Kramer v. Chicago & M. E. R. Co. 171 Wis. 627. ESCHWEILER, J. In charging the jury upon the seventh question, as to whether plaintiff was guilty of any want of ordinary care proximately contributing to his injury, the trial court recited the substance of all but one of the city ordinances above quoted, but did not inform them that under the law of this state any violation of such provisions was to be considered as negligence as a matter of law. Neither did the court submit to the jury, as requested by defendant, any separate questions involving the issues as to whether or not there had been such violations by plaintiff of the respective ordinances. Whether separate questions involving such rules of the road should be submitted in a special verdict need not here be determined. But whether so submitted or when embraced in the more general questions involving the negligence of any party to such a lawsuit, the jury should be charged in connection therewith that a violation of such a rule is negligence as a matter of law. It is then for the court or jury to determine if such negligence proximately contributed to the injury. Steinkrause v. Eckstein, 170 Wis. 487, 175 N. W. 988. This was not done in the instant case, and upon the record we deem it prejudicial error. The motorman testified that, while the street car was a considerable distance away, he saw the automobile as it was backing out of the garage and crossing the sidewalk. The jury, however, found by their answer to the first question of the special verdict that the motorman failed to keep a proper lookout. The trial court omitted in his charge to the jury any reference to the ordinance sec. 1242, supra, pleaded by defendant, which requires the having of a light visible on both the front and rear end of an automobile at the hour of the evening involved. It seems to have been considered that the submission of any question or the giving of an instruction concerning or with reference to the alleged violation of that particular ordinance was rendered unnecessary in view of such testimony of the motorman, Jaeger v. Salentine, 171 Wis. 632. under the view that there would be no need of any notice being given by the use of such light, he having already discovered the presence of the automobile independently of any such light. The jury, however, negatived the keeping of a proper lookout by the motorman. This, inferentially at least, amounts to a finding that the motorman did not see the automobile any appreciable time before the collision, and thus in effect discredits his testimony that he did so see it. In such a situation defendant was entitled to have the determination of the jury upon the material and disputed issue of fact as to whether or not there was such a light. Yahnke v. Lange, 168 Wis. 512, 170 N. W. 722. It follows that the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and a new trial granted. By the Court.-Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial in the circuit court. JAEGER, Respondent, vs. SALENTINE and another, Appellants. May 6-June 1, 1920. Master and servant: Son driving automobile of father: Negligence: Liability of father. The son of an automobile owner, who was the only member of the family who could safely operate the car and who was permitted by his father to drive when requested by any other member of the family, was the agent of his father in conveying his sister to town with his father's knowledge, and the father is liable for injuries to another resulting from the negligence of the son. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: JOHN J. GREGORY, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. Action for damages resulting from an automobile collision. The evidence shows that Christ Salentine lives with Jaeger v. Salentine, 171 Wis. 632. On De his family on a farm near the city of Waukesha. cember 5, 1918, his daughter, who was a nurse in a Milwaukee hospital, was at home on a visit. Christ Salentine knew that she was home only for the day and that she must return that evening. He owned an auto which had been purchased for family use. He knew that his son would take Celia in the car either to Milwaukee or to Calhoun, where she could take the train to Milwaukee. Christ, the father, testified that Peter, the son, sometimes took the daughters out in the machine and drove them to different places and that he had done that frequently; that he had driven his mother and sisters around frequently; that when they wanted to go anywhere they simply went and that was the end of it, and that he never made any objection. Peter, the son, testified that he had frequently taken different members of the family around prior to the date of the collision; that he was the only one on the farm that could safely operate the car; that on the evening in question he took his sister Celia to Milwaukee, because she asked him to, and that his sister Ameela rode with them; that Celia was a nurse in a Milwaukee hospital, came home about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and that she had to return before 10 o'clock that night. The evidence shows that the Salentine car was being driven along Scott street in the city of Milwaukee, between Fifteenth and Sixteenth avenues, at a high rate of speed; that a wagon was being unloaded at the south curb on Scott street, which projected into the street some ten feet. The Salentine car was obliged to go around this wagon and, in so doing, got well out towards the center and probably on the wrong side of the street, and at a point about 118 feet from the wagon the Salentine car collided with the plaintiff's car on the north side of the street, where plaintiff's car was lawfully traveling, inflicting personal injuries upon the plaintiff. The jury by its special verdict found Peter Salentine guilty of negligence in the management of the car which Pringle v. Jackson Fence Co. 171 Wis. 634. proximately contributed to the injury, absolved the driver of plaintiff's car from contributory negligence, and assessed plaintiff's damages at $600: Judgment was rendered on the verdict, and the defendants appealed. Edward H. Hibbard of Milwaukee, for the appellants. For the respondent there was a brief by Glicksman, Gold & Corrigan of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Walter D. Corrigan. OWEN, J. The special verdict in this case, so far as it relates to the negligence of the parties, is well supported by the evidence, and that question requires no treatment. The further question is whether Christ Salentine, the father of Peter, who was driving the car, is liable in this action. The jury found that the defendant Peter Salentine was the servant and agent of the defendant Christ Salentine in running the automobile at the time of the collision, and that while he was driving the automobile he was acting within the scope of his employment. We think the evidence set forth in the statement of facts brings the case well within the rule of Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 67 Wis. 495, 30 N. W. 922, and that the question of Christ Salentine's liability must be answered in the affirmative upon the authority of that case. By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. PRINGLE, Appellant, vs. JACKSON FENCE COMPANY, May 6-June 1, 1920. Master and servant: Tender of resignation: Wrongful discharge: Compensation. Where a salesman, before the expiration of his contract, requested by letter that his resignation be accepted, such tender of resignation was not a breach of contract; and the employer's reply that the salesman had breached his contract by Pringle v. Jackson Fence Co. 171 Wis. 634. writing the letter of resignation was a wrongful discharge justifying recovery of salary, commission, and expenses up to the time the resignation was to take effect. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: E. T. FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge. Reversed. Action begun in the civil court of Milwaukee county to recover compensation for services rendered the defendant under a contract of employment beginning July 1, 1915, and terminating July 1, 1917. Plaintiff was a traveling salesman selling products of the defendant's factory, consisting of fence, gates, and structures. On March 1, 1917, he wrote the defendant to the effect that owing to the higher prices and the consequent falling off in trade he was of the opinion that the other salesmen in Wisconsin could take care of all the business of defendant therein, and stated: "Please accept my resignation to become effective April 1." On March 7th defendant wrote him: "Upon my return to the office after an absence of three weeks I find your letter of March 1st tendering resignation, which of course constitutes a breach on your part of certain contract made with this company and dated May 31, 1915, covering services for two years from July 1, 1915, hence relieves us of obligation on our part of fulfilling terms of same, and we will accept your resignation to become effective as per date of your communication, namely, March 1, 1917." This letter was received by plaintiff March 10th, up to which time he had continued to sell goods for defendant. After that date he could make no sales because the trade had been notified by defendant that he was no longer in its employ. He sought to recover for salary, expenses, and commissions up to April 1, 1917, and this the trial court permitted him to do on the ground that, though the plaintiff had no right to resign, he believed he had, and in any event it was the duty of defendant to inform plaintiff that it did not accept his resignation and would hold him to the terms of his contract; that it had no right to discharge him under |