Argument for Petitioner. 195 U.S. 135 U. S. 641, 657; L. S. & M. S. R. R. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Trunick v. Smith, 63 Pa. St. 18; California v. Pacific R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 39; W. M. & P. R. R. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 296; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 696; Mich. Tel. Co. v. City of Charlotte, 93 Fed. Rep. 11. And taxes may be imposed for their construction and maintenance. Railroad Company v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667, 673; Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83, 91; People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401. The primary purpose of every highway is public travel, traffic, commerce, communication. But the manner of use within the range of physical possibility is for the legislature to determine. It is because railroads are highways that Congress is empowered to establish them as post and military roads of the United States. The power of Congress to establish the railroads of the United States as military and post roads is not a dormant power, but has been asserted and enforced by the Federal Government from the day the first railroad company was chartered. It has frequently been exercised as to railway bridges. 17 Stat. 99, 120, 160, 379. See also 5 Stat. 283; 10 Stat. 255; 12 Stat. 334; 14 Stat. 66; 17 Stat. 308, where in the case of such highways as the waters of the United States, canals and plank roads, Congress declares them to be post roads during the time the mail is carried thereon." Is not the omission of this qualification in the case of railroads somewhat significant? By the act of 1866, and correlated acts, Congress declared a policy and a purpose, that to encourage and facilitate intercommunication among the people, the companies operating the railroads and telegraphs of the United States should be mutually accommodating and coöperative, and should, so far as practicable, construct their lines of railroad and telegraph along the same rights of way. This policy is not only manifest from the title and context of the act of 1866, but from its history and the debates in Congress prior to its passage. This 195 U. S. Argument for Petitioner. policy has been discovered and declared by the courts, and numerous States have extended the policy by legislative enactment to include the telephone. Not only so, but through the dictates of self-interest and mutual accommodation, railroad and telegraph companies, from the earliest times, have under contract and agreement, operated side by side, so that today there is not, nor has there ever been, a railroad in the United States, over and along which telegraph lines have not been constructed, maintained and operated. Cong. Globe, Pt. IV, 1st Sess. 39th Cong., pp. 3480-3490; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530; United States v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 1, 41, 49; Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line, 114 Fed. Rep. 787; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 89 Fed. Rep. 190; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line, 65 Pac. Rep. 735; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. B. & S. W. Ry. Co., 3 McCrary, 130; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. B. & O. Tel. Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 660; Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 78 Fed. Rep. 858. Not only so, but the statutes of many States extend the right to occupy the highways of the State, including the highways called railroads, to telephone companies-this court having limited the application of the act of July 24, 1866, to telegraph companies proper. New Orleans, M. & T. R. R. Co. v. S. & A. T. Co., 53 Alabama, 211; Colorado: Union Pac. R. Co. v. Colo. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 69 Pac. Rep. 564; Georgia: S. F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 38 S. E. Rep. 353; Idaho: Postal Tel. Co. v. O. St. Line Ry. Co., 104 Fed. Rep. 623; Illinois: St. L. & C. R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 Illinois, 508; Kentucky: Postal Tel. Co. v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 54 S. W. Rep. 727; Louisiana: Postal Tel. Co. v. M., L. & T. R. R. & S. S. Co., 21 So. Rep. 183; Mississippi: Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 26 So. Rep. 370; North Carolina: Phillips v. Postal Tel. Co., 41 S. E. Rep. 1022; Tennessee: Mobile & O. Ry. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 41 L. R. A. 403; Texas: T. & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 52 S. W. Rep. 108; Virginia: Postal Tel. Co. v. Farmville & P. R. Co., 32 S. E. Rep. 468; Utah: Postal 195 U.S. Argument for Petitioner. Tel. Co. v. Oregon Short Line, 65 Pac. Rep. 735; Ohio: R. S. §§ 3454 et seq. By the act of 1866, the Western Union Telegraph Company, having accepted its provisions, was in express terms granted, among other things, "the right to construct, maintain and operate lines of telegraph over and along" the railroads of the defendant railroad company, provided only that its lines be so constructed and maintained as not to interfere with the ordinary travel on the railroads. The right granted to the Western Union Telegraph Company by the act of 1866, is simply of an easement of use, in an easement, yielding at all times to the necessities of the paramount use, and limited at all times to the non-interference with the primary uses of the railroad company. A right granted in such manner is not unusual, see cases cited supra. As to whether Congress, under its constitutional powers over the highways of the nation, as military and post roads, may appropriate the use of such post roads for the construction and operation of postal telegraph lines owned by it, or by one of its agencies, so long as the same shall not interfere with the ordinary travel on such military and post roads, without making compensation, either to the owners of the post roads or to the owners of reversionary interests therein, see Pittsburgh & W. E. Pass. Ry. v. Point Bridge Co., 165 Pa. St. 37; Stockton v. B. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9; Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 Fed. Rep. 803; S. C., 179 U. S. 141, and authorities cited; Hawkins Point Light House Case, 39 Fed. Rep. 77; S. C., 155 U. S. 102; Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269; Hewett v. W. U. Tel. Co., 4 Mackey, 424; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 324; Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593. As to the public character of a railway, see act incorporating N. J. R. R. and Transportation Company, by the legislature of New Jersey, March 7, 1832; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3; Wisconsin &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 296; Lake 195 U.S. Argument for Petitioner. Superior &c. R. R. Co., 93 U. S. 442; § 21 Penna. R. R. Co. Charter, Pamphlet Laws of Pennsylvania, 1846, p. 312; Trunick v. Smith, 63 Pa. St. 18; People's Telephone v. President &c., 199 Pa. St. 411. For decisions pro and con as to whether a telegraph line is an additional servitude, see Nichol v. Telegraph Co., 62 N. J. L. 733, as reported in 7 Am. Elec. Cas. 277, with note by Edw. Q. Keasbey. If a telegraph company, accepting the obligations of the act of 1866, in attempting to avail itself of the rights and privileges granted it by said act in public and such quasipublic property as the military and post roads of the United States, finds it necessary to appropriate to its use private property involved with the public and quasi-public property, the grant made by Congress will not be declared void as transcending the constitutional powers of Congress, but the Constitution itself will be read into the act and the act interpreted in connection therewith and the courts will provide the court machinery necessary to determine judicially the amount of just compensation to be paid therefor. The right to condemn may be exercised on the theory that an implied right has been granted. 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1054. Statutes should be sustained rather than ignored. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Fenton v. Hampdon, 11 Moore's P. C. 360; Sutherland's Statutory Construction, §§ 295, 324, 332, 340, 341, 343, 344, 379, 382, 388. The constitutional inhibition against taking private property without just compensation, being negative, is self-executing, and is to be read into every law and statute where applicable. In re Rugheimer, 36 Fed. Rep. 369; Hickman v. City of Kansas, 41 Am. St. Rep. 684, and note; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Williams, 8 L. R. A. 429. Compare Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. 600; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 334. Where a right is given by law or statute, and no special machinery is provided for the enforcement of the law, the courts will supply the machinery, Argument for Petitioner. 195 U.S. either by adopting the machinery already in use or the machinery in vogue at common law, which, in cases of condemnation, was the writ ad quod damnum, which simply means that the amount of compensation to be paid to an owner for the appropriation of his private property to a public use shall be determined by a full jury. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513; High Bridge Co. v. United States, 69 Fed. Rep. 320; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403; Dashiell v. Grosvenor, 66 Fed. Rep. 338; New York v. Pine, 185 U. S. 93; Galway v. Elevated Ry. Co., 128 N. Y. 132; Shepard v. Elevated R. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 442; Osborne v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 147 U. S. 248; McElroy v. Kansas City, 21 Fed. Rep. 357; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645; St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. W. U. T. Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 497. As to the writ ad quod damnum, see 2 Lewis Em. Dom. § 402; Scudder v. T. D. F. Co., 1 Sax. Ch. (N. J.) 694; Hooker v. New Haven & N. Co., 14 Connecticut, 146; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315; Wheelock v. Young, 4 Wend. 650; Stevens v. Middlesex County, 12 Massachusetts, 466; Bloodgood v. M. . & H. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Beekman v. S. & S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45; Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 467, 476. The act of 1866, necessarily implies that the beneficiary is vested with the power of eminent domain if, to avail itself of the rights granted, private property, incidentally involved with the specific property appropriated to its use, is also appropriated by it; otherwise the grant would fail. Murphy v. Kingston &c. R. R. Co., 11 Ontario, 582, distinguished. No case involving the principal issue herein has ever been presented to this court. The Pensacola case and the Ann Arbor case, on this point are not only clearly obiter, but by no means justify the significance attributed to them. While the principal issue has never been presented to this court lesser courts have construed the act of 1866 according to the principles contended for by the petitioner. Postal Tel.Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line, 114 Fed. Rep. 787; Postal |