thing in which all free agency confifts.-The pulse can bear; and the limbs can move, in fome bodily disorders, or when one that is ftronger than we takes hold of them whether we will or no. But God does not confider us as accountable, for fuch actions as these. And we should, not without reason, think it very hard, fhould he blame or punish us for them. For an honest and good man's pulfe may beat, as irregularly as the worst villain's in the world. Or his hands, in a convulfion, may ftrike thofe around him, in spite of all he can do to hold them ftill. Grone may be carried by force, along with a gang of thieves, and be taken for one of them, though no man hates fuch company and actions as theirs, more heartily than he does. Such involuntary actions, every one fees a man is not, & ought not to be, accountable for. And the reafon is, no bad inclination of ours, or want of a good one, is neceffary in order to them, They are fo free, as to be independant of us, and out of our power. If all our actions were like thefe; noways neceffarily connected with our difpofition, and choice, and temper of mind; we could not be accountable creatures, or the fubjects of moral government. If a good tree, could bring forth evil fruit, and a corrupt tree good fruit if a good man, out of the good treasure of his heart, could bring forth evil things, and an evil man out of the evil treasure, good things; the tree could never be known by its fruit. It could never be known by a man's actions, any thing what his heart was. that, if they were dealt with according to their works, the most upright and well difpofed, would be as liable to be punished; and the most ill-natured and ill-difpofed, as likely to be rewarded, as the contrary. Whence all moral government must be at an end.

So

CERTAINLY, if we are justly, accountable, rewardable or punishable, for any actions; if any actions are, or can be, properly our own, it must be fuch as are dictated by ourfelves, and which can't take place without our own confent. An inability, therefore, to act otherways than agreeably

agreeably to our minds, is only an inability to act otherways than as free agents. And that neceffity which a riles from the temper and choice af the agent himself, and that which is against his choice and his very nature, are fo far from coming to the fame thing at laft, that they are directly contrary one to the other, as to all the purposes of morality: freedoni, accountablenefs, and defert of praife, or blame, reward or punishment.

AND this is agreable to the fenfe of all mankind, in all common cafes. A man's heart being fully fet in him to do evil, does not render his evil actions the lefs cri minal, in the judgment of common fenfe, but the more 10 fo: Nor does the strength of a virtuous difpofition, Bren der a good action the lefs, but the more amiable, and ⠀ worthy of praife. Does any one look upon the Divine Being, as less excellent and glorious, for being fo infinite!! ly and unchangeably holy in his nature, that he "cannot "be tempted with evil," or act otherwife, than in the most holy and perfect manner? Does any one look upon the devil, as lefs finful and to blame, because he is of fuch. a devilish difpofition, fo full of causeless spite and malice, V against God and man, as to be incapable of any thing, but the most horrid wickednefs ? And as to mankind: Who is there that does not make a difference, be m tween him that is incapable of a base action, only by rea fon of the virtuoufnefs of his temper, having all the natural talents, requifite for the moft confummate villany; and him that is incapable of being the worft of villains, for no other reafon,than only because he don't know how? Does any one think, that only the want of a will to work, excuses a man from it just as much as bodily infirmity dces? Or, do we any of us, ever imagine, that the cove tous mifer, who with all his useless hoards, has no heart to give a penny to the poor, is for that reafon, equally excufable from deeds of charity, as he who has nothing to give?

We certainly, always make a diftinction, betwixt want

of

of natural abilities to do good, and the want of a heart; looking upon the one as a good excuse, the other as no excufe at all, but rather as that in which all wickedness radi cally confifts. A natural fool,no one blames, for acting like a fool: But to him that knoweth to do good, and doth "it not; to him it is fin," in the fenfe of all mankind, as well as in God's account. "If there be first a willing "mind," we always fuppofe it ought to be "accepted,

according to that a man hath, and not according to "that he hath not." But the want of a willing mind, or not being a mind to do well, is univerfally confidered as a crime, and not as an excufe. Nothing is more fa- : miliar to us, than to diftinguish in this manner. can any man of common fenfe, help judging thus.

Nor

Now, this diftinction is as applicable to the cafe before us, as it is to any other cafe, Some may be unable to comply with the gofpel, through the want of thofe powers of mind, or those bodily organs, or thofe means of grace, without which it is impoffible to understand the character of Christ, or the way of falvation, let their hearts be ever fo good. In either of which cafes, the inability is of the natural kind. Others, may have all the outward means,and all the natural faculties, which are neceffary in order to a right understanding of the gofpel; and yet, through the evil temper of their minds, they may be wholly averfe to it, and wholly blind to the glory of it. They may be disposed, to make light of all its proposals and invitations, and to treat every thing relating to religion and another world, with the utmoft neglect and indifference. Or if their fears of "the wrath to come," are by any means awakened, and they are made with much folicitude, to enquire" what "they fhall do to be faved;" ftill,they may be utterly dif inclined to fubmit to the righteousness, or the grace of God, as revealed in the Gospel. They may be ftill, fuch "children of the devil, and enemies of all righteousness, "as to be irreconcilably averfe to all the right ways of the "Lord." They may have "fuch an evil heart of un"belief

Certainly an Inability of one Kind or the other, &c. 17

"belief, to depart from the living God," as is abfolute ly inconfiftent with confenting to the covenant of grace, or "believing to the faving of the foul." Now, when this is the cafe, the inability the finner is under, is only of a moral nature. We may pass on now to the

H. HEAD, viz. To fhow that all who are not the fubjects of this fpecial and effectual grace of God, must certainly be unable, in one or the other of these fenfes, to come to Chrift, or comply with the gofpel.

THOSE, many of them at leaft, who diflike the diftinction now explained, and fome who feem in a fort to admit it, fuppofe all men have, and must have, every kind of ability to do their duty, and to obtain falvati on. But, I apprehend, it will be very eafy to make appear, that this certainly is not the cafe. A variety of fcripture arguments, and a multitude of texts, might be adduced. here, were they needed. But that all have not, both the forementioned kinds of ability to comply with the gofpel, either of themfelves, or by the help of common grace, is as evident as any thing needs to be, meerly from the fact, that many do not do it, but actually live and die in impenitence and unbelief. By common grace is meant, that grace which is given to finners in general, thofe that are not faved, as well as thofe that are. They who believe all, are in every fenfe, able to work out their own falvation, through the gofpel, would not be thought to fruftrate the grace of God. They do not fuppofe finners are able to do this of themselves, but that fome divine affiftance, fome working of God in them, both to will and to do, is really neceffary in the cafe. But then they fuppofe, all this needed grace, whatever it be, is given to finners without exception; and hereby they account for God's commanding all men every where, to repent and believe the gospel. "I grant, indeed,' fays an ingenious arminian writer," that by reason of original fin, we are utterly disabled for the perform

C

Dr. Stebbing, on the opperations of the spirit.

ance

"ance of the condition, without new grace from God. "But I fay then, that he gives fuch grace to all of us,

by which the performance of the condition is truly "poffible, and upon this ground he doth and may most

66.

righteously require it." Here by the way, it is worthy of particular remark, what notions many are obliged to entertain of divine grace, in order not to reflect upon the divine justice. To require perfect holiness of creatures fo enfeebled and depraved as we are, they uppofe would be evidently one of the most unreasonable things in the world. Therefore God has been graciously pleased to fend his Son to obey and die in our room, that we might not be "under the law but under grace." But then the covenant of grace, is not mild and gracious enough to be quite strictly juft; because by reason of original fin, we are utterly difabled for the performance of the condition upon which falvation is fufpended ftill. To remedy the unreasonableness of this, new grace from God is required. Accordingly" he giveth more grace." "he "He gives fuch grace to all of us, whereby the performance of the "condition, is truly poffible; and upon this ground he "doth and may moft righteously require it !" Thus, not only the obedience and death of Chrift, but, likewise all the grace of the Holy Ghoft which is neceffary to falvation, is found no more than barely fufficient to screen the ways of God to men, from the juft imputation of unreafonableness, and unrighteoufnefs. It is certainly difficult to conceive, how any man who really views things in this light, however much he may talk of free grace, can ever feel himself any more obliged and indebted to God, than if he had only dealt with us in a righteous manner from firit to laft, never requiring more of us than we were able to do, and fo no occaffion or room had been given for any grace in the affair. And yet this view of the matter, is really as friendly to the grace of God,' as any conceivable one which proceeds upon the principle, that

nothing

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