upon himself a public employment, with special privileges which only the State can confer upon him, the case is clear enough; and it seems to have been the view of both courts in this case, that the circumstances were such as to give the warehousemen in Chicago, who were the only persons affected by the legislation, a "virtual" monopoly of the business of receiving and forwarding the grain of the country to and from that important point, and by the very fact of monopoly to give their business a public character, affect the property in it with a public interest, and render regulation of charges indispensable.1 The phrase "affected with a public interest" has been brought into recent discussions from the treatise De Portibus Maris of Lord Hale, where the important passage is as follows: "A man for his own private advantage may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes the most of his own. If the king or subject have a public wharf unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharves only licensed by the queen, or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, &c., neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by the king's license or charter. For now the wharf, crane, and other conveniences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his own land; it is now no longer bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest." If the case of a street thrown open to the public is an apt 1 See what is said by Breese, Ch. J., in 69 Ill. 88-89, and by Waite, Ch. J., in 94 U. S. Rep. 131. In Attorney-General v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 589, Chief Justice Ryan, in his very able opinion affirming the right to fix railroad charges by amendment to charters which reserved the power of amend ment, intimated decided views in illustration of the public interest Lord Hale had in mind, the interest is very manifest. It will be equally manifest in the case, of the wharf, if it is borne in mind that the title to the soil under navigable water in England is in the Crown, and that wharves can only be erected by express or implied license, and can only be made available by making use of this public property in the soil. If, then, by public permission, one is making use of the public property, and he chances to be the only one with whom the public can deal in respect to the use of that property, it seems entirely reasonable to say that his business is affected with a public interest which requires him to deal with the public on reasonable terms. In the following cases we should say that property in business was affected with a public interest: 1. Where the business is one the following of which is not of right, but is permitted by the State as a privilege or franchise. Under this head would be comprised the business of setting up lotteries, of giving shows, &c., of keeping billiard-tables for hire, and of selling intoxicating drinks when the sale by unlicensed parties is forbidden; also the cases of toll-bridges, &c. 2. Where the State, on public grounds, renders to the business special assistance, by taxation or otherwise. 3. Where, for the accommodation of the business, some special use is allowed to be made of public property or of a public easement. 4. Where exclusive privileges are granted in consideration of some special return to be made to the public. Possibly there may be other cases. Miscellaneous Cases. It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which police power is or may be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance * of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity.1 Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his [* 595] interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages, within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result.2 Wharf lines may also be established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners of waterfronts from building out on that which constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature have authority" to impose.* So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the owner, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Mill-dams are sometimes destroyed upon this ground; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of 1 Saltpetre Case, 12 Coke, 13; Mayor, &c. of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend. 129; Russell v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 2 Denio, 461; Sorocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69; Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 714; American Print Works v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 248; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38; Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Penn. St. 80; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 756759. And see Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517, for a case where the municipal authorities purchased and took possession of the liquor of a city about to be occupied by a capturing military force, and destroyed it to prevent the disorders that might be anticipated from free access to intoxicating drinks under the circum urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery purposes.1 The keeping of gunpowder in unsafe quantities in cities or villages; 2 the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labelled; allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydrophobia is apprehended; or the keeping [* 596] for sale unwholesome provisions, or other deleterious substances, are all subject to be forbidden under this power. And, generally, it may be said that each State has complete authority to provide for the abatement of nuisances, whether they exist by the fault of individuals or not, and even though in their origin they may have been permitted or licensed by law.5 3 The preservation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to legislative supervision, which may forbid the keeping, exhibition, stopped. Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64. See League v. Journeay, 26 Tex. 172; ante, p. *584, and cases cited in note. 1 Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 Cow. 538; Coates v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Penn. St. 411; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 377. As to the general power of regulation of places of burial, see Woodlawn Cemetery v. Everett, 118 Mass. 354; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191. And see ante, p. *584, note. 2 Foote v. Fire Department, 5 Hill, 99; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Geo. 509. And see License Cases, 5 How. 589, per McLean, J.; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 27, per Shaw, Ch. J. 8 Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H. 373; Washington v. Meigs, 1 Mc Arthur, 53. Dogs, which are animals in which the owner has no absolute property, are subject to such regulations as the legislature may prescribe, and it is not unconstitutional to authorize their destruction, without previous adjudication, when found at large without being licensed and collared according to the statutory regulation. Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136. And see Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 298; Morey v. Brown, supra. As a measure of internal police, the State has the power to encourage the keeping of sheep, and to discourage the keeping of dogs, by imposing a penalty upon the owner of a dog for keeping the same. Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62. A law prohibiting the bringing of Texas and Cherokee cattle into the State, because of the tendency to communicate a dangerous and fatal disease to other cattle, was sustained in Yeazel v. Alexander, 58 Ill. 254. It has since, however, been questioned, and in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. Rep. 485, such an act was held to be an invasion of the power of Congress over interstate commerce. See Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; Watertown v. Mayo. 109 Mass. 315. But under this power it would not be competent for a city to tax a lot owner for the expense of abating a nuisance on his lot which the city itself had created. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. See Barring v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 95. 5 See cases of repealing licenses, ante, p. *283 and note. or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their destruction if seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement that may be resorted to for the purpose of gaming; or forbid altogether the keeping of implements made use of for unlawful games; or prevent the keeping and exhibition of stallions in public places.2 So the markets are regulated, and particular articles allowed to be sold in particular places only, or after license; weights and measures are established, and dealers compelled to conform to the fixed standards under penalty,5 and persons following particular occupations of a nature requiring special public supervision, such as auctioneers, draymen, hackmen, hucksters, victuallers, and the like, are required to take out licenses, and to conform to such rules and regulations as are deemed important for the public convenience and protection. These instances are more than 1 Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Commonwealth v. Colton, 8 Gray, 488; State v. Hay, 29 Me. 457; State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426. 2 Nolin v. Mayor of Franklin, 4 Yerg. 163. A city may forbid the keeping of swine within its densely settled portions. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. Or slaughterhouses. Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315. Compare Blydenburg v. Miles, 39 Conn. 485. Or any other business noxious or dangerous to the public or any portion thereof. Taylor v. State, 35 Wis. 298. 3 In Louisana it has been held competent to prohibit private markets within a certain distance of the public market. New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 La. Ann. 417. • Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Weud. 99; Bush v. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418; Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347; State v. Leiber, 11 Iowa, 407; Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio, N. s. 550; Green v. Carson, 10 Bush, 64. The power is continuing, and markets once established may be changed at the option of the authorities, and they cannot even by contract deprive themselves of this power. Gale v. Kalamazoo, 23 Mich. 344; Gall v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, N. s. 563; Cougot v. New Orleans, 16 La. Ann. 21. A constitutional provision forbidding the General Assembly granting "to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens," does not preclude the licensing of the sale of intoxicating drinks by males only. Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 315. 5 Guillotte v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 432; Page v. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392; Raleigh v. Sorrell, 1 Jones, L. 49; Gaines v. Coates, 51 Miss. 335; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 323, 324, and cases cited. 6 Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428; s. c. 20 Am. Rep. 12; Dillon, Mun. Corp. §§ 291-296. As to license fees, and when they are taxes, see ante, pp. *201, *495; Mayor, &c. of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 139. The sale of pure milk and pure water mixed may be made a penal offence. Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264. As to market regulations in |