any colony or foreign dominion of the Crown where Her Majesty has a lawfully established Court or Courts of Justice having authority to grant and issue the said writ, and to insure the due execution thereof throughout such colony or dominion (25 Vict., c. 20), and it is certainly doubtful whether a certiorari or writ of error from the High Court would lie, even with the fiat of the Attorney-General, to any Court out of England (Reg. v. Lees, 1858, 27 L.J. Q.B. 403). But the above cited statute does not include the Isle of Man, which though not a part of the United Kingdom is neither a colony nor a foreign dominion (In re Brown, 1864, 33 L.J. Q.B. 193), and there might arise other excepted cases (see Ib.; Reg. v. Anderson, 1861, 30 L.J. Q.B. 129), for instance, the writ would still run to Jersey, In re Barnett, per Blackburn, J. Hil. 1875, Short and Mellor, 339.

If the writ lies, and it appears that the Court has acted with jurisdiction, the Court here will credit that Court. stating that the adjudication was for contempt, and according to the form and practice of that Court; which Court itself is the judge whether there has been a contempt or no, the Court in England not dealing with the question whether the decision was erroneous or no, but only looking to see whether there has been an adjudication with jurisdiction (In re Carus Wilson (Carus Wilson's Case), 1845, 7 Q.B. 984; 14 L.J. Q.B. 201; In re Crawford, 1849, 18 L.J. Q.B. 225; cf. Reg. v. Brenan and Gallan, 1847, 16 Ib. 289).

So, where to a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, &c., directed to the gaoler and Viscount of the Island of Jersey, the return stated that the prisoner was committed under and by virtue of a certain sentence of the Royal Court of that Island, which sentence was set out in the return, and was to the effect that in a cause in which the prisoner was a party, just as the Court was about to give judgment, the

prisoner, in the most unbecoming tone, interrupted the Court, by protesting against the reading of the judgment and the competence of the Court, and that he, having in vain been admonished to be more respectful, was committed to prison till he had paid a fine of £10, or asked pardon of the Court, and the return further certified that the sentence was a good and lawful sentence duly and lawfully made by the Court, and that the Royal Court was a court of civil and criminal jurisdiction with an appeal only to Her Majesty in Council, it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench that upon the return the conduct stated in it might have amounted to a contempt, and, that being so, the Court would not inquire into the degree of it, that the Judges in whose presence words are used are, in reality, the only competent judges as to whether what was said and done amounted to a contempt or no, that no warrant was necessary in order to make the commitment valid, and that affidavits were not admissible to shew that the law of Jersey, as set forth in the return, was incorrectly stated (Carus Wilson's Case, ubi supra).

The same principles were re-affirmed in a case where the prisoner had been committed, without warrant and not for a time certain, by the Chancery Court of the Isle of Man, for publishing, in the Mona's Herald, a libel in contempt of that Court (In re Crawford, ubi supra).

ii. Colonial Courts and the Judicial Committee.

The jurisdiction and powers of a Colonial Court depend upon its constitution as may appear from its charter, or from statutes or orders in council (Rainy v. Justices of Sierra Leone, 1852; 8 Mo. P.C. 47; McDermott v. Judges of British Guiana, 1868, L.R. 2 P.C. 341). By the Common Law every Court of Record is the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt, and the Judicial Committee can make no order by way of appeal in the ordinary manner,

as to a fine imposed as for contempt by a Court of Record (Ib.; Smith v. Justices of Sierre Leone, 1841, 3 Mo. P.C. 361 ; In re Ramsay, 1870, L.R. 3 P.C. 427). But a petition, forwarded to Her Majesty through the proper channel, may be referred to the Committee for their advice (Ib., 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 41).

Accordingly, where fines amounting together to £150 were imposed upon a practitioner in a colony in which a professional income could scarcely exceed £500, their Lordships recommended Her Majesty to reduce the sum to £60 (Rainy v. Sierra Leone, ubi supra).

A barrister engaged in his professional duty before the Supreme Court at Hong Kong was, without notice of the alleged contempt, or rule to shew cause, and without being heard in defence, by an order of that Court, fined, and adjudged to have been guilty of several contempts of Court in disrespectfully addressing the Chief Justice while conducting a cause. Their Lordships reported that, in their judgment, no person should be punished for contempt of Court, which is a criminal offence, unless the specific offence charged against him be distinctly stated, and an opportunity of answering it given to him, and, further, that it appeared that the barrister had received one sentence as for six several offences, and that in the statement of those alleged offences in the judgment pronounced by the Chief Justice, they were not satisfied that each of the six amounted to a contempt, or was legally an offence. The order was set aside and the fine remitted (In re Pollard, 1868, L.R. 2 P.C. 106; cf. Emerson v. Judges of Newfoundland, 1852-4, 8 Mo. P.C. 157).

There is no doubt as to the power of Colonial Courts to prevent advocates who misconduct themselves from practising before them (In re Justices of Antigua, 1830, 1 Kn. P.C. 267; In re Monckton, 1837, 1 Mo. P.C. 455; In re Grant, 1850, 7 ib. 141; Bunny v. Justices of New Zealand,

1862, 15 ib. 164). But to procure the officer of the Court to serve notice of a petition to the Queen upon the Judge is not such a contempt as to warrant suspension from practice for six months (In re Downie & Arrindell, 1841, 3 ib. 414). To offences which are contempts there has been attached by law and long practice a definite kind of punishment, namely, fine and imprisonment (In re Wallace, 1866, L.R. 1 P.C. 283). It is doubtful whether striking off the Rolls or suspension can be the proper punishment even for a contempt committed as an advocate or practitioner (Ib.; In re Downie & Arrindell, ubi supra; Smith v. Sierre Leone, ubi supra), and certainly a barrister should not be suspended from practice for a contempt committed by him not in his professional capacity, but as himself a suitor in the Court, by writing a letter to the Judge complaining of his conduct in the cause (In re Wallace, ubi supra).

Their Lordships being of opinion that the conduct of the petitioner, though improper and disrespectful, was not such as to justify an order to strke him off the Rolls, directed the petitioner to make an application to the Colonial Judges to restore him, with an expression of their opinion that if he apologised he should be restored (Smith v. Justices of Sierra Leone, 1848, 7 Mo. P.C. 174). An order nisi for striking an attorney and practitioner of the Colony of Newfoundland off the Rolls of the Court there, unless cause be shewn to the contrary in four days, made absolute upon no cause being shewn, notwithstanding an application for extension of time to prepare defence, reversed as improperly and irregularly made. (Emerson v. Newfoundland, ubi supra).

It has been held that a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench in Lower Canada, sitting alone in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction, under the authority of sect. 72 of c. 77 of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada, has no power to pronounce a counsel in contempt for publishing two

letters reflecting upon the conduct of the Judge, or to impose a fine (In re Ramsay, 1870, L.R. 3 P.C. 427. See Canada Statutes, c. 95).

Note II. to Article IV. Contempt of Parliament.

Imperial Parliament (Co. Lit. § 110a).

The Commons have exercised, and the Lords have claimed and exercised, a jurisdiction to punish contemptuous words spoken of a member of the Royal Family, as a contempt of the King, the head of Parliament (Floyde's Case, 1621, 2 St. Tr. 1154; 8 ib. 52).

The Lords have committed one of their own members for contempt of the House in the House (Earl of Shaftesbury's Case, 1677, I Mod. 144; 6 St. Tr. 1269), and, in 1799, they committed the printer of the Cambridge Intelligencer for a libel on a spiritual peer (Rex v. Flower, 1799, 8 T.R. 314). In these last two cases, upon applications for release by Habeas Corpus, the Queen's Bench held a general return, stating a committal for contempt of the House, sufficient, and were pretty clearly of opinion that they had no jurisdiction to inquire into any proceeding of the highest Court in the land (See also Sir Samuel Barnadiston's Case, 6 St. Tr. 709; Anson, Law of the Constitution, I., 300, 301; § ii. (a) supra).

House of Commons.

If ever at any time the House of Commons possessed any judicial authority (Stubbs, ii., 248, 2nd Ed.), the House was relieved thereof, at its own request, as early as the time of Henry IV. (Anson, 308). It has thus come to be doubtful whether the House can be rightly called a Court of Record (Burdett v. Abbott, Burdett v. Colman, 1811, 14 East 1,163, K.B.; 1812, 4 Taunt. 401, Ex. Ch.; 1817, 5 Dow. 165, H.L.; Speaker of Victoria v. Glass, 1871, L.R. 3 P.C. 560,