or an affection of the passive nature, which we term love, as distinguished from charity, because it can be nothing else. Thus we reasoned, and if Schiller himself reasoned differently, that was his fault, not ours. Schiller certainly relies on art or æsthetic culture to evolve that inward state which is to him the condition sine qua non, at least, of all virtuous action. But the subjective principle of the power or influence of art is the sensibility. The province of art is to embody or reveal the beautiful. The intellect apprehends the beautiful, which affects the sensibility and produces a sentiment which, in our language, is called love. Here begins and ends the whole influence of art. Here is the whole sphere of the influence of æsthetic culture; for any culture extending beyond this sphere is not æsthetic, but moral, religious, social, or intellectual. Then, in making the cognition of beauty the medium of the liberation of the individual from the thraldom of nature, and of placing him in the condition to do his duty, or to be virtuous, Schiller necessarily relied on love. To excite this love by appeal to the sensibility, and to evolve the play-impulse, are precisely one and the same thing, as all must admit. Where, then, is our error in identifying the play-impulse with what we termed love? We are not quite ignorant of the German æsthetic theories in general. We know very well that many among ourselves, half Germanized, regard man as endowed with a faculty distinct from intellect, from will, and from sensibility, to which art addresses itself, a faculty which they cannot name, define, nor describe, and the existence of which no sound psychologist can admit. There is no peculiar mystery in the influence of art. Such is our nature, that, when we have intuition of the beautiful, it moves our sensibility, attracts us towards it, and affords us a sensible delight. This is all. Beauty appeals, as beauty, not to the intellect, not to the will, but solely to the sensibility. In relation to the intellect it is truth, to the will it is goodness. But art, as art, deals with beauty alone, and its aim is to affect the sensibility. It may affect it, and turn it towards what is true and good, and then it aids intellectual and moral culture; or it may turn it in an opposite direction, and then it becomes the minister of vice and corruption. In the former case, it is commendable and useful; in the latter, it is not. But it is as much art in the one case as in the other. There is more perfect art in the Elective Affinities than in the Wilhelm Tell or the Wallenstein. Nor is it true that the general tendency of art, or æsthetic culture, is to liberate the mind. The panders to vice know very well that art is one of the most effectual means of enchaining their victims, and do not fail to enlist architecture, poetry, music, painting, sculpture, in their service, as is but too well known; and we may lay it down as an invariable rule, that art uniformly tends to corrupt, when not preceded and accompanied by high spiritual, or moral and religious culture. Art, in the hands of the saint, ministers to virtue; in the hands of the sinner, to vice. The soul must have been liberated, the will elevated, its affections purified, by other than æsthetic influences, before æsthetic culture can aid moral progress. The love of show and finery" is not a proof of that inward freedom desired, is not a preparation for the gospel of truth, as our friend imagines; but is itself a vice, and the indication of a soul already enslaved by a hateful passion. Certainly we cannot regard those of our sisters, or our wives and daughters, who manifest the love for show and finery in the highest degree, as being the nearest the kingdom of heaven, or as being in the best possible state to listen to the Gospel, and to yield to its self-sacrificing precepts. That we were wrong in classing Schiller with modern idolaters, we do not admit. Modern idolatry does not consist in worshipping wood or stone, four-footed beasts, the stars of heaven, or images made with men's hands; but in worshipping humanity itself. For charity it substitutes the sentiment of love, for the love of God the love of man, for heaven the earth, and for revelation the instincts of the race. It makes man the beginning and end, the a quo and the ad quem of all right action. From man, too, it looks for all its strength, all the force or power requisite to work out our true good. All its theories presuppose the sufficiency of man, and its study is to find out how man, by exerting his own energy, may effect the end he holds to be desirable. It may admit in words a Supreme Being, but this Supreme Being is to be found only in the fixed and invariable laws of nature and the human soul, and aids us only because such is the character of these laws, that, if we conform to them, we shall find ourselves better off than if we neglect them. To obey him is simply to follow nature, to conform to the natural order, the old Epicurean doctrine under a new dress, entirely excluding Providence, and all active interference of the Creator in the government of the world. God has made the world, and leaves it to itself. If it recognizes Jesus Christ, or, out of deference to the prejudices of the age, resolves to patronize him for a time, it is simply as a brother man, who is worthy of our respect, inasmuch as he has suggested some wise rules for the regulation of life, and has set us in his own life an example of a very high order of excellence, worthy of our imitation, and serving to show us what we may ourselves be and do if we choose. Now, it is well known that Schiller was no Christian, or may be known by any one who will read his Philosophical Letters. He was in his way a Reformer, and sought to remake man; but all his theories imply that he did not look beyond man himself, and that man is his own beginning and end. His love was for man, his hope was placed in man, and out of man, by aid of æsthetic culture, was to arise the new and brilliant social order he contemplated. He therefore belonged to the class of modern idolaters, and we were not wrong in designating his theory as one of the forms of modern idolatry. Practically, it would prove to be one of the worst of these forms, because it places first in order of time and rank, and as the foundation of all other culture, æsthetic culture; which is to place the sensibility above reason and will. To place sensibility above reason and will, when it comes to morals, is to place the inferior soul above the superior, the flesh above the spirit. There are several other matters on which Mr. Weiss, in vindicating Schiller, touches, that we must reluctantly pass over. He has travelled and can speak of art from personal observation, an advantage we cannot claim. But, with all deference, we must doubt the superiority in all respects of Grecian over Christian art, or of the Greeks as a race over the Jews. We do not think it is really a matter of regret that our Lord did not choose to be born of a Greek virgin instead of a Jewish, or that in this respect the Supreme Wisdom committed a blunder. We are far also from believing the Gospel would have been improved, even if "some green peak from the Olympic ridge" had overshadowed the cradle of Bethlehem. The Greeks have unquestionably contributed somewhat to the artistic culture of the race, but we owe far less to this vain, fickle, turbulent, faithless race, than is commonly imagined by scholars. Of what is valuable in modern civilization, which we have retained from the ancient heathen world, a much larger part is due to the ancient Romans than to the ancient Greeks. The Greek mind was subtle, but sophistical. It wanted the balance, the sober common sense, and the firm grasp of principle, which belonged to the Roman mind. But this is a topic we cannot now discuss. Schiller's translator thinks that the nearer inclination and duty coincide, the nearer do we approximate the Christian type; that is, we advance in Christian perfection in proportion as we find in our flesh less and less opposition to duty. There may, perhaps, be a sense in which this is true; but we confess we do not know in what sense. As long as we live in this world, concupiscence remains, and there must be a struggle, a warfare, between the flesh and the spirit; and the more we advance in sanctity, the higher the degree of perfection to which we attain, the more severe does the struggle become, because the more acute is our perception, on the one hand, of what is good, and, on the other, of what is evil. The greater the saint, the greater the struggle; and hence it is that the saints always regard themselves as the greatest of sinners, and are the most deeply affected by a sense of their imperfections, the most convinced of the necessity of mortification, and of the assistance of divine grace to keep them from falling. That, in proportion as we advance, the inclinations of the will coincide with duty, is true; but that the inclinations of the flesh, the inclinations in question, do, we have not yet learned, and do not believe; for the saint must always say "in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing, for it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be." Hence, the combat must be maintained, and, till we are raised in glory, ever will it be necessary to chastise our bodies, to mortify the flesh, and to be assisted by supernatural grace, to prevent the flesh from gaining the mastery over the spirit. But we are probably talking of matters foreign to the ordinary thoughts of our Liberal Christian preacher, and of which we ourselves are but poorly qualified, neophyte as we are, to speak at all. We leave the subject, confident that we have said enough to justify us in asserting as we did, that Schiller's Esthetic Theory is incompatible with Christianity. It is one of the numerous theories invented in modern times to supersede the Gospel of our Lord, and therefore we cannot entertain it, cannot afford it any countenance, but must, whatever the genius or ability it indicates in the author, condemn it as a theory, and without reserve. AP 2 .B88 1846 ent 109942 Liberalism and Catholicity. 275 'd be to contradict well known facts. But I do say that gical process can suffice for such a result; and this your own arguments have abundantly shown. Of ur proposition of the authority of the Roman Church ur deduced assertion QUARTERLY REVIEW. JULY, 1846. ART. I. Liberalism and Catholicity. A Letter from a THE following letter comes to us from a very estimable young Protestant minister of our acquaintance, and for whom we have personally a very high regard. It was occasioned by a conversation we recently had with him, in which we labored to impress upon his mind that he was bound in prudence and in morals to give the great question of Catholicity, at least, a fair, candid, and thorough investigation. We do not know whether he expected us to publish his letter or not; but it deserves a reply, and a more elaborate reply than we are just now able to give it, unless we may at the same time make it answer the purpose of an article in our Review. Moreover, the "obstacles" of which he speaks may be in the way of others as well as of himself; and therefore, in replying publicly, we may be doing a service not only to him, but also to a whole class, and perhaps a very numerous class. We suppress his name and residence, that we may not have even the appearance of betraying any confidence, expressed or implied, which he may have reposed in us. "DEAR SIR: แ April 9, 1846. "I have considered your arguments, saving this month's number, which I have not yet read. But there are certain obstacles which prevent the reasonings from having much weight, and seem to me to make the case logically hopeless. "I. I do not object to your position, that 'faith is impossible out of the Catholic Church'; for the only Catholic Church' I can acknowledge at present comprises 'those who share the faith and sal |