law, especially by that which makes it the duty of the referee to give notice to creditors (sec. 38), and by that which imposes the duty on the bankrupt to appear at the meeting of creditors for examination.

The finding of the trial court is that defendant "had no notice or actual knowledge, or other knowledge, of said proceedings in bankruptcy prior to the discharge of the bankrupt therein." This is made more definite as to time by the Court of Appeals. Defendant in error, upon making an inquiry by letter November 6, 1899, about Russell & Birkett, was informed that they had gone through bankruptcy, and subsequently, (November 17), the Northern District was given as the district of the proceedings. The discharge was September 12, 1899. Knowledge, therefore, it is contended, came to defendant in error in time to prove its claim (section 65), and to move to revoke the discharge of the bankrupt (section 15). It is hence argued that defendant in error must he held to have had "actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy," as those words of section 17 must be construed. We do not think so, nor is that construction supported by the other provisions of the law urged by plaintiff in error. Actual knowledge of the proceedings contemplated by the section is a knowledge in time to avail a creditor of the benefits of the law-in time to give him an equal opportunity with other creditors-not a knowledge that may come so late as to deprive him of participation in the administration of the affairs of the estate or to deprive him of dividends (section 65). The provisions of the law relied upon by plaintiff in error are for the benefit of creditors, not of the debtor. That the law should give a creditor remedies against the estate of a bankrupt, notwithstanding the neglect or default of the bankrupt, is natural. The law would be, indeed, defective without them. It would also be defective if it permitted the bankrupt to experiment with it-to so manage and use its provisions as to conceal his estate, deceive or keep his creditors in ignorance of his proceeding without penalty to him. It is easy to see

what results such looseness would permit-what preference could be accomplished and covered by it.

Judgment affirmed.

THE CITY OF SEATTLE v. KELLEHER.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON.

No. 29. Argued October 28, 1904.-Decided November 28, 1904.

An assessment on lands for the entire expense of opening a street levied under a front foot assessment authorized by statute is not necessarily void under the Fourteenth Amendment because levied after the work was completed, or because at the time the work was ordered the municipality had power, under statutes repealed after the completion of the work and before the assessment was made, to include a portion of the expense in the general taxes and to levy the assessment on a valuation basis under which a smaller amount would have been assessed against these lands.

Taxation, whether general or special, is not subject to the rules applicable to a vendor's lien and its enforcement against a bona fide purchaser for value, and it is for one purchasing lands after a public improvement has been completed to inquire whether it has been paid for, and the same rules as to the enforcement of the assessment applicable to the former owners are applicable to him.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Mitchell Gilliam, with whom Mr. Walter S. Fulton was on the brief, for appellant:

The intention to dedicate and the acceptance of the city appear and constituted a valid common law dedication. Elliott on Roads and Streets, Ch. V, 85; Dillon on Mun. Corp., 4th ed., vol. 2, 737; 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 395; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Peters, 662; City of Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters, 431; Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Illinois, 29; Surgeant v. Bank, 4 McLean, 339. An incomplete statutory dedication may become one at common law by acceptance by

Argument for Appellant.

195 U. S.

the public. Fulton v. Mehrenfeld, 8 Ohio St. 440; Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood, 6 N. E. Rep. 866.

The owner is precluded from revoking such dedication. 61 Am. Dec. 221; Heirs of David v. New Orleans, 79 Am. Dec. 586; People v. Jones, 6 Michigan, 176. Privies in estate are bound to the same extent as grantors. Warren v. Town of Jackson, 15 Illinois, 236; see also Kenyon v. Knipe, 2 Washington, 394; Tilzie v. Haye, 8 Washington,. 187; Schettler v. Lynch, 64 Pac. Rep. 955.

Even if some work was improperly done or an improper item included, the entire assessment would not be vitiated. Cincinnati v. White Lead Co., 44 Ohio St. 243; Dyer v. Scalmanini, 69 California, 637. The act provides a method of objection and appeal and that procedure must be followed or the right lost. Tumwater v. Pix, 18 Washington, 153; New Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Imp. Co., 16 Washington, 131; Annie Wright Seminary v. City of Tacoma, 23 Washington, 109.

A reassessment can be made by a different method from that in force when the original assessment was made. Wilson v. Seattle, 2 Washington, 543.

The question of adopting a method of levying assessments for local improvements lies purely in legislative discretion, and so long as that discretion is exercised in a reasonable manner, and gives parties interested an opportunity to be heard with the right to appeal to the courts from the determination of the city council, it cannot be said that there is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269; Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389; Wright v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371; French v. Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 325.

There is nothing in the front-foot method repugnant either to the Constitution of the United States, to the state constitutions and laws, to the decisions of the courts or to the conclusions of practical experience. Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 582; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104.

195 U. S.

Argument for Appellant.

So the determination of the taxing district and the manner of the apportionment are all within the legislative power. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Stanley v. Supervisors, 121 U. S. 535, 550; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 591; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 107; United States v. Memphis, 97 U. S. 284; Laramie v. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307; Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 176; Parsons v. Dist. of Col., 170 U. S. 51; Kidd v. Parsons, 128 U. S. 1; People &c. v. Brooklyn, 55 Am. Dec. 276; 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 1st ed., 71; Mattingly v. Dist. of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 590; Lexington v. McQuillan, 35 Am. Dec. (Ky.) 161; Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 238; Cooley's Const. Lim., 6th ed., 623; Baltimore v. University, 56 Maryland, 499; Northern Ind. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; 2 Dillon Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., § 761; Elliott on Roads and Streets, 391; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 644; Whiting v. Townsend, 57 California, 515; Emory v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 California, 345; Hayden et al. v. City of Atlanta, 70 Georgia, 817; Bacon v. Mayor of Savannah, 32 A. & E. Corpn. Cas. 244; Springfield v. Green, 120 Illinois, 269; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Indiana, 337; Amery v. Keokuk, 72 Iowa, 701; Sheley v. Detroit, 45 Michigan, 431; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Missouri, 379; Sigler v. Fuller, 34 N. J. L. 232; O'Reilly v. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 439; Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 North Dakota, 504; Upington v. Treasurer, 24 Ohio St. 232; King v. City of Portland, 2 Oregon, 147; Harrell v. Storrie, 47 S. W. Rep. 838; Davis v. Lynchburg, 84 Virginia, 861; Austin v. Seattle, 2 Washington, 669; Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wisconsin, 243.

After a person has signed a petition for an improvement, which can only be paid for by means of an assessment on contiguous property, he is estopped from contesting the validity of the assessment, especially after the work has been completed and accepted by the proper authorities. Cooley, Tax'n, 819; Ball v. Tacoma, 9 Washington, 592; Motz v. City of VOL. CXCV-23

Argument for Appellee.

195 U. S.

Detroit, 18 Michigan, 495; Wood v. Norwood Twp., 52 Michigan, 32; Ricketts v.-Spraker, 77 Indiana, 371; Patterson v. Baumer, 43 Iowa, 477; Ferson's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 140; Evansville v. Pfisterer, 34 Indiana, 36; Elliot, 420; Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. 252; Wright v. Tacoma, 19 Pac. Rep. 45; Powers v. New Haven, 120 Indiana, 185; 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 2d ed., 429; Taber v. Ferguson, 109 Indiana, 227; Ross v. Stackhouse, 114 Indiana, 200; Jenkens v. Stetler, 118 Indiana, 275; Johnson v. Allen, 62 Indiana, 57.

Due process of law is afforded where there is opportunity to be heard before the body which is to make the assessment, and the legislature of a State may provide that such hearing shall be conclusive so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned.

Mr. Frederick Bausman, with whom Mr. Daniel Kelleher and Mr. G. Meade Emory were on the brief, for appellee:

The former owner could have opposed the reassessment. Inviting the municipality to open a highway he did so according to the statute. Howell v. Tacoma, 3 Washington, 715; Grant v. Bartholomew, 58 Nebraska, 839; Birdseye v. Clyde, 61 Ohio St. 27; Smith v. Minto, 30 Oregon, 351; Terre Haute v. Mack, 139 Indiana, 99.

When a man's land is assessed unlawfully or in an unconstitutional manner for street improvements, he may contest the validity of the assessment, although he was a petitioner for the improvement.

As to the planking, see Session Laws, Washington Territory, 238, § 7.

Leaving out the violation of plain statutes involved here, there is such inequality as amounts to confiscation. It was grossly unnecessary and unjust to include this vacant, unoccupied tract in a district which was to bear the expense of planking when that planking was extended only along the settled portion of the street, and was to stop a thousand feet from our own tract, vacant and wild. Norwood v. Baker, 172