Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

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of the mortgage was immediately broken, as soon as made, by failure to pay taxes previously and then due, no taxes having ever been paid by the mortgagor, and again by failure to pay the notes maturing in 1869, 1870 and 1871. After condition broken the title became absolute in the mortgagee, and so it was at the time of the enactment of the statute of 1872.

A statutory bar does not satisfy a debt, annul a contract, or deprive the holder of security. Keener v. Crull, 19 Illinois, 189, 191; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Illinois, 376, 384; McCagg v. Heacock, 42 Illinois, 153; Brockman v. Sieverling, 6 Illinois A. 512; Hancock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 114 Massachusetts, 155; Moses v. St. Paul, 67 Alabama, 168; Wheelan v. Kinsley, 26 Ohio St. 131; Waterman v. Brown, 31 Pa. St. 161; Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. 278.

If plaintiff in error had a right of entry as against the mortgagor in 1872, when condition was broken and she made her peaceable entry, the statute of 1872, which the Supreme Court of Illinois says is merely a statute of limitation, cannot have destroyed or changed that right of possession without invading the Constitution, for laches will not be imputed to one in the peaceable possession of land. Mills v. Lockwood, 42 Illinois, 111, 118; Dorman v. Dorman, 187 Illinois, 154, 160; Wilson v. Byers, 77 Illinois, 76, 84; Boyd v. Boyd, 163 Illinois, 611, 615; Beck Lumber Co. v. Rupp, 188 Illinois, 562, 570; Parker v. Shannon, 137 Illinois, 376, 392; Bush v. Stanley, 122 Illinois, 406, 418.

A constitutional statute of limitation does not run against or affect a possessor of real estate, but one out of possession. This was the law of Illinois when this mortgage deed was made. Mills v. Lockwood (1866), 42 Illinois, 111, 119; Parker v. Shannon (1891), 137 Illinois, 376, 392.

Such a change in the law, as here applied, deprives plaintiff in error of the right, title and interest vested in her under the laws of the State as they existed at the date of her mortgage and when condition was broken and when she took possession,

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Argument for Defendant in Error.

and violates the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 45; Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548, 599, 605; Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204, 222.

If the constitutional guaranties referred to protect plaintiff in error from the divestiture of her title, either by the statute of 1872 or by the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, she has such an equitable title as is contemplated by the statute of 1835, quoted in our statement of questions involved, and having been in possession, by actual residence thereon by her tenants, since 1872 and paid all the taxes, and for more than seven successive years from and after the expiration of the period of redemption (when her equitable title became complete), she is protected by said statute from defendant in error's action. Irving v. Brownell, 11 Illinois, 402; Collins v. Smith, 18 Illinois, 160; Martin v. Judd, 81 Illinois, 488; Dolton v. Cain, 14 Wall. 472; Gregg v. Tesson, 66 U. S. 150; Dredge v. Forsyth, 67 U. S. 563.

Mr. George W. Wall and Mr. E. A. Wallace, with whom Mr. Lyman Lacey, Jr., was on the brief, for defendant in error:

See § 30, ch. 77, laws of Illinois; it is a statute of limitations. Ryhiner v. Frank, 105 Illinois, 326, 330; Petterson v. Emerson, 135 Illinois, 55, 60; Seeberger v. Weinberg, 151 Illinois, 369, 382; Brown v. Ridenhower, 161 Illinois, 239; Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Illinois, 510, 515; Bradley v. Lightcap, 201 Illinois, 511, 519.

The Legislature of a State has the right to enact statutes of limitation, and it is no objection to their validity that they are made to apply to existing rights, provided a reasonable time be given in future for complying with the statute, and under repeated decisions of this court, the statute complained of is not unconstitutional. Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245, 255; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632; Kashkonong v. Benton, 104 U. S. 668, 674; Jackson v. Lamphier, 3 Pet. 280,

Argument for Defendant in Error.

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290; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 316; Ross v. Duvall, 13 ̃· Pet. 45, 64; Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514.

In Illinois the title to land mortgaged is not out of the mortgagor, except as between him and the mortgagee, and then only as an incident of the mortgage debt for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction; as to all other persons, and for all other purposes, the mortgagor is the legal owner of the mortgaged premises, and in the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Illinois merely adheres to the law of the State, as it always has existed therein. Fitch v. Pinckard, 4 Scam. 69, 83; Ryan v. Dunlap, 17 Illinois, 40; Sargent v. Howe, 21 Illinois, 149; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Illinois, 30; Hall v. Lance, 25 Illinois, 250; Harris v. Mills, 28 Illinois, 44, 46; Pollock v. Maison, 41 Illinois, 516; Emory v. Keigan, 88 Illinois, 482; Delano v. Bennett, 90 Illinois, 533; Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 Illinois, 32; Lightcap v. Bradley, 186 Illinois, 518, 524; Ware v. Schints, 190 Illinois, 189; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 497; Hutchinson v. King, 1 Wall. 53.

While the mortgage conveys to the mortgagee a legal title, it is only a limited or qualified legal title, and neither before. nor after condition broken does the mortgagee have the "absolute legal title" under the law of Illinois. On the contrary it is only a base or determinable fee. Independent of the debt, which the mortgage is given to secure, he has no title whatever. When the debt is paid, released, discharged or barred by the statute of limitations or in any way satisfied, the mortgagee's title is extinguished by operation of law. Cases cited supra and Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Illinois, 124, 132; Speer v. Hadduck, 31 Illinois, 439, 443; Bogardus v. Moses, 181 Illinois, 554.

The title, which the mortgagee gets by the mortgage, can be used by him, for one and only one purpose, viz.: as a means for the collection of the debt secured, or so much thereof as the mortgaged premises, when resorted to for that purpose, will satisfy. A valid foreclosure of the mortgage by a decree of a court of equity in a foreclosure suit, followed by a valid

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sale in pursuance of the decree, extinguishes the mortgage lien and satisfies the debt so far as the mortgage and land is concerned. Smith v. Smith, 32 Illinois, 198; Siligman v. Laubheimer, 58 Illinois, 124, 126; Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Illinois, 170, 179; Rains v. Mann, 68 Illinois, 264; Robins v. Swain, 68 Illinois, 197; Finley v. Thayer, 42 Illinois, 350, 353; Trustees of School v. Love, 34 Ill. App. 418; People v. Beebe, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 379, 388.

The land having been once applied by sale under a valid foreclosure toward satisfying the debt which was a charge upon it, could not again be sold or applied to the payment of the same charge. State Bank v. Wilson, 4 Gilm. 57, 67; Whiteneck v. Agritt, 56 Ill. App. 72; Smith v. Smith, 32 Illinois, 198; Hughes v. Frisby, 81 Illinois, 188; Ogle v. Koerner, 140 Illinois, 170, 180; Smith v. Vandyke, 17 Wisconsin, 214, 216; Smith v. Luddington, 17 Wisconsin, 344, 349; Warrick v. Hull, 102 Illinois, 280.

The authorities already cited show that a mortgagee, or cestui que trust, who becomes the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, thereafter sustains the same relation to the property that any stranger would sustain if such stranger had been the purchaser. Davis v. Dale, 150 Illinois, 239, 243.

No

In Illinois a certificate of purchase is only a lien. title passes to the holder of it, and there is none vested in him until the deed is made. Until the deed is made, he is not even entitled to the possession of the premises. Bennett v. Matson, 41 Illinois, 332, 344; O'Brien v. Fry, 82 Illinois, 274, 277; Rockwell v. Servant, 63 Illinois, 425; Vaughn v. Ely, 4 Barb. 159; Evertson v. Sawyer, 2 Wend. 507; Aldrich v. Sharp, 3 Scam. 261, 263; Kelhotts v. Wolf, 8 Brad. (Ill. App.) 371; Johnson v. Baker, 38 Illinois, 98, 102; Hays v. Cassell, 70 Illinois, 669, 672; Stephens v. Ill. M. F. Ins. Co., 43 Illinois, 327; Bowman v. The People, 82 Illinois, 246; Roberts v. Clelland, 82 Illinois, 538, 542; Smith v. Calvin, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 161.

The statute complained of, at most, only operated upon the remedy, and not even upon that until after all contract

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rights, obligations and duties given by, or growing out of the McCune trust deed had been enforced, and the trust deed itself extinguished by the foreclosure and sale. From and after the sale, all rights and interest of plaintiff in error, in or to the land, were measured by the certificate of purchase. Cases cited supra and Seeberger v. Weinberg, 151 Illinois, 369, 380; Smith v. Smith, 32 Illinois, 198; Rains v. Mann, 68 Illinois, 264; Wyman v. Cochran, 35 Illinois, 152; Leslie v. Bontil, 130 Illinois, 501.

A legislative act is not in conflict with the Federal Constitution, prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of a contract, unless it operates directly on the contract and impairs it. Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273; Turner v. Wilkes, 173 U. S. 461; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 109; Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535.

The conclusions of the Supreme Court of Illinois as to the respective rights, title and interest of the mortgagor and mortgagee, being predicated on the general local law of the State governing the same, are not reviewable by this court on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State. New Orleans Water Co. v. Louisiana S. R. Co., 125 U. S. 18; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 109; Turner v. Wilkes County, 173 U. S. 461; Abraham v. Casey, 179 U. S. 210; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316.

A certificate of purchase is not even color of title, much less does it confer title. Bride v. Watt, 23 Illinois, 507; Rigor v, Frye, 62 Illinois, 507; Shackleford v. Bailey, 35 Illinois, 387; Perry v. Burton, 111 Illinois, 138.

The title which is required by § 4, ch. 83, must be at least a prima facie good title either in law, or equity, and must continue in the party setting up the bar, for seven years, as well as the possession for seven years. Elston v. Kennicott, 46 Illinois, 207; Moore v. Brown, 11 How. 414; Skyle's Heirs v. King's Heirs, 2 A. K. Marshall, 385.

Cases cited supra show that the Supreme Court of Illinois has expressly decided that there is no title in the holder of