fendant married him to obtain his property and estate by undue influence and corrupt methods; that a deed of 40 acres was obtained by her by fraud and undue influence; that said deed conveyed only 20 acres, and afterwards was changed by defendant to include 40 acres; that the title to a house and lot in Grand Rapids was obtained by fraud and undue influence, as well as a deed of 80 acres of land which was conveyed by Samuel Landis to defendant. It is also contended that at the time said deed to the 80 acres was made and delivered by Samuel Landis to defendant a mortgage of $3,000 upon the same premises was made by her to Samuel Landis to secure the payment of part of the purchase money, and that she took the deed and mortgage promising to have them both recorded in the office of the register of deeds; that she recorded the deed, but destroyed the mortgage. It is therefore sought by this bill to revive this mortgage. This deed and mortgage were given on September 19, 1891. The court below, in determining the case, filed a written opinion, which is set out in the record. While we concur with that court in most of the conclusions reached, and think the marriage cannot be set aside, and that there is not sufficient evidence from which to find that the deed of the 40 acres was changed from 20 to 40, or that the deed to the 80 acres was fraudulently obtained; yet we are of the opinion that the mortgage of $3,000 upon the 80 acres was fraudulently destroyed, and that by the undue influence which the defendant exercised over Samuel Landis in his lifetime he was kept from asserting his rights thereunder. Defendant does not deny the execution of the mortgage, and that she destroyed it, but claims it was kept off the record under an understanding with Samuel Landis, and eventually destroyed with his knowledge and consent. Samuel Landis was a man of weak mind, and there can be no question that when the mortgage was executed it was the expectation of both parties that it should stand as security upon the 80 acres for the payment of the $3,000. We are led to believe, however, by the testimony, that he never consented to its destruction. The decreee below will be reversed. The proceedings will be certified to the court below, and further testimony taken, if necessary, to ascertain the time when the mortgage was to come due and the rate of interest, the amount of the $3,000, with interest, to be made a lien upon the premises from the date the mortgage was given, and such decree to stand in place of the mortgage, and to be recorded as such. Complainants will recover their costs of both courts. The other justices concurred.

MARBLE et al. v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. P. & S. STE. M. RY. CO. (Supreme Court of Michigan. May 28, 1897.) Error to circuit court, Delta county; John W. Stone, Judge. Action by Webster L. Marble and others against the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and defendant brings_error. Affirmed. E. C. Chapin, for appellant. Ball & Ball, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. The question raised by this record became unimportant, as the merits of the case were heard and determined in the case of Railway Co. v. Marble (Mich.) 70 N. W. 319. The judgment is affirmed.

Atty., for the People. Clarence Tinker, for respondent.

GRANT, J. Respondent was convicted of keeping a saloon and selling intoxicating liquors without having paid the tax or given a bond as required by law. The testimony is all in the record, and fully justifies the verdict. The attorney for the respondent says in his brief: "I have cited no authorities, and it is not necessary. The questions are almost entirely those of elementary law." The attorney for the people concurs in this view. There is therefore nothing in the case requiring discussion. The learned circuit judge correctly instructed the jury on these elementary principles, and fully as favorably to the respondent as he was justified in doing. The conviction is affirmed, and the circuit court directed to proceed to sentence. The other justices concurred.

WHITE v. WHITTALL. (Supreme Court of Michigan. June 28, 1897.) Error to circuit court, Kent county; William E. Grove, Judge. Action brought by Edward White against Thomas Whittall to recover damages for an assault and battery. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. C. O. Smedley (Benn M. Corwin, of counsel), for appellant. McKnight & McAllister, for appellee.

GRANT, J. Plaintiff and defendant had a disgraceful fight in the public highway, in the presence of their own children and neighbors, on their way home from a school meeting. The language used was also disgraceful. Each charged the other with commencing the assault, and introduced testimony tending to sustain the charge. There is also testimony tending to show that the fight was mutual, each being "eager for the fray." Plaintiff was worsted in the fight. He entered a criminal prosecution for assault and battery against defendant, who was acquitted upon the trial. He then brought this action for damages, and the jury again found against him, either upon the theory that he was the assaulter or that the fight was voluntary. The court fully explained to the jury the claim of each party and the correct rules of law governing the case. A discussion of the points raised would be of no benefit to any one. We find no error, and the judgment is affirmed. HOOKER, J., did not sit. The other justices concurred.

STATE v. HULL et al. (Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 26, 1897.) Certified case from district court, Itasca county; G. W. Holland, Judge. Proceedings by the state of Minnesota against Morton D. Hull and others to recover taxes for the year 1894. Judgment discharging the land from liability for taxes. Case certified. Reversed. C. L. Pratt, for the State. J. B. Atwater, for defendants.

PER CURIAM. This case involves the same questions as those raised and decided in the case of State v. Weyerhauser, 71 N. W. 265, and is ruled by it. Order reversed.

COUNTY. (Supreme

In re TAXES FOR ITASCA STATE v. WENONA IRON CO. Court of Minnesota. May 26, 1897.) Certified case from district court, Itasca county; George W. Holland, Judge. Proceedings by the state of Minnesota against the Wenona Iron Company to collect taxes in Itasca county, delinquent in 1896. Judgment that said lands be discharged from all liability for taxes claimed, and case certified. Reversed. C. L. Pratt, for plaintiff. C. C. McCarthy, for defendant.

BUCK, J. This case involves the same questions as those raised in the case of State v. Weyerhauser, 71 N. W. 265, and is governed by the decision made therein.

WHITE v. HOLMBERG. (Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 29, 1897.) Appeal from municipal court of Minneapolis; W. A. Kerr, Judge. Action by Hannah A. White against John E. Holmberg. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order refusing a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Merrick & Merrick, for appellant. Cobb & Wheelwright, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. We find no error in the record. The assignments of error raise no questions of sufficient substance to entitle them to special notice.

COTTON v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF SUPERIOR.

(Supreme Court of Nebraska. June 3, 1897.) JUDGMENT-LIEN.

This case involves the same questions determined in Cotton v. Bank (just decided) 71 N. W. 711.

Error to district court, Nuckolls county; Hastings, Judge.

Action by the First National Bank of Superior against George F. Cotton. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

H. W. Short and S. W. Christy, for plaintiff in error. Searle & Coleman, for defendant in error.

NORVAL, J. This is a companion case to Cotton v. Bank (decided herewith) 71 N. W. 711. The records in the two cases are substantially alike, and, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in that case, the judgment will be affirmed. Affirmed.

F. DOHMEN CO., Limited, v. MANUFAC-
TURERS' & BUILDERS' FIRE INS.
CO. OF NEW YORK.

(Supreme Court of Wisconsin. April 30, 1897.) Appeal from superior court, Milwaukee county; R. N. Austin, Judge.

Action by the F. Dohmen Company, Limited, against the Manufacturers' & Builders' Fire Insurance Company of New York. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

The an

This is an action to recover on a policy of fire insurance covering the same property mentioned In the case of F. Dohmen Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (herewith decided) 70 N. W. 69. The action is on one of the policies mentioned in such previous case. It was issued October 22, 1892, insuring such property for the term of one year to the amount of $1,250. The complaint alleged all the facts necessary to a recovery. swer put in issue the amount of the loss, and the issue thus raised was the only one litigated on the trial. There was a motion for a change of venue to the circuit court made and denied. The objection to the granting of such motion was thereafter withdrawn by stipulation, and an order entered changing the place of trial. Defendant failed to pay the clerk's fees and have the papers transmitted within the time prescribed by statute. The clerk refused to transmit the papers after the expiration of such time, and thereupon defendant moved the court for an order for such transmission, which motion was denied, and defendant excepted thereto. At the close of the plaintiff's case, defendant's counsel moved the

court for a nonsuit, which was overruled. No evidence was offered by defendant. On motion of plaintiff's counsel, the court directed a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $1,101.89, the full amount claimed. There was a motion to set the verdict aside as against the evidence and for errors committed on the trial, which was overruled and excepted to. Judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor upon the verdict, and defendant appealed.

Miller, Noyes, Miller & Wahl and J. V. Quarles, for appellant. Timlin & Glicksman, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts). The only questions presented on this appeal relate to proceedings for a change of venue and to the exceptions taken to the admission of evidence of the contents of plaintiff's books, without any foundation being laid therefor. The same questions were raised and determined in F. Dohmen Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (decided herewith) 71 N. W. 69. The decision in that case rules this, and requires a reversal of the judgment appealed from. The judgment of the superior court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

MALONEY v. WARNER et al. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. April 30, 1897.) Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee county; D. H. Johnson, Judge. Action by Thomas J. Maloney against E. E. Warner and others, impleaded with the Wauwatosa Park Company, to rescind a contract for fraud and for other relief. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants Warner and others appeal. Reversed. Orren T. Williams (Lyman G. Wheeler, of counsel), for appellants. N. S. Murphey, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J. The questions presented in this case are identical with those presented and decided at this term in Franey v. Warner, 71 N. W. 81. The amount of stock subscribed for was $500; hence the plaintiff's share of the profits made and fraudulently retained by the appellants was $141.91, which sum plaintiff should have judgment for on the facts found. The judgment rendered against appellants for the full amount of money paid by plaintiff upon his stock was erroneous, for the reasons stated in Franey v. Warner, supra. The judgment of the circuit court as to the appellants is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to render judgment in accordance with this opinion.

WHEELER v. CLARKE. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. June 11, 1897.) Appeal from circuit court, Dane county; Robert G. Siebecker, Judge. Action of attachment by William Brummel Wheeler against the Sheasby & Smith WallPaper & Paint Company. Jerome D. Clarke, assignee of defendant for the benefit of creditors, traversed the affidavit of attachment, and from a judgment sustaining the attachment he appeals. Affirmed. Erdall & Swensen, for appellant. Lewis & Briggs, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J. This appeal involves the same question presented in Manufacturing Co. v. Clarke (decided herewith) 71 N. W. 883, and is ruled by the decision in that case.

BY THE COURT. That part of the judgment of the circuit court appealed from is affirmed.