195 U. S. Argument for the United States. 358, 373; So. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Bell, 183 U. S. 675, 690; Clark v. Herrington, 186 U. S. 206. The foregoing and the following decisions of this court, viz, United States v. McDaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 14, 15; Williams v. United States, 138 U. S. 514, 524; Knight v. U. S. Land Assn., 142 U. S. 161, 177; Catholic Bishop of Nesqually v. Gibbon, 158 U. S. 155, 167; Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211, 222; Kan. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Atchison &c. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 414, 421; Barney v. Winona &c. R. R. Co., 117 U. S. 228, 232; New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261, 267; Michigan Land &c. Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, 592; Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Musser-Sauntry Co.,. 168 U. S. 604, 611; Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co., 190 U. S. 301, 308; Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 324, settle beyond controversy the following propositions: 1. Upon the Land Department is imposed the duty of administering the Northern Pacific Railroad land grant, and it is clothed with power and authority to prescribe rules and regulations to that end, which necessarily includes the manner of making indemnity selections by said company, its successors and assigns. 2. It is the duty of the Land Department to pass upon and determine all questions touching the validity of indemnity selections, including the adjudication of adverse claims made for the lands selected, and if found to be legal in all respects, to approve the selections; otherwise to reject them. 3. No title passes from the Government, nor does any vested right attach to lands within a Northern Pacific Railroad indemnity selection unless and until such selection receives the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 4. When the indemnity selections are approved, the equitable title to the lands embraced therein passes under the grant. 5. The legal title does not pass from the Government until patent has issued. The Secretary of the Interior cannot arbitrarily refuse to approve an indemnity selection made by the railroad company, or defeat such selection by failure or neglect to act Argument for the United States. 195 U.S. thereon. Williams v. United States, 138 U. S. 514, 524; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473, 478; Dunnigan v. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co., 27 L. D. 467, 469. He has not finally passed upon these selections; that he must act upon them and determine all questions affecting their validity before the matters complained of can be carried into the courts by any person claiming an interest in the lands by reason of the indemnity selections. New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261; Germania Iron Co. v. United States, 165 U. S. 379; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 475, and until approved, there are no selections in fact, only preliminary proceedings. In respect to equitable rights to public lands this court has held: .1. That until the legal title passes from the Government, inquiry as to all equitable rights comes within the cognizance of the Land Department. Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473, 476. But until the title has passed to an individual the equities subject to which he holds it cannot he enforced in the courts. Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473, 475. 2. Until the legal title to public land passes from the Government the Land Department has jurisdiction to determine the question whether or not the equitable title has passed. Michigan Land and Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, 593; Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 476, 488. But pending the determination of this question by the Land Department the courts will not pass upon the same in controversies between individuals, but will leave it to be determined by the Land Department. Litchfield v. Register and Receiver, 9 Wall. 575, 578; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378, 396; New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473; Cosmos Co. v. Gray Eagle Co., 190 U. S. 301, 308. 3. After the Land Department has passed upon all disputed questions of fact and finally determined that the equitable title to public lands has passed from the Government, but not before, the courts may inquire into and determine controversies between individuals in respect to the validity of such 195 U.S. Argument for the United States. equitable title, together with individual rights claimed thereunder, and will accept the findings of the Land Department as conclusive upon all questions of fact. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530; Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473; Johnson v. Drew, 171 U. S. 92, 99; Clark v. Herrington, 186 U. S. 206, 210. Within the principles as above set forth the courts are without jurisdiction in this case, so far as the unpatented lands are concerned, to grant the relief prayed for by the complainants for the reasons: (1) The legal title is still in the United States; (2) the Land Department has jurisdiction to détermine the question whether or not the equitable title has passed; (3) the record shows that the Land Department is now considering this question and has not made a finding upon any questions of fact which may be involved. It is not a fact, as alleged by complainants, that the Land Department has passed upon the asserted rights of the respective parties to the entered lands, nor has it decided that patents shall issue upon the entries. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co., 26 L. D. 265. Until it does finally pass upon the asserted rights of such parties to these lands and decides to issue patents therefor, no vested rights attach thereto. While it is true that when the right to a patent once becomes vested, it is equivalent, so far as the Government is concerned, to a patent actually issued, Barney v. Dolph, 97 U. S. 652, 656; Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 402, 418; Simmons v. Waggoner, 101 U. S. 260; it is equally true that the right to a patent to public land does not become vested "as against the United States until all the prerequisites for the acquisition of the title have been complied with, Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330, 338; nor until conflicting claims, if any, to the lands have been finally determined by the Land Department. Cases cited supra. The Land Department retains jurisdiction in respect to public lands until patent has issued. United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 396; Knight v. U. S. Land Association, 142 U. S. 161. Whether the erroneous decision of the Secretary of the Interior with respect to the eastern terminus of the Northern VOL. CXCV-32 Pacific land grant involved merely a question of law, a mixed question of law and fact, or only of fact, the entries in question made because of such erroneous decision are, nevertheless, subject to inquiry by the Land Department and may be and should be canceled by it if found to be illegal. Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473; United States v. Schurz, supra; Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U. S. 353, 364. Mr. Benton Hanchett and Mr. H. H. Hoyt for Avery and other appellees. Mr. Luther C. Harris submitted a brief for Alger and other appellees. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. It is appropriate at the outset to refer to certain allegations of the bill which bring the determination of the case within a very narrow compass and make it unnecessary to consider some matters referred to by counsel. After setting out in detail the various steps taken by the railroad company to acquire a right to the lands in dispute, the bill alleges that "but for the vested rights" of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and its grantees the several tracts of land in question would have been unappropriated public lands open to the several kinds of entries or location made with respect to them, severally; also, that "the several applications and proceedings with respect to the said several entries were in due form, and regularly conducted, as required by law, and, in the absence of the vested rights of the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company and its grantees in the said premises, would have been operative and effectual to invest the several entrymen of said lands with complete equitable title thereto, each of such entries and locations having been finally receipted for, allowed and approved by the proper land officers of the United States; the only act remaining for the United States or its officers to perform with respect to such entries being the issuance of the patent in cases where the patent has not already issued;" and that all of the said entries and locations of lands referred to in the exhibit filed with the bill were allowed, and the final certificates (and so far as issued the patents) issued therefor "under a mistake of law founded upon a certain erroneous ruling by the Secretary of the Interior, to the effect that the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and their successors in interest, were not entitled to any lands by virtue of said act of Congress, approved July 2, 1864, and said joint resolution approved May 31, 1870, granting lands to said Northern Pacific Railroad Company, east of that point on the line of said Northern Pacific Railroad where the same crosses the line of the St. Paul and Duluth Railroad, known as Thompson Junction." Obviously, the first inquiry should be as to the object and scope of the act of 1898. Upon that point we do not think any doubt can be entertained, if the words of the act be interpreted in the light of the situation, as it actually was at the date of its passage. Here were vast bodies of land, the right and title to which was in dispute between a railroad company holding a grant of public lands, and occupants and purchasers -both sides claiming under the United States. The disputes had arisen out of conflicting orders or rulings of the Land Department, and it became the duty of the Government to remove the difficulties which had come upon the parties in consequence of such orders. The settlement of those disputes was, therefore, as the Circuit Court said; a matter of public concern. If the disputes were not accommodated, the litigation in relation to the lands would become vexatious, extending over many years and causing great embarrassment. In the light of that situation Congress passed the act of 1898, which opened up a way for an adjustment upon principles that it deemed just and consistent with the rights of all concerned-the Government, the railroad grantee; and individual claimants. The railroad company evinced its approval of this |