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was directly in judgment; but there are dicta which afford some aid in reaching a conclusion. In 7 Amer. L. Rev. 587, 588, various definitions of an accident, as the term is used in insurance policies, are given, namely: "An accident is any event which takes place without the oversight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected by the event:" Ripley v. Ry. Passengers' Assurance Co., 2 Bigelow's Cases 738; Providence Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 32 Md. 310. "It is any unexpected event which happens as by chance, or which does not take place according to the usual course of things:" N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Penn. St. 43. It is something which takes place without any intelligent or apparent cause, without design, and out of course:" Mallory v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52. "Some violence, casualty or vis major is necessarily involved" in the term accident. It means, in short, in insurance policies, "any injury which happens by reason of some violence, casualty or vis major to the assured without his design or consent or voluntary co-operation." Similar definitions are given by Mr. Justice PAINE in his discussion of the question, in Schneider v. Ins. Co., 21 Wis. 30.

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In Scheiderer v. Ins. Co., 58 Wis. 14, it was alleged in the pleading, that while the assured, who was travelling in a railway car, was in a dazed and unconscious condition of mind, and not knowing or realizing what he was doing, he involuntarily arose from his seat and walked unconsciously to the platform of the car, and fell therefrom to the ground;" and it was held that this constituted a good cause of action upon a policy of accident insurance. Here, it is true, the injury resulted from falling from the car; but since the moving cause was the involuntary act of leaving the seat and walking to the platform, the case suggests the inquiry, if, for example, a person in a fit of somnambulism, or in delirium, not knowing or realizing what he is doing, involuntarily inflicts injury upon himself—that is, by means of his own hand-and death ensues, is not such an injury as much the result of accident, as if, in the same circumstances, the injury results from other external forces, such as falling from the platform of a moving train?

In Hill v. Ins. Co., 22 Hun 189, the insured took poison by mistake, and died suddenly. The court said that death occurred through accidental means. The taking of poison was not the result of the will or intention of the person, and was therefore not his voluntary act. It was adjudged, however, that the plaintiff could not

recover, on the ground that the policy contained a clause, that the company should not be liable if death should be caused by taking poison. And this clause was held to exempt the company from liability, whether the poison was taken intentionally or by mistake. In Pierce v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 34 Wis. 395, Mr. Chief Justice DIXON, speaking for the court, in interpreting the clause in the policy in question in that case, referred to instances of death resulting from an act committed under the influence of delirium, as if the person should, in a paroxysm of fever, precipitate himself from a window or, having been bled, remove the bandages; or, should take poison by mistake; and observed, that deaths thus produced are more properly denominated deaths by accident than deaths by suicide.✶ ✶ * * Deaths so caused, are held to be deaths by accident within the meaning and purpose of policies of insurance against accident, as where a man negligently draws a loaded gun towards him by the muzzle, or the servant fills the lighted lamp with kerosene, and the gun is discharged, and the lamp explodes." In Horn v. Life Ins. Co., 7 Jur. (N. S.) 673, the court, in passing upon the question, whether a policy of insurance upon life is rendered void by the suicide of the insured, when insane, speaks of such a death as just as much an accident as if the insured had fallen from the top of a house.

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In Breasted v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 8 N. Y. 306, it was observed by the court, that "a death by accident and a death by the party's own hand, when deprived of reason, stand on principle in the same category. In both cases the act is done without a controlling mind."

To maintain the proposition that because his own hand constituted the violent means employed by the insured in taking his life, those means were not external and accidental, it is necessary to take a distinction between force emanating from the insane person himself, and force operating independently from without. I can hardly think there is ground for such a distinction. The injury and the death seem equally fortuitous in both cases, for in neither case is there a concurring will which prompts the act. An insane man burns his own insured property. The insurer is nevertheless liable for the loss, unless its contract expressly exempts it from liability, even in case of such a burning: this, for the reason that the act was not voluntary, or done with the assent, procurement or design of the assured as a rational person: Karow v. Continental Ins. Co.,

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57 Wis. 56. Although, in the darkness that enveloped his mind, the hand of Edward M. Crandal adjusted the fatal noose, the act was no more attributable to his voluntary agency, than if, as a sane man walking the street in the darkness of night, the same fatality, without co-operation on his part, or even consciousness of danger, had overtaken him. Therefore, it would seem that in the one case as in the other, the death would be attributable to casualty. Additional force is given to this view of the question, when we consider that in cases arising upon life insurance policies decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it has been repeatedly held that if the insured, while in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from any motive, intentionally takes his own life, such death is within the proviso on the subject of suicide, and the insurer is not liable. On the contrary, if the insured takes his life when insane, then the death can not be said to be "by his own hand," and the insurer is liable. And so it would seem to follow, that, as in the latter instance, the act of self-destruction is not the act of the party, it must be regarded in a case like the present, as brought about by means which are accidental, because not the result of the concurring will of the insured.

It is to be further observed that in the policy in suit the company declares that it incurs no liability in case of death from suicide or self-inflicted injuries. Thus it appears that the insurer took into consideration the possibility that the insured might voluntarily, ana with deliberate intent-that is, as a sane person-take his life, and in such case the death was not to be regarded as covered by the contract, because not effected by accidental means. This is the import of this clause in the policy; but no provision is made against suicide when insane. And this also adds force to the view that the contract is fairly open to the construction contended for by the plaintiff. By the term "self-inflicted injuries," as used in the policy, was not meant injuries inflicted by the insured upon himself when insane, but injuries self-inflicted when capable of rational, voluntary action.

Several cases have been cited by counsel for the defendant. Among them is Harris v. Travelers' Ins. Co., decided by the Superior Court of Chicago in 1868, and referred to in 7 Am. Law Rev. 589; but the point here involved does not seem to have been there raised. The deceased was a fireman, who was accidentally buried under a falling wall, but was soon rescued without apparent

injury, and continued his work for three months, when he took poison. In a suit to recover the insurance on the ground that the accident rendered him insane, it was held that if he was insane on account of the accident, the death was too remote to be covered by the policy, which included only proximate results. It would seem that the plaintiff relied upon the original accident as a ground of recovery, and that was held too remote. Another case cited is Pollock v. U. S. Mut. Accident Assoc., 28 Alb. L. J. 518. But all that was decided in that case was, that the defendant was not liable for a death by poison, because the contract so expressly provided; and in view of that provision it made no difference whether the poison was innocently or intentionally taken. There was no question of insanity involved, and moreover the death was not caused by "external violence," and this was one of the prerequisites to rccover as fixed in the contract. In Bayless v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 14 Blatchf. 144, the question of insanity did not arise, and it is on the same line in principle with Pollock v. U. S. Mut. Accident Ascoc., supra.

On the whole, my conclusion is, that the death of the insured, Edward M. Crandal, resulted from injuries effected through accidental and violent means, within the meaning of the policy in suit.

Second. Still another and equally interesting question remains to be determined. The contention of the defendant is, that the death in this case was caused by bodily infirmities or disease, namely, the insanity of the insured, and therefore that the plaintiff cannot recover. As has been observed, the policy provides that the company shall not be liable if the death be "caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease." The policy further recites that it is issued in consideration of the warranties made in the application for insurance, and of the premium paid; and in the application signed by the assured, he makes certain statements of fact usual in such cases, the last of which, numbered fifteen, is as follows: "I am aware that this insurance will not extend to * * * any bodily injury happening directly or indirectly in consequence of disease; nor to death or disability caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities, or by disease; ** nor to any case except when the accidental injury shall be the proximate and sole cause of disability or death." This is not a warranty of any fact. It is, in effect, merely an admission of knowledge on the part of the insured of such limita

tions of liability as may be declared in the policy. As, therefore, it is to the policy we must look for these limitations, it is observable that the policy does not declare that the insurance shall not extend to any bodily injury, "happening directly or indirectly in consequence of disease;" but only that it shall not extend "to death or disability which may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease." This, then, is the limitation of liability to be considered as it is expressed in the policy issued and delivered subsequently to the application for insurance, rather than the statements on the subject contained in the application. The fifteenth clause in the application is not referred to in the policy. Wherein. therefore it differs from the written contract, it is no part of the

contract.

The argument of counsel for the defendant, is, in brief, that insanity is a bodily infirmity or disease; that in ordinary life insurance cases it is regarded and characterized by the courts as a disease, and therefore it is, that insurance companies are held liable in cases of suicide when the insured was insane. Further, that in the case in hand, the act of self-destruction was occasioned by the insanity, and so that within the meaning of the policy, the death was caused by disease. I was much impressed with the force of this argument, and I may use the language of DENMAN, J., in a case hereafter referred to, "but for Winspear v. Accident Ins. Co., 6 Q. B. Div. 42, I am not sure but that I should have thought the company were protected."

It is true that in cases upon life policies, death by an insane suicide is regarded by the courts as death by disease. As it is expressed in Eastabrook v. The Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224,"Death by disease is provided for by the policy. Insanity is a disease. Death which is the result of insanity, is death by disease." It is to be borne in mind, however, that this and similar observations are made in a class of cases where the insurance is not special but general, and where the protection which it is intended to afford, covers all diseases and disorders-other than those which may be specially excepted-which result in death. In the case of a life policy it may not matter whether the disease of insanity, or the particular act of self-destruction be regarded as the immediate cause of death. It is the life which is insured, and liability arises when death occurs, unless the death is within one of the specially excepted cases enumerated in the policy. The fact, therefore, that