was emancipated or not, but whether the father knew of the contract and made no objection: Atkins v. Sherbino, 58 Vt.

PARTNERSHIP.

Attachment of Partner's Interest.-The individual interest of a copartner in the copartnership effects is attachable. The attachment may be made by seizure of the effects, and the attaching officer may remove them for safe keeping: Trafford v. Hubbard, 15 R. I.

That the defendant copartner has overdrawn his account with the copartnership does not invalidate the attachment: Id.

But the execution and record by the defendant copartner of a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors dissolves the attachment: Id.

PATENT. See Execution.

RAILROAD. See Negligence.
RECEIVER.

Appointment without Notice.-A receiver should not be appointed, except on notice to the party whose property is to be divested, except in cases of the gravest emergency, demanding the immediate interference of the court for the prevention of irreparable injury: Moyers v. Coiner, 21 or 22 Fla.

The rule requiring notice to defendant of an intended application for the appointment of a receiver would seem to be not a matter of discretion, but an inflexible rule, subject to the above exception: Id.

SALE.

When Title passes-Locality of -Whether or not the legal title to personal property passes by sale is a question of intent, to be gathered from the acts of the parties, and all the facts and circumstances of the case; thus, the respondent, a dealer in New York, shipped intoxicating liquor to parties in Vermont, by express, on a C. O. D. order, which was in effect a direction by the consignor to the express company not to deliver the liquors to the consignee except upon payment. The liquors, intended for an unlawful use, were seized, without warrant, while in the possession of the express company, and confiscated, before delivery and payment; Held (a), that the seizure was lawful; (b) that the contract was inchoate or executory while the goods were in transit; that payment was a condition precedent, and that there was no surrender of legal title; that the express company was the agent of the consignor, and that he was legally convicted under an indictment charging him with keeping liquors for unlawful purposes: State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt.

When in such case the liquors have been delivered by the express company to the consignee in Vermont, and paid for, the sale is in this state, and the vendor is liable to a conviction for an illegal sale: Id.

Conditional Sale-Validity.-An agreement in writing to sell personal property, the title to which is reserved by the seller, until the purchase-money is paid by the buyer, is a conditional sale, and does not vest title in the buyer until the performance of the condition, to wit: the payment of the purchase-money, notwithstanding that at the time

of making said agreement, possession of the property is delivered by the seller to the purchaser: Campbell Printing Press Co. v: Walker, 21 or 22 Fla.

Such an agreement is valid, as against subsequent creditors and bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice: Id.

SET-OFF.

In Equity. It is not essential to the proper allowance of a legal demand as a set-off in equity against a judgment at law, on the ground of the insolvency of the party in whose favor the judgment was recovered, that the insolvency should have occurred subsequent to the judgment. The set-off may be allowed irrespective of the time of the occurrence of the insolvency, whether before or subsequent to the judgment: G. & S. W. Rd. v. Ennor, 116 Ill.

And although the cross-demand in such case might have been set off in the action at law in which the judgment was recovered, that was permissive, but not compulsory on the defendant: Id.

SUNDAY. See Criminal Law.

TELEGRAPH. See Contract.

Negligent Transmission-Liability of Company-Cipher Message.When a telegram is delivered to an operator, employed by a telegraph company for transmission and delivery to the person to whom it is addressed, and the consideration for said service is paid to and accepted by such operator, the law enjoins on such company prompt and skilful performance of their undertaking: Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Hyer, 21 or 22 Fla.

If a telegraph company, to whom a telegram has been delivered, as above, fail to transmit or to deliver the same to the person to whom it is addressed, within a reasonable time, such company is responsible for such failure, to the person injured, whether he be the sender or the person indicated in such telegram as the one to whom it was to be sent, for such damages as are proximate and reasonable, and naturally result from such failure: Id.

It is no defence for said company, when sued for failure to transmit and deliver a telegram, as above, that the sender did not inform them or the operator of its importance, when they fail to show that if they or their operator had have received such information, it would in any respect have changed the method of its transmission, or the time in which it was to be sent, the agency employed, the price demanded therefor, or the degree of skill used in its transmission: Id.

Nor is it any defence to said company that such message is in cipher or words, the meaning of which the operator does not know; provided, such message is plainly written and the words therein are in the letters of the English alphabet: Id.

TRADE MARK.

Character of-Infringement-Protection afforded in Equity.-The words "health-preserving," preceding the word "corset,"in the name adopted by the manufacturer of corsets, made under letters patent, but describe

a quality of the corset, or the effect which its use will produce, and can not therefore, be employed as a trade mark: Bull v.

Siegel, 116 Ill. It is well settled that directions, advertisements, notices, &c., constitute no part of a trade mark, and also, that no one can obtain a trade mark in the form, appearance or finish of his goods, so that another may not lawfully make his goods like them, nor can there be a trade mark in the form or color of a package or box: Id.

Even if a party has a trade mark in the name of "Balls" and picture and words and form of lettering on the labels pasted on his boxes, containing corsets, there is no infringement of the same when a different name is used by another manufacturer, with a picture, words and form of lettering on the labels pasted on his boxes so totally unlike those of the former, as that no one can reasonably mistake the one for the other: Id.

As a general rule, exact similitude is not required to constitute an infringement of a trade mark, or to entitle the complaining party to protection; but if the words of the alleged infringing device, are such as would be likely to mislead persons in the ordinary course of purchasing the goods, and induce them to suppose they were purchasing the same article, then the similitude is such as entitles the injured party to equitable protection, if he takes seasonable measures to assert his rights and prevent their continued invasion: Id.

But a court of equity is not bound to interfere, when ordinary attention will enable purchasers to discriminate between the trade marks used by different parties: Id.

VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Vendor's Lien-Principle on which Lien rests-Waiver.-The principle governing courts of equity in the enforcement of liens, is the implied agreement held to exist between the vendor and vendee that the former shall hold a lien on the lands sold, for the payment of the purchase price, on the ground that the person who has the estate ought not, in conscience, as between them, to keep it and not pay the purchasemoney: Beal v. Harrington, 116 Ill.

If a vendor of real estate takes collateral and independent security for the purchase-money, he thereby releases and waives all right to a vendor's lien: Id.

A person purchased a tract of land for himself, for which he agreed to pay by a stock of goods valued at $4000, and the conveyance of town lots valued at $1000, and had the land so purchased by him conveyed to his two sons in trust for himself, they paying nothing, and delivered the goods, but was unable to convey the lots for want of title thereto. The sons afterward, at the father's request, conveyed the land to a third person, who paid nothing therefor, but held the title for the father: Held, that the vendor of the land had a vendor's lien upon the lands conveyed by him, to the extent of $1000, the amount of the unpaid purchase-money, which he might enforce as against the sons and their voluntary grantee: Id.

WILL.

Legacy-Accord and Satisfaction-Interest.-Legacies, unless otherwise controlled by the will, draw interest after one year from the probate

of the will; and the rule is not affected by the fact that the executor is unable to gather in the assets and pay the legacy within the year: Vermont State Baptist Convention v. Ladd, 58 Vt.

When there is a dispute between an executor and a legatee as to the amount of interest due on a legacy, on account of the expense and delay caused by a long litigation carried on for the protection of the estate, an acceptance by the legatee of a sum less than the one due on the legacy is an accord and satisfaction, if the payment is made upon the express condition that it shall be in full for the balance due, and the money is accepted without protest against such condition: Id.

Devise-Charity-Corporation.-A devise of real and personal property generally, without stating the purpose, to a corporation created and existing for educational purposes alone, must be regarded as a devise for educational purposes: Female Academy v. Sullivan, 116 Ill.

A corporation for educational purposes, as, an academy, is not one for "pecuniary profit," merely because fees are charged for tuition. A corporation for pecuniary profit is one organized "for the pecuniary profit of its stockholders or members :" Id.

Devise-Life-Estate-Residuary Devisee.-When a party is the devisee of the interest in real estate specifically devised as a life-estate, that fact will not preclude such party from taking the remaining interest in the estate in the character of a residuary devisee: Davis v. Callahun, 78 Me.

By one clause of a will the testator devised unto his wife, for and during the term of her natural life, certain real estate. The reversionary interest therein was not specifically devised. By the general residuary clause he devised unto his wife all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate, real, personal and mixed, wherever found and however situate. Held, that by the terms of the will and the intention of the testator as gathered from the whole instrument, the wife took an estate in fee in the real estate thus devised: Id.

Deficiency of Assets-Annuities-Legacies.-When the possibility of a failure of sufficient assets to meet the legacies named by a testator in his will, has not been anticipated and specifically provided for by him, the presumption of intended equality prevails between general legatees, as well as equality in respect to the share to be borne in all deficiencies of assets: Emery v. Batchelder, 78 Me.

In the administration of testamentary assets where there is a deficiency of such assets after the payment of debts, expenses and specific legacies the loss is to be borne pro rata by those pecuniary legacies which are in their nature general: Id.

Annuities stand upon the same footing as legacies: Id.

Between annuitants and legatees there is no priority merely because one is an annuitant and the other a legatee, where the estate is deficient, but both must abate proportionally: Id.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

NOVEMBER 1886.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO RETROSPECTIVE AND EX POST FACTO LAWS.

I. Under the Constitution of the United States.-All ex post facto laws are necessarily retrospective in their operation; but not all retroactive legislation is ex post facto in the sense in which the latter term is used in the phraseology of constitutional law. Retrospective legislation is an expression sufficiently comprehensive to include all statutes, whether civil or criminal, which operate upon antecedent transactions, rights or remedies. Ex post facto, on the other hand, is a technical term applying solely to crimes and their punishments. It is thus defined by Mr. Justice STORY: "It has been solemnly settled by this court that the phrase, ex post facto laws, is not applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws which punish a party for acts antecedently done which were not punishable at all, or not punishable to the extent or in the manner prescribed. In short, ex post facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings which impose punishments or forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively:" Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 363; Grim v. School District, 57 Penn. St. 435; Bridgeport v. Hubbell, 5 Conn. 240; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill 299. Now the Constitution of the United States prohibits the several states from passing any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts. But it follows from the distinctions above taken that state enactments retroactive in their operation, even such as must necessarily divest vested rights, do not fall within the provisions of

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