. L. 367; Butler v. Robinson, 75 Mo. 192; Mandere v. Bonsignore, 28 La. Ann. 415; Carrow v. Bridge Co. Phill. L. (N. C.) 118. 5 May's Heirs v. Frazee, 4 Litt. 392; Elmendorff v. Carmachael, 3 id. 472; Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358; Campbell's Case, 2 Bland's Ch. 209. 6 Id. 7 Earl of Shrewsbury v. Scott, 6 C'. B. (N. S.) 1, 157, 184; Crittenden v. Wilson, 2 Cow. 165; 2 Kent's Com. 466; Jackson v. Catlin, 2 John. 248; S. C. 8 id. 520; McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 206; Lucy v. Levington, 1 Vent. 175; Jones v. Tatham, 20 Pa. St. 398. 66 8 Campbell's Case, 2 Bland's Ch. 209; Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 454; Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 Har. & J. 307, note; Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick. 460. Bland, Chan., in Campbell's Case, said: A private act of parliament, although strictly and literally followed, as regards the authority and jurisdiction conferred (Ex parte King, 2 Bro. C. C. 158; Ex parte Bolton School, 2 Bro. C. C. 662 2; Madd. Chan. 719), is in many respects considered and construed as a mere legal conveyance; in general binding only on those who are parties to it; that is, those who petition for it or are named in the act itself and those claiming under them. The Case of the Chancellor of Oxford, 10 public and in part private. The courts do not take judicial They have to be proved in the notice of private statutes. usual manner. But in England by virtue of a statute, and in some of the states of the Union, all acts are public, and the courts take notice of them. And under the prevalent constitutional prohibition of special and local legislation, the distinction between public and private acts has lost much of its importance. Coke, 57; Hasketh v. Lee, 2 Saund. 84; Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 499; Perchard v. Heywood, 8 T. R. 472; Wallwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 25; Bullock v. Fladgate, 1 Ves. & Bea. 471; Vauxhall Bridge Co. v. Earl Spencer, 2 Mad. 356; S. C. 4 Cond. Ch. 28; Edwards v. Grand Junction R. R. Co. 10 id. 85; Moore v. Usher, id. 107; 2 Black. Com. 344; Cru. Dig. tit. 33. It is never permitted to affect strangers or to defeat the rights of bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration; because, as to strangers, a private act is considered only in the light of a private conveyance. Pomfret v. Windsor, 2 Ves. 480." 1 Dwarris on St. 354; People v. Supervisors, 43 N. Y. 10. 21 Black. Com. 86. 3 Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Pet. 317. 4 13 and 14 Vic. c. 21. PART SECOND. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. CHAPTER XI. CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF STATUTES. $195. The names applied to statutes. [§ 205. Preceptive, prohibitive and 196. Ancient statutes of England. 197. Federal, state, territorial and colonial statutes. 198. Public and private statutes. 200. Declaratory statutes. 202. Affirmative and negative statutes. permissive statutes. 207. Remedial statutes. § 195. The names of statutes.- In the preceding pages we have discussed the general nature, enactment, duration and proof of statutes and cognate topics. We have now to discuss the principles by which is determined their meaning and effect. These principles are adapted to the peculiar nature of the statute; therefore, a chapter explaining the different kinds of statutes, with the names by which they are designated, will naturally precede the exposition of the principles which diversify and make up the law of hermeneutics. Some of these statutes have already been defined, but it will be useful to present them with others in one comprehensive view. They bear names significant of their origin, form or intrinsic nature. Many by name and operation are in dual contrast or contradistinction. English statutes, in part entering into our jurisprudence and in part foreign, are distinguished as ancient and modern. In our system we have federal, state, colonial and territorial statutes. A generical classification of all statutes is as public or private. The former are divided into species of general and local or special statutes. General statutes are further divided by other distinctions. In respect to duration they are temporary or perpetual; in respect to their force with reference to the date of taking effect, prospective or retroactive; as to the nature of their operation, declaratory, permissive, prohibitive, preceptive, remedial, directory, mandatory, or repealing statutes; as to form, affirmative or negative. Another large and important class of public statutes is designated as penal. $196. Ancient statutes of England. The statutes termed ancient are those adopted in Latin and French prior to the reign of Edward III., which commenced in 1327.1 Since that time they are contradistinguished as nova statuta, and since the accession of Richard III., 1483, the statutes have been first printed in English, and entirely so since the time of Henry VII.2 Until late in the reign of Edward III., oral proceedings in the courts were conducted in the French language, "a tongue much unknown in the realm," and the pleadings and record in Latin. In the thirty-sixth year of his reign the proceedings were required to be conducted in English, and by the same statute the pleadings and record continued in Latin. Formerly the judges formulated the statutes from the petition of the commons and the king's answer. All those passed at one session of parliament were strung together, making so many capitula or chapters of one statute; to which was usually prefixed a memorandum of the time and place of the meeting of parliament, and the occasion for calling it. On account of the generality or brevity of ancient statutes, a very liberal and latitudinary construction was practiced and held to be justifiable, not admitted of new or modern statutes. Hence, there is a wide distinction between the construction of ancient and modern statutes. This consideration should detract from the force of rules of interpretation which originated in reasons peculiar to the administration of ancient statutes, and originat I Dwarris, 2d ed. 460. 2 Id. 3 Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; Att'yGen'l v. Weymouth, 1 Amb. 22, Rex v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 93; Morant v. Taylor, 1 Ex. D. 194; Shrewsbury v. Scott, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 1; Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. 982; Chance v. Adams, 1 Lord Raym. 77; Hadden v. Collector, 5 Wall. 110; Bac. Abr. Court of Parliament, E. 4 Dwarris, 460. 52 Inst. 401; Gwynne v. Burnell, 6 Bing. N. C. 561; Wilson v. Knubley, 7 East, 128; McWilliam v. Adams, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 120; Montrose Peerage, id. 401. 6 Miller v. Salomons, 7 Ex. 475; Bradley v. Clark, 5 T. R. 201; Bradford v. Treasurer, Peck, 425; Jones v. Kearns, Mart. & Y. 241; Waller v. Harris, 20 Wend. 555, 561. ing in the forms of legislation then in vogue and now obsolete, or displaced by others radically different. These ancient statutes are a part of our common law.1 § 197. Federal, state, territorial and colonial statutes.— The valid acts of congress are those which it enacts in the exercise of the delegated powers enumerated in the federal constitution. They have force and are binding throughout the Union and the federal domain, or in such lesser part of it as the act professes to operate in. On such subjects the federal laws are supreme they are domestic; all courts take notice of them.3 Treaties are also a part of the law. The federal courts are organized for the enforcement of those laws; they reach in their operation the entire nation, and they are binding on the states and all their departments. The states have supreme power within their limits for local government, except as this power is restrained by the concession of the federal powers in the constitution of the United States. With this limitation, for the purpose of local government, the states are supreme and independent. The law-making powers of state legislatures are plenary, subject only to the restrictions of the federal and state constitutions. Colonial statutes are those in force in the colonies prior to their becoming states. Those laws which were suited to their new condition, politically and otherwise, continued to form part of the jurisprudence of the succeeding states until altered by later statutes. Territorial statutes are those enacted by territorial legislatures, pursuant to the authority of an act of congress. § 198. Public and private statutes.- Blackstone defines a public act as a universal rule that regards the whole commu Ante, § 15. 2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. 358; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Padelford v. Mayor, etc. 14 Ga. 438. 3 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295; United States v. Rathbone, 2 Paine, 578; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 341. 4 Const. art. VI, 2; United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cr. 103; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253. 5 Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539; New York v. Miln, 11 id. 102; Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Turner v. Board of Commissioners, 27 Kan. 639. 6 Ante, § 19. 7 National Bank v. Yankton Co. 101 U. S. 129; ante, § 23; 2 Story on Const. § 1325. |