a final injunction could be granted, under the 79th section. Of course, under the rule of omne majus continet in se minus, if the court can grant an injunction ex parte, à fortiori, it can grant it on notice. It is, therefore, clear to my mind, that the common-law courts had this jurisdiction in all common-law actions. That jurisdiction is transferred to the High Court, and that would suffice to decide this question of jurisdiction. But, by the Judicature Act of 1873, sect. 25, sub. sect. 8, a larger jurisdiction to grant injunctions than existed before, is given in every case; and in my opinion, that enactment extends the general jurisdiction given in commonlaw actions, to all actions whether in equity or at common law. The result, therefore, is that there is jurisdiction in a proper case, upon interlocutory application to restrain the further publication of a libel." But neither the statute-law of this country nor any well considered judgments of the courts, had introduced this new branch of equity into our jurisprudence. There may be a case or two looking that way, but none that we deem of sufficient authority to justify us in assuming the jurisdiction. The authority of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the cases of Boston Dialite Co. v. Florence, 114 Mass. 69, and Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Id. 484, is flatly against it. So, also, are the New York cases of the New York Juvenile, &c., Society v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly 188: Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24; Munger v. Dick, 55 How. Prac. 132; also, the Georgia case of Caswell v. Central Rd. Co., 50 Ga. 70; and the Missouri case of Life Association of America v. Booger, 3 Mo. App. 173. We do not regard the contrary decision in Croft v. Richardson, 59 How. Pr. 356, as of sufficient authority to counteract these cases or to disturb what we consider to be the well-established law on the subject. That law clearly is, that the Court of Chancery will not interfere by injunction, to restrain the publication of a libel, as was distinctly laid down by Lord Chancellor CAIRNS, in the case of the Pruden tial Assurance Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142, where he says, in reference to an application for an injunction to restrain a libel calculated to injure property: "Not merely is there no authority for this application, but the books afford repeated instances of the refusal to exercise jurisdiction." And then referring to several authorities, "If this decision has since been overruled, it is only because of the enlarged jurisdiction conferred upon the English Courts, by the statutes referred to. It is a standard authority on the general law, independent of legislation." We do not think that the existence of malice, in publishing a libel or uttering slanderous words, can make any difference in the jurisdiction of the court. Malice is charged in almost every case of libel, and no case of authority can be found, independent of statute, in which the power to issue an injunction to restrain a libel or slanderous words, has ever been maintained, whether malice was charged or not. Charges of libel and slander are peculiarly adapted to and require trial by jury, and exercising as we do, authority, under a system of government and law, which, by a fundamental article, secures the right of trial by jury, in all cases at common law, and which, by express statute, declares that suits in equity shall not be sustained in any case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law, as has always heretofore been considered the case in cases of libel and slander, we do not think that we would be justified in extending the remedy of injunction to such cases. The application for injunction must be denied, and the auxiliary bill is dismissed with costs. ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.' SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA.2 SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.3 COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND. AGENT. See Bills and Notes. ASSIGNMENT. See Deed; Gift. Foreign Attachment-Certificate of Stock.-The defendants, residing in the state of Indiana and owning stock in a bank located there, lodged 1 From J. Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Conn. Rep. 2 From D. C. Wilson, Esq., Clerk. The cases will probably appear in 21 or 22 Florida Rep. 3 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 117 Ill. Rep. 4 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 65 Md. Reports. From Geo. B. Okey, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 44 or 45 Ohio St. Reports. a certificate of the stock, with a blank power to sell and transfer it, with a corporation in this state as collateral security for a loan, its value being considerably in excess of the loan. Held, that their equitable interest in the stock could not be reached by the process of foreign attachment in this state: Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn. Suit on Bond-What is "improperly" Suing out Attachment.--An attachment is "improperly" sued out within the meaning of the statute when the plaintiff has no meritorious cause of action of that class in which the statute authorizes this remedy, or having such a cause of action, the ground alleged in the affidavit for its issue is untrue, or not one of the grounds enumerated which must exist before it can be obtained: Steen v. Ross, 21 or 22 Fla. Where the plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action of the class for which an attachment may lawfully issue, and the cause for its issuance is one of those specified in the statute, and such cause is true, a dissolution of the attachment for some mere irregularity in the papers, is not ground for recovery on the attachment bond for "improperly" suing out the attachment: Id. In an action on an attachment bond for "improperly" suing out the attachment, the declaration must state in what the impropriety of the issue of the attachment, within the meaning of the statute, consisted, and it is not sufficient to allege simply that it was improperly issued: Id. ATTORNEY. See Corporation; Evidence. BANK. Certified Check-Liability thereon-Collection of Check-Negligence. A bank which certifies a check drawn upon it, is primarily liable for its payment, the same as upon a promissory note or bond given by it: Drovers' Nat. Bank v. Anglo American Packing and Provision Co., 117 Ill. A bauk taking a certified check on another bank, either as a payment, on account, or for the purpose, only, of collection, is entitled to show that the check has availed nothing, when the bank so receiving the same has discharged its duty by an effort to collect it: Id. But if the bank receiving such check, either on account or for collection, sends the same directly to the debtor bank for payment, and the debt is lost in consequence thereof, the bank so transmitting the check must bear the loss: Id. BANKRUPTCY. Property of the Bankrupt-Subscription Price of Stock of an Incorporated Company-Discharge of Stockholder in Bankruptcy-Actions against Bankrupt for an Unpaid Instalment-Debt not Provable in Bankruptcy. The law will not compel an assignee in bankruptcy to accept property of the bankrupt which is onerous, and will yield nothing toward the payment of his debts: Glenn v. Howard, 65 Md. Where the subscription price of the stock of an incorporated company, was only to be paid in such instalments, and at such times, as it should be called for by the company, and at the time of the bankruptcy of a stockholder, and for a considerable time thereafter, no call for the payment of his subscription had been made, the discharge in bankruptcy, under the late bankrupt law of the United States, of such stockholder, is no bar to an action against him for an instalment of his subscription, subsequently called for; the unpaid subscription for the stock not constituting such a debt or liability as was provable against his estate in bankruptcy, under the provisions of the bankrupt law: Id. BILLS AND NOTES. See Partnership. Acceptance by Agent-Liability of Agent-Parol Proof-The drawee of a bill of exchange, drawn by the "Kanawha & Ohio Coal Co.," was described in the bill as "John A. Robinson, Agt.," and it was accepted by him as "John A. Robinson, Agent K. & O. C. Co." Held, that the acceptance so made was the personal obligation of John A. Robinson, and that in a suit upon the acceptance by an endorsee against him, parol evidence was not admissible, in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, to show that the defendant so accepted the bill, intending to bind the drawer as his principal, and that this fact was known to the plaintiff at the time it became the owner and holder of it: Robinson v. Kanawha Val. Bank, 44 or 45 Ohio St. Promissory Note-Fraud-Burden of Proof-Bona Fide Holder for Value-Knowledge of Facts Impeaching Validity.—If fraud in the procurement of a note be shown, the onus is cast upon the plaintiff to show that he paid value for the note before maturity, and under circumstances that created no presumption that he knew of the existence of the facts that impeached the validity of the instrument: Crampton v. Perkins, 65 Md. A bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument for valuable consideration, without notice, will be protected against the antecedent equities of the original parties; Id. But actual knowledge of the impeaching facts at the time of taking the paper, notwithstanding value is paid, will defeat recovery on it: Id. Alteration-Effect of-Burden of Proof.-If the acceptor of a bill of exchange allege affirmatively that it has been altered materially and without his authority since he accepted it, the burden is upon him to prove the alleged alteration. The production of the bill will, if the alteration is apparent upon its fact, make a prima facie case for the acceptor and throw the burden upon the holder to show that the alteration was made before it was accepted. The party producing and claiming under the paper must explain every apparent material alteration and remove every suspicion thereof, of which there is evidence on its face, before he can recover. If there is nothing upon the face of the bill to indicate or to put one on notice as to the alteration, the acceptor must prove it by extraneous testimony: Harris v. Bank of Jacksonville, 21 or 22 Fla. The bill of exchange in question was drawn on a printed blank form, all the blanks being filled in the handwriting of C. F. R., in whose handwriting were also the words "payable at Metropolitan National Bank, New York City." The words "Accepted, James A. Harris," in Harris' handwriting, were in red ink, and the other writing on the paper in black ink: Held, that there was apparent, upon the face of the bill of exchange, no alteration, nor any presumptive evidence or reasonable ground for suspicion thereof: ld. CHECK. See Bank. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Insolvent Law-Effect of on Contract with Citizen of another StateSubscription to Corporation.-Where the subscription price of the stock of a company incorporated under the laws of Virginia, was only to be paid in such instalments, and at such times, as it should be called for by the company, and at the time of the insolvency of a stockholder, and of his discharge under the insolvent law of Maryland, no call for the payment of his subscription had been made, such discharge of the stockholder is no bar to an action against him for an instalment of his subscription subsequently called for, even though the unpaid subscription may have constituted, at the time of the discharge of the insolvent, a debt or contract within the meaning of the insolvent law-the insolvent law of this state not operating to discharge a contract made with a citizen or corporation of another state: Glenn v. Clabaugh, 65 Md. Eminent Domain-Taking Land for Cemetery Purposes.-The burial of the dead being a necessity, land may be taken for the purpose under the authority of the state: Evergreen Cemetery Association v. Beecher, 53 Conn. And land taken for such a purpose by a corporation authorized to establish and conduct a cemetery, is taken for public use, if all the public have a right of burial there, even though the expense may operate practically to exclude some: Id. But a corporation does not take land for a public use where the public have not, and cannot acquire, the right to bury in it: Id. Impeaching Validity of Statute-Effect of Journals of Legislature. Where the journal of each house of the general assembly shows that a law received the concurrence of the number of members required by the constitution for its adoption, and that it was publicly signed in the presence of each house by its presiding officer as required by sect. 17, art. 2, of the constitution, its authenticity cannot be impeached by parol evidence that one or more of the members in either house, recorded as concurring in its adoption, had, prior thereto, been seated upon the determination of a contested election, by less than a constitutional quorum, although the concurrence of such member, or members, was necessary to the number of votes required by the constitution for the passage of the law State v. Herron, 44 or 45 Ohio St. CONTRACT. See Damages. Conditional Acceptance of an offer to Sell-Receipt of a Deposit.— To constitute a contract of sale of land by the acceptance of an offer to sell, the acceptance must be unconditional. No contract will result from a letter in reply, that the party will accept the offer "provided the title is perfect." At any time before an unconditional acceptance of an offer and compliance with its terms it may be withdrawn: Corcoran v. White, 117 Ill. The agents for the owner or party having the power to sell a lot, gave to a party desirous of purchasing the same, a receipt, as follows: "Received of J. H. W., attorney for T. R. C, his check for $500, as deposit on account of proposed purchase of sub-lot 2, &c., said sum of $500, VOL. XXXIV.-93 |