injuries; and also those intended for the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and administrative polity of the state. It is a rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy. But other rules also apply, even to particular provisions of such statutes which come within the general notion of remedial laws, and qualify and abridge the application of the rule of liberal construction, as will be seen hereafter. As, for example, statutes in derogation of the common law;2 or for taking private property for public use; 3 statutes granting power, or authorizing summary proceedings for obtaining judgment, as by motion," writs of attachment, and those providing for any novel proceeding or remedy."

1 Heydon's Case, 3 Rep. 7b; Turtle v. Hartwell, 6 T. R. 429; Vigo's Case, 21 Wall. 648; Davenport v. Barnes, 2 N. J. L. 211; Franklin v. Franklin, 1 Md. Ch. 342; Twycross v. Grant, 2 C. P. D. 530; Cullerton v. Mead, 22 Cal. 95; Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y. 446; Fuller v. Rood, 3 Hill, 258; Smith v. Moffat, 1 Barb. 65; McCormick v. Alexander, 2 Ohio, 284; Lessee of Burgett v. Burgett, 1 id. 219; Wilber v. Paine, id: 17; Fox v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 154; Fox v. Sloo, 10 id. 11; Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Loose, 19 Pa. St. 15; Quinn v. Fidelity, etc. Asso. 100 id. 382; Bolton v. King, 105 id. 78; Hassenplug's Appeal, 106 id. 527; Poor District v. Poor District, 109 id. 579; Tuskaloosa Bridge v. Jemison, 33 Ala. 476; Marshall v. Vultee, 1 E. D. Smith, 294; Mayor, etc. v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285; Jones v. Collins, 16 Wis. 594; Pearson v. Lovejoy, 53 Barb. 407; Jackson v. Warren, 32 III. 331; Smith v. Stevens, 82 id. 554; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 id. 260; Converse v. Burrows, 2 Minn. 229; Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597; New Orleans v. St. Romes, 9 La. Ann. 573; First School Dist. v. Ufford, 52 Conn. 44; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1 Gill, 66.

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2 Burnside v. Whitney, 21 N. Y. 148; Smith v. Randall, 3 Hill, 495; People v. Hulse, id. 309; Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322; Hollenback v. Fleming, 6 Hill, 307; Dwelly v. Dwelly, 46 Me. 377; Harrison v. Leach, 4 W. Va. 383; Gibson v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. St. 253; Wilson v. Arnold, 5 Mich. 98; Fessenden v. Hill, 6 id. 242; Galpin v. Abbott, id. 17; Hollman v. Bennett, 44 Miss. 322; Thompson v. Clay, 60 Mich. 62.

3 Powers' Appeal, 29 Mich. 504; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 id. 92; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47.

Best v. Gholson, 89 Ill. 465; Banks v. Darden, 18 Ga. 318; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 78 Ill. 96; Morris Aqueduct v. Jones, 36 N. J. L. 206; Matthews v. Skinker, 62 Mo. 329; People v. Supervisors, 6 Hun, 304; Ryan v. State, 32 Tex. 280.

♪ Hearn v. Ewin, 3 Cold. 399. 6 McQueen v. Middletown, etc. Co. 16 John. 5; Edwards v. Davis, id. 281.

See Hubbell v. Denison, 20 Wend. 181; Waller v. Harris, id. 555; Cole v. Perry, 8 Cow. 214; Townsend v. Chase, 1 id. 115; Sacia v. De Graaf, id. 356; Jackson v. Hobby, 20 John. 361; Hale v. Angel, id. 342; Under

208. Penal statutes.- Such statutes are often treated as contradistinguished from remedial statutes. They are not, however, in full and direct contrast. Penal statutes are those by which punishments are imposed for transgressions of the law. They are construed strictly, and more or less so according to the severity of the penalty. When a law imposes a punishment which acts upon the offender alone, and not as a reparation to the party injured, and where it is entirely within the discretion of the law-giver, it will not be presumed that he intended it should extend further than is expressed; and humanity would require that it should be so limited in the construction.2 The general purpose or aim of a statute may be remedial; as where they provide punitive compensation to the injured party. But the provisions that enforce the wrong for which a penalty is provided, and those which define the punishment, are penal in their character and are construed accordingly. A statute may be remedial in one part and penal in another."

wood v. Irving, 3 Cow. 59; Jackson v. Shepherd, 6 id. 444; Smith v. Mumford, 9 id. 29; Bank v. Ibbotson, 5 Hill, 461; Hoffman v. Dunlop, 1 Barb, 185; People v. Recorder, 6 Hill, 429; Smith v. Argall, id. 479; Huntington v. Forkson, id. 149; Sherwood v. Reade, 7 id. 431; Doughty v. Hope, 1 N. Y. 79; Danks v. Quackenbush, id. 129; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Powell v. Tuttle, id. 396; Humphrey v. Chamberlain, 11 id. 274; Clarkson v. R. R. Co. 12 id. 304; Wait v. Van Allen, 22 id. 319; Willard v. Fralick, 31 Mich. 431; Colgate v. Penn. Co. 102 N. Y. 127.

Hall v. State, 20 Ohio, 7; Van Rennsselaer v. Sheriff, 1 Cow. 443; Seaving v. Brinkerhoff, 5 John. Ch. 329; Van Valkenburgh v. Torrey, 7 Cow. 252; Andrews v. United States, 2 Story, 202; Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; State v. Solomons, 3 Hill (S. C.). 96; United States v. Ramsay, Hempst. 481; United States v. Starr, Hempst. 469; United States v. Ragsdale, id. 497; Commonwealth v. Mar

tin, 17 Mass. 359; Commonwealth v. Keniston, 5 Pick 420; Gibson v. State, 38 Ga., 571; State v. Upchurch, 9 Ired. 454; Reed v. Davis, 8 Pick, 514; Warner v. Commonwealth, 1 Pa. St. 154; Lair v. Killmer, 1 Dutch. 522; State v. Whetstone, 13 La. Ann. 376; Gunter v. Leckey, 30 Ala. 591; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76; Randolph v. State, 9 Tex. 521; Strong v. Stebbins, 5 Cow, 210,

2 State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334. 3 Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick, 94, 100; Stanley v. Wharton, 9 Price, 301; Palmer v. York Bank, 18 Me. 166; Bayard v. Smith, 17 Wend. 88; Frohock v. Pattee, 38 Me, 103; Sloan v. Johnson, 14 S. & M. 47; Foote v. Vanzandt, 34 Miss. 40

4 Bay City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Austin, 21 Mich, 390; Smith v. Causey, 22 Ala. 568; Cohn v. Neeves, 40 Wis. 393; Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109; Swift v. Applebone, 23 Mich. 252.

5 Wynne v. Middleton, 1 Wils. 126; Raynard v. Chase, 1 Burr, 2, 6.

And the same statute may be remedial for certain purposes, and liberally construed therefor, and at the same time be of such a nature, and operate with such harshness upon a class of offenders subject to it, that they are entitled to invoke the rule of strict construction. All of the provisions of criminal statutes are not construed strictly; they are construed strictly against the accused, and favorably and equitably for him.2

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§ 209. Repealing statutes.-These are revocations of former statutory enactments. A repeal may be in express words or by implication; as where a subsequent statute conflicting with it is enacted. This subject has been fully treated in a previous chapter.

1 Hathaway v. Johnson, 55 N. Y. 93. 21 Hawk. P. C., Curwood's ed. 90; Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502; Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East, 242, 245; United

States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1
Wood. & M. 401.

3 Dwarr. 478.
4 Ante, ch. 8.

§ 210. The title.- The English courts have always held the title to be no part of the act; it is said to be no more so than the title of a book is part of the book. In strictness, Lord Coke said, it ought not to be taken into consideration at all. It was generally framed by the clerk of the branch of parliament where the act originated, and was intended only as a convenient means of reference. The same declaration, that the title is no part of the act, has been frequently made by judges in this country. But in modern practice the title is adopted by the legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states is the subject of constitutional regulation. It is not an enacting part, but is in some sort a part of the act, though only a formal part. By the common law it could not control the plain words of a statute; it was resorted to only in cases of doubt for such aid as it could afford

1 Mills v. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62; Salkeld v. Johnson, 2 Ex. 256, 283; Rex v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 93; AttorneyGeneral v. Weymouth, 1 Amb. 20; Chance v. Adams, 1 Lord Raym. 77; Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. 982; Rawley v. Rawley, 1 Q. B. D. 466; Bentley v. Rotherham, 4 Ch. D. 588; Morant v. Taylor, 1 Ex. D. 194; Hunter v. Nockolds, 1 McN. & Gord. 651.

2 Attorney-General v. Weymouth, 1 Amb. 20; Powlter's Case, 11 Coke, 33.

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3 Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 107, 110; Plummer v. People, 74 Ill. 361.

4 Bradford v. Jones, 1 Md. 351, 370; Commonwealth v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71; Plummer v. People, 74 Ill. 361, 363; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, (S. C.) 334.

5 Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 107, 110; Burgett v. Burgett, 2 Ohio, 219, 221; Plummer v. People, 74 Ill. 361; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584.

in removing ambiguities.1 Acts may be identified by the title.2 An act may have effect as to persons and subjects broader than the title where the words are plain, and where there is no constitutional barrier. But if the meaning is doubtful, the title if expressive may have the effect to resolve the doubts by extension of the purview, or by restraining it," or to correct an obvious error; for in ascertaining the intention nothing is to be rejected from which aid can be derived; therefore, the title of an act may claim a degree of notice, and is entitled to its share of consideration. Where the text of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the title cannot have the effect to modify it.8

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§ 211. The constitutional provision that no law shall embrace more than one subject, and requiring that to be expressed in the title, has given the title of legislative acts more importance. It is not, however, required or intended that the title shall contain a full index to all the contents of the law;

i United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. 358; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, 584; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; People v. O'Brien, 111 id. 1; S. C. 7 Am. St. R. 684; Hines v. R. R. Co. 95 N. C. 434; Commonwealth v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cas. 172; Davidson v. Clayland, 1 Har. & J. 546; Canal Co. v. R. R. Co. 4 Gill & J. 1; Kent v. Somervell, 7 Gill & J. 265; Lucas v. McBlair, 12 id. 1; Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Ga. 157; State v. Cazeau, 8 La. Ann. 109; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Burgett v. Burgett, 2 Ohio, 219; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266; Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 9 Phila. 80; Cochran v. Library Co. 6 id. 492; Bailie's Case, 1 Leach's Cas. 396; Crespigny v. Wittenoom, 4 T. R. 793; Taylor v. Newman, 4 B. & S. 89; Coomber v. Berks, L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 33; Johnson v. Upham, 2 E. & E. 250; Shaw v. Rudder, 9 Irish C. L. (N. S.) 219; Reg. v. Mallow Union, 12 id. 35; Free v. Burgoyne, 5 B. & C. 400; Allkins v. Jupe, 2 C. P. D. 375; Heard v. Baskervile, Hob. 232; Wood v. Row

cliffe, 6 Hare, 191. The title of a city ordinance being inessential cannot control the tenor of the enactment. Hershoff v. Treasurer, etc. 45 N. J. L. 288.

2 Reg. v. Wilcock, 7 Q. B. 317; Boothroyd, In re, 15 M. & W. 1.

3 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. 358: Powlter's Case, 11 Coke, 33.

4 Deddrick v. Wood, 15 Pa. St. 9; Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 9 Phila. 80.

5 Cochran v. The Library Co. G Phila. 492; Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 425; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631; State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Field v. Gooding, 106 Mass. 310; Brett v. Brett, 3 Addams, 219.