in the express declarations of scripture itself the basis of this doctrine is laid. But the mode of warfare resorted to by some of them, enforces a slight deviation from the line of procedure which otherwise I should have pursued. When men, in order to effect a particular purpose, can have recourse to reasonings, which, if admitted, would land us in utter and deplorable scepticism, it becomes necessary both for their own sake, and for the sake of those over whom they may have acquired influence, to attack and demolish their sophistry. The assumption by certain parties of the fallibility of consciousness, is a ruse de guerre so decidedly exceeding the utmost license indulged to theological controversy, that it deserves to be exposed. No soundly and profoundly thinking mind, it is true, can be led astray by such an argument; but all are not capable of thinking soundly and profoundly; and as persons belonging to the latter class are more numerous than those belonging to the former, it becomes necessary, with a view to their advantage, to shew up the fallacy involved in every representation that our consciousness may deceive us. Besides, thereby, even the most illiterate will be furnished with the means of getting rid of an argument which, in the hands of the artful and designing, may be turned to considerable account.

The next chapter, therefore, will be devoted to the consideration of the subject of consciousness.

CHAPTER II.

THE INFALLIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The testimony of consciousness is always unerring, nor was it ever CALLED IN QUESTION BY THE GREATEST SCEPTICS, ANCIENT OR MODERN.

REID on the Active Powers.

An account of some recent attacks which have been made on the infallibility of consciousness, will prepare the reader for understanding the nature of my defence of that doctrine, and constitute some sort of an apology for the time, pains, and space which I have devoted to the consideration of the subject.

Till within the last few years, I am not aware that any person, in the possession of his sober senses, ever dreamed of calling in question the truth and infallibility of consciousness. Men of every sect and party in religion concurred in receiving it as an axiom, that whatever might be the feelings of an individual, or the thoughts passing through his mind, it was essential to their very existence that he should be conscious of them.

To feel or think, and to be conscious of feeling or thinking, were regarded by every one who had any pretensions, however slight, to the character of a metaphysician, as identical modes of expressing ourselves. So thoroughly satisfied was Mr. John Barclay of Edinburgh-the author of a masterly work on the assurance of faith, to which particular reference will afterwards be made of its being impossible, without grossly outraging the common sense of mankind, to deny the identity of feeling, and the consciousness of feeling, that with the utmost propriety he assumed this identity as one of the bases of his system; and declared, in his usual emphatic way, that if any man should dispute it, "he would despise his arguments, and think himself entitled to answer him with silence.*" But we live in sadly sceptical times. What, sixty years since, Mr. Barclay deemed it impossible for any sober minded man to assert, has in our day actually been maintained; and, strangely enough, his own work has been one of the principal means of calling forth this exhibition of perverted intellect. Shrewd and discerning Calvinists opposed to Mr. Barclay's system could not help perceiving, that to concede to him the infallibility of consciousness, while at the same time they agreed with him in maintaining that through faith in the divine testimony concerning Jesus we are necessarily interested in gospel blessings, was in reality to bring themselves under the necessity of conceding to him his conclusion likewise. For, granting that consciousness accompanies all the

* Assurance of Fath Vindicated. By John Barclay, A.M., p. 31, 3d ed.

operations of the mind, and that it is necessarily infallible, how could they maintain that a person actually believing the gospel might nevertheless be ignorant of his so believing, or be liable to fall into any mistake respecting the matter? To admit, however, the correctness of Mr. Barclay's theory, that every believer of the gospel is infallibly certain of his own everlasting happiness, suited neither the experience nor the interests of those opposed to him, and therefore they behoved to find out some loop-hole for retreat. While the doctrine of the infallibility of consciousness was allowed to stand, escape was out of the question; and therefore to assail, and, if possible, to undermine this doctrine, the efforts of that portion of the Calvinistic body which may properly be denominated its forlorn hope, began to be directed. Regardless of consequences-careless as to the desolating scepticism into which, could they succeed, mankind would necessarily be plunged-these heroes have at length ventured to maintain, and even attempted to demonstrate, that every man is liable to be imposed on by his own consciousness. One of the Christian sceptics of whom I am now speaking, in an article written expressly on Mr. Barclay's work, after admitting that the whole controversy respecting assurance hinges on the question as to "the certainty of the evidence of consciousness," thus proceeds: "It is in the first place very plain that if the testimony of consciousness were infallible, there could be no such thing as self-deception; for consciousness is connected with all our mental acts and feelings. To explain how it

happens that a power which takes cognizance of what passes through our minds should deceive us by its testimony, would lead us too far into the philosophy of the human mind; but we may just remark, by the way, that if the operations of the mind were better understood by theologians, we should have far fewer of those unprofitable metaphysical vagaries which have so often perplexed the beautiful simplicity of Christian truth.* But one thing is plain, that if consciousness were a source of certain information as to the state of our minds, there could be no such a thing as self-deception. And is not self-deception just as inherent and universally prevalent in every human mind, as that depravity in which it originates? Are we not continually deceiving ourselves as to our characters, our propensities, our purposes, our passions, our faults, and every thing within us ? With regard to belief itself we often deceive ourselves. One man tells us he believes there is no such thing as apparitions, and yet trembles in the church yard or lonely chamber. Another tells us he trusts in the credit and honour of a certain neighbour, but when put to the test he dares not commit his property to that neighbour's keeping. The same with regard to Christianity. There are multitudes who mistake for firm belief, what is little better than a negation of unbelief. They have a certain measure of knowledge respecting Christian truth and its evidences.

How exquisitely modest, when we think that the writer is broaching a theory, not merely at variance with the views of the most eminent mental philosophers, but in opposition to the common sense of mankind.