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THE

JUDICIAL DICTIONARY.

“Words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools.”

HOBBES' LEVIATHAN, Pt. 1, ch. 4.

“How necessary it is to know the signification of words.”

Co. LITT. 325 a.

“Is not the judge bound to know the meaning of all words in the English Language ?"

Per MARTIN, B., Hills v. London Gas Co., 27 L. J. Ex. 63.

“Definition is always periculosæ plenum opus aleæ.”

Per WILLS, J., Swansea Imp. Co. v. Swansea Urban Authority, 61 L. J. M. C. 125.

“It is not necessary to go into the derivation of words, for that sort of rea= soning would not assist in the administration of justice.”

Per KINDERSLEY, V. C., Barrett v. White, 24 L. J. Ch. 726.

“Legal definitions are, for the most part, inductive generalizations derived from judicial experience.”

Mickle v. Miles, 1 Grant's Cases (Pa.), 328.

“Neither is a Dictionary a bad book to read. There is no cant in it, no excess of explanation, and it is full of suggestion.”

EMERSON.

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“When I use a word,' — Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,'it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.' "The question is,' said Alice, - 'whether you can make words mean so many different things ? '

“The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be the master ? That's all.'"

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, ch. 6.

"It is of the utmost importance that in all parts of the Empire where English Law prevails, Interpretation should be, as nearly as possible, the same.”

Per PRIVY COUNCIL, Trimble v. Hill, 5 App. Ca. 345; 49 L. J. P. C. 51.

THE

Judicial Dictionary,

OF

WORDS AND PHRASES JUDICIALLY INTERPRETED,

TO WHICH HAS BEEN ADDED

STATUTORY DEFINITIONS.

BY

F. STROUD,

OF LINCOLN'S INN, BARRISTER-AT-LAW,

RECORDER OF TEWKESBURY.

SECOND EDITION.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE,
STEVENS AND SONS, LIMITED, 119 & 120, CHANCERY LANE.
BOSTON, U. S. A.: THE BOSTON BOOK CO.

1903.

All rights reserved.

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