sustain by reason of any interference with any of its pipes, mains or hydrants, or any exposure of the same caused by such person or persons, corporation or corporations.

"SEC. 6. The said Helena Consolidated Water Company shall furnish and provide a full, ample and sufficient supply of good, pure, wholesome and clear water for the use and wants of the inhabitants of said city, and to provide said city with water for fire, sewerage (maintenance and construction) and for other purposes; and such supply shall be full, ample and sufficient for the present population of said city, and for the future population of the said city, as the same may be from time to time during the full term of five years; and said water shall be pure, wholesome and free from animal, vegetable or mineral substances, such as would render it unhealthy or unfit for domestic use.

"SEC. 26. It is hereby declared and understood to be of the essence of the agreement and the acceptance hereof that the said Helena Consolidated Water Company shall, at all times during the term of such agreement, provide all the inhabitants of the city, whatever their number may be, with a full, ample and sufficient supply of good, pure and wholesome and clear water, and shall convey, distribute and sell to them upon the terms and conditions herein provided and expressed."

By section 8 the company was required to provide twenty miles of mains within the limits of the city, and by section 10 the company was required to lay and maintain additional mains, of such sizes, at such times and upon such streets as the city council might from time to time direct. Section 17 provides that the company shall not refuse to permit connections to be made by or to sell water to persons offering to pay for the same.

Section 16 of the ordinance fixes maximum rates for water to be furnished to the inhabitants of the city. Section 21 makes appropriations for the term of five years from and after January 1, 1890, of certain sums for hydrants and the use of water for the benefit of the city. By the first section

of the ordinance, the company is granted the use of the streets, alleys and avenues and public grounds of the city for the laying and maintenance of its pipes and mains for the purpose of conveying water and selling it to those "desiring" to purchase the same, and to the city for fire and other purposes in case the city "desires to purchase the same."

Certainly, there is nothing in this section that savors of a contract beyond the obligation imposed upon the company in consideration of the franchise and privileges granted to furnish water at certain maximum rates to private persons or to the city, when such persons or the municipality desire to purchase the same. When we come to consider section 6 wefind an engagement whereby the obligation of the company to furnish water to the city is limited to the term of five years, and in section 21 we find an appropriation made to cover the compensation to be paid by the city for the term of five years for the use of water for public purposes. If these sections can be construed to amount to a contract between the city and the company, binding the city to take its entire supply of water from this company for five years, which would be broken by the erection or building of a plant by the city to supply itself with water, it had expired before the beginning of this suit, and the contract, if it existed after the expiration of the term named in section 6, must be found in other sections of the ordinance. The contention is that as by section 26 the water company was bound during the term of the agreement, which, it is claimed, is twenty years, to provide all the inhabitants of the city, whatever their number, with a water supply, this contract will be impaired and its benefits to the company destroyed if the city should erect an independent plant of its own. But, in our view, this section must be read with section 1, which requires the company to furnish water to such inhabitants of the city as desire to purchase the same, and there is nothing in this agreement which binds the city. to take water from the company beyond the term of five years, expressly provided in section 6, and for which, upon specific

terms as to prices, an appropriation was made in section 21. There is nothing in section 26 nor in section 1 undertaking to bind the inhabitants of the city to take water from the company. The city has not and, of course, could not undertake to make any contract upon the subject for the private supply of individuals in the city beyond securing a maximum rate of charge for water supplied. The engagement for their benefit requires the company during the term of the franchise to supply water at not exceeding certain maximum prices, which were fixed by the ordinance. Properly construed, we think this ordinance shows an agreement upon the part of the company to furnish water to the inhabitants of the city at not exceeding certain maximum rates, and to the city itself, upon terms to be agreed upon, made definite, as far as the city was concerned, for the term of five years. As thus interpreted, we do not find anything in this contract that prevents the city, certainly after the expiration of five years, from constructing its own plant. It has not specifically bound itself not so to do, and, as has been frequently held in this court, nothing is to be taken against the public by implication. Hamilton Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258; Long Island Water Supply Company v. Brooklyn, supra, and cases cited in the opinion. Had it been intended to exclude the city from exercising the privilege of establishing its own plant, such purpose could have been expressed by apt words, as was the case in Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Company, 172 U. S. 1. It is doubtless true that the erection of such a plant by the city will render the property of the water company less valuable and, perhaps, unprofitable, but if it was intended to prevent such competition, a right to do so should not have been left to argument or implication, but made certain by the terms of the contract. The right to tax within certain limits to procure a supply of water for the municipality, which shall be owned and controlled by the city, is authorized by the Constitution of Montana, article 13, § 6. Paragraph 4800 of the Political Code of Montana provides for the carrying into

effect of this constitutional power to tax for a system of water works to be owned and controlled by the municipality. The feature of the law requiring the purchase of existing water works instead of building an independent plant by the city was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Montana in Helena Consolidated Water Company v. Steele, 20 Montana, 1. The privilege of building other works was, in the absence of some binding contract forbidding the exercise of the power, clearly within the city's constitutional and statutory rights. We cannot find that the city has precluded itself from exercising this right by anything shown in this case. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to decide whether the city's right to construct a plant of its own was expressly saved in section 3 of the ordinance reserving the right to construct and maintain sewer work, or other works of a public nature."

This action is also brought by the water company as a taxpayer, and it is claimed that the city had no right to acquire a water supply and build its water works except by acquiring the plant of the company.

In the findings of fact it was expressly stipulated:

"That the City of Helena contemplates and intends to do all acts and things necessary to secure a water supply and system to be owned and controlled by the said City of Helena, and that it contemplates and intends to raise funds and revenue therefor in the manner provided by law, and to use the same for said purpose, and to furnish and supply the City of Helena and the inhabitants thereof with water from its said plant, and that it contemplates and intends to purchase and secure a sufficient quantity of water for said purpose, and that complainant does not obtain any of its water supply from either Beaver, McClellen or Prickly Pear Creeks.

"That the Ordinances Nos. 467 and 483, mentioned in paragraph 27 of the complainant's bill of complaint, were duly passed and adopted and approved, and that unless said defendant, the City of Helena, is enjoined and restrained from acquiring a water supply, plant and system, it will proceed

to acquire the same under said ordinances or such others as are necessary for said purpose, as herein before stated, and will engage in furnishing the said defendant, the City of Helena, and its inhabitants, with water, suitable and proper for its use, and that to do so will depreciate the value of complainant's franchise and property, as stated in paragraph 28 of the complaint, but that no injury of which complainant can complain will result therefrom if defendant city has the rights claimed by it. That the revenue for said purpose will be created and raised by borrowing money or raising funds within the limit of indebtedness, as heretofore or hereafter to be extended, in accordance with the requirements of the constitution and provisions of the statutes of the State of Montana in that behalf, unless it shall be adjudged that it has no legal or equitable right to do so, on account of the facts and admission hereinbefore stated and made."

We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that by this stipulation the controversy was narrowed to the question of the right of the city to erect and maintain an independent plant of its own in view of the alleged contract rights of the complainant. For that purpose, if it has the right so to do, it is conceded "it contemplates to raise funds and revenues therefor in the manner provided by law," and will raise revenues within the limits of indebtedness authorized by the Constitution and laws of Montana. This concession renders it unnecessary to notice the allegations of the complaint as to the right to tax for the purpose of erecting such works, or the alleged invalidity of any method of acquiring water works for the city except by purchase from the complainant.

Judgment affirmed.