consideration moving from the promisee to the promisor, then the superadded consideration makes it a new agreement, which is not within the Statute of Frauds: Power v. Rankin, 114 Ill.

So where a party having a chattel mortgage upon a lot of corn, to secure a note of some $1200, relinquishes the same, and allows the corn to be sold and delivered by his debtor, in consideration that an agent, in whose hands $1000 was placed, had agreed to pay him that sum when the corn should be delivered, it was held, that the verbal promise to pay the holder of the chattel mortgage was not within the Statute of Frauds, and that an action would lie for a failure to make the payment: Id.

Reserving a Verbal Trust by a Grantor.-An express trust between the grantor and grantee of land, that the grantee is to hold the land in trust for the grantor, or is to reconvey to him in a certain contingency, is invalid, under the Statute of Frauds, unless evidenced by some writing signed by the grantee: Stevenson v. Crapnell, 114 Ill.

Resulting Trust-When it Arises.—Where there is an express trust, there cannot be a resulting or implied trust; and in case of a voluntary conveyance, no resulting trust can arise in favor of the grantor: Stevenson v. Crapnell, 114 Ill.

HABEAS CORPUS.

Removal of, into United States Court.-A writ of habeas corpus is not removable from a state court into a circuit court of the United States, under the Act of March 3d 1875, c. 137, sect. 2: Kurtz v. Moffitt, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Conveyance-Attachment and Levy.-The statute prohibiting conveyances by the wife, without the joinder of her husband, of such real estate as has been directly or indirectly conveyed to her by her husband, does not include transfers by attachment and levy for the satisfaction of her debts. Such real estate is liable to attachment and levy by her creditors Virgie v. Stetson, 77 Me.

INSURANCE.

When in the Nature of a Wager.-It would seem that a policy or certificate for the payment of a premium to one who may hold a number next to that held by the one who dies, and solely because he does die, makes the transaction in the nature of a wager upon the life of one in whom the party thus benefited has no interest, and is therefore illegal : The People v. Golden Rule, 114 Ill.

Agency-Broker-Evidence.-A party desiring to insure certain property, applied to an insurance agent of his place to procure the insurance, leaving him to select the company. He forwarded the application to certain insurance brokers in Chicago, who procured the policy in a company with which they had considerable dealing, and sent the same to the assured through the first named agents, and he sent the premium to the agents in Chicago, who never forwarded the same to the insurance company. The policy contained the usual clause that it should not be binding until the actual payment of the premium. A loss occurred, and

payment was refused, when suit was brought on the policy, and a recovery had hell, that the liability of the insurance company depended upon the fact whether the Chicago agents were its agents, or were authorized to receive payment in its behalf: Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saginaw Barrel Co., 114 Ill.

Where insurance brokers procuring a policy of insurance received payment of the required premium, and failed to return the same to the insurance company, it was held that the correspondence between the brokers and the company was proper evidence for the purpose of showing their previous relations and methods of business, in respect to insurance effected through them, and as tending to show they were, in fact, agents of the company, and as such authorized to receive payment of the premium: Id.

Mutual Benefit Association-Power of Chancery to enforce Contract. -A mutual benefit association, a corporation not organized for pecuniary profit, having no surplus, and relying entirely upon mortuary assessments made upon each death of a member for the payment of benefits to the beneficiaries of decedent, gave a certificate of membership to a member, in the sum of $5000, whereby it promised, upon proof of his death, that an assessment should be levied upon the surviving members to the amount of the certificate, which sum, when collected, less the expenses and collection costs, it would pay to his devisees, in case he left any, and if he left none, to his legal heirs. It was held, that a court of chancery might properly take jurisdiction of a bill brought by the heirs of the deceased member to enforce payment of the certificate, by compelling a specific performance of the contract: Benefit Association v. Sears, 114 Ill.

JUDICIAL SALE. See Decedents' Estates

Default of Purchaser-Resale-Right to recover Deposit.-A judicial sale was made upon the conditions that the purchaser was required to pay down ten per cent. of his bid, and pay the remainder at a certain time; that if any purchaser should not comply with the conditions, then the property would be offered for sale a second time, and that the first purchaser would not be benefited by any advance, but would be held liable for all loss and expense incurred thereby. A. purchased a lot, paid ten per cent. of his bid, and failed to pay the remainder. The lot was resold for a sum in excess of the first amount sufficient to pay the interest on the first bid and the expense of the second sale; held, that the first purchaser was entitled to be repaid the ten per cent.: The Chancellor v. Gummere, 40 N. J. Eq.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Rent received in Cotton-Right of Landlord to enter and pick Cotton. -The landlord, having rented his land for a certain number of pounds of cotton, had no right to enter, pick and remove the cotton, against the will of the tenant, though the cotton was wasting and likely to be destroyed: Wadley v. Williams, 73 or 74 Ga.

The title to the crop was in the tenant; the landlord had only a lien thereon: Id.

The relation of landlord and tenant existed in this case. The land was let to the defendant in error for a fixed rent to be paid therefor out of the crop. The contract was not a mere cropping agreement: Id.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Corporation; Covenant. Constitutionality of-Repeal of.-There is a clear distinction between the effect of statutes of limitation in vesting rights to real and personal property, and their operation as a defence to contracts. Where the question is as to the removal of the bar of the statute of limitations by a legislative act, passed after the bar has become perfect, such act, in the former case, deprives the party defendant of his property, without due process of law; because, by the law in existence before the repealing act, the property had become his; but in the latter case, it merely takes away a purely arbitrary defence to an action, which falls with the repeal of the law on which it depended; and such a defence is not a right of property which is protected by the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Campbell v. Holt, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Fellow-Servants- Who are.-Servants of the same master, to be coemployees or fellow-servants, so as to exempt the master from liability on account of injuries sustained by one resulting from the negligence of the other, must be such as are directly co-operating with each other in a particular business; that is, the same line of employment; or such that their usual duties shall bring them into habitual consociation, so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution: Rolling-Mill v. Johnson, 114 Ill.

The relations of the servants must be such, that each as to the other, by the exercise of ordinary caution, can either prevent or remedy the negligent acts of the other, or protect himself against its consequences. Where there is no right or no opportunity of supervision, or where there is no independent will, and no right or opportunity to take measures to avoid the negligent acts of another without disobedience to the orders of an immediate superior, the doctrine exempting the master can have no application: Id.

MINES AND MINING.

Title to Mineral Lands, how obtained from the United States.-No title from the United States to land known at the time of sale to be valuable for its minerals of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper, can be obtained under the pre-emption or homestead laws, or the town-site laws, or in any other way than as prescribed by the laws specially authorizing the sale of such lands, except in the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri and Kansas: Deffebach v. Hawke, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.

It would seem that there may be an entry of a town-site, even though within its limits mineral lands are found, the entry and the patent being inoperative as to all lands known at the time to be valuable for their minerals, or discovered to be such before their occupation and improvement for residences or business, under the town-site title.: Id.

MORTGAGE.

Liability of Purchaser of Real Estate subject to-Extension of Time of Payment by Agreement with Purchaser.-A. purchased real estate

from B., subject to the payment of a mortgage thereon to C. Held, that even though A. had expressly promised B. to pay the mortgage debt, this would not, without the consent of C., convert B. from a principal debtor to a surety. 2. The relation of principal and surety not existing between A. and B., an extension of the time of payment of the mortgage debt granted by C. to A. would not discharge B. from his liability to C. (It did not appear in this case whether or not B. was prejudiced by the extension of time for paying the mortgage debt, through depreciation in the value of the property on which it was secured): Shepherd V. May, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Taxation.

Police Powers.-Closing Places of Business on Sunday.-Cities and villages incorporated under the general Incorporation Act, giving power "to regulate the police of the city or village, and pass and enforce all necessary police regulations," may pass an ordinance prohibiting persons from keeping open their places of business in such city or village, for the purpose of vending goods, wares and merchandise on Sunday, and provide a penalty for a violation of the same: McPherson v. Village of Chebanse, 114 Ill.

The police regulations of a village may differ from those of the state upon the same subject, if they be not inconsistent therewith. A village ordinance prohibiting the keeping open of places of business on Sunday, for the sale of goods, etc., is not inconsistent with the provisions of section 261 of the Criminal Code : Id.

Subdivision 66 of section 62, article 5, of the " Act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages," which reads that the city or village council shall have power "to regulate the police of the city or village, and pass and enforce all necessary police regulations," is not limited in its application to the organization and regulation of a police force, but may extend to and embrace a subject-matter of police regulation, under the general police power of the state: Id.

NEGLIGENCE. See Master and Servant.

Minor-Contributory Negligence-Railroad-Absence of Flagman.— Where there is no evidence of the want of capacity or discretion in a minor plaintiff suing a railway company for a personal injury from negligence, and he is present at the trial, and it appears that he was of such age and ability to care for himself as to be trusted by his parents to attend school in a large city, a considerable distance from home, and to go and return by himself, it was held error to instruct the jury that if believed, from the evidence, that the plaintiff, at the time and place of the injury, was of such tender years, and was so immature, that the requisite capacity to exercise proper care was wanting, then the law would not impute negligence to him. While the same degree of care might not have been required of him as from a person of mature years, it cannot be said that no negligence could be attributed to him: Chicago, R. 1. and P. Rd. Co. v. Eininger, 114 Ill.

In a suit by a plaintiff, against a railway company, to recover for an injury received from a passing train at a public street crossing-not in attempting to cross the track along the street, but while unlawfully walking along the track as a footway-it was held error to instruct the jury

that if the injury happened because of there being no flagman at the . railroad crossing to give warning to those about to cross the street and railroad track at the approach of train at the crossing, contrary to a city ordinance, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover: Id.

A requirement of a railway company to keep a flagman at a public street crossing in a large city, to give warning of the approach of trains, is intended for the protection of persons crossing the railroad tracks at such crossing, and not for the benefit of persons walking along the railroad track, employing it as a foot-path. To the latter the company does not owe the duty in respect to a flagman: Id.

Railroad-Arson-Contributory Negligence-Burden of Proof.-In order to support a recovery against a railroad corporation on account of an injury, or death, caused by a collision with its train at a crossing, whether the action be in form civil or criminal, it must affirmatively appear: 1. That the defendant corporation was guilty of negligence. 2. That its negligence was the cause of the accident. 3. That the injured party was in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time of the injury, or at least, that the want of such care on his part in no way contributed to produce it: State v. Maine Central Rd. Co., 77 Me. It is not enough to show that the defendant was negligent: Id.

It is incumbent on the prosecuting party to go further, and directly or indirectly, by affirmative proof satisfy the jury that no want of due care on the part of the injured party, helped to produce the accident: Id.

It is negligence to attempt to cross the track of a railroad without looking and listening to ascertain if a train is approaching, and ordinary sense, prudence and discretion require this of a traveller so far as he has an opportunity so to do: Id.

It is still greater negligence for one seeing and hearing a train approaching at ordinary speed to attempt to cross directly in front of it: ld.

PARTITION.

Defence of Equitable Title-Practice.-In a suit for partition in chancery, where a defendant sets up an equitable title to the whole estate in the premises, or impeaches the complainant's title on equitable grounds, the court will not suspend the suit until the title be settled, but will pass upon such title and settle all disputes concerning it in the partition suit, and grant relief accordingly: Read v. Huff, 40 N. J. Eq.

Where a husband pays the consideration of the purchase of lands, and has the conveyance made to his wife, the presumption is that a gift or settlement was intended, and a resulting trust will not arise in his favor from such payment: Id.

The proof which in such cases shall overcome the presumption of a gift to the wife must be of facts antecedent to or contemporaneous with the purchase, or else immediately afterwards, so as to be in fact part of the same transaction; and it must be equally satisfactory and explicit with the proof required to establish a resulting trust; Id.

PARTNERSHIP.

What constitutes.-Where M. was to conduct a saw-mill, pay its expenses from the proceeds and divide the net profit with two others,