THE NEW ENGLANDER. No. LVI. NOVEMBER, 1856. ART. I.-THE HYPOTHESIS: ITS PLACE IN REASONING. Theory of the Moral System, including a Possible Reason why Sin exists. Hartford: F. A. Brown. 1855. WE have in this book another instance of theorizing in theology. Ever since men began to think deeply and systematically on religious subjects, works of a similar character have been written, and doubtless, such will continue to appear from time to time, so long as we see through a glass darkly in this earthly state, and great interesting problems of moral science remain unsolved. Nor would we rebuke these attempts to account for the facts in our moral system and vindicate the ways of God to man. It may be objected that these explanations are unnecessarythat it becomes us to trust in God, to confide in his wisdom and rectitude where his ways are unsearchable; to find our repose in this assurance, that the Judge of all the earth will do right, and not in the success of our speculations. There are those who condemn all this theorizing on religious subjects. They content themselves with knowing that clouds and darkness are round about Jehovah, that he is a God who hideth himself, and whose ways are past finding out, and they VOL. XIX. 32 would not have the temerity to attempt discovering or elucidating any portion of God's ways upon which obscurity may rest. We have charity and a measure of sympathy for this class of persons. They conceive that these theories and speculations. savor of irreverence, of presumption, of distrust towards God; that they engender pride of reason and heat of controversy, and vain jangling, and minister questions rather than godly edifying which is in faith. And it must be admitted that there is some reason for these complaints and apprehensions. Such results have often followed the discussion of a theory or hypothesis, and they are to be deprecated. Better forego these speculations than carry them on with an irreverent and bitter spirit. But such discussions are by no means inconsistent with the Divine glory, with the integrity and authority of Divine truth, or with the humility of the reasoner. We would throw open this whole field. We would give full permission to him who feels disposed, and who is convinced that he could not employ his time or talents to better purpose, to study out and propound his theory. Frame and state your hypothesis, only in obedience to the Christian spirit and the laws of sound reasoning. We do not believe God forbids it. His truth will bear investigation. His character and ways will bear scrutiny. Your intellectual powers were given to be employed. God asks not unintelligent irrational faith. And you need have no fear but enough will remain, after all your efforts, to test your confidence and submission. We would not then forbid theories and hypotheses. We would only caution against the abuses and dangers which often attend them but are not inseparable from them. We would only bid you confine your theory or hypothesis to its legitimate uses. And on the dangers and uses connected with this species of argument we shall have something to say in the present Article. We do not intend a review of the book which has suggested these remarks. It claims to be only a theory. It is one added to the many attempts which have been made to account for the existence of sin under the Divine Government-to account for it in consistency with the Divine perfections. With the details of the theory, and with the degree of plausibility attaching to it, we are not at present concerned. But it is in place to remark, (and it is no slight commendation of the author,) that he evidently understands the nature of a theory and has kept it steadily in view throughout his work. His argument is intelligent, clear, consecutive, logical. The hypothesis in his hand is put to its legitimate use. The book is uncommonly free from the objectionable and mischievous features which often belong to works of this speculative character. It produces on the mind of the reader no impression dishonorable to God, or his truth, or unfriendly to the spirit of devotion. Its aim is modest and it fulfills all that it promises. The precise object which the author proposed to himself he has distinctly stated; and it will be seen that he claims for his argument only the strength of a supposition or hypothesis-possible, at least, (and if possible, it has its uses,) perhaps plausible or even probable. He sets forth his design in these words: "Were we fully acquainted with the plan of the moral universe, and could we obtain that connected view of it which God has, every doubt, difficulty and objection, in respect either to the doctrines of the Bible, or the dealings of Providence, would instantly vanish; for we should then see how every part is consistent with every other part; the precise object of each would appear, and the entire system unfold itself before us, even as it lies in the mind of the Almighty, harmonious, benevolent and grand. So if a system can be imagined, consistent with itself, and conflicting with no known truth, while it still contains within itself, the main doctrines of the Bible, then will it, to a certain extent, be attended with the same result. And this result will follow just in proportion to the degree of apparent harmony and plausibility imparted to it. . The effort has been to construct such a system, and to give it as great an air of probability as the circumstances of the case will permit. But whether it shall appear to the reader probable, or only plausible, or even highly improbable, be it remembered, that all that is claimed for it, is simply that it lies within the limits of possibility." (Introduction, pp. 19-20.) In this extract the author discloses his own correct apprehension of the nature and value of a theory or hypothesis; and we accord to him the credit of rigidly adhering to the laws of such reasoning. We have spoken of a theory or supposition or hypothesis, using these terms indiscriminately. Though perhaps unneces sary, it may yet be well to state our view of this species of argument. Hypothesis (rò rionu) and supposition (sub pono) may be taken as synonymous. And there may be this difference between hypothesis and theory, that theory is hypothesis favored or confirmed by independent considerations. It not only is supposed to explain the facts, but is sustained by other arguments. This seems to be the distinction, so far as there is any-a distinction, however, which we shall not very carefully observe in this essay. Without making any attempt at abstruse definition or metaphysical nicety, we simply say, that we have in view that kind of reasoning which is introduced to account for or explain some fact. It is often introduced to remove an objection or difficulty. It assumes certain premises which may be true, and if they are, they furnish a possible solution of the case. They explain the fact or phenomenon. They silence the objector. They relieve the difficulty. This is a mode of argument very extensively employed, as well in natural science as in morals and theology. On opening, for instance, a work on Geology, we find a discussion of the aqueous and igneous theories. There are certain palpable admitted facts in regard to the structure or condition of our globe. One school in science would explain them by the agency of water, another by the agency of fire. We turn to natural philosophy; and here also we find controversies about hypothesis. There are arguments to sustain the hypothesis of one electric fluid, and on the other hand, it is claimed that the theory of two fluids better explains the phenomena of electricity. And light, as it comes to the eye, is it material, does it move in right lines? Or is it produced by an independent medium and propagated in waves? Each supposition has its advocates. So in astronomy. There is the nebular hypothesis to account for planets in their various stages of formation. There was the old theory of ignorance and the Vatican, which maintained the revolution of the sun around the earth, while the earth was deemed stationary; and there is the now received theory, the Copernican, that the motion of the sun is only apparent, while, in truth, the earth is the revolving body. The doctrine of chances, in Logic, partakes of the nature of this argument. A certain supposition is made and the chances are calculated in respect to it. Then are the chances calculated in reference to a certain other supposition. And from such calculations it is judged which supposition is the more probable. The hypothesis is a mode of argument often resorted to in Logic and in pure Mathematics. So prevalent is this mode of reasoning. Indeed a certain philosopher seems to have held that the whole material world is only a hypothesis, not actually existing, but only supposed to exist; and on this theory an attempt has been made to explain the sensations, perceptions, and actions of mankind. This extensive use of the hypothesis shows that it is a species of reasoning natural and legitimate to the mind; and that it has its worth within certain limits. If it may be carried into extremes and fancies, so it may also be restricted, and in its proper sphere may render essential service to the cause of truth, both in science and in religion. The hypothesis may be of several kinds, or rather, may involve different degrees of probability. A supposition may be made which is violent, which shocks our consciousness or our reason. We then say the supposition is inadmissible. It answers not the purpose of a hypothesis, but would create more difficulty than it would remove. The hypothesis of a better not may assume only that which is possible. But it may be mere hypothesis. It may compel from us the admission that all this may be, but at the same time, and just as likely, it may There are no arguments to favor the supposition. It may account for the fact, but either of several other theories would account for it just as well. The hypothesis carried farther becomes plausible or probable. It satisfactorily explains the phenomena. It conflicts not with consciousness or reason; nor wit ha any known truth or fact. It seems to harmonize with the general analogy of nature, or morals or theology. Besides answering a purpose it has other considerations in its favor. Such a hypothesis is of value. It is at least good until it is overthrown or something better introduced as a substitute. A hypothesis, to be of the highest worth, must be such as, if admitted, will explain the phenomena or relieve the difficulty; such as may be admitted in consistency with all known truth; such as is attended with a degree of probability; and finally, the simpler and more probable the better. When the premises assumed as hypothesis pass from possibility to probability, and established truth, (as may sometimes be the case,) then the Probability to certainty-when the supposition becomes argument passes out of the region of hypothesis, and out of the mode of reasoning which we have at present under considera fron tion. It may the be well to glance at some of the useful ends to which nothing, it is not on this account without its value. hypothesis is subservient. it proves For, in the first place, hypothesis may lead to actual disCoveries or satisfactory conclusions, both in natural and moral science. Dr. Gregory, quoted by Stewart, remarks that "hypotheses, proposed in the modest and diffident manner that becomes' mere suppositions or conjectures, are not only harmless, but even necessary for establishing a just theory. They are the first rudiments or anticipation of Principles." "It is not to be questioned," says another writer quoted by Stewart, "but many inventions of great moment have been brought forth by authors, who began upon suppositions, which afterwards they found as it did to Columbus, who first believed the clouds that hover to be untrue. And it frequently happens to philosophers, |