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§ 266. When two words or expressions are coupled together, one of which generically includes the other, it is obvious that the more general term is used in a meaning excluding the specific one. A revenue act of congress exempted from duty "animals of all kinds; birds, singing, and other, and land and water fowls." A later act levied a duty of twenty per cent. "on all horses, mules, cattle, sheep, hogs and other live animals." It was held that birds were not included in the term "other live animals" as used in the later act. "This act of 1861," said Mr. Justice Davis, "was in force when the act of 1866 the act in controversy -- was passed, and it will be seen that birds and fowls are not embraced in the term animals,' and that they are free from duty, not because they belong to the class of 'living animals of all kinds,' but for the reason that they are especially designated. It is quite manifest that congress, adopting the popular signification of the word 'animals,' applied it to quadrupeds, and placed birds and fowls in a different classification. Congress having, therefore, defined the word in one act, so as to limit its application, how can it be contended that the definition shall be enlarged in the next act on the same subject, when there is no language used indicating an intention to produce such a result? Both acts are in pari materia; and it will be presumed that if the same word be used in both, and a special meaning were given it in the first act, that it was intended it should receive the same interpretation in the later act, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention." 3

§ 267. Relative and qualifying words and phrases.— Relative and qualifying words and phrases, grammatically and legally, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. A proviso is construed to apply to the

1 Endl. § 396; Rex v. Cowell, 2 East P. C. 617; Rex v. Loom, 1 Moo. C. C. 160; Dewhurst v. Feilden, 7 M. & G. 182; Peto v. West Ham, 2 E. & E. 144; Reg. v. Midland R. Co. 4 E. & B.

958; Lead Smelting Co. v. Richardson, 3 Burr. 1341; Rex v. Sedgley, 2 B. & Ad. 65; Rex v. Cunningham, 5 East, 478; Morgan v. Crawshay, L. R. 5 H. L. 304; Bourguignon Building

Asso. v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St.
54, 65; Dick's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 589.
2 Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162.
3 Id.

4 Fowler v. Tuttle, 24 N. H. 9; State v. Brown, 3 Heisk. 1; Ellis v. Murray, 28 Miss. 129; Cushing v. Worrick, 9 Gray, 383; Gyger's Estate, 65 Pa. St. 311; Fisher v. Connard, 100 id. 63; Staniland v. Hopkins, 9 M. & W. 178.

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provision or clause immediately preceding.' Where the by-laws of a society provided first for an annual meeting for the election of officers, and then for a monthly meeting on a specified day "at half-past seven o'clock, P. M.," it was held that the clause specifying the hour of meeting had reference only to the monthly meeting. The intention is sufficiently obvious in the following provision for the establishment of libraries, without recourse to any rule. It is nevertheless within this principle. It was provided that any town or city might appropriate money for suitable buildings or rooms, and for the foundation of a library a sum not exceeding one dollar for each of the ratable polls in the year next preceding, and, annually thereafter, a sum not exceeding fifty cents for each of its ratable polls. It was held that the power to make the subsequent appropriations, with its limitation, was for the same object as the first, and did not apply to the power to appropriate for buildings or rooms. An act provided for the adoption of a statute by cities and towns "at a legal meeting of the city council, or the inhabitants of the town called for that purpose." It was held that "called for that purpose" did not apply to a city council.* This principle is of no great force; it is only operative when there is nothing in the statute indicating that the relative word or qualifying provision is intended to have a different effect. And very slight indication of legislative purpose or a parity of reason, or the natural and common-sense reading of the statute, may overturn it and give it a more comprehensive application. Thus, as was said by the court in Great Western Railway Company v. Swindon, referring to the phrase "horses, oxen, pigs and sheep, from whatever country they come,” the last clause would apply alike to all these animals and not alone to sheep. In furtherance of the intention it was held in that case that in the construction of the phrase "messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments of any tenure," the last and qualifying words," of any tenure," applied to all the preceding words 3 Dearborn v. Brookline, 97 Mass. 466.

1 Partington, Ex parte, 6 Q. B. at p. 653; Spring v. Collector, 78 Ill. 101; Lehigh Co. v. Meyer, 102 Pa. St. 479. See United States v. Babbit, 1 Black, 55; Re Cambrian Railway Scheme, L. R. 3 Ch. 278; § 223.

2 State v. Conklin, 34 Wis. 21.

4 Quinn v. Lowell Electric L. Co. 140 Mass. 106.

5 Gyger's Estate, supra; Fisher v. Connard, supra.

L. R. 9 App. Cas. at p. 808.

Qualifying words have

and not merely to "hereditaments." been applied to several preceding sections where the nature of the provisions and the obvious sense required it. Thus, where there was a restriction relating to the compensation of certain officers, upon the ground of reason and intention as to all, and the improbability of a contrary design, it was held not limited in its effect to the section where it was inserted, but was an independent proposition applying alike to all officers of the same class. Where the intention is manifest, a proviso, or qualifying words or clauses found in the middle of a sentence, may be placed at the end; or, when inserted in one section, they may be applied to the matter of another section.*

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§ 268. When general words follow particular. When there are general words following particular and specific words, the former must be confined to things of the same kind. It was held that a bull was not included under the words" or other cattle" as used in a statute which made it indictable for any person to wantonly or cruelly beat, abuse and ill-treat any horse, mare, gelding, mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, steer, sheep or other cattle." Bayley, J., said: "Horse, mare, gelding, are one class; ox, cow, heifer and steer are another, and in my opinion the bull is not included in this act." Where an act imposed a penalty on any person hauling "any timber or stone or other thing, otherwise than upon wheeled carriages," it was held not to extend to straw, but was confined to things as weighty and as likely to cause injury to roads as timber or stone. It was provided by the winding-up acts that the court might wind up a company if a special resolution was passed, or the business of the company was not commenced within a year, or the number of members was

1 See Eby's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 311, 314; Coxson v. Doland, 2 Daly, 66; Hart v. Kennedy, 15 Abb. Pr. 290.

55.

2 United States v. Babbit, 1 Black,

5 Reg. v. Edmundson, 28 L. J. M. C. 215; 2 E. & E. 77; Gunnestad v. Price, L. R. 10 Ex. 69 (but see The Alina, 5 Ex. Div. 227; S. C. 5 Prob. Div. 138; The Rowa, 7 id. 247);

3 Waters v. Campbell, 4 Sawyer, Washer v. Elliott, L. R. 1 C. P. Div.

121.

4 State v. Turnpike Co. 16 Ohio St. 308. See Matthews v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 989; State v. Forney, 21 Neb. 223, 226.

174; Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 687.

6 Hill, Ex parte, 3 C. & P. 225. Radnorshire Co. Road Board v. Evans, 3 B. & S. 400.

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reduced below seven, or the company was unable to pay its debts, or if the court thought it just and equitable that the company should be wound up. It was held that the grounds upon which the court might form its conclusion must be ejusdem generis with those already enumerated.'

§ 269. Landlords were authorized by statute to distrain for rent "all sorts of corn and grass, hops, roots, fruits, pulse, or other product whatsoever, which shall be growing on any part of the estates demised." This did not include trees, shrubs and plants growing in a nursery garden. The memorandum of a company stated that the company was formed for the purpose, among others, "of carrying on the business of mechanical engineers and general contractors." A question was: What was the scope of the concluding words, "general contractors." Lord Cairns said: "Upon all ordinary principles of construction, these words must be referred to the part of the sentence which immediately precedes them; . . therefore,

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the term "general contractors" would be referred to that which goes immediately before, and would indicate the making generally of contracts connected with the business of mechanical engineers. . If these words were not to be interpreted as I have suggested, the consequence would be that they would stand absolutely without any limit of any kind." An act made a railroad company liable for killing certain enumerated domestic animals, "et cetera." It also excluded from being witnesses employees of the company who might be responsible to it for negligence "by which any stock may be injured or killed as contemplated by this act." It was held that the act did not apply to negro slaves.*

§ 270. The object of enumeration is to set forth in detail things which are in themselves so distinct that they cannot conveniently be comprehended under one or more general terms; there is believed to be no a priori presumption that the things enumerated are all of them of the same kind. When a specific enumeration concludes with a general term

1 Wilb. on St. 181; Spackman, Ex L. 653. See Great Western R'y Co. parte, 1 Macn. & G. 170; Re Anglo- v. Swindon, etc. R'y Co. L. R. 9 Ap. Greek Steam Co. L. R. 2 Eq. 1. Cas. 787.

2 Clark v. Gaskarth, 8 Taunt. 431.
3 Ashbury Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H.

4 Scaggs v. Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co. 10 Md. 268.

it is held to be limited to things of the same kind. It is restricted to the same genus as the things enumerated. It was enacted that "no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer, or other person whatsoever, shall do or exercise any labor, business, or work, of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's day." This has been held not to include a farmer, or drivers of stagecoaches,' or attorneys." On the same principle "parochial rclief or other alms" means other parochial alms. "Cities, towns, corporate boroughs and places" do not include places which are not incorporated. An act empowering justices to determine differences between masters and persons in several employments, and "servants in husbandry, artificers, handicrafters," and finally "all other laborers," does not by these words extend to a domestic servant, nor to a man employed to take care of goods seized under a writ." "County, riding or division" means a division analogous to a county or riding.10

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§ 271. A Michigan statute gave "every wife, child, parent, guardian, husband or other person a right of action against a liquor-seller for injury done to the plaintiff by reason of the intoxication of any person. On the ground and principle under consideration, it was held that the intoxicated person himself was not within the statute." Another statute of the same

1 Countess of Rothes v. Kirkcaldy Water Works Commissioners, L. R. 7 App. Cas. 706.

or writing, or by any other false pretense," obtain signatures to a written instrument. It was held that

2 Fenwick v. Schmalz, L. R. 3 the statute does not enumerate the C. P. 315.

3 Reg. v. Cleworth, 4 B. & S. 927. 4 Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. 96. 5 Peate v. Dicken, 1 C. M. & R. 422. Reg. v. Lichfield, 2 Q. B. 693. Rex v. Wallis, 5 T. R. 375. 8 Kitchen v. Shaw, 6 Ad. & E. 729. 9 Bramwell v. Penneck, 7 B. & C. 536.

10 Evans v. Stevens, 4 T. R. 459.

11 Brooks v. Cook, 44 Mich. 617. In Higler v. People, 44 Mich. 299, the statute provided for the punishment of any person who, "with intent to defraud or cheat another, shall designedly, by color of any false token

false pretense in particular terms, so that the term "any other false pretense" is not limited to a particular kind of pretense, and the rule of construction that general terms must be construed as of the same tenor as preceding particular terms previously enumerated has no application. In construing a common carrier's contract, containing provisions to qualify the carrier's responsibility, which exempted the railroad company from liability for losses and damages "in loading, unloading, conveyance and otherwise," whether arising from negligence, misconduct or otherwise,

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