January 6, 1900. He reported in obedience to his orders, and was assigned to the command of the Baltimore at Hong Kong, February 7, 1900. Between December 2, 1899, and February 7, 1900, petitioner was occupied in traveling on duty. partly on merchant steamer and partly on land, and in reporting to the Navy Department. During this time his pay was reduced fifteen per cent from the regular sea pay, in accordance with the first proviso of the Personnel Act, which declares that "such officers when on shore shall receive the allowances, but fifteen per centum less pay than when on sea duty."

The order detaching him from the Lancaster was as follows:

"SIR: You are hereby detached from duty in command of the U. S. T. S. Lancaster, will proceed immediately to Washington, D. C., and report at the Navy Department, at that place, for special temporary duty.

"Hold yourself in readiness for orders to sea duty.

"This employment on shore duty is required by the public interest.

"Respectfully,
"(Sgd.)

A. S. CROWNİNSHIELD,

"Captain CHARLES M. THOMAS, U. S. N.,

"U. S. T. S. Lancaster."

The next day, after reporting to the Navy Department under this order, he was ordered to proceed to San Francisco, California, and thence to Hong Kong. It thus appears that while he was not regularly detailed for shore duty, he was ordered to report at the Navy Department for a special temporary duty, and the final sentence of the latter indicates that it was regarded as an employment on shore duty. He was allowed by the Department fifty dollars traveling expenses from Barbadoes to New York, but was not allowed either mileage or sea pay. The Court of Claims, however, allowed him mileage under section 13 of the Navy Personnel Act, and

a clause of the Army Appropriation Act of March 3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1064, 1068, providing "that hereafter the maximum sum to be allowed and paid any officer of the army shall be seven cents per mile, distances to be computed over the shortest usually travelled routes;" but mileage seems not to have been claimed for his traveling from Washington to Hong Kong, by reason of the further provision of the same act "that actual expenses only shall be paid to officers when travelling to and from our island possessions in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans." The Government apparently acquiesced in this allowance of mileage, as it made no appeal therefrom.

But the Court of Claims further held that, under Rev. Stat. section 1571, he was not entitled to sea pay, because, by that section "no service shall be regarded as sea service except such as shall be performed at sea, under the orders of a department and in vessels employed by authority of law."

This construction must necessarily be correct, unless we are prepared to hold that a steamer upon which a naval officer takes passage under the orders of the department is a "vessel employed by authority of law." Obviously, it does not admit of this construction. A person who takes passage upon a steamer or a seat in a railway carriage does not "employ". such steamer or carriage in any just sense. We think the term "vessels employed by authority of law" is restricted to vessels owned or chartered by the Government, or otherwise engaged in the service of the United States.

Sea duty being duty at sea upon such vessels, an allowance for mileage is obviously inconsistent with such duty, as the pay of the officer necessarily includes travel upon such vessels; while it is appropriate to shore duty, since travel upon such duty is performed either upon land or upon vessels not engaged in Government service.

There is nothing in the Navy Personnel Act inconsistent with or repealing Rev. Stat. section 1571, and the case of Gibson v. United States, 194 U. S. 182, is not in point. In that case it was held that the Personnel Act did repeal sections 1578

and 1585, allowing sea rations, because the later act covered the same subject and superseded the provisions of those sections. There is no such conflict between section 1571 and the Personnel Act.

The ruling of the Court of Claims in this last particular was correct; but for the error in the previous ruling the decree must be

LOCKHART v. LEEDS.

Reversed.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW

MEXICO.

No. 10. Argued October 20, 1904.-Decided December 5, 1904.

Pleadings must be construed reasonably and not with such strictness as to refuse to adopt the natural construction of the pleading because a particular fact might have been more distinctly alleged, although its existence is fairly, naturally and reasonably to be presumed from the averments actually made.

There is nothing in the intricacy of equity pleading that prevents plaintiff .from obtaining the relief under the general prayer to which he may be entitled upon the facts plainly stated in the bill; and the court will not deny the relief if plaintiff is otherwise entitled thereto because it is asked under the general relief prayer on a different theory from that which is advanced under one of the special prayers.

Where the defendants are in possession of a mine, having obtained title thereto from the Government through fraud and connivance with one who was legally bound to take the title for the plaintiff, and the plaintiff cannot maintain ejectment, never having had the legal title, his remedy is by action in equity to have the defendants declared trustees ex maleficio for his benefit, and if it also appears that some of them are insolvent the defendants will be restrained from further mining pendente lite.

THE appellant filed his bill in this suit in the proper court of New Mexico for the purpose of obtaining relief against the defendants mentioned therein. The defendants demurred on several grounds, among which was that the complainant's

remedy, if any, was at law, and that the bill did not state a case for a court of equity. The demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, and the complainant thereupon appealed to this court. Among other things the bill averred that about May 7, 1893, the complainant and one Johnson, and the defendant Pilkey, entered into an agreement in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, by which they were to become partners in the enterprise mentioned in the agreement, and that for the consideration mentioned therein Pilkey was to start out to discover, if possible, and to locate for the purpose of operation by the parties, any mining claim of gold, silver or other metal, and that in order to enable Pilkey to carry out his portion of the. agreement he was to be furnished certain tools, etc,, and some money. If he discovered any such mine it was his duty to locate the same and to send in to the other partners specimens of the ore in order that its value might be determined. Work was to be begun within twenty days after the signing of the agreement. Any fraud by Pilkey was to forfeit his share, which was to be one-third interest in any mine discovered and worked.

The agreement was to continue for a year, and all discoveries and locations of any mines during that time by Pilkey were to be under the agreement mentioned. After the making of this agreement Pilkey started out to prospect and to discover, if possible, a mining claim of the character mentioned. The parties were aware at the time of the execution of the agreement of the existence of the place where Pilkey went for the purpose of prospecting and discovering a mine, and that there possibly might be a valuable claim at that place. Accordingly, Pilkey at once went to the spot, and on or about the tenth of July, 1893, he discovered the claim at that place, and it turned out to be a valuable mine. He located the mine according to the agreement, and posted the notice thereon provided by the laws of the United States and New Mexico, and proceeded to do work thereon pursuant to the provisions.

of those laws, but did not do all the work made necessary by them. The bill then alleges that Pilkey commenced to sink a shaft or cut upon the mineral-bearing lode, and did work enough thereon to arrive at mineral-bearing ore in place, within less than ninety days from the time of taking possession of the lode, and it is then averred that the parties were ready, able and willing in all things to comply with the laws spoken of, "and would have so done except for the wrongful, fraudulent and unlawful acts of the defendants hereinafter mentioned." Some time about October 1, 1893, Pilkey, while so in possession of the lode, wrongfully and fraudulently conspired, combined and confederated with the defendants to defraud plaintiff, and they agreed that said Pilkey, in violation and fraud of the rights of the plaintiff in and to the mine, should transfer, convey and deliver possession of the mine to the defendants, or one of them, without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff and the said Johnson. This was done. It was also agreed that they should do all other acts necessary to transfer the right to defendants. Pilkey was to have a certain proportion of interest in the mine and the defendants the balance. The defendants also caused and procured the defendant Pilkey to stop work upon the mine under the agreement already referred to, and it was also agreed that Pilkey should fail and neglect to record, in the proper office, a copy of the location notice posted by him on the ground. The defendants also covered up and concealed the work which had been done on the ground by Pilkey, and they posted another notice thereon and called the mine the "Washington" mine, and filed a copy of the same for record December 13, 1893, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff or his copartner, Johnson, and they made the location for the benefit of themselves as locators under the mining laws of the United States. For the purpose of concealing the interest of Pilkey in such pretended location it was agreed that each of the four defendants named should be entitled to a fifth interest, and that Pilkey should be entitled to the remaining fifth, which last-named interest should